The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
XAVIER JOSEPH
NAMPIAPARAMPIL,
Plaintiff, 25-CV-1346 (JPO)
-v- OPINION AND ORDER
NEW YORK CITY CAMPAIGN
FINANCE BOARD, et al.,
Defendants.
J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Xavier Joseph Nampiaparampil, proceeding pro se, brings this case against the
New York City Campaign Finance Board (the “Board” or “CFB”), the New York City
Department of Sanitation Enforcement Division, the City of New York, and Joseph Gallagher,
general counsel of the CFB (collectively, “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting
claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the first amended complaint (the “FAC”). For the reasons that follow, the motion is
granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
The following facts are taken from the FAC and Nampiaparampil’s additional filings, and
are presumed true for the purpose of resolving the motion to dismiss. Alsaifullah v. Furco, No.
12-CV-2907, 2013 WL 3972514, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013). Nampiaparampil is an
engineer and statistician who has experience in marketing analytics and regression analysis.
(ECF No. 4 (“FAC”) ¶ 15.) He has previously worked for a political party to identify the party’s
highest-yield donors based on statistical modeling. (Id.) His daughter, Devi Nampiaparampil
(“Devi”), ran for New York City Public Advocate in the 2021 general election. (Id. ¶ 2.)
Nampiaparampil’s wife, Mary Nampiaparampil (“Mary”), served as the treasurer of Devi’s
campaign. (Id. ¶ 24.) Nampiaparampil himself was not a staff member in his daughter’s
campaign. (ECF No. 49 at 7.)
Nampiaparampil intended to use his skills in data analysis and political fundraising
modeling in support of Devi’s campaign. (FAC ¶ 20.) However, the CFB capped personal
contributions to Devi’s campaign at $2,000 per individual and subjected volunteer services,
appraised based on their fair market value, to that cap. (Id. ¶ 21.) Because Nampiaparampil had
already contributed $2,000 in funds, he could not volunteer for Devi’s campaign without
exceeding the limit. (Id.) Nampiaparampil was also prohibited from using existing datasets
from his past work in political fundraising, as the CFB deemed those datasets a contribution.
(Id.) Nampiaparampil further alleges that the financial restrictions imposed by Defendants
barred Devi’s campaign from spending funds on security measures for Devi or her volunteers.
(Id. ¶ 35.) Nampiaparampil, concerned about his daughter’s safety while she was petitioning,
experienced severe stress and emotional distress. (Id.)
The FAC alleges that Defendants also took certain actions that affected Devi’s campaign.
Nampiaparampil alleges that Defendants misrepresented, suppressed, or excluded information
about Devi’s candidacy in the Voter Guide that it publishes as part of its role in administering
elections. (Id. ¶¶ 42-43.) Further, Defendants placed the debate for the 2021 election on
Spectrum News NY1, a cable channel that is accessible only in a limited number of buildings
and households in New York City, as opposed to the major network television stations that the
CFB had historically used. (Id. ¶¶ 47-48.) Defendants also denied Indian-American and Asian-
American journalists access to the debate while allowing other media outlets to cover the event.
(Id. ¶ 51.)
Devi’s campaign concluded on November 2, 2021. (Id. ¶ 29.) The CFB subsequently
initiated an audit of Devi’s campaign finances. (Id.) Although Nampiaparampil wanted to use
his professional background to assist with the audit, the CFB barred outside assistance because
Devi’s campaign could no longer solicit funds or services from donors without risking violating
campaign finance regulations and incurring penalties. (Id.) And because Mary,
Nampiaparampil’s wife, was an officer of Devi’s campaign, any penalties that she incurred
would have affected Nampiaparampil, who has joint assets with her. (Id.)
The FAC also alleges that Mary was wrongfully issued sanitation summonses by city
authorities as part of a broader pattern of governmental harassment against Nampiaparampil’s
family in response to their political engagement. (Id. ¶ 36.) Mary, who had been diagnosed with
cancer, became demoralized and Nampiaparampil suffered emotional distress as a result. (Id.
¶¶ 36-37.) Mary was never served with a summons but was also prohibited from hiring a lawyer
due to the spending restrictions on campaign-related legal fees. (Id. ¶ 39.)
Devi commenced an action against the CFB on September 29, 2021. (Id. ¶ 40.) Shortly
thereafter, Mary was fined $1,000 for allegedly posting signs that said “Vote for Dr. Devi on
Nov. 2nd.” (Id.) On February 14, 2025, Devi and her campaign were sent an Enforcement
Notice signed by Gallagher, attached to the FAC, which indicated that the staff of the CFB had
recommended that the Board determine that Devi’s campaign must pay $20,217 in penalties for
violations of CFB rules and the Campaign Finance Act. (Id. at 27.) The Enforcement Notice
indicated that the Board would make a final determination on any violations or subsequent
penalties and that the recipient of the Notice—Devi and her campaign—must respond with all
supporting explanations, documentation, and evidence that they intend to provide no later than
March 21, 2025. (Id.) Failure to meet the deadline would constitute a waiver of any rights to
participate in the post-election enforcement process, including the right to a hearing before the
Board or an administrative law judge. (Id.) The Enforcement Notice required financial
disclosures from Devi’s campaign approximately every six months until the campaign files a
final statement showing disposal of all assets and satisfaction of all liabilities. (Id. at 29.)
Failure to make a timely disclosure statement could result in penalties. (Id.)
Nampiaparampil commenced this action on February 14, 2025. (ECF No. 1.) He then
filed the FAC on February 18, 2025. (See FAC.) Defendants filed the present motion to dismiss
on September 26, 2025 (ECF No. 36), alongside a memorandum of law in support (ECF No. 37
(“Mem.”)). Nampiaparampil filed an opposition on November 6, 2025 (ECF No. 42 (“Opp.”)),
alongside exhibits attached to both his opposition and a separate letter (id.; ECF No. 43).
Defendants filed a reply in further support on December 10, 2025. (ECF No. 48.)
Nampiaparampil filed a supplemental notice of the procedural posture of relevant audit and
enforcement proceedings on April 23, 2026. (ECF No. 49.)
II. Legal Standards
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v.
United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). “In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a district court . . . may refer to evidence outside
the pleadings.” Id.
A case is properly dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) if the
complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(cleaned up). Rather, a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Id.
All reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint must be construed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir.
2020). Additionally, courts “must construe pro se pleadings broadly, and interpret them to raise
the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir. 2000)
(quotation marks omitted). However, courts are “not bound to accept conclusory allegations or
legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.” Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149
(2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J.) (quotation marks omitted).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts may “consider the facts alleged in the complaint,
documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the
complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). “Where a
document is not incorporated by reference, the court may never[the]less consider it where the
complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect, thereby rendering the document integral to the
complaint.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “Although courts generally may not look outside
the[se] pleadings when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the mandate to read the
papers of pro se litigants generously makes it appropriate to consider plaintiff’s additional
materials.” Alsaifullah, 2013 WL 3972514, at *4 n.3 (quotation marks omitted). “Accordingly,
where a pro se plaintiff is faced with a motion to dismiss, a court may consider materials outside
the complaint to the extent that they are consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted); see also Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (“A
district court deciding a motion to dismiss may consider factual allegations made by a pro se
party in his papers opposing the motion.”).
III. Discussion
A. Standing
Defendants argue that Nampiaparampil lacks standing to bring his claims. (See Mem. at
13-16.) “The Court must ensure that the constitutional requirement of standing is met prior to
adjudicating a plaintiff’s claims.” Angeles v. Grace Prods., Inc., No. 20-CV-10167, 2021 WL
4340427, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2021) (Nathan, J.) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t., 523 U.S. 83, 93-96 (1998) and Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
“For a plaintiff to have Article III standing, he must establish three things: (1) that he has an
injury in fact; (2) that there is a causal connection between his injury and the conduct complained
of; and (3) that his injury will be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Harty v. W. Point
Realty, Inc., 28 F.4th 435, 442 (2d Cir. 2022). “Plaintiffs also must comply with prudential
limitations on standing, including the rule that a party cannot assert claims ‘on the legal rights or
interests of third parties,’ but rather ‘must assert his own legal rights and interests.’” Rubin v.
