Opinion

Mezzella

Court: District Court, S.D. New York
Filed: May 26, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.7%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TERESA MURPHY,

Plaintiff,

7:25-CV-1950 (KMK)

ORDER OF SERVICE

OFFICER MEZZELLA, individually and in

official capacity, et al.,

Defendants.

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Teresa Murphy, who is currently incarcerated in the Albion Correctional Facility,

brings this pro se Action asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, as well as

under state law.1 By order dated September 18, 2025, Judge Stanton dismissed Plaintiff’s claims,

but granted Plaintiff leave to amend some of them in an amended complaint, to be filed within 60

days of the date of that order. (Dkt. No. 17.) On December 10, 2025, the Court received from

Plaintiff, while she was incarcerated, a motion styled as brought under Rule 60(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 60(b)(6) motion”), requesting a temporary restraining

order. (Dkt. No. 20.) That motion is pending.

On March 5, 2026, the court received Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (Dkt. No.

23), which is the operative pleading for this Action, and in which she seeks damages, declaratory

1 Plaintiff commenced this Action while she was at liberty; she filed a consent to

electronic service of court documents with her original complaint while she was at liberty. (Dkt.

No. 3.) She has not withdrawn that consent since her incarceration.

relief, and injunctive relief.2 Plaintiff names the following as defendants in that pleading3: (1)

Warwick Police Officer Mezzella (or “Mazzella”), in his individual and official capacity; (2)

“Judge Brown,” who appears to be Judge Craig Stephen Brown of the County Court, Orange

County, who is also an Acting Justice of the New York Supreme Court, Orange County;4 (3) the

Orange County Probation Department; (4) Orange County Child Protective Services (“OCCPS”);

(5) the County of Rockland; (6) the Town of Warwick Police Department (“TOWPD”); (7)

unidentified “John Does 1-10”; (8) Probation Officer Skyler Kemp, Plaintiff’s probation officer;5

(9) the Town of Warwick (“TOW”); (10) the County of Orange; (11) Warwick Police Sergeant

Sircable; (12) Warwick Police Officer Laya; (13) Warwick Police Officer Kennedy; (14) “Orange

County Family Court”; (15) “Rockland County Family Court”; (16) Garnett Medical Center (the

“hospital”); (17) Paul Weber, Plaintiff’s court-appointed criminal defense attorney who also

appeared for her at Family Court proceedings; (18) the Orange County District Attorney’s Office;

2 Under Rule 5.2(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, court submissions may only

refer to the name of a minor child by using the initials of the child’s name, and to a person’s birth

date by using the person’s birth year. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(2), (3). A party or non-party filer

who reveals their own personal information, such as their complete birth date, in their court

submissions, waives the protection of this rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a), (h). While Plaintiff

has revealed her own complete birth date in her second amended complaint (Dkt. No. 23) and in

her Rule 60(b)(6) motion (Dkt. No. 20), in those submissions, she has also revealed the full

names and complete birth dates of her minor children, who have not filed anything in this Action.

The Court has therefore directed that the Clerk of Court to restrict public electronic access to

those submissions pending a further order of the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(2), (3).

3 The second amended complaint is a combination of three complaints with three

captions; the second and third captions include both duplicative and non-duplicative additional

defendants. In the third caption, Plaintiff seems to indicate that she is asserting claims on her

own behalf and on behalf of her three minor children. (Dkt. No. 23, at 11.) Here, the Court has

listed all of the defendants listed in all three captions.

4 Plaintiff has crossed out Judge Brown in the first and second captions (Dkt. No. 23, at 1,

4), but refers to him as a defendant within the text of her second amended complaint, (see id. at

2, 5).

5 Plaintiff has crossed out Kemp in the second caption (Dkt. No. 23, at 4), but refers to

her as a defendant with the text of her second amended complaint, (see id. at 5).

(19) Orange County District Attorney David M. Hoovler; (20) Orange County Assistant District

Attorney Dole; (21) James Leo, Plaintiff’s father; (22) Catherine Leo, Plaintiff’s mother;

(23) Francis (also known as Frankie or Frank) Navarra, the father of at least one of Plaintiff’s

children; (24) Natalie Navarra, the paternal grandmother of at least one of Plaintiff’s children and

the mother of Francis Navarra; (25) the Orange County Department of Social Services;

(26) OCCPS Supervisor Christina Caceres; (27) OCCPS Supervisor Jeanine Locicero;

(28) OCCPS Supervisor Morgan Cruz; (29) OCCPS Supervisor Catherine Drake; (30) OCCPS

employee Joan Dorer (also known as Joan Decker); (31) OCCPS employee Karen Fischer;

(32) OCCPS employee Michelle Francise; (33) OCCPS employee Mandy Lane; (34) OCCPS

employee L-M Ari; (35) OCCPS employee Sherisa Saladeen; (36) OCCPS employee Taylor

Campbell; (37) OCCPS employee Jessica Pepin; (38) OCCPS employee Elizabeth Lofstedt;

(39) an unidentified “John Doe” Warwick Police Officer who arrested Plaintiff, with other

officers, or March 22, 2025; (40) the Orange County Sherriff’s Office; (41) the Rockland County

Sheriff’s Office; (42) the Orange County Jail (“OCJ”); (43) the Rockland County Jail (“RCJ”);

and (44) OCJ Correctional Lieutenant Nicholas Gessnar, Plaintiff’s brother-in-law.

By order dated April 30, 2025, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without

prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons discussed below, the

Court construes Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion as a motion for reconsideration of Judge

Stanton’s September 18, 2025 order, brought under Local Civil Rule 6.3, and denies that motion.

In addition, for the reasons set forth below, the Court: (1) dismisses, for the reasons set forth in

Judge Stanton’s September 18, 2025 order, all of those type of claims raised again in the second

amended complaint that Judge Stanton, in his September 18, 2025 order, previously dismissed,

with the exception of any claims raised against municipalities and individual defendants, not

including claims against Judge Brown and Probation Officer Kemp; (2) dismisses Plaintiff’s

official-capacity claims against municipal officers; (3) dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claims against

the New York Family Courts for Orange and Rockland Counties and the Orange County District

Attorney’s Office; (4) dismisses Plaintiff’s federal individual-capacity claims for damages

against District Attorney Hoovler and Assistant District Attorney Dole; and (5) dismisses

Plaintiff’s federal claims against the Hospital, the RCJ, and the OCJ. The Court directs counsel

for the Hospital’s owner and operator and for the TOW to provide the identities, service

addresses, and, if appropriate, badge numbers of the abovementioned unidentified “John Doe”

and “Jane Doe” defendants. The Court directs service on the remaining identified defendants, as

specified below.

I. Standard of Review

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation

omitted), has its limits—to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 8”), which requires a complaint to make a short and

plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially

plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that

the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id.

But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,”

which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After

separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine

whether those facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Id.

II. Analysis

A. Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion

Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion (Dkt. No. 20) seems to challenge, at least in part, Judge

Stanton’s September 18, 2025 order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims but granting Plaintiff leave to

replead (Dkt. No. 17).6 Because Judge Stanton’s September 18, 2025 order was not a final order,

see Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 460 F.3d 215, 224 (2d Cir. 2006) (“A dismissal with leave to

amend is a non-final order and not appealable”), and because Rule 60(b) “applies only to final

orders and judgments,” Harris v. Millington, 613 F. App’x 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order)

6 In this pending motion, Plaintiff asks the court to: (1) “[e]njoin Defendants from further

retaliation or interference with her legal mail and access to the courts”; (2) “direct . . . [prison

officials] to ensure she has reasonable law-library access and the ability to send and receive legal

mal to” the court; (3) “restore . . . [this Action] to the active docket”; and (4) “treat [her amended

complaint (Dkt. No. 10)] as the operative pleading[] or grant leave for [her] to file a . . . [second]

amended complaint once she has meaningful access to the court.” (Dkt. No. 20, at 3.) Plaintiff

has attached to this motion copies of previous pleadings and supplements raising claims and

seeking relief previously adjudicated in Judge Stanton’s September 18, 2025 order. (Id. at 9–13.)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and Fennel v. TLB Kent Co., 865 F.2d 498, 501 (2d Cir. 1989)), the

Court construes Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion as a motion for reconsideration of Judge

Stanton’s September 18, 2025 order brought under Local Civil Rule 6.3.

