Hanson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

April Hanson,

Plaintiff,

25-CV-8518 (AS)

-against-

Corsearch, Inc., OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant.

ARUN SUBRAMANIAN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff April Hanson alleges that she was sexually assaulted by a former colleague when

she worked at Corsearch, and that Corsearch subjected her to a gender-based hostile work

environment. Dkt. 1 ¶ 1. Although the alleged sexual assault and subsequent investigation occurred

in Europe, Corsearch has filed a motion to transfer this case to the United States District Court for

the District of Idaho, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Dkt. 22. That motion is DENIED.

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may

transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought . . . .”

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). To transfer, two factors must be satisfied. “First, the transferee district must

be one where jurisdiction over the defendant could have been obtained at the time suit was brought,

regardless of defendant’s consent.” Dickerson v. Novartis Corp., 315 F.R.D. 18, 26 (S.D.N.Y.

2016) (quotation marks omitted). “Second, the transfer must be in the interest of justice and

convenience of the parties and witnesses.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

“[T]he Court must evaluate the following factors to determine whether to grant a motion

to transfer venue: (1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the

location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (4) the locus of

operative facts; (5) the availability of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6)

the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight

accorded the plaintiff’s choice of forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the interests of justice.” Id. at

27 (quotation omitted). “[T]he burden is on the movant to show that transfer is justified” clearly

and convincingly. Xiu Feng Li v. Hock, 371 F. App’x 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2010).

No one disputes that this case could have been brought in the District of Idaho, so the Court

focuses on factors bearing on whether the transfer is in the interests of justice and convenience of

the parties and witnesses.

Corsearch has not clearly and convincingly shown that transfer is justified. First, Corsearch

says that the convenience of the witnesses favors transfer to Idaho because Hanson lives in Idaho,

her treatment providers are in Idaho, and her husband is a likely witness who apparently resides in

Idaho. Dkt. 23 at 7, 8. Hanson responds that of the six non-party witnesses included in the parties’

initial disclosures, four are in Europe, one is in Mississippi, and only one is in Idaho. Dkt. 25 at 4–

5. Hanson is correct that New York is more convenient than Idaho for the witnesses based in

Europe, who seem to have the most material testimony about the alleged sexual assault and

investigation. Dkt. 25 at 6; see Herbert Ltd. P’ship v. Elec. Arts Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286

(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he court must qualitatively evaluate the materiality of the testimony that the

witnesses may provide.”). So Corsearch hasn’t shown that the convenience of non-party witnesses

favors Idaho over New York.

Second, Corsearch says the convenience of the parties favors transfer because Hanson lives

in Idaho. Dkt. 23 at 9. But Corsearch’s national headquarters is in New York. Dkt. 1 ¶ 8. So this

factor doesn’t favor transfer. SBAV LP v. Porter Bancorp, Inc., 2013 WL 3467030, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.

July 10, 2013) (“A defendant moving for transfer must show . . . that the original forum is

inconvenient for it.” (quoting 15 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice

and Procedure § 3849 (3d ed. 2007))).

Third, Corsearch claims that the locus of operative facts is in Idaho, not New York, because

Hanson received treatment in Idaho and says she was constructively discharged while in Idaho.

Dkt. 23 at 10–11. But the real locus of operative facts is in Europe, where the alleged “assaults and

the company’s subsequent investigation occurred,” Dkt. 25 at 7; see Bare Body Laser Spa, Inc. v.

Billings, 2024 WL 3445333, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2024) (focusing on “[t]he ‘center of gravity’

of th[e] case”). So this factor is neutral.

Corsearch highlights that Hanson’s choice of forum should be afforded minimal (if any)

deference because Hanson lives in Idaho, lacks any connection to this district, and because “this

litigation has no meaningful connection to New York.” Dkt. 23 at 6–8. But Hanson says that some

“decisions related to [Corsearch’s] investigation and remedial actions occurred in New York”

because Corsearch’s New York-based CEO, Abel Clark, determined “how to respond to reports

that his Chief Revenue Officer sexually assaulted [Hanson].” Dkt. 25 at 1, 7. (Corsearch responds

that Clark “is not a witness” and wasn’t a decisionmaker, Dkt. 28 at 2, but bare assertions without

supporting evidence are insufficient on a motion where Corsearch bears the burden.) This suggests

that the Court should afford some deference to Hanson’s choice of forum. That said, this is not

Hanson’s home forum, and most of the key operative facts occurred in Europe. So Hanson’s choice

of forum is entitled to minimal weight. See Dickerson, 315 F.R.D. at 32 (“Where the forum

selected is not plaintiff’s home forum or the place where the operative facts of the action occurred,

. . . this diminishes the weight assigned to this factor.” (quotations omitted)).

The remaining factors don’t move the needle. Corsearch has failed to show there are

relevant physical documents located in Idaho that can’t easily be scanned electronically. The trial

efficiency factor is neutral “in the early stages of litigation” and with “no other litigation [that]

appears to be pending.” Hummingbird USA v. Tex. Guaranteed Student Loan Corp., 2007 WL

163111, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2007). And the relative-means factor may slightly favor transfer,

but “this factor has rarely been a dispositive reason to grant or deny a transfer motion, and is not

so here.” Schoenefeld v. New York, 2009 WL 1069159, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2009) (quotations

omitted). Next, while Corsearch says the witnesses in England are former employees and Hanson

“has not established that she will be able to get them into the U’S. to testify at all,” Dkt. 28 at 2,

that argument flips the applicable burden. See Wistron Neweb Corp. v. Genesis Networks Telecom

Servs., LLC, 2022 WL 17067984, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2022) (“For this factor to have weight

... [movants] would have to show . . . that [the potential witnesses] would be unwilling to testify

without a subpoena.”). Finally, Hanson’s claims “raise questions of federal law” under Title VII,

“which either forum is equally capable of deciding,” Dickerson, 315 F.R.D. at 32, and Corsearch

hasn’t shown that Hanson’s state-law claim “turns on nuanced issues of [Idaho] state law that [an

Idaho court] is materially more qualified to apply than a [New York] court would be,” Everlast

World’s Boxing Headquarters Corp. v. Ringside, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 735, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

The balance of factors doesn’t point strongly in either direction. In other words, Corsearch

has failed to show that transfer is clearly and convincingly justified. So the motion to transfer

venue is DENIED. And Corsearch’s motion to stay discovery until the Court resolves the motion

to transfer is DENIED AS MOOT.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions at Dkts. 22 and 33.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 21, 2026

New York, New York

ARUN SUBRAMANIAN

United States District Judge