Kohlbrenner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TZIPPORA MILLER,

Plaintiff,

26-CV-1457 (LLS)

-against-

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

KELLY KOHLBRENNER; ROCKLAND

WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD

HOSPITAL GUILD INC.,

Defendants.

LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”).

Named as Defendants are the Rockland Hospital Guild Inc. and its Director of Supportive

Housing, Kelly Kohlbrenner. By order dated February 20, 2026, the court granted Plaintiff’s

request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. By order dated

February 25, 2026, Chief Judge Laura Taylor Swain denied Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary

injunction and temporary restraining order. (ECF 9.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court

dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead her claims in an amended

complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the “special

solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits—to state a claim, pro se

pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires

a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially

plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that

the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must

accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79

(2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating

legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those

facts make it plausible—not merely possible—that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff bring this action against the Rockland Hospital Guild Inc., which she alleges is a

“nonprofit entity engaged in providing supportive housing services” and that receives public

funding, and Kelly Kohlbrenner, Rockland Hospital Guild’s Director of Supportive Housing,

whom Plaintiff describes as “an individual who acted as a care coordinator or agent through

state-funded housing-related program for individuals with disabilities and exercised authority

and influence over Plaintiff’s medical care.” (ECF 1, at 2.) The following facts are drawn from

the complaint.1 Plaintiff has “serious medical conditions requiring ongoing medical care,

including monitoring and treatment for dangerously elevated blood pressure, respiratory issues,

and other medical emergencies.” (Id.) She was previously enrolled in a “housing-related

program,” presumably with Rockland Hospital Guild, that “required [her] to sign authorizations

allowing coordination or involvement in medical care.” (Id.) As of January 2026, Plaintiff is no

longer enrolled in that program and “did not consent to [its] continued involvement” in her

medical care. (Id.)

Despite Plaintiff’s disenrollment from the program, Defendants continued to “interfere”

in Plaintiff’s medical care by “contacting doctors, hospitals, and medical providers, making

representations on Plaintiff’s behalf, and influencing medical decision-making.” (Id.)

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have “characterized Plaintiff’[s] medical

conditions as psychiatric in nature and have directed or influenced medical providers to pursue

psychiatric placement instead of medical treatment, including emergency room records reflecting

psychiatric mischaracterization of a medical complaint.” (Id. at 2-3.) As an example of

Defendants’ “involvement and interference” with her medical care, Plaintiff alleges that she has

experienced “repeated instances in which vital signs and diagnostic testing, including blood

pressure measurements and other medical assessments, were recorded or relied upon in a manner

inconsistent with Plaintiff’s prior objective findings,” and, therefore, according to Plaintiff,

resulted in “medically necessary treatment” being delayed, limited or denied. (Id. at 4.)

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation

are as in the original unless noted otherwise.

Plaintiff maintains that she is “subject to a valid New York State court order prohibiting

interference with [her] access to medical care,” but “Defendants’ conduct occurred despite the

existence of the state court order.”2 (Id. at 3.)

In addition to interfering with Plaintiff’s medical care, Defendants “engaged in a pattern

of harassment and surveillance directed at Plaintiff, including repeated unwanted contact,

tracking or monitoring of Plaintiff’s phone and vehicle, and actions that interfered with

Plaintiff’s business and livelihood.” (Id.) She further alleges “upon information and belief” that

Defendants communicated with members of her family without her consent. (Id.)

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, including an order that, among other things, enjoins

Defendants from “direct[ly] or indirect[ly]” interfering with Plaintiff’s medical care;

communicating with or “influenc[ing]” any medical provider with respect to Plaintiff; and

recommending “psychiatric evaluation, placement, or confinement in lieu of medical treatment.”

(Id. at 6.) Plaintiff also seeks an order granting her “emergency medical care as indicated is

necessary verbally by medical providers.” (Id.)

DISCUSSION

A. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendants violated her right to due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment. A claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege

2 Plaintiff states that she attaches a copy of that court order as an exhibit to her request for

preliminary injunctive relief. The referenced document is a February 11, 2026 order to show

cause issued by Judge Larry J. Schwartz of the Supreme Court of the State of New York,

Rockland County, directing Rockland Hospital Guild to show cause at a February 27, 2026

hearing why Plaintiff’s proposed temporary restraining order prohibiting it from interfering with

her care should not be granted. (ECF 4-2, at 1-2.) That order includes language temporarily

restraining Rockland Hospital Guild and its associates from interfering with Plaintiff’s medical

care pending determination of the motion. (Id. at 2.) The documents submitted by Plaintiff do not

indicate whether the court granted her temporary restraining order.

facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties are therefore not generally liable under the

statute. Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn.

Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of

Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the

Government, not private parties.”).

Here, Defendant Rockland Hospital Guild is a private nonprofit organization and

Defendant Kohlbrenner is a private individual employed by Rockland Hospital Guild. Plaintiff

does not allege that either defendant works for any state or other governmental body. Plaintiff

instead argues that Defendants are state actors because they receive government funding. (See

ECF 1, at 2.) Although there are limited circumstances in which a nominally private actor can be

deemed a state actor for Section 1983 purposes, it is well established that receipt of government

funding, “no matter how extensive, is insufficient to transform otherwise private conduct into

state action.” Young v. Halle Hous. Assoc., L.P., 152 F. Supp. 2d 355, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see,

e.g., Aponte v. Diego Beekman M.H.A. HFDC, No. 16-CV-8479 (JPO), 2019 WL 316003, at *12

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2019) (dismissing Section 1983 claims based on “entwinement” theory where

plaintiffs alleged that landlord “receive[d] public funds and tax exemptions in exchange for

providing low-income housing,” and holding that entities do not become state actors “simply

because those entities receive state funding for providing a public service” (citing Rendell-Baker

v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982))).

Because Defendants are private parties who do not work for a state or government body,

and do not qualify as state actors, Plaintiff has not stated a Section 1983 claim against them. The

Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for failure to state a claim on which

relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. Claims under the ADA and RA

Plaintiff asserts claims of disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA, which

prohibits discrimination by public entities, and the RA. Because Defendants are not state or local

governments, Plaintiff’s ADA claims do not arise under Title II. The Court will construe

Plaintiff’s ADA claims as arising under Title III, which governs public accommodations, a term

that includes “social service center establishment[s]. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(K). The Court

assumes for the purposes of this order, without deciding, that Defendant Rockland Hospital

Guild is a public accommodation covered by Title III.3 See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S.

661, 676-77 (“The phrase ‘public accommodation’ . . . ‘should be construed liberally’ to afford

people with disabilities ‘equal access’ to the wide variety of establishments available to the

nondisabled.” (footnotes omitted)).

Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and

equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of

any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a

place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Under the RA, “no otherwise qualified

3 Individual defendants, such as Kohlbrenner, cannot be held liable under the RA. See,

e.g., Davis v. Power of Auth., No. 19-CV-0792 (KMK), 2022 WL 309200, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.

2, 2022) (noting that there is no individual liability under the Rehabilitation Act). As to

individual liability under Title III of the ADA, courts have focused “the inquiry . . . on the issue

of control, i.e., whether the named defendant ‘operates’ a place of public accommodation within

the meaning of the ADA” and “‘[t]he term operate has been interpreted as being in a position of

authority and having the power and discretion to perform potentially discriminatory acts.’”

Bowen v. Rubin, 385 F. Supp. 2d 168, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Coddington v. Adelphi

Univ., 45 F. Supp. 2d 211, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)). The Court declines to decide, at this stage,

whether Kohlbrenner is subject to liability under the ADA.

individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,

be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The

substantive standards for claims under the ADA and the RA are substantially the same, Wright v.

N.Y. State Dep’t of Corrs., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016), although a claim under the RA must

be supported by allegations that the benefit is part of a “program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance,” Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

To state a claim under either of these statutes, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that

(1) she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the defendant is subject to one of the Acts;

and (3) she was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the defendant’s services,

programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the defendant because of her

disability. See Krist v. Kolombos Rest., Inc., 688 F.3d 89, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2012) (Title III of the

ADA); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2009) (RA). Under the ADA and RA, a

“disability” is defined as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being

regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C) (ADA); 29 U.S.C.

§ 705(20)(B) (RA incorporating by reference the ADA’s definition).