Under Local Civil Rule 6.3, a motion for reconsideration must be brought within 14 days

of the entry of the court’s order being challenged. Judge Stanton’s September 18, 2025 order

was entered the next day, September 19, 2025. The time to file a timely motion for

reconsideration expired 14 days later, on October 3, 2025. Plaintiff did not file her motion, at the

earliest, until December 9, 2025, which is the date listed in the motion’s declaration. (Dkt. No.

20, at 4.) Accordingly, the Court denies the motion as untimely.

Even if the motion were timely, the Court would still deny it. A party who seeks

reconsideration must show that the court overlooked “controlling law or factual matters” that had

been previously put before it. R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. Mimi So, 640 F. Supp. 2d 506, 508–09

(S.D.N.Y. 2009). “Such motions must be narrowly construed and strictly applied in order to

discourage litigants from making repetitive arguments on issues that have been thoroughly

considered by the court.” Range Road Music, Inc. v. Music Sales Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 390,

391–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc., 642 F.

Supp. 2d 206, 209–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A] motion for reconsideration [under Local Civil Rule

6.3] is not an invitation to parties to ‘treat the court’s initial decision as the opening of a dialogue

in which [the moving] party may then use such a motion to advance new theories or adduce new

evidence in response to the court’s ruling.’” (citations omitted)).

Plaintiff asserts nothing to suggest that Judge Stanton overlooked controlling law or

factual matters when he dismissed Plaintiff’s claims in his September 18, 2025 order.

Accordingly, the Court alternatively denies Plaintiff’s motion on this basis.

B. Types of claims raised again in the second amended complaint that Judge Stanton previously

dismissed in his September 18, 2025 order without leave to replead

The Court must dismiss those types of claims that, in her second amended complaint,

Plaintiff raises again which Judge Stanton, in his September 18, 2025 order, previously

adjudicated and dismissed without leave to replead. In that previous order, Judge Stanton:

(1) dismissed Plaintiff’s claims seeking the criminal prosecution of others; (2) dismissed

Plaintiff’s claims brought pro se on behalf of others; (3) dismissed, under the Younger abstention

doctrine, Plaintiff’s claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief that would cause the court to

intervene and disrupt her pending state-court criminal action(s); (4) dismissed, under the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, Plaintiff’s federal claims seeking injunctive and/or declaratory relief that

would impugn her state-court conviction7; (5) dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims against Judge

Brown and Probation Officer Kemp under the doctrine of judicial immunity; (6) dismissed,

under the domestic relations abstention doctrine, Plaintiff’s federal claims seeking a decision

with regard to custody of her children; (7) dismissed Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims

arising from OCCPS’s taking custody of her children, but with leave to replead; (8) dismissed

Plaintiff’s substantive due process claims arising from OCCPS’s taking custody of her children,

but with leave to replead; (9) dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against municipal agencies, construed

them as brought against the municipalities themselves, and dismissed Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claims against all of the Municipal defendants with leave to replead such claims solely against

the municipalities themselves; (10) dismissed Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the

individual defendants, but with leave to replead their direct and personal involvement (not

7 Judge Stanton also dismissed any construed claims for habeas corpus relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 for lack of jurisdiction and/or for failure to exhaust state-court remedies. (Dkt.

No. 17, at 11 n.5.)

including any claims against Judge Brown and Kemp for which they were adjudicated immune

from suit); and (11) dismissed Plaintiff’s Section 1983 and 1985 conspiracy claims, but with

leave to replead. (Dkt. No. 17.)

In her second amended complaint, Plaintiff again asserts the types of claims that Judge

Stanton previously adjudicated and dismissed without leave to replead in his September 18, 2025

order, specifically: (1) claims seeking the criminal prosecution of others; (2) claims brought pro

se on behalf of others8; (3) claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief the would cause the

court to intervene and disrupt Plaintiff’s pending state-court criminal action; (4) federal claims

seeking injunctive and/or declaratory relief that would impugn Plaintiff’s state-court conviction,

including any claims for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; (5) federal claims

against Judge Brown and Probation Officer Kemp; (6) federal claims seeking a decision with

regard to custody of Plaintiff’s children; and (7) claims against municipal agencies. (See id.)

The Court dismisses these types of claims raised again in Plaintiff’s second amended complaint

for the same reasons Judge Stanton dismissed such types of claims in his September 18, 2025

order. (See id.)

C. Official-capacity federal claims brought against individual municipal officers

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claims brought against any individual municipal

officers in their official capacities, including Defendant Mezzella. This is because such claims

are duplicative of Plaintiff’s federal claims against the Municipal defendants themselves. See

Coon v. Town of Springfield, 404 F.3d 683, 687 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A Section] 1983 suit against a

8 The Court notes that, in her second amended complaint, Plaintiff seems to assert claims

pro se on behalf of a person named Charles Bernard Starke and her own three children. While

the September 18, 2025 order did not contemplate any claims Plaintiff raises pro se on behalf of

her own children, the same reasoning applies. Plaintiff, who does not assert that she is an

attorney, cannot assert claims on behalf of anyone else pro se. (See Dkt. No. 17, at 7–8.)

municipal officer in his official capacity is treated as an action against the municipality itself.”);

see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (“There is no longer a need to bring

official-capacity actions against local government officials . . . [because] local government units

can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.”). The Court therefore

dismisses these claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

D. Plaintiff’s claims against the New York Family Courts and the Orange County District

Attorney

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the New York Family Courts for

Orange and Rockland Counties and against the Orange County District Attorney’s Office under

the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not

be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless

Congress has abrogate[d] the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. . . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer,

568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he

immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state

agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). This immunity shields States, their agencies, and instrumentalities

from claims for money damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. See

Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72–74 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465

U.S. 89, 101–02 (1984).

The doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity also precludes a plaintiff from seeking,

in federal court, relief under state law against a State, its agencies, and its instrumentalities. See

Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 540–42 (2002); Halderman, 465 U.S. at 120–

21; In re Charter Oak Assocs., 361 F.3d 760, 765 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Although the text of the

[Eleventh] Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the

federal courts, it has been construed more broadly to render states and their agencies immune

from suits brought by private parties in federal court.” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)).

“The New York State Unified Court System and individual state courts, including Family

Courts, are arms of the state that are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Newsome v.

Villaseñor, No. 25-CV-8774, 2026 WL 1214592, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2026); see Gollomp,

568 F.3d at 368. In addition, “[i]n the State of New York, a District Attorney’s Office, when

prosecuting a criminal matter, is deemed an arm of the State of New York and, therefore, in that

context, enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.” Mobley v. Rodriguez, No. 25-CV-

6784, 2025 WL 3042024, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2025) (citing cases); see also Ying Jing Gan v.

City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 535–36 (2d Cir. 1993) (District Attorneys sued in their official

capacities are treated as state officers with respect to their “decisions whether or not, and on what

charges to prosecute”).

Congress has not abrogated the States’ immunity for Section 1983, 1985, and 1986

claims, see Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990) (Section 1983 claims);

Qader v. Cohen & Slamowitz, No. 10-CV-1664, 2011 WL 102752, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2011)

(Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims, citing cases), and the State of New York has not waived

its immunity to suit in federal court for claims under those statutes, see Trotman v. Palisades

Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977) (Section 1983); Winters v. New York,

No. 24-CV-7420, 2026 WL 710123, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2026) (collecting cases). Thus, the

Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims against the New York Family

Court, Orange County, the New York Family Court, Rockland County, and, because Plaintiff’s

claims against the Orange County District Attorney’s Office involve its decisions as to whether

or not to criminally prosecute Plaintiff and on what charges, the Court also dismisses such claims

against that office, all under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity, because such claims

seek monetary relief from defendants that are immune from such relief, see § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii),

and because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see Close v.

New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38–39 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[U]nless New York waived its immunity, the

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction”); Atl. Healthcare Benefits Trust v. Googins, 2

F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Although the parties do not address the Eleventh Amendment in their

briefs, we raise it sua sponte because it affects our subject matter jurisdiction”; holding that,

under the Eleventh Amendment, the court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims against a

state agency). In addition, and for the same reasons, the Court dismisses any state-law claims

raised against these defendants. See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

E. Federal claims for damages brought against District Attorney Hoovler and Assistant District

Attorney Dole in their individual capacities

The Court understands Plaintiff’s second amended complaint as asserting Section 1983,

1985, and 1986 claims for damages against District Attorney Hoovler and Assistant District

Attorney Dole in their individual capacities. The Court must dismiss these claims under the

doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. Under this doctrine, prosecutors are immune from

individual-capacity civil suits for damages for acts committed within the scope of their official

duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “‘intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161,

165 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see also Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (absolute immunity is analyzed under a “functional

approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who

performed it” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). This immunity applies to,

among other prosecutorial actions, the decision of whether to prosecute someone. See Simon v.

City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013) (among the prosecutorial actions protected

from damages liability by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity are “deciding whether to bring

charges and presenting a case to a grand jury or a court, along with the tasks generally

considered adjunct to those functions, such as witness preparation, witness selection, and issuing

subpoenas”). In addition, prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for acts that may be

administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp

v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009); see also Ogunkoya v. Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 70–72 (2d

Cir. 2019) (holding that prosecutors’ direction as to where a criminal defendant would be

arraigned was in preparation for a court proceeding in which the prosecutors were acting as

advocates, and prosecutors were therefore shielded by absolute immunity). Prosecutors are

immune under this doctrine for such acts taken in the course of a probation revocation

proceeding. See, e.g., Shakir v. Derby Police Dep’t, No. 11-CV-1940, 2015 WL 13860933, at

*5–6 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2015). In addition to applying to Section 1983 claims, this doctrine has

been applied to Section 1985 and Section 1986 claims as well. See Vazquez-Diaz v. Borreiro,

No. 22-CV-8708, 2022 WL 17539501, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2022) (Section 1983 and

Section 1985 claims), appeal dismissed, No. 23-42, 2023 WL 4347957 (2d Cir. May 4, 2023)

(unreported decision); Santos v. Syracuse Police Dep’t, Nos. 22-CV-1102, 22-CV-1164, 2022 WL

16949542, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2022) (Section 1986 claims), report & recommendation

adopted, 2023 WL 3612842 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2023).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims under Sections 1983, 1985, and 1986 against District Attorney

Hoovler and Assistant District Attorney Dole are based on their actions that were within the

scope of their official duties as prosecutors (deciding whether or not to prosecute Plaintiff and, if

so, on what charges) and were associated with the conduct of a trial (a pending state-court

criminal proceeding and a previously adjudicated probation-revocation proceeding). The Court

therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 individual-capacity claims for

damages against District Attorney Hoovler and Assistant District Attorney Dole under the

doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, for seeking monetary relief from defendants who are

immune from such relief, see § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and because such claims are frivolous, see

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); Collazo v. Pagano, 656 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding, for the

purposes of the IFP statute, that a claim dismissed under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity

is deemed frivolous).

F. Federal claims against the Hospital, the RCJ, and OCJ

The Court also understands the second amended complaint as asserting Section 1983,

1985, and 1986 claims against the Hospital, the RCJ, and the OCJ. Each of those statutes

extends liability to “persons.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986. But “[i]t is well established that a

hospital is not a person [for the purposes of] Section 1983 liability.” Simpara v. NY DA (Dist.

Attorney), No. 24-CV-8095, 2025 WL 2410556, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2025) (internal

quotation marks omitted, collecting cases). The same is true with respect to a jail or prison as to

Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims. See Winchcombe v. Whitaker, No. 26-CV-0145, 2026 WL

614170, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2026) (Section 1983 claims); Gauthier v. Kirkpatrick, No. 2:13-

CV-0187, 2013 WL 6407716, at *15 (D. Vt. Dec. 9, 2013) (Section 1983, Section 1985, and

Section 1986 claims). Thus, if a hospital is not a person for the purposes of Section 1983 claims,

and a jail or prison is not a person for Section 1983, 1985, and 1986 claims, a hospital is also not

a person for Section 1985 and 1986 claims. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s Section

1983, 1985, and 1986 claims against the Hospital, the RCJ (a jail), and the OCJ (another jail) for

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.9 See § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

G. Unidentified “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants

Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the Court in

identifying an unidentified defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In the second amended

complaint, Plaintiff supplies sufficient information to permit the TOW and Garnet Health (the

Hospital’s owner and operator) to identify the unidentified “John Doe” and “Jane Doe”

defendants; they include: (1) the TOWPD police officer(s) not already named as a defendant in

this Action, who, along with TOWPD Police Officer Mezzella (or Mazzella), entered Plaintiff’s

home on a date in February 2024; (2) the TOWPD police officer(s) not already named as a

defendant in this Action who, on a date in February 2025, entered Plaintiff’s home while Plaintiff

was home alone; (3) the TOWPD police officer(s) not already named as a defendant in this

Action who, on March 22, 2025, assisted TOWPD Police Officer Mezzella (or Mazzella) in

arresting Plaintiff; and (4) the security guards, nurses, and other persons employed at the Garnet

Medical Center who, on January 13 and 14, 2025, restrained Plaintiff while she was medicated in

that facility, medicated her in that facility, and/or drew her blood in that facility. It is therefore

ordered that counsel for the TOW and Garnet Health must ascertain the identity and, if

appropriate, badge number of each of the unidentified “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants

whom Plaintiff seeks to sue here and the address where each of them may be served. Counsel for

the TOW and Garnet Health must provide this information to Plaintiff and to the Court within 60

days of the date of this order.

9 The Court offers no opinion as to the merits of any claims under federal or state law that

Plaintiff may assert against the Hospital’s owner and operator, Garnet Health, in a third amended

complaint.

Within 30 days of receiving this information, Plaintiff may file a third amended

complaint naming the newly identified individuals as defendants and providing their service

addresses and, if appropriate, badge numbers. The third amended complaint will replace, not

supplement, the original complaint, the amended complaint, the amended complaint’s

supplements, and the second amended complaint. A third amended complaint form that Plaintiff

should complete is attached to this order. Once Plaintiff has filed a third amended complaint, the

Court will screen it and, if necessary, issue an order directing service on the newly identified

defendants.10

H. Service on the remaining identified defendants

Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, she is entitled to rely on

the Court and the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) to effect service on the remaining

identified defendants, which include: (1) TOWPD Police Officer Mezzella (or Mazzella); (2) the

County of Rockland; (3) the TOW; (4) the County of Orange: (5) TOWPD Police Sergeant

Sircable; (6) TOWPD Policer Officer Laya; (7) TOWPD Police Officer Kennedy; (8) Paul

Weber; (9) James Leo; (10) Catherine Leo; (11) Francis (also known as Frankie or Frank)

Navarra; (12) Natalie Navarra; (13) Christina Caceres; (14) Jeanine Locicero; (15) Morgan Cruz;

(16) Catherine Drake; (17) Joan Dorer (also known as Joan Decker); (18) Karen Fischer;

(19) Michelle Francise; (20) Mandy Lane; (21) L-M Ari; (22) Sherisa Saladeen; (23) Taylor

Campbell; (24) Jessica Pepin; (25) Elizabeth Lofstedt; and (26) OCJ Correctional Lieutenant

Nicholas Gessnar (collectively referred to as “the remaining identified defendants”).11 Walker v.

10 Plaintiff’s third amended complaint must comply with the personal-information

restrictions articulated in Rule 5.2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

11Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that a

summons be served within 90 days of the date that the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding

IFP and could not have effected service on the remaining identified defendants until the Court

Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the

court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must

order the USMS to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP).

To allow Plaintiff to effect service on the remaining identified defendants through the

USMS, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a USMS Process Receipt and Return form

(“USM-285 form”) for each of the remaining identified defendants. The Clerk of Court is

further instructed to issue summonses for the remaining identified defendants and deliver to the

USMS all the paperwork necessary for the USMS to effect service of summonses and the second

amended complaint on the remaining identified defendants.

If the summonses and the second amended complaint are not served on the remaining

identified defendants within 90 days after the date that the summonses for the remaining

identified defendants are issued, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See

Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility

to request an extension of time for service).

Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if her mailing address changes, and the Court

may dismiss this Action if she fails to do so.

III. Conclusion

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to mail an information package to Plaintiff.

The Court construes Plaintiff’s motion brought under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure (Dkt. No. 20) as a motion for reconsideration brought under Local Civil Rule

reviewed the second amended complaint and ordered that summonses be issued for the

remaining identified defendants. The Court therefore extends the time to serve the remaining

identified defendants until 90 days after the date that summonses for the remaining identified

defendants issue.

6.3. For the reasons discussed in this order, the Court denies that motion. The Court therefore

directs the Clerk of Court to terminate the Motion at Dkt. No. 20.

