Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 FLOR MARIA GARCIA RODRIGUEZ Case No. 1:26-cv-2886-TLN-JDP

(A-Number: 204-680-859),

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Petitioner,

13 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

v.

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WARDEN OF THE CALIFORNIA CITY

15 DETENTION FACILITY,

16 Respondent.

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18 Petitioner Flor Maria Garcia Rodriguez entered the United States at an unknown time and

19 was detained by ICE in 2025. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under

20 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondent argues that petitioner has not exhausted her administrative

21 remedies. For the following reasons, I recommend that the petition be dismissed.

22 Background

23 Petitioner entered the United States at an unknown time. ECF No. 7-1 at 2. There is no

24 allegation or evidence that, prior to her present detention, petitioner has been detained. Petitioner

25 previously benefited from Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, but that has since expired. Id.

26 In June 2019, petitioner was arrested for burglary of a vehicle. ECF No. 7-4 at 6. She was later

27 convicted of this crime. Id. at 8.

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1 In September 2025, petitioner was detained by ICE. Id. In December 2025, petitioner

2 was afforded a bond hearing. ECF No. 7-4. While recognizing that the immigration court might

3 not have jurisdiction to conduct petitioner’s bond hearing, the immigration judge held that “[i]n

4 the event that the court has jurisdiction, the court denies bond as [petitioner] is a danger to the

5 community.” Id. at 1. Specifically, the immigration judge found that while petitioner denied

6 having a criminal history, she has been convicted of burglary of a vehicle, and that when

7 petitioner was asked about the crime, she “stated she had forgotten about this conviction.” Id.

8 Accordingly, the immigration judge found that petitioner failed to meet her burden of establishing

9 that she is not a danger to the community. Id. Petitioner waived her right to appeal that order.

10 Id. at 2.

11 Legal Standard

12 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates

13 federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75

14 (2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of

15 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”

16 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a

17 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.

18 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of

19 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have

20 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction

21 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

22 Analysis

23 Petitioner claims that her detention violates the Fifth Amendment.1 ECF No. 1 at 6.

24 Respondent counters that the petition should be dismissed because, by not appealing the

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1 Petitioner also challenges the conditions of her detention. ECF No. 1 at 6-12. A habeas

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petition, however, is not the “proper mechanism” for such a claim. See Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d

27 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Habeas corpus proceedings are the proper mechanism for a prisoner to

challenge the legality or duration of confinement. A civil rights action, in contrast, is the proper

28 method of challenging conditions of confinement.”) (cleaned up).

1 immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), petitioner has not

2 exhausted her administrative remedies under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). ECF No. 7 at 2-4, 6-8.

3 “The exhaustion requirement is prudential, rather than jurisdictional, for habeas claims.”

4 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). To decide whether exhaustion is

5 required, courts consider the Puga factors to determine if:

6 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to

generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation

7 of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the

administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to

8 allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the

need for judicial review.

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10 Id. (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)).

11 Where a court finds that the petitioner fails to exhaust prudentially required administrative

12 remedies, it “ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the

13 proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies.” Id. (quoting Leonardo v. Crawford, 646

14 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)). However, even if a consideration of the Puga factors favors

15 prudential exhaustion, a court may nonetheless waive exhaustion if “administrative remedies are

16 inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture,

17 irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Id. (quoting

18 Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). I begin by considering the Puga factors

19 in turn.

20 First, I do not find that “agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to

21 generate a proper record and reach a proper decision.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. The IJ

22 provided a written decision, and respondent does not argue that BIA consideration is necessary to

23 generate a proper record. See ECF No. 7-4 at 1-2; ECF No. 7. Where, as here, the petitioner is

24 entitled to a bond hearing under section 1226, courts have found that the first Puga factor weighs

25 against prudential exhaustion. See Okoth v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-1936-KES-SAB, 2026 WL

26 45199, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2026); Hernandez Burruel v. Murray, No. 1:25-cv-1569-DAD-AC,

27 2025 WL 3240356, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025).

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1 Second, I find that “relaxation of the [exhaustion] requirement would encourage the

2 deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. Indeed,

3 “[g]ranting petitioner’s requested relief would ‘bypass’ the administrative scheme under

4 § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations.” See Okoth, 2026 WL 45199, at *3 (finding that the

5 second Puga factor weighs in favor of prudential exhaustion). Notably, the Court of Appeals has

6 held that section 1226’s procedures facially satisfy due process. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53

7 F.4th 1189, 1213 (9th Cir. 2022). While the Court of Appeals did not foreclose as-applied

8