The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10 JOSE EDUARDO LIMA (A-078-063- No. 1:26-cv-03753-TLN-CSK
984),
11
Petitioner,
12 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
v.
13
WARDEN, GOLDEN STATE ANNEX
14 DETENTION CENTER, et al.,
15 Respondents.
16
17 Petitioner Jose Eduardo Lima (A-078-063-984), a citizen and native of Mexico, filed a
18 petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 He last entered the United
19 States without inspection in approximately 1999 or 2000. During his time in the United States,
20 petitioner has been arrested by local authorities on multiple different occasions for different
21 charges. On August 22, 2025, petitioner was detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs
22 Enforcement (“ICE”) officials. This habeas action concerns petitioner’s detention. For the
23 reasons that follow, the Court recommends petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus be dismissed in part
24
1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72,
25
and Local Rule 302(c)(17). Petitioner’s name is identified as “Jose Eduardo Lima” on the
petition. (ECF No. 1.) His name on immigration records submitted, such as the Notice to
26
Appear, lists his name as “Eduardo Garcia-Lima”, with an AKA of “Joser Linares.” (ECF No. 8-
27 2 at 7.) His name on the EOIR case status website appears as “Jose Eduardo Garcia Lima.” The
Court refers to Petitioner by his name as identified on the petition.
28
1 and granted in part.
2 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3 Petitioner is a national and citizen of Mexico. (ECF No. 8-2 at 7.) Petitioner first entered
4 the United States on an unknown date without inspection. (ECF No. 8-1 at 2.) On November 12,
5 1997, petitioner was returned from the United States to Mexico. (Id.) Petitioner re-entered the
6 United States on an unknown date without inspection. (Id.) On August 2, 1999, petitioner was
7 returned to Mexico again. (Id.). Petitioner again re-entered the United States on an unknown
8 date and was returned to Mexico again on October 5, 1999. (Id.) Petitioner most recently entered
9 the United States on an unknown date in approximately 1999 or 2000. (See id.) Petitioner has
10 been arrested by local authorities on multiple different occasions for different charges. (See id. at
11 2-3.) Respondents assert the following criminal history for petitioner:2 (1) on October 1, 1999,
12 petitioner was convicted of possession of a controlled substance in violation of California Health
13 and Safety Code § 11350; (2) on December 10, 2000, petitioner was arrested for willful cruelty to
14 child in violation of California Penal Code § 273a(b) and for battery in violation of California
15 Penal Code § 243(e)(1); (3) on May 21, 2023, petitioner was arrested for threaten with intent to
16 terrorize in violation of California Penal Code § 422 and convicted on August 23, 2024 of arson
17 of property of another in violation of California Penal Code § 451(d). (Id.; ECF No. 8-2 at 30-
18 33.)
19 On August 22, 2025, ICE encountered petitioner outside the Fresno County Superior
20 Court and took him into ICE custody. (ECF No. 8-2 at 4.) ICE served him with a Notice to
21 Appear and placed him into Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) Section 240 (8 U.S.C.
22 § 1229a) removal proceedings, charging him under Immigration and Nationality Act
23 § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), as a noncitizen present in the United States without admission or parole.3 (Id.
24 at 7.) On April 2, 2026, an immigration judge denied his applications for relief. (Id. at 35-38.).
25 2 In their answer, respondents include criminal charges against petitioner that were subsequently
dismissed or dropped. Respondents do not assert detention authority on the basis of dismissed or
26
dropped charges, and the Court therefore does not address these charges.
27 3 Removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (INA § 240) are standard removal
proceedings, which are different from expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
28 § 1225(b)(1) (INA § 235(b)(1)).
1 Petitioner filed an appeal of the immigration judge’s order with the Board of Immigration
2 Appeals, which remains pending. (ECF No. 8-1 at 3.) Petitioner has been in continuous
3 detention since August 22, 2025. (ECF No. 1 at 1.)
4 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
5 On May 15, 2026, petitioner filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 1.)
6 On May 18, 2026, petitioner was ordered to file a motion for a temporary restraining order
7 (“TRO”) if he sought emergency relief. (ECF No. 5.) Petitioner did not file a TRO motion, and
8 the case was subsequently referred to the assigned magistrate judge. (ECF No. 6.) On June 4,
9 2026, respondents filed a timely response to the petition. (ECF No. 8.) On June 11, 2026,
10 petitioner filed a timely reply. (ECF No. 9.) Briefing is now complete.