In addition, for the reasons discussed above, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims

against: (1) Judge Brown; (2) the Orange County Probation Department; (3) Orange County

Child Protective Services; (4) the Town of Warwick Police Department; (5) Probation Officer

Skyler Kemp; (6) “Orange County Family Court”; (7) “Rockland County Family Court”;

(8) Garnet Medical Center; (9) the Orange County District Attorney’s Office; (10) Orange

County District Attorney David M. Hoovler; (11) Orange County Assistant District Attorney

Dole; (12) the Orange County Department of Social Services; (13) the Orange County Sheriff’s

Office; (14) the Rockland County Sheriff’s Office; (15) the Orange County Jail; and (16) the

Rockland County Jail. The Court therefore directs the Clerk of Court to terminate these

defendants from the docket caption of this Action.

The Court also directs the Clerk of Court to: (1) issue summonses for the remaining 26

identified defendants, which include:

(a) Police Officer Mezzella (or Mazzella),

(b) the County of Rockland,

(d) the County of Orange,

(e) Police Sergeant Sircable,

(f) Police Officer Laya,

(g) Police Officer Kennedy,

(h) Paul Weber,

(i) James Leo,

(j) Catherine Leo,

(k) Francis (also known as Frankie or Frank) Navarra,

(l) Natalie Navarra,

(m) Christina Caceres,

(n) Jeanine Locicero,

(o) Morgan Cruz,

(p) Catherine Drake,

(q) Joan Dorer (also known as Joan Decker),

(r) Karen Fischer,

(s) Michelle Francise,

(t) Mandy Lane,

(u) L-M Ari,

(v) Sherisa Saladeen,

(w) Taylor Campbell,

(x) Jessica Pepin,

(y) Elizabeth Lofstedt, and

(z) Correctional Lieutenant Nicholas Gessnar;

(2) complete USM-285 forms with the service addresses for these defendants; and (3) deliver all

documents necessary to effect service of summonses and the second amended complaint (Dkt.

No. 23) on these defendants to the United States Marshals Service.

The Court further directs the Clerk of Court to mail copies of this order and of the second

amended complaint (Dkt. No. 23) to the following addresses: (1) Town of Warwick, 132 Kings

Highway, Warwick, New York 10990; and (2) Garnet Health, 707 East Main Street, Middletown,

New York 10940-2650.

The Court directs counsel for the Town of Warwick and for Garnet Health to provide to

Plaintiff and to the Court the identities, service address, and, if appropriate, badge numbers of the

unidentified “John Doe” and “Jane Doe” defendants, as specified in this order.

A third amended complaint form is attached to this order.

The Court additionally directs the Clerk of Court to revoke Plaintiff’s consent to

electronic service of court documents (Dkt. No. 3) unless and until Plaintiff files another such

consent clearly indicating her consent to electronic service of court documents while she is

incarcerated. Unless and until Plaintiff does so, the Clerk of Court is to remove Plaintiff’s email

address from her docket address. This order and all future court filings are to be mailed to

Plaintiff unless and until Plaintiff files such a consent.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks habeas corpus relief, because she has not, at this time,

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability

will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any

appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, IFP status is denied for

the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

pa’ White Plains, New York

KENNETH. KARAS

United States District Judge

SERVICE ADDRESSES FOR DEFENDANTS

Police Officer Mezzella (or Mazzella)

Town of Warwick Police Department

132 Kings Highway

Warwick, New York 10990

The County of Rockland

Law Department

11 New Hempstead Road

New City, New York 10956

The Town of Warwick

132 Kings Highway

Warwick, New York 10990

The County of Orange

Law Department

255-275 Main Street

Goshen, New York 10924

Police Sergeant Sircable

Town of Warwick Police Department

132 Kings Highway

Warwick, New York 10990

Police Officer Laya

Town of Warwick Police Department

132 Kings Highway

Warwick, New York 10990

Police Officer Kennedy

Town of Warwick Police Department

132 Kings Highway

Warwick, New York 10990

Paul Weber, Esq.

Weber Law Firm, PLLC

P.O. Box 330

Cornwall, New York 12518

James Leo

15 Rutledge Avenue

Highland Hills, New York 10930

Catherine Leo

15 Rutledge Avenue

Highland Hills, New York 10930

Francis (also known as Frankie or Frank) Navarra

27 Roe Avenue

Cornwall-On-Hudson, New York 12520

Natalie Navarra

27 Roe Avenue

Cornwall-On-Hudson, New York 12520

Christina Caceres