New York City Bd. of Educ., No. 20-CV-10208, 2023 WL 1972729, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6,
2023) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 20-CV-10208, 2023 WL 2344731 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2023).1
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1 Defendants also argue that Nampiaparampil is not the real party in interest for any of his
claims. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that an “action must be brought by the
person who, according to the governing substantive law, is entitled to enforce the right.” Oscar
Gruss & Son, Inc. v. Hollander, 337 F.3d 186, 193 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted).
“[A] party may have Article III standing but nevertheless not be the real party in interest when
the party has completely assigned the claim to another.” Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. HSBC
Bank US, Nat’l Ass’n, 331 F.R.D. 63, 70 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Defendants do not make
arguments as to real party in interest that are distinct from their arguments as to standing, and
Nampiaparampil asserts a number of claims, many of which are related. The first set of
his claims (the “Campaign Finance Claims”) challenge Defendants’ campaign finance
restrictions which, as alleged in the FAC, affected Nampiaparampil’s ability to donate to and
volunteer for Devi’s campaign, the campaign’s ability to afford security measures, and Devi’s
and Mary’s ability to retain legal representation in proceedings related to the campaign’s funds
and spending. (FAC ¶¶ 53-68.) The FAC also alleges that Defendants weaponized these
campaign finance restrictions in retaliatory fashion against the campaign. (Id. ¶¶ 80-82.) The
second set of Nampiaparampil’s claims (the “Election Administration Claims”) concern
Defendants’ exclusion or alteration of information about Devi’s campaign in Defendants’ Voter
Guide and Defendants’ conduct as related to the 2021 debate and media access. (Id. ¶¶ 69-79.)
Because standing is analyzed on a claim-by-claim basis, see DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“[O]ur standing cases confirm that a plaintiff must demonstrate
standing for each claim he seeks to press.”), the Court takes each of Nampiaparampil’s claims in
turn.
1. Campaign Finance Claims
a. Cap on Donations and Volunteer Services
Nampiaparampil asserts a First Amendment claim on the basis that Defendants’ spending
cap regulations and their appraisal of volunteer work as in-kind contributions “have
unconstitutionally restricted [his] right to participate in political advocacy.” (FAC ¶¶ 53, 54-60.)
Nampiaparampil has standing to assert this claim because he has alleged that he is unable to
donate to and volunteer his services, including data analysis and auditing assistance, for Devi’s
there is no reason to believe that Nampiaparampil has assigned any of his claims to another.
Accordingly, the Court focuses on Defendants’ challenges to standing.
campaign to the full extent that he would like. That is a cognizable First Amendment injury. See
Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 105 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded on other grounds sub
nom. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (holding that contributors have “standing to assert
their challenge to [state] expenditure and contribution limits”). “It is . . . well established that
contributors to political parties and campaigns engage in protected First Amendment activities.”
Corren v. Sorrell, 151 F. Supp. 3d 479, 494 (D. Vt. 2015) (holding that contributors to individual
candidates have standing to challenge limitations in Vermont’s campaign finance law as it
pertains to publicly-funded candidates); see also New York Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733
F.3d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that campaign contribution limits constitute a “direct
restriction on political expression” of campaign contributor). Nampiaparampil thus has standing
to bring a First Amendment claim against Defendants’ campaign finance restrictions as they
inhibited his ability to contribute money or volunteer services to Devi’s campaign.
Nampiaparampil seems to further assert a First Amendment claim based on future
contemplated participation in New York City elections that would be subject to the same
campaign finance regulations. The FAC alleges that he “wishes to participate in the 2025
election cycle but his speech remains chilled by the existing statutes restricting him from
volunteering in excess of donor contribution limits.” (FAC ¶ 5; see also id. ¶ 29 (noting that
Nampiaparampil “will be capped in the 2025 citywide elections” because “[i]f his chosen
candidate participates in the matching funds program, he will be capped at $2100”).) At the time
that Nampiaparampil filed the FAC, the 2025 elections had not yet happened. To bring a pre-
enforcement First Amendment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) ‘an intention to engage in
a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest’; (2) that the intended conduct
is ‘arguably proscribed by’ the challenged regulation; and (3) that ‘there exists a credible threat
of prosecution thereunder’ that is ‘sufficiently imminent.’” Cerame v. Slack, 123 F.4th 72, 81
(2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159, 162 (2014)). “An
allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is
a ‘“substantial risk” that the harm will occur.’” Vitagliano v. County of Westchester, 71 F.4th
130, 136 (2d Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409,
414 n.5 (2013)).
Although the FAC alleges that Nampiaparampil “wishes to participate in the 2025
election cycle” (FAC ¶ 5), the FAC does not identify any specific campaign to which
Nampiaparampil sought to contribute, nor does it allege that such a campaign would be subject
to the same financial caps as Devi’s campaign. Indeed, it does not even allege that
Nampiaparampil intends to donate money or services in excess of any challenged regulation.
Even though pre-enforcement First Amendment claims are assessed “under somewhat relaxed
standing rules,” Upsolve, Inc. v. James, 155 F.4th 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2025) (cleaned up), cert.
denied sub nom. Upsolve, Inc. v. James, No. 25-948, 2026 WL 858427 (U.S. Mar. 30, 2026), a
plaintiff still must demonstrate an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected
with a constitutional interest that is arguably proscribed by the challenged regulation, Susan B.
Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 159, 162. Here, Nampiaparampil has not alleged that he intends to
donate to a candidate in excess of Defendants’ challenged regulations.2 Accordingly, he has
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2 In his Opposition, Nampiaparampil indicates that he “was interested in potentially
volunteering” on the campaigns for Theo Bruce Chino Tavarez and Paperboy Love Prince, but
that “there was no point” because he “learned that all were under ongoing regulation of any legal
spending that might be used towards becoming tag-along plaintiffs.” (Opp. at 18.) This
statement, which seems to concern whether the two campaigns would also be restricted from
engaging legal counsel if they exceeded their budgets under Defendants’ public funding
program, does not clarify if Nampiaparampil sought to donate to their campaigns in excess of
Defendants’ campaign finance regulations.
failed to plead a future injury that is “certainly impending.” Vitagliano, 71 F.4th at 136
(quotation marks omitted).
b. Retaliation
Nampiaparampil also asserts a First Amendment retaliation claim on the basis that
Defendants’ audits, threats of enforcement, and threat of sanitation fines were retaliation for his
family’s political participation and legal efforts. (FAC ¶¶ 9, 68, 80, 82.) On this claim,
Nampiaparampil lacks standing. The retaliation alleged in the FAC was directed at the campaign
and officers of that campaign, like Devi and Mary. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 40 (noting that Mary “was on
the hook for over $1,000 in sanitation fines” after Devi filed her suit, and that “the campaign had
been punitively charged” the day that Nampiaparampil commenced this action).) Indeed, despite
Nampiaparampil’s argument in his opposition that the Enforcement Notice compelled him to turn
over evidence (Opp. at 14), the Enforcement Notice that is attached to the FAC is addressed only
to Devi and to Devi’s campaign and does not address Nampiaparampil. (Id. at 27, 29 (requesting
only “the Campaign[]” to respond to the Notice and requiring only the campaign to “continue
filing semi-annual disclosure statements”).) Nampiaparampil was not a subject of Defendants’
investigations into Devi’s campaign, was not required to satisfy any discovery or disclosure
obligations, and was not liable for any resulting penalties.
Nampiaparampil argues that he has standing because his household would suffer as a
result of the penalties—in particular, because he shares joint assets with Mary, and therefore
would be financially injured by any penalty. (Opp. at 5-7; FAC ¶¶ 4, 29, 55.) However, “shared
home ownership or bank accounts or reciprocal wills does not automatically give wives or
husbands standing to sue for economic injuries allegedly inflicted on their marital partners.”
Meimaris v. Royce, No. 18-CV-4363, 2019 WL 4673572, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2019)
(quotation marks and parentheses omitted), aff’d, No. 19-3339-CV, 2021 WL 5170725 (2d Cir.
Nov. 8, 2021). Nampiaparampil also alleges that he suffered emotional distress from watching
his family campaign without security and from watching Defendants subject his family to
retaliatory proceedings. (FAC ¶¶ 35, 37-38). However, “only the person toward whom the state
action was directed, and not those incidentally affected[,] may maintain a § 1983 claim.”
Morgan v. City of New York, 166 F. Supp. 2d 817, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quotation marks
omitted). For this reason, “[a] plaintiff lacks standing to bring a § 1983 claim on their own
behalf based upon a deprivation of their loved ones’ rights or for emotional stress caused by such
a deprivation.” Baez v. Pinker, No. 13-CV-9165, 2015 WL 3457277, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 1,
2015) (citing Collins v. W. Hartford Police Dep’t, 324 Fed. App’x 137, 138 (2d Cir. 2009)
(summary order)), aff’d, 673 F. App’x 50 (2d Cir. 2016).
Accordingly, any injury resulting from Defendants’ allegedly retaliatory conduct was to
Devi, Mary, and Devi’s campaign. To the extent that Nampiaparampil seeks to sue on behalf of
those injured by the retaliatory conduct, he cannot do so. “[A] plaintiff generally may not
establish standing on the basis of injuries to third parties, unless the plaintiff additionally
demonstrates ‘a close relation to the injured third party and a hindrance to that party’s ability to
protect its own interests.’” In re Big Apple Volkswagen, LLC, 571 B.R. 43, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(quoting Mid-Hudson Catskill Rural Migrant Ministry, Inc. v. Fine Host Corp., 418 F.3d 168,
174 (2d Cir. 2005)). Although Nampiaparampil has alleged a familial relationship with both
Devi and Mary, he has not alleged that either is unable to protect her own interests. Indeed, both
Devi and Mary have brought suits of their own. (FAC ¶¶ 7, 40.)
In short, Nampiaparampil has standing to assert a First Amendment claim challenging
Defendants’ campaign finance regulations as they affected his ability to contribute to Devi’s
campaign, but he lacks standing to assert his other First Amendment challenges to Defendants’
campaign finance regulations.
c. Fourteenth Amendment Campaign Finance Claims
Nampiaparampil also brings Fourteenth Amendment challenges to Defendants’ campaign
finance restrictions as they pertain to Mary and Devi’s ability to engage legal representation in
audit and sanitation violation proceedings as well as the campaign’s ability to spend on security
and public safety. (FAC ¶¶ 61-68.) Again, because Nampiaparampil was not an officer of the
campaign, he was not party to the legal proceedings in which Mary and Devi were restricted
from engaging counsel. Accordingly, Nampiaparampil relies on allegations that he suffered
emotional distress as a result of the actions taken against Devi and Mary. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 35
(“[Nampiaparampil] experienced severe stress and emotional distress knowing that he could not
assist in providing security for his daughter while she campaigned in high-risk areas.”); id. ¶ 37
(“The emotional distress of trying to keep his wife motivated and hopeful while seeing her
become consumed by despair over legal and financial pressures caused [Nampiaparampil] severe
suffering.”).) He lacks standing to bring these claims, for substantially the same reasons that he
lacks standing to bring his retaliation claim. See Baez, 2015 WL 3457277, at *4; cf. Garten v.
Hochman, No. 08-CV-9425, 2010 WL 2465479, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2010) (holding that
“severe strain” on a relationship between the plaintiff and his family members “is a far cry from
ending the relationship” and insufficient injury to support a Fourteenth Amendment intimate
association claim).
Nampiaparampil therefore lacks standing to bring his Fourteenth Amendment challenges
to Defendants’ campaign finance regulations.
2. Election Administration Claims
Nampiaparampil also lacks standing to bring his First and Fourteenth Amendment claims
challenging the Defendants’ conduct as it pertained to the Voter Guide or the debate.
Nampiaparampil alleges that Defendants excluded or altered key information about Devi’s
campaign while affording other candidates more favorable representation, and that Defendants
failed to provide a sufficient appeal process for candidates who sought to clarify or correct
information in the Voter Guide. (FAC ¶¶ 70-72.) Nampiaparampil largely alleges injury only to
Devi and her campaign. (See id. ¶ 73 (noting that these actions “diminished [Devi’s] ability to
compete on equal footing with other candidates”).) And although Nampiaparampil alleges that
he experienced emotional distress as a result of the Voter Guide incident (id. ¶ 44), such an
allegation does not establish standing to bring a § 1983 claim, for the reasons discussed above.
Nampiaparampil similarly lacks standing to challenge Defendants’ minimization of
debate coverage and discrimination against Indian-American and Asian-American journalists.
(Id. ¶¶ 50-51.) Although Nampiaparampil alleges that he and other members of the public were
deprived “of their right to receive political speech and fully participate in the electoral process”
(id. ¶ 76), he does not plead specific allegations as to how he himself was deprived. He has not
alleged, for example, that he was unable to watch the debate because Defendants broadcasted the
debate on Spectrum News NY1, that he was a journalist harmed by Defendants’ restrictions on
access to the debate, or that he suffered any other specific and cognizable injuries. “Nondescript
and conclusory allegations of injury are not the type of general factual allegations from which
the Court may presume the specific facts necessary to ensure that the plaintiff has standing, and
are insufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden of alleging an injury in fact that is concrete and
particularized.” Fullwood v. Wolfgang’s Steakhouse, Inc., No. 13-CV-7174, 2017 WL 377931,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2017) (cleaned up). Accordingly, Nampiaparampil has not alleged
standing to bring his Election Administration claims.
B. Time Bar
Nampiaparampil has alleged standing to bring only his First Amendment challenge to
Defendants’ campaign finance restrictions to the extent they limited his ability to donate money
and services to Devi’s campaign. However, Devi’s campaign ended in November of 2021 and
Nampiaparampil did not bring this action until February 14, 2025. (FAC ¶ 2; see ECF No. 1.)
“In section 1983 actions, the applicable limitations period is found in the ‘general or residual
[state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.’” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296
F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New
York, that period is three years. See id. (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5)). That three-year
limitation period begins to run “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury
which is the basis of his action.” Id. at 80 (quotation marks omitted).
Because Nampiaparampil commenced this action over three years after the conclusion of
Devi’s campaign, Defendants argue that Nampiaparampil’s First Amendment challenge to their
campaign finance regulations is time-barred. (Mem. at 16-18.) In response, Nampiaparampil
argues that “the retaliation and chilling effects continued into 2024 and 2025.” (Opp. at 16.) But
Nampiaparampil seems to rely on audit notices issued to Devi’s campaign and the campaigns of
other non-party candidates. (Id. at 16-18.) As explained above, Nampiaparampil was not
himself subject to any auditing obligations, and he cannot bring a claim on behalf of a campaign
that was subject to auditing obligations.
However, the FAC also alleges that Nampiaparampil “wanted to help with the audit” of
Devi’s campaign, “but was again prohibited from doing so,” “[f]ollowing the campaign’s
conclusion on November 2, 2021.” (FAC ¶ 29.) This allegation, with all inferences construed in
favor of Nampiaparampil, suggests that he had an interest in donating his services to Devi’s
campaign that continued even after the conclusion of the 2021 election, and that he suffered a
First Amendment injury when he was denied the ability to do so. Thus, on this record, the Court
cannot conclude that Defendants have met their burden of showing that Nampiaparampil’s First
Amendment claim is time-barred.
C. Merits
Although Defendants argue that Nampiaparampil fails to assert a cognizable Monell
claim against the City, their arguments seem to concern Nampiaparampil’s retaliation claim.
(Mem. at 19.) To the extent Defendants seek to make this argument as to Nampiaparampil’s
First Amendment challenge against the CFB’s campaign finance regulations, it fails at the
motion to dismiss stage. Nampiaparampil alleges that the restrictions imposed on him were done
so pursuant to City rules, which would constitute a custom or policy for Monell purposes. (FAC
¶¶ 22-23 (citing 52 R.C.N.Y. § 5-06).) See Chin v. New York City Hous. Auth., 575 F. Supp. 2d
554, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Official policy traditionally takes the form of an ‘ordinance,
regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [the municipality’s] officers.’”
(quoting Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978))).
