Glynn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JERMAINE NATHANIEL GLYNN,

Plaintiff,

26-CV-3076 (LTS)

-against-

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

DONALD JOHN TRUMP SR,

Defendant.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action asserting claims against President

Donald Trump. By separate order, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. The Court dismisses the complaint for the

reasons set forth below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the “special

solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits—to state a claim, pro se

pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires

a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

BACKGROUND

The following allegations are drawn from the complaint.1 Plaintiff’s uses the court’s

general complaint form and alleges violations of his rights under Article II Section 2 of the

United States Constitution, and Article III Section 3 of the United States Constitution. (ECF 1 at

2.)

In the Facts section of the complaint form, Plaintiff writes, in full:

Donald John Trump Sr shall nominate and appoint Jermaine Nathaniel®©™ Glynn judge

of the Supreme Court of the United States whose appointment shall be established by law

of Article III Constitution of the United States of America.

(Id. at 5.) In the Injuries section of the complaint form, Plaintiff writes: “False accusations and

blood shed, murder threats.” (Id. at 6.) In the Relief section, he appears to demand monetary

relief. (Id.)

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous

Under the IFP statute, a court must dismiss an action if it determines that the action is

frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i). “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is

appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). A complaint is “‘factually frivolous’ if the

sufficiently well-pleaded facts are ‘clearly baseless’—that is, if they are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ or

‘delusional.’” Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Denton, 504 U.S. at

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation

are as in the original unless noted otherwise.

32-33) (finding as frivolous and baseless allegations that set forth a fantastical alternative history

of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25

(1989) (A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”);

Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437(“[A]n action is ‘frivolous’ when either: (1) the factual contentions

are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, a court has “no obligation to

entertain pure speculation and conjecture.” Gallop, 642 F.3d at 368.

Plaintiff’s complaint appears to be premised upon his belief that he should be appointed

to the United States Supreme Court. However, a “[p]laintiff’s beliefs—however strongly he may

hold them—are not facts.” Morren v. New York Univ., No. 20-CV-10802 (JPO) (OTW), 2022 WL

1666918, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2022) (citation omitted), report and recommendation

adopted, 2022 WL 1665013 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2022). Plaintiff provides no factual basis for his

assertion that he should be a Supreme Court justice. See Lefkowitz v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,

No. 13-CV-6414 (KPF), 2014 WL 2619815, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2014) (complaint must set

forth facts showing basis for information and belief); Johnson v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr.,

686 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (even where necessary evidence is in “exclusive

control of the defendant, . . . plaintiff must still set forth the factual basis for that belief”).

Because Plaintiff has pleaded no factual predicate in support of his assertions, his

allegations are not plausible and the Court must dismiss them as frivolous. See Kraft v. City of

New York, 823 F. App’x 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that “the district court did not err in sua

sponte dismissing the complaint as frivolous,” based on the plaintiff’s allegations that he had

“been the subject of 24-hour, multi-jurisdictional surveillance by federal ‘fusion centers’ and the

New York State Intelligence Center, which put a ‘digital marker’ on him in order to collect his

personal data and harass him”); Khalil v. United States, No. 17-CV-2652, 2018 WL 443343, at *4

(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2018) (dismissing complaint where “[p]laintiff allege[d] a broad conspiracy

involving surveillance of and interference with his life by the United States and various

government actors” because his allegations were “irrational and wholly incredible”).

B. Leave to amend denied

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Plaintiff’s complaint does not suggest that he is in possession of facts that would cure the

identified deficiencies. See Gallop, 642 F.3d at 369 (district court did not err in dismissing claim

with prejudice in absence of any indication plaintiff could or would provide additional

allegations leading to different result); Fischman v. Mitsubishi Chem. Holdings Am., Inc., No. 18-

CV-8188 (JMF), 2019 WL 3034866, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019) (declining to grant leave to

amend as to certain claims in the absence of any suggestion that additional facts could remedy

defects in the plaintiff’s pleading). Because the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured

with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses the action

as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses this action as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The Court

directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment dismissing this action.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment dismissing this case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 27, 2026

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge