Campbell

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 CEASAR DUNCAN, Case No. 1:24-cv-00970-HBK (PC)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

TUANU’U AND GARZA’S EXHAUSTION-

13 v. BASED MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT1

14 T.L. CAMPBELL, et al.,

(Doc. 37)

15 Defendants.

16

17 Pending before the Court is the exhaustion-based motion for summary judgment (“MSJ”)

18 filed on behalf of Defendants V. Tuanu’u and E. Garza on February 3, 2026. (Doc. 37). Plaintiff

19 opposed the motion and Defendants replied. (Docs. 38, 39). For the reasons below, the Court

20 grants Defendants Tuanu’u and Garza’s exhaustion-based MSJ.

21 BACKGROUND

22 Plaintiff Ceasar Duncan, a prisoner, proceeds on his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

23 as screened, alleging: (1) an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive use of force against

24 Defendants Musselman, Vega, Virdi, Sanchez, and Juarez; (2) an Eighth Amendment failure to

25 intervene claim against Defendants Musselman, Robles-Ayala, Alvarez, and Zepeda; and (3) a

26

27 1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc.

22).

28

1 First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Hernandez, Ozuna, Huerta, Silva,

2 Rodriguez, Garza, Cantu, and Tuanu’u. (Docs. 10, 11, 12, 13).

3 By way of background, the FAC alleges that on December 9, 2022, Defendants Juarez,

4 Musselman, Sanchez, Vega, Robles-Ayala, and Virdi approached Plaintiff’s locked cell and

5 signaled for it to be opened. The door initially failed due to an improvised lock created by

6 Plaintiff, but staff ultimately forced it open as Plaintiff moved to remove it. Defendant Juarez then

7 grabbed Plaintiff’s wrist, slammed him to the concrete, twisted his leg and foot, and caused him

8 pain. Defendants Virdi, Sanchez, and Vega joined in, repeatedly striking Plaintiff, who states he

9 did not resist and suffered over 30 blows to his head and neck. Juarez also held Plaintiff’s head

10 and struck it twice with his knee. Meanwhile, Defendants Musselman, Robles-Ayala, Alvarez,

11 and Zepeda allegedly observed the assault without intervening. Plaintiff was eventually

12 restrained, evaluated, and transported to a hospital.

13 Immediately after the incident, Plaintiff reported to Defendant Hernandez that excessive

14 force had been used and requested review of available video footage. Plaintiff alleges Hernandez

15 instead ordered staff to charge him with battery on a police officer without reviewing the footage

16 and directed Defendants Juarez, Virdi, Vega, and Sanchez to falsify reports. Plaintiff further

17 alleges Defendants Ozuna, Huerta, Silva, Rodriguez, Garza, and Cantu approved these reports

18 without investigation. Plaintiff was later found not guilty of the charge at a disciplinary hearing

19 on January 12, 2023.

20 Plaintiff also claims retaliation following his return from the hospital. After Plaintiff

21 reported the incident and requested video review to Defendants Rodriguez and Tuanu’u,

22 Defendants Rodriguez and Tuanu’u placed him in administrative segregation, which he alleges

23 was done in retaliation for reporting misconduct.

24 Relevant to the MSJ, Plaintiff proceeds on a First Amendment retaliation claim against

25 Tuanu’u and Garza arising from events after a December 9, 2022 use-of-force incident.

26 Specifically, he alleges Garza approved false documents without reviewing video footage and

27 Tuanu’u approved Plaintiff's placement in administrative segregation after Plaintiff complained

28 about staff misconduct.

1 PARTIES’ POSITIONS

2 A. Defendants’ Exhaustion-Based Motion for Summary Judgment

3 Defendants V. Tuanu’u and E. Garza filed the instant exhaustion-based MSJ on February

4 3, 2026. (Doc. 37). In support, Defendants submit a Memorandum of Points and Authorities

5 (Doc. 37); the Declaration of California State Prison Corcoran Grievance Coordinator A. Vasquez

6 (Doc. 37-1), with Grievance Log. No. 339447 (Exh. 1), the Office of Grievances’ decision

7 regarding Grievance Log. No. 339447 (Exh. 2), Grievance Log. No. 356654 (Exh. 3), the Office

8 of Grievances’ decision regarding Grievance Log. No. 356654 (Exh. 4) and the Rule Violations

9 Report referenced in Grievance Log. No. 356654 (Exh. 5); a Statement of Undisputed Material

10 Facts (Doc. 37-2); and a Rand warning (Doc. 37-3).

11 Defendants argue that Plaintiff submitted only two grievances regarding the events giving

12 rise to his claims and that neither grievance exhausted administrative remedies as to his First

13 Amendment retaliation claims against Tuanu’u and Garza. They contend Grievance Log. No.

14 339447 addressed the excessive force claim against the non-moving defendants, and Grievance

15 Log. No. 356654, though identifying other correctional officers, did not identify Tuanu’u and

16 Garza or include any allegations that could have placed correctional officials on notice of a claim

17 against them. (Doc. 37 at 9-10, 14-17).

18 B. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Exhaustion-Based MSJ

19 Plaintiff filed an opposition to the MSJ on February 24, 2026, along with a response to

20 Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. (Doc. 38). Plaintiff argues summary

21 judgment should be denied because there are genuine disputes of material fact as to: (1)

22 exhaustion; (2) supervisory liability; and (3) retaliatory adverse actions through deliberate

23 inaction and obstruction. (Id. at 1).

24 Regarding exhaustion, Plaintiff argues Grievance Log. No. 339447 sufficiently provided

25 notice that the grievance was being brought against Defendants Tuanu’u and Garza because it

26 stated, “These actions were taken by a bunch of rogue C.O.’s who are encouraged by their

27 sergeant’s, lieutenant’s, captain to beat inmates at will in violation of state and civil law . . .” (Id.

28 at 2-3). Plaintiff does not address Grievance Log. No. 356654. (See generally id.).

1 C. Defendants’ Reply in Support of their Exhaustion-Based MSJ

2 In their reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s arguments regarding supervisory liability

3 and retaliatory adverse actions through deliberate inaction and obstruction are irrelevant to the

4 exhaustion issue presented by the MSJ. (Doc. 39 at 1). They further contend that the statement

5 Plaintiff cites in Grievance Log. No. 339447 does not suffice to exhaust administrative remedies

6 as to his First Amendment retaliation claim against Tuanu’u and Garza. (Id. at 2-3).

7 Defendants argue that Grievance Log. No. 339447 does not mention Tuanu’u or Garza

8 and addresses only the excessive force claim, with no reference to retaliation. (Id. at 2-4). They

9 also submit that Plaintiff’s failure to rely on the second grievance implicitly concedes that it did

10 not exhaust his claims against Tuanu’u and Garza. (Id. at 2 n.1).

11 APPLICABLE STANDARD AND LAW

12 A. Summary Judgment

13 “The purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

14 order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith

15 Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate

16 when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

17 as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). It should be entered “after adequate time for discovery

18 and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

19 of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

20 at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

21 The moving party bears the “initial responsibility” of demonstrating the absence of a

22 genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. A dispute of material fact is genuine only if there is

23 sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party, and a

24 fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v.

25 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

26 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to

27 present specific facts showing a genuine issue of a material fact. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e);

28 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. The opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is

1 some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. The party must

2 present evidence of specific facts, by affidavit, or admissible discovery material, demonstrating a

3 genuine dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11.

4 The opposing party need not conclusively establish a material act in its favor; it is enough

5 that “the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’

6 differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Electrical Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors

7 Assoc., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). However, “failure of proof concerning an essential

8 element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex,

9 477 U.S. at 323.