11 III. LEGAL STANDARD
12 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every
13 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
14 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in
15 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure
16 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas
17 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the
18 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has
19 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its
20 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s
21 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
22 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
23 IV. DISCUSSION
24 Petitioner challenges his continued detention based on the violation of the following:
25 (1) petitioner’s arrest and prolonged detention violates the Fifth Amendment procedural due
26 process clause; (2) violation of the Accardi doctrine and agency regulations; and (3) violation of
27 the Fifth Amendment substantive due process clause. (ECF No. 1 at 5-7.) Respondents argue
28 that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A), as he
1 inadmissible for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude based on his arson
2 conviction. (ECF No. 8 at 3.) Respondents further argue that petitioner should be required to
3 challenge whether he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) before the immigration
4 court in a Joseph hearing. (Id. at 4 (citing Matter of Joseph, 22 I & N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999).)
5 Respondents also argue petitioner’s detention is separately mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
6 because he entered the United States without inspection. (Id. at 6-7.) Respondents contend his
7 continued detention does not violate due process. (Id. at 4-5.)
8 A. Statutory Basis for Detention
9 In analyzing petitioner’s challenge to his detention, the Court “must first identify the
10 statutory provision that purports to confer” authority for his detention. Prieto-Romero v. Clark,
11 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) “carves out a statutory category of
12 [noncitizens] who may not be released under § 1226(a),” mandating detention for an alien
13 apprehended under § 1226 “who falls into one of several enumerated categories involving
14 criminal offenses.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis in original).
15 Section 1226(c) mandates detention of any noncitizen who is inadmissible by reason of having
16 committed any offense covered in 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(2), which includes noncitizens convicted of
17 a crime involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
18 Respondents argue that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
19 § 1226(c)(1)(A), as his conviction for arson in violation of California Penal Code § 451(d)
20 constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. (ECF No. 8 at 3 (citing Ruiz v. Holder, 44 Fed.
21 Appx. 68, 69 (9th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez–Herrera v. INS, 52 F.3d 238, 239 (9th Cir. 1995)).)
22 Petitioner argues that this is “incorrect or, at minimum, requires further factual development.”
23 (ECF No. 9 at 3.) Respondents also argue that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
24 remedies as to this claim. (ECF No. 8 at 4.)
25 Section 2241 “does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before
26 filing petitions for habeas corpus.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004).
27 However, “[a]s a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available
28 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678
1 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Because exhaustion is not required by statute, it is not
2 jurisdictional. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by
3 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995) (citing Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. CHG Int’l, Inc.,
4 811 F.2d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir. 1987)). If a petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the
5 district court, in its discretion, may “determine whether to excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach
6 the merits or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in
7 court.” Id. “Courts may require prudential exhaustion if (1) agency expertise makes agency
8 consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of
9 the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3)
10 administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the
11 need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation
12 and quotation marks omitted).
13 Under the circumstances of this case, this Court finds that petitioner should not be excused
14 from exhausting administrative remedies. See Buckley v. Chestnut, 2026 WL 1030931, at *2-4
15 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2026) (court declined to waive the prudential exhaustion requirements
16 because petitioner’s appeal of his Matter of Joseph hearing was pending). At a Joseph hearing,
17 petitioner “may avoid mandatory detention by demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not
18 convicted of the predicate crime, or that the INS is otherwise substantially unlikely to establish
19 that he is in fact subject to mandatory detention.” See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3
20 (2003) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(h)(2)(ii) (2002)). The Joseph hearing process enables petitioner to
21 challenge his mandatory detention under § 1226(c), and the immigration court has the expertise
22 necessary to develop the record and reach a proper decision. Relaxing the exhaustion
23 requirement under these circumstances would encourage others to bypass the administrative
24 exhaustion process. Finally, in this case administrative review is likely to allow the agency to
25 correct its own mistakes and thus avoid the need for judicial review.
26 “If a petitioner fails to exhaust prudentially required administrative remedies, then ‘a
27 district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the
28 proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies,’” unless exhaustion is excused.
