Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ROBERT WILLIE JOHNSON,

Plaintiff, 1:26-CV-2723 (LTS)

-against-

1:26-CV-2832 (LTS)

LEWISBURG UNITED STATES

PENITENTIARY, et al., ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Defendants.

ROBERT WILLIE JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

-against-

GEOFFREY J.L. BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Robert Willie Johnson, a federal prisoner who is currently held in the Devins

Federal Medical Center located in Ayers, Massachusetts (“FMC Devins”), and who appears pro

se, filed both of these actions while he was held in the federal prison formerly known as the

United States Penitentiary located in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP Lewisburg”).1 In both

complaints commencing these actions, Plaintiff seeks damages, his immediate release from

1 That federal prison is currently known as the Federal Correctional Institution located in

Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“FCI Lewisburg”). In one of his complaints commencing these civil

actions, Plaintiff refers to a federal criminal action of his that is pending in the United States

District Court for the Northern District of New York. (ECF 1:26-CV-2832, 1, at 3.) The Court

notes that, in an amended Northern District of New York order, dated March 23, 2026, that court

held that Plaintiff was currently incompetent to stand trial in his pending federal criminal matter.

United States v. Johnson, 5:25-MJ-0236 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2026). That court also directed that

Plaintiff be committed to a mental-health facility for further evaluation and treatment “to

determine whether [he] will attain the capacity to permit [his pending federal criminal]

proceedings to go forward.” Id. That court further ordered that Plaintiff’s period of commitment

not exceed four months. Id.

confinement, the dismissal of the federal criminal charges brought against him, and other

injunctive relief. (ECF 1:26-CV-2723, 1, at 6; ECF 1;26-CV-2832, 1, at 4.) Plaintiff seeks to

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) with respect to both of these actions. (ECF 1:26-CV-2723, 2;

ECF 1:26-CV-2832, 2.)

On July 10, 2020, in a now-closed action, Plaintiff was barred from filing future civil

actions in this court IFP without first obtaining from the court leave to file. See Johnson v.

O’Hagan Wolfe, ECF 1:19-CV-7337, 8 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 21-299

(2d Cir. July 15, 2021).

The Court understands Plaintiff’s claims in which he seeks his immediate release from

custody and the dismissal of the federal criminal charges against him as claims for habeas corpus

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because the July 10, 2020 filing injunction does not apply to any

of Plaintiff’s claims for habeas corpus relief, the Court grants Plaintiff IFP status as to those

claims raised in both of these actions. The injunction does apply, however, to Plaintiff’s

remaining civil claims in both of these actions. For the reasons discussed below, the Court

dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for Section 2241 habeas corpus relief in both of these actions for

lack of jurisdiction and without prejudice, denies Plaintiff IFP status with respect to his

remaining civil claims in both of these actions, and also dismisses those claims without

prejudice.

DISCUSSION

A. Habeas corpus relief

The Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Plaintiff’s claims for habeas corpus relief under

28 U.S.C. § 2241. Generally, in order to entertain a claim for habeas corpus relief under Section

2241, a court must have jurisdiction over the person who has custody of the person seeking such

relief, see Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973), who is

usually the warden of the facility in which the person seeking such relief is held or some other

official who has direct control over the custody of the person seeking such relief, see Rumsfeld v.

Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004) (“[T]he District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the

writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s

release.”) Thus, jurisdiction to consider a Section 2241 habeas corpus challenge to a federal

prisoner’s physical confinement generally lies in the United States District Court for the federal

judicial district where that person is confined at the time of filing. See id. at 442; Ozturk v. Hyde,

136 F.4th 382, 391 (2d Cir. 2025).

Plaintiff commenced both of these civil actions by filing his complaints while he was

held in FCI Lewisburg, formerly known as USP Lewisburg, which is located in the Middle

District of Pennsylvania, not in this judicial district.2 This court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to

consider any of Plaintiff’s claims in which he challenges his confinement. The Court also notes

that Plaintiff is currently held in FMC Devins, which is located in the District of Massachusetts.

The Court does not believe that it would be in the interest of justice to sever and transfer these

claims to another federal district court. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the claims for Section

2241 habeas corpus relief in both of these actions for lack of jurisdiction, but without prejudice

to the filing of the claims in an appropriate court in the judicial district where he is confined.3

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406(a), 1631.

2 This judicial district, the Southern District of New York, is comprised of the following

New York State counties: (1) New York (New York City Borough of Manhattan); (2) Bronx

(New York City Borough of the Bronx); (3) Westchester; (4) Dutchess; (5) Rockland;

(6) Orange; (7) Putnam; and (8) Sullivan. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(b).

3 Under the gatekeeping provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a habeas corpus petitioner must obtain authorization from the appropriate

Court of Appeals before filing a second or successive habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(3)(A). Because conversion of a submission into a Section 2241 habeas corpus petition

may restrict a litigant’s future attempts to seek habeas corpus relief, federal district courts must

B. Remaining civil claims

Plaintiff seeks IFP status to proceed with his remaining civil claims in both of these

actions, but he has not sought leave from the court to file such claims, as required by the court’s

July 10, 2020 order in Johnson, ECF 1:19-CV-7337, 8. The Court therefore denies Plaintiff IFP

status as to the remaining civil claims in both of these actions and dismisses them without

prejudice due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the court’s July 10, 2020 order in Johnson,

ECF 1:19-CV-7337, 8.

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses these actions. The Court treats Plaintiff’s claims in which he seeks

his immediate release from custody and the dismissal of the federal criminal charges against him

as claims for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because the filing injunction issued

against Plaintiff pursuant to the court’s July 10, 2020 order in Johnson, ECF 1:19-CV-7337, 8,

does not apply to any of his claims for habeas corpus relief, the Court grants Plaintiff IFP status

as to those claims raised in both of these actions. The injunction does apply, however, to

Plaintiff’s remaining civil claims in both of these actions.

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for Section 2241 habeas corpus relief in both of

these actions for lack of jurisdiction and without prejudice. With respect to the remaining civil

claims in both of these actions, the Court denies Plaintiff IFP status and dismisses such claims

normally give a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to withdraw the submission before a

court recharacterizes it as a Section 2241 petition. See Simon v. United States, 359 F.3d 139, 144

(2d Cir. 2004). Here, however, giving Plaintiff notice and granting him an opportunity to

withdraw is unnecessary because the Court’s dismissal of his claims for habeas corpus relief

without prejudice does not trigger the AEDPA’s restrictions on second or successive petitions.

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000).

without prejudice due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the court’s July 10, 2020 order in

Johnson, ECF 1:19-CV-7337, 8.

Because Plaintiff has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right, certificates of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253.

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order

would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.

See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to issue a judgment dismissing both of these actions

for the reasons set forth in this order and also denying certificates of appealability.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 26, 2026

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge