Jones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

LORETTA JONES,

Plaintiff,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

-against-

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 26-€N-1369 (GBD)

COMMISSIONS, US,

Defendant.

GEORGE B. DANIELS, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendant Federal

Communications Commission (“FCC”) violated her rights. By separate order, the court granted

Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. The

Court dismisses this action for the reasons set forth below.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous

or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston □□□

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a

complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe

pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to

raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d

471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But the “special

solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits—to state a claim, pro se

pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a

complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Loretta Jones states that she brings this action on her own behalf and on behalf of

her “corporation NY Gold Tours, Inc and its Gold de la Locale in trust of all future business under

GDLL brands.” (ECF No. 1, at 1.) The following facts are drawn from the complaint.' Plaintiff

states that she is bringing this action “for exercise of rights and measures by the FCC Federal

Communications Commission to make PRIVATE my intellectual properties, processes and

practices, along with those same of my companies, that which has if not nefariously, surely

neglectfully, need made, by some law enforcement in fact maybe ambitious policies, PUBLIC.”

(/d.)

Plaintiff would like

to question if the FCC has adequate governing and instilling of protective

technologies that meet needs presented by currently used RWI Remote Weaponry

Invasion surveillance measures that include actual broadcast of my spoke, planned,

thought, deliberated, crafted and personally created, communicated, written and

otherwise expressed and/or developed actions, intentions and memories of such

those my agency which | would otherwise and of course wish PRIVATE until I

determine to share with future employees, specific roles and counterparts as I may

choose.

(Ud. at 1-2.)

Plaintiff further claims that

even right now as I write these papers of my own and sole intellect and human

dictate of otherwise expected and demanded in fact, PRIVACY, bad actors of

city/states proceed to impersonate authorship of this very content I’m putting forth

with hereby sworn attest that all said and everything | will say is TRUE, completely.

(d. at 4.)

' The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are in the

complaint unless noted otherwise.

Plaintiff asks the Court to “cause [the FCC] to shore up and sure up for certain safety and

parameters of [illegible] and other communications and affords related to and relating from my

involvements and undertakings as I’ve herein described for your authoritative/judicial review and

rulings.” (Ud. at 2-3.)

II. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE DISMISSED

A. Claims on behalf of a corporation

Plaintiff Loretta Jones states that, in addition to bringing claims on her own behalf, she is

also asserting claims on behalf of her corporation. As a nonlawyer, Plaintiff can only represent

her own interests. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; U.S. ex rel. Mergent Servs. y. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92

(2d Cir. 2008) (“[A]n individual who is not licensed as an attorney may not appear on another

person’s behalf in the other’s cause.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Eagle

Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991)) (noting that Section 1654

“allow[s] two types of representation: ‘that by an attorney admitted to the practice of law by a

governmental regulatory body, and that by a person representing himself”). The Court therefore

dismisses without prejudice any claims Plaintiff is asserting on behalf of NY Gold Tours, Inc.

B. Sovereign immunity

The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars federal courts from hearing all suits against the

federal government, including federal agencies, except where sovereign immunity has been

waived. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (citing United States v. Sherwood,

312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)); Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir.

1994) (“Because an action against a federal agency or federal officers in their official capacities is

essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are... barred under the doctrine of sovereign

immunity, unless such immunity is waived.”). “The sovereign immunity of the United States may

only be waived by federal statute” and that waiver must be express, not implied. Presidential

Gardens Assocs. v. U.S. ex rel. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 175 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999),

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing waiver. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110,

113 (2d Cir. 2000).

Here, Plaintiff sues the FCC, a federal agency, which enjoys sovereign immunity. See

Murrey v. BrandYourself.com, Inc., No. 21-CV-0320 (AT) (JLC), 2022 WL 4395808, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2022) (“[T]he FCC is a federal agency and as such, has sovereign immunity.”

(citing cases)), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 1780806 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2023).

The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiffs claims against the FCC under the doctrine of sovereign

immunity, and consequently, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)—iii), Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

C. Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous

The Court also dismisses Plaintiffs claims as frivolous. A claim is frivolous when it “lacks

an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989),

abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton

v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (holding that “a finding of factual frivolousness is

appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”);

Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437 (“[A]n action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are

clearly baseless... ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Even when read with the “special solicitude” due pro se pleadings, Triestman, 470 F.3d at

474, Plaintiff's complaint lacks an arguable basis either in fact or in law. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at

324-25. Plaintiff's allegations are incoherent and her references to being subject to “Remote

Weaponry Invasion surveillance measures” lack any factual predicate and are implausible. The

Court is unable to identify (1) any legal basis for her claims against Defendant, which is an agency

of the federal government, or (2) any legal theory on which Plaintiff may proceed. See Denton,

504 U.S. at 33; Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437. The Court therefore also dismisses the complaint as

frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND IS DENIED

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Because the defects in Plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court

declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses the complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), under the

doctrine of sovereign immunity, and, consequently, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and as

frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(), (iil); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not

be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status 1s denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 22, 2026

New York, New York

eB. Pong

United States District Judge