1 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d
2 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011)). Petitioner has provided no argument as to why exhaustion should be
3 excused under the circumstances of his case. Therefore, this Court finds that petitioner’s claim
4 challenging his mandatory detention under § 1226(c) should be dismissed without prejudice
5 based on petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
6 B. Prolonged Detention
7 Petitioner raises a Fifth Amendment due process claim for prolonged detention that
8 exceeds six months. (See ECF No. 1 at 5-6; ECF No. 9 at. 4-5.) For the purposes of analyzing
9 petitioner’s prolonged detention claim, this Court assumes without deciding that petitioner is
10 detained pursuant to § 1226(c).
11 While the Supreme Court has rejected a facial challenge to mandatory detention under
12 § 1226(c) in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), an as applied challenge is not foreclosed and
13 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Demore specifically noted that “since the Due Process
14 Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful permanent resident alien such as [Kim]
15 could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if
16 the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.” Id. at 532. In addition, “[t]he Ninth
17 Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens
18 detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).” Loba L.M. v. Andrews, et al., No. 1:25-cv-0611 JLT SAB,
19 2025 WL 2939178, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025
20 WL 3187577 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025); see Avilez, 69 F.4th at 538 (declining to determine
21 whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(c)).
22 “Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process requires a bond
23 hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the First, Second, and Third Circuits
24 have found that ‘the Due Process Clause imposes some form of ‘reasonableness’ limitation upon
25 the duration of detention . . . under [section 1226(c)].’” Loba L.M., 2025 WL 2939178, at *5
26 (quoting Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021); citing Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133,
27 138 (2d Cir. 2024) (“conclud[ing] that a noncitizen's constitutional right to due process precludes
28 his unreasonably prolonged detention under section 1226(c) without a bond hearing”); German
1 Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that
2 after Demore and Jennings, petitioners detained pursuant to § 1226(c) can still bring as-applied
3 challenges to their detention and that due process affords them a bond hearing once detention
4 becomes unreasonable)). “[E]ssentially all district courts that have considered the issue agree that
5 prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, ‘will—at
6 some point—violate the right to due process.’” Martinez v. Clark, No. 2:18-cv-01669-RAJ, 2019
7 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL
8 5962685 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019) (citation omitted); see also Loba L.M., 2025 WL 2939178,
9 at *5. This Court joins other courts that have found that unreasonably prolonged detention
10 pursuant to § 1226(c) without a bond hearing can violate due process. See Keo v. Chestnut, et al.,
11 No. 1:26-cv-1192 DJC CSK, 2026 WL 747117, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2026); Loba L.M., 2025
12 WL 2939178, at *5.
13 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life,
14 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is clear that
15 commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due
16 process protection.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). “[T]he Due Process Clause
17 applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is
18 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. “The Due Process
19 clause applies to noncitizens in this country in connection with removal proceedings, even if their
20 presence is unlawful or temporary.” Tinoco v. Noem, 2025 WL 3567862, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
21 14, 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).
22 The Court analyzes petitioner’s due process claim “in two steps: the first asks whether
23 there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines
24 the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with
25 the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing
26 Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). The Court concludes
27 that petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his freedom from detention. See Keo, 2026 WL
28 747117, at *2 (concluding clear liberty interest in freedom from detention where petitioner was
1 detained pursuant to § 1226(c) for over 37 months). Petitioner has been detained over ten months
2 since August 2025 and faces prolonged detention during his appeal to the BIA and further
3 potential judicial review. This also exceeds the time period the Supreme Court noted in Demore:
4 “the detention at stake under § 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of
5 cases in which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which the alien
6 chooses to appeal.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 530.
7 Next, the Court turns to what procedures are necessary to ensure that the deprivation of
8 the protected liberty interest meets the demands of the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit has
9 “regularly applied Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to due process challenges to
10 removal proceedings.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022); see also
11 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in
12 immigration detention context). In applying the Mathews test to a procedural due process claim
13 challenging immigration detention, the Ninth Circuit explained that “Mathews remains a flexible
14 test that can and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the immigration
15 detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F. 4th at 1206-07 (citations omitted). Under Mathews,
16 the Court considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous
17 deprivation; and (3) the government’s interest.4 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
18 First, petitioner has a clear interest in remaining free from detention. “Freedom from
19 imprisonment -- from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint -- lies at
20 the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing
21 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty
22 protected by the Due Process Clause.); Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 981 (“[T]he government’s
23
24 4 “District courts within this Circuit have adopted a variety of multi-factor tests for determining
at what point a noncitizen detained pursuant to a mandatory detention statute is constitutionally
25
entitled to a bond hearing.” Mohammed v. Warden of California City Detention Center, No.