10 The Court must apply Rule 56 standards to determine whether the moving party

11 demonstrated there is no genuine issue of material fact and showed judgment to be appropriate

12 as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). “[A] court

13 ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage in credibility determinations or the

14 weighing of evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

15 The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party” and “all

16 justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Orr v. Bank of America,

17 NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002). A mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to

18 establish a genuine dispute to defeat an otherwise properly supported summary judgment

19 motion. Anderson., 477 U.S. at 252. However, where “opposing parties tell two different

20 stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record” courts “should not adopt that

21 version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris,

22 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

23 In an exhaustion-based summary judgment motion, the defendant bears the initial burden

24 of establishing “that there was an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not

25 exhaust that available remedy.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014). If the

26 defendant carries that burden, “the burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence

27 showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally

28 available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. The ultimate burden of

1 persuasion remains, however, with defendant. Id.

2 B. Exhaustion Under the PLRA

3 Under the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42

4 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

5 correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.

6 § 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life,” including

7 Bivens claims. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 532 (2002). Exhaustion is a condition

8 precedent to filing a civil rights claim. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).

9 The PLRA recognizes no judicially exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, even in

10 “special circumstances.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 648 (2016). The one significant qualifier

11 is that “the remedies must indeed be ‘available’ to the prisoner.” Id. at 639. Remedies are

12 considered unavailable when: (1) the administrative procedure “operates as a simple dead end

13 with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; (2) the

14 scheme is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use . . . so that no

15 ordinary prisoner can make sense of what it demands”; or (3) “prison administrators thwart

16 inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or

17 intimidation.” Id. at 643-44.

18 A prison’s internal grievance process determines whether a grievance satisfies the PLRA

19 exhaustion requirement. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). An inmate must exhaust

20 available remedies but is not required to exhaust unavailable remedies. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d

21 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). “To be available, a remedy must be available ‘as a

22 practical matter’; it must be ‘capable of use; at hand.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d

23 926, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2005)). Accordingly, an inmate must exhaust “those, but only those,

24 grievance procedures that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action complained

25 of.’” Ross, 578 U.S. at 642 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001)).

26 Failure to exhaust under the PLRA is “an affirmative defense the defendant must plead

27 and prove.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 204. Defendants bear the burden to prove that an available

28 administrative remedy existed and that the prisoner failed to exhaust it. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172.

1 Once that burden is met, “the prisoner has the burden of production” to come forward with

2 evidence that the generally available administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to

3 him. Id. If the Court concludes that a prisoner failed to exhaust available administrative

4 remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal without prejudice. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 223–24; Lira

5 v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2005).

6 C. CDCR Custody Grievance Process

7 For grievances received by prison officials on or after June 1, 2020, the California prison

8 grievance system has two levels of review. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3480-3487.2 Section

9 3481(a) permits an inmate to “submit a written grievance containing one or more claims

10 . . . to dispute a policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or departmental

11 staff.” Id., § 3481(a). Section 3482(c) requires an inmate to follow this procedure when

12 submitting a grievance: (1) type or print legibly on an official CDCR 602-1 (03/20) form or

13 complete the form electronically if available; (2) describe all information known and available

14 regarding the claim, including key dates and times, names and titles of all involved staff (or a

15 description of those staff) and witnesses, to the best of the claimant’s knowledge; (3) describe any

16 attempt to resolve the claim informally, including key dates, times, names, titles, and results; (4)

17 include all supporting documents available or sufficiently identify relevant records; and (5) sign

18 and date the CDCR 602-1 form. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3482(c)(1)–(5). An inmate must submit

19 a grievance within 60 days of the incident being challenged. Id. § 3482(b).

20 Once an inmate has submits a CDCR 602-1, the Institutional or Regional Office of

21 Grievances (“OOG”) must issue a written decision that clearly explains the reasoning as to each

22 claim in the grievance. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3481(a). Within 60 days of the OOG decision,

23 the inmate may appeal to the Office of Appeals (“OOA”), which must also provide a written

24 decision clearly explaining its reasoning as to each claim. Id., §§ 3481(a), 3484. The grievance

25 is exhausted once the OOA completes its review. Id., § 3485(l)(5).

26

27 2 Effective January 22, 2026, various subsections of California Code of Regulations Title 15, sections 3480

through 3487 were amended. All the citations in this order are to the regulations in place in 2022 and

28 2023, the relevant period for this action.

1 The regulations impose two principal timing constraints. First, an official who receives a

2 grievance at either the OOG or OOA level must provide a notice of receipt within 14 days, which

3 must include the date of receipt and the response deadline. Id., §§ 3483(c), 3485(c). Second,

4 both the OOG and OOA must issue written responses within 60 days of receipt, unless a shorter

5 time is mandated by other law. Id. §§ 3483(g), 3486(g).

6 MATERIAL FACTS RELEVANT TO EXHAUSTION

7 After reviewing the record, the Court finds the following material facts undisputed:

8 • At all relevant times, Plaintiff was in incarcerated in CDCR custody and housed at

9 California State Prison, Corcoran (Corcoran). (Doc. 10 at 3).

10 • Defendant Garza was a Correctional Captain at Corcoran, and Defendant Tuanu’u was

11 a Correctional Sergeant at Corcoran. (Doc. 10 at 4).

12 • Plaintiff’s operative complaint alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim against

13 Tuanu'u and Garza based on events following a December 9, 2022 use-of-force

14 incident. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Garza signed off on allegedly fraudulent

15 documents without reviewing video footage, and that Tuanu'u refused to review video

16 footage before signing an administrative segregation placement order. (Doc. 10; Doc.

17 11 at 13).

18 • During the relevant period, CDCR maintained a two-level administrative grievance

19 process (institutional review by the Office of Grievances (OOG) and headquarters

20 review by the Office of Appeals (OOA)) that required incarcerated persons to identify

21 involved staff by name or description and that exhausted claims and officials

22 identified once final decisions issued or staff-misconduct grievances were referred for

23 investigation. (Vasquez Decl. at ¶¶ 1, 2, 3, 5).

24 • Between December 12, 2022 and February 8, 2023, Plaintiff submitted two grievances

25 related to the December 9 incident: Grievance Log No. 339447 and Grievance Log

26 No. 356654. Both grievances were accepted and processed by the OOG. (Vasquez

27 Decl. at ¶¶ 1, 2, 3, 5, Exhs. 1-4).

28

1 • Grievance No. 339447 alleged that correctional officers used excessive force on

2 December 9, 2022. It did not identify Tuanu'u or Garza by name or description, and

3 did not raise a retaliation or administrative-segregation claim. (Vasquez Decl. at ¶ 7,

4 Exh. 1).

5 • Grievance No. 356654 alleged excessive force, a fabricated rules violation report, and

6 placement in administrative segregation and identified several staff members by name.

7 (Vasquez Decl. at ¶ 7, Exh. 3).

8 • The OOG treated both grievances as allegations of staff misconduct and referred them

9 outside the grievance and appeal process, which exhausted administrative remedies as

10 to the claims and officials identified in those grievances. (Vasquez Decl. at ¶ 8, Exhs.

11 2, 4).

12 DISCUSSION

13 The Court has carefully reviewed and considered all arguments, points and authorities,

14 declarations, exhibits, statements of undisputed facts and responses thereto, if any, objections, and

15 other papers filed by the parties. Any omission of an argument, document, or objection in this

16 Order should not be construed as a failure to consider it. The Court has reviewed and considered

17 all evidence it deemed admissible, material, and appropriate for purposes of this Order.

18 A. There is No Dispute that Remedies were Available

19 As noted above, an inmate must exhaust available remedies but need not exhaust

20 unavailable ones. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171. Here, there is no dispute that remedies were

21 available to Plaintiff. He submitted two grievances and does not argue that any remedies were

22 unavailable. (See generally Doc. 38). The Court therefore finds that administrative remedies

23 were available to Plaintiff.

24 B. Grievance No. 339447 Did Not Exhaust Claims Against Tuanu’u and Garza

25 To exhaust administrative remedies, a grievance must “describe[] all information known

26 and available to the claimant regarding the claim, including key dates and times, names and titles

27 of all involved staff members (or a description of those staff members), and names and titles of all

28 witnesses, to the best of the claimant’s knowledge.” Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 15, § 3482(c)(2).