The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that, where the plaintiff challenges “the substance

of the services provided” rather than “illegal discrimination,” there is no violation of the federal

disability statutes. Doe, 148 F.3d at 84 (rejecting ADA and RA challenge to adequacy of services

for disabled individuals through the New York Office of Vocational Educational Services for

Individuals with Disabilities); see e.g., Schnauder v. Gibens, 679 F. App’x 8, 10 (2d Cir.

2017) (summary order) (rejecting the assertion by detainee that “denial of timely and meaningful

medical treatment for his [broken] nose constituted a failure to provide a ‘reasonable

accommodation’”); Cushing v. Moore, 970 F.2d 1103, 1109 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the RA

“does not create a cause of action based on a [disability] that is directly related to providing the

very services at issue”); United States v. Univ. Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984)

(explaining that “where medical treatment is at issue, it is typically the [disability] itself that

gives rise to, or at least contributes to, the need for services,” and thus holding that the

Rehabilitation Act “prohibits discrimination against a [disabled] individual only where the

individual’s [disability] is unrelated to, and thus improper to consideration of, the services in

question”).

Here, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA or RA. Plaintiff does not allege

sufficient facts to suggest that she has a disability as defined by the ADA and RA. Although she

alleges that she has “serious medical conditions” that include “dangerously elevated blood

pressure, respiratory issues, and other medical emergencies” (ECF 1, at 2), she alleges no facts

describing how her medical condition substantially limits one or more major life activities. Even

if the Court assumes that Plaintiff has a disability as defined by the statutes, she does not allege

facts suggesting that she was denied Defendants’ services or otherwise discriminated against

with respect to Defendants’ services because of her disability. According to the complaint,

Defendants’ allegedly discriminatory actions began after Plaintiff was no longer enrolled in its

program. (See id.) It is therefore unclear that Plaintiff was denied or unable to fully participate in

Defendants’ services.

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding discrimination do not suggest a violation of the ADA or

RA. Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants took actions to discriminate against her with

respect to medical services she received through non-party medical providers. Specifically,

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants interfered in her medical care by speaking with her family and

medical providers and “mischaracterizing medical conditions as psychiatric.” (Id. at 5.) As a

preliminary matter, it is unclear from the complaint how Defendants—who are not medical

providers—were able to influence or override the judgment of the medical professionals

providing care to Plaintiff. In any event, even if the Court assumes that Defendants’ actions

impacted the type of care Plaintiff received from medical providers—i.e., that she was provided

“psychiatric” care rather than “medical” care—these allegations do not amount to discrimination

under the ADA and RA. Rather, Plaintiff appears to be challenging only the substance of

services provided. See Doe, 148 F.3d at 84.

Because Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting that Defendants discriminated against

her based on a disability, the Court dismisses her claims under the ADA and RA for failure to

state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The Court grants Plaintiff leave to replead her ADA and RA claims in an amended

complaint alleging facts showing that Defendants discriminated against her with respect to their

services based on a disability as defined by the ADA and RA.

C. Claims under state law

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims

when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and

only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.”

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (footnote omitted). Having dismissed

the federal claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its

supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New

York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms

the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which

district courts can refuse its exercise.’” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522

U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).

D. Permission for electronic filing

Plaintiff has filed a request to participate in electronic case filing in this action. (ECF 7.)

The Court grants Plaintiff’s request. The ECF Rules & Instructions are available online at

https://nysd.uscourts.gov/rules/ecf-related-instructions.

Following Plaintiff’s registering to file documents electronically, she no longer will

receive service of documents by postal mail, whether or not she previously consented to accept

electronic service. All documents filed by the court, or any other party, shall be served on

Plaintiff by electronic notice to Plaintiff’s designated email address. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

5(B)(2)(E).

Should Plaintiff have any questions regarding electronic filing, she may call the ECF

Help Desk at (212) 805-0800.

LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED

Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts

generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its

defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir.

2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has

cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to

amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid

claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v.

USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege

additional facts to state a valid claim under the ADA and RA, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days’

leave to amend her complaint to cure the deficiencies identified above.

If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will

direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action.

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses the complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), for failure to

state a claim on which relief may be granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), with 30 days’

leave to replead.

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff

may be asserting. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

The Court grants Plaintiff's request to participate in electronic case filing in this action.

(ECF 7.)

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil

judgment is entered.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 18, 2026

New York, New York Lee L. Start

Louis L. Stanton

U.S.D.J.

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