In any event, as to Nampiaparampil’s only surviving claim, Defendants seem to
principally argue that it fails on the merits because the CFB’s public campaign financing
program is constitutional. (Mem. at 19-20.) In support, Defendants cite Corren v. Condos, 898
F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2018), a Second Circuit case that upheld Vermont’s campaign finance law
offering public funding to qualifying candidates and imposing an additional set of restrictions on
candidates who accept that offer. See Corren, 898 F.3d at 214, 223-24. In particular, Corren
concluded that “if a candidate declines private contributions in favor of public funds, the
candidate’s supporters cannot complain that the state has infringed their rights to make
contributions.” Id. at 224. When candidates are free to engage in unlimited private funding and
spending instead of opting into more restrictive public funding, “the restriction on contributions
that applies when candidates voluntarily elect public funding does not abridge supporters’
rights.” Id.
Nampiaparampil alleges that he was limited to a $2,000 contribution to Devi’s campaign,
including volunteer services. (See FAC ¶¶ 21, 27, 29.) New York City regulations impose a
$2,000 limit on campaigns that seek public financing.3 See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-703(1)(f)
2F
(requiring that, to be eligible for optional public financing, a candidate or her committee can
accept no more than $2,000 in contributions from any one individual). Defendants argue,
accordingly, that Nampiaparampil was subject to the $2,000 limit on donations and volunteer
services only because Devi’s campaign opted for public financing.4 (Mem. at 20-21.)
3F
If, in fact, Nampiaparampil was subject to the $2,000 limit because Devi’s campaign
opted for public matching, then Nampiaparampil is unlikely to prevail on his First Amendment
claim under Corren. See Corren, 898 F.3d at 224. In support of their argument that the $2,000
limit applied because Devi’s campaign opted into the public matching program, Defendants cite
Devi’s complaint in a separate action. (See Mem. at 7.) But that complaint is not before this
3 The Court can consider this regulation, even though it is not directly cited in the FAC, as it is
judicially noticeable. See Jeter v. Mount Sinai Health Sys., No. 23-CV-7889, 2026 WL 818735,
at *1 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2026).
4 The Court notes that judicially noticeable regulations governing the CFB’s matching program
do not appear to deem volunteer services to be “contributions.” See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-
702(8) (defining “contribution” to “not include . . . the value of services provided without
compensation by individuals who volunteer a portion or all of their time on behalf of a candidate
or political committee”); 52 R.C.N.Y. § 1-02 (defining “in-kind contribution” to “not include
personal services provided without compensation by individuals volunteering a portion or all of
their time on behalf of a candidate”). Nonetheless, the FAC alleges that CFB officials told
Devi’s campaign, who relayed to Nampiaparampil, that individuals could not contribute money
or services in excess of the $2,000 limit. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 21-25.) The Court accepts the
allegations in the FAC as true for purposes of the pending motion to dismiss.
Court and cannot be considered at this juncture. Cf DiFolco, 622 F.3d at 111. The FAC is
unclear as to whether Devi’s campaign had indeed opted for public funding. In fact,
Nampiaparampil’s opposition alleges that Devi’s campaign “never received any public funds.”
(Opp. at 11.) It is therefore possible that Nampiaparampil was subject to this limitation even
though Devi’s campaign did not opt into public matching, in which case Defendants’ sole
argument on the merits is inapplicable. Because the FAC and opposition are unclear as to the
precise reason Defendants imposed the $2,000 contribution limit on Devi’s campaign, the Court
declines to dismiss Nampiaparampil’s First Amendment claim on the basis that any limitation
was pursuant to the campaign’s decision to opt into public funding.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. The motion is DENIED as to Nampiaparampil’s First Amendment claim
challenging Defendants’ campaign finance regulations as they affected his ability to donate time
and money to Devi’s campaign. The motion is GRANTED in all other respects.
Defendants are directed to file an answer to the remaining claim within fourteen days
after the date of this Opinion and Order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A).
The parties are directed to appear for a telephonic conference on July 8, 2026 at 12:00
p.m. At the scheduled time, Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants should call (855) 244-8681 and
enter ID number 2312-828-7066 ##.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at Docket Number 36.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 1, 2026
New York, New York
| ] J. PAUL OETKEN
United States District Judge
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