1 It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not name Defendants Tuanu’u or Garza in Grievance No.

2 339447. (Vasquez Decl. ¶ 7, Exs. 1–2). Plaintiff nonetheless argues the grievance gave sufficient

3 notice that it was brought against them because it stated: “These actions were taken by a bunch of

4 rogue C.O.’s who are encouraged by their sergeant’s, lieutenant’s, captain to beat inmates at will

5 in violation of state and civil law . . .” (Doc. 38 at 2-3).

6 The Ninth Circuit has held that a grievance may exhaust remedies as to an unnamed

7 individual where the grievance “plainly put prison officials on notice of the nature of the wrong

8 alleged in his federal suit.” Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2016). In Reyes, the

9 grievance alerted prison officials to the same pain-related claim raised in the federal suit, and both

10 the first-level and appeal decisions addressed the merits of that claim and referred to the Pain

11 Management Committee even though plaintiff had not named its members. Id. at 656, 659. The

12 prison officials’ responses made clear they recognized the allegations against unnamed committee

13 members and chose not to enforce the naming requirement, effectively opting out of it. Id. at 658.

14 This case is materially different. Grievance No. 339447 concerns only Plaintiff’s

15 excessive force allegations, whereas the claim against Defendants Tuanu’u and Garza is a First

16 Amendment retaliation claim based on events after the use-of-force incident. (Vasquez Decl. ¶ 7,

17 Exs. 1–2; Doc. 11 at 8–9). There is nothing in the grievance or any appeal indicating that

18 Plaintiff was complaining of retaliation. (See Doc. 37-1 at 6–9). The appeal identifies the subject

19 solely as “excessive force.” (Doc. 37-1 at 8). The OOG’s decision likewise does not suggest that

20 officials understood the grievance to encompass retaliation or claims against Tuanu’u or Garza,

21 nor does it indicate that they chose to waive the Title 15 requirement that Plaintiff identify the

22 involved staff. (See Doc. 37-1 at 11).

23 Accordingly, Grievance No. 339447 did not exhaust Plaintiff’s administrative remedies as

24 to Defendants Tuanu’u and Garza.

25 C. Grievance No. 356654 Did Not Exhaust Claims Against Tuanu’u and Garza

26 Plaintiff does not contend that Grievance No. 356654 exhausted his claims against

27 Defendants Tuanu’u and Garza. (See generally Doc. 38). There is no mention of Tuanu’u or

28 Garza in either the grievance or the RVR it references. (Doc. 37 at 13-14, 18-21). While the

1 | grievance explicitly identifies staff members including H. Hernandez, I. Virdi, J. Juarez, A. Vega,

2 | I. Sanchez, R.Silva, R. Ozuna, Lt. Huerta, P. Rodriguez, E. Cantu, and Lt. Espinoza, Plaintiff

3 | neither explicitly nor implicitly refers to Tuanu’u and Garza. (/d. at 13-14). As to Tuanu’u and

4 | Garza, Grievance No. 356654 therefore fails to comply with Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 15, §

5 | 3482(c)(2).

6 For the same reasons, Reyes does not assist Plaintiff. Unlike in Reyes, the grievance

7 || responses here do not show that prison officials identified a claim against unnamed staff and

8 | decided it on the merits despite any defect in naming. (Doc. 37-1 at 15-21).

9 Because Plaintiff did not exhaust available administrative remedies as to Tuanu’u and

10 | Garza before filing suit, his First Amendment retaliation claims against them must be dismissed

11 | without prejudice.

12 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

13 1. Defendants Tuanu’u and Garza’s exhaustion-based motion for summary judgment

14 (Doc. 37) is GRANTED.

15 2. Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Tuanu’u and Garza

16 are dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

17 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Defendants Tuanu’u and Garza from this

18 action.

19

| Dated: _ July 7, 2026 Mihaw. Wh. foareh Base

21 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

23

24

25

26

27

28

1]