1:26-cv-0118 DJC CSK, 2026 WL 192368, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2026) (applying Matthews
26
test to prolonged detention claim under § 1225(b)(1)). Cf. Keo, 2026 WL 747117, at *2
27 (applying seven factor test from Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *7, to prolonged detention claim
under § 1226(c)). As the considerations in the various multi-factor tests are relevant to the due
28 process analysis, the Court will address them within the Mathews framework.
1 discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.”).
2 While petitioner’s detention for over ten months is not as lengthy as other similar cases, the
3 length of future detention is unknown and indefinite where his appeal to the BIA is pending and
4 was received on April 27, 2026, he does not yet have a final removal order, and further judicial
5 review is available after the BIA appeal. (See ECF No. 8-1 at 3.) In addition, though the record
6 before the Court indicates that petitioner requested two continuances of his removal proceedings
7 in September 2025 and December 2025, the record does not indicate whether the continuances
8 were granted, for how long any such continuances resulted in delay, and whether the government
9 requested any continuance or caused any delays. (See ECF No. 8 at 2; ECF No. 8-1 at 3.) The
10 first factor therefore weighs in petitioner’s favor.
11 Second, “[t]he risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the petitioner]
12 has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing.” See A.E. v. Andrews, 2025 WL
13 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025). Civil immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in
14 purpose and effect[,]” is typically justified under the Due Process Clause only when a noncitizen
15 presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Padilla v.
16 ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Here, petitioner has been detained for over
17 ten months since August 22, 2025 without a bond hearing to evaluate whether petitioner is a flight
18 risk or a danger to the community. (ECF No. 8-1 at 3.) It is not this Court’s role to determine
19 whether petitioner is a danger or flight risk, and a neutral arbiter may very well determine that
20 petitioner is a danger given his criminal history or a flight risk.
21 As to the third Mathews factor, this Court recognizes that the government has an interest
22 in enforcing immigration laws and in public safety, but respondent’s interest in detaining
23 petitioner without a hearing is “low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal.
24 Nov. 19, 2019); Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025). Detention
25 hearings in immigration courts are routine and impose a “minimal cost.” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at
26 1094. Overall, balancing these factors, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing
27 under the Due Process Clause where he has been detained for over ten months, his appeal to the
28 BIA was recently filed and is still pending, and the length of his future detention is unknown
1 where further judicial review is available and the removal order is not yet final. See also Jose G.
2 M. L. v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention Facility, et al., No. 1:26-cv-0047 TLN
3 EFB, 2026 WL 472987, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2026) (granting preliminary injunctive relief for
4 a bond hearing where the petitioner’s detention under § 1226(c) exceeded six months). Because
5 this Court recommends petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing based on his due process claim, the
6 Court does not address Respondents’ assertion his detention is separately mandated by 8 U.S.C.
7 § 1225(b). (ECF No. 8 at 6-7.)
8 C. Petitioner’s Other Claims for Relief (Claims Two and Four)
9 Because the Court recommends granting the petition on the due process claim (claims one
10 and three), the Court need not address any additional claims (claims two and four) raised in the
11 petition. See N.K. v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-0292 KES SAB, 2026 WL 130345, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
12 16, 2026); Constantinovici v. Bondi, No. 3:25-cv-2405 RBM AHG, 2025 WL 2898985, at *7
13 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025). Petitioner is entitled to the habeas relief he seeks based on the Court’s
14 findings and recommendations as to claims one and three.
15 V. CONCLUSION
16 In summary, the Court recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be
17 dismissed without prejudice in part and granted in part on the due process claim (claims one and
18 three).
19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
20 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT
21 PREJUDICE IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART.
22 2. Respondents be ordered to provide petitioner Jose Eduardo Lima (A-078-063-984)
23 with a bond hearing before an immigration judge/ neutral decisionmaker within seven
24 (7) days of the adoption of these findings and recommendations where respondents
25 bear the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner poses
26 a danger to the community or a risk of flight to justify his continued detention.
27 3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Petitioner and close
28 this case.
] These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
2 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days of
3 || the date of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the
4 || Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to
5 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be
6 || filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that
7 || failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District
8 | Court’s order. See Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
9
10 || Dated: July 2, 2026 4 aA
Aan Spe |
CHI SOO KIM
V2 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
13
14 | Aima.3753.2241.imm/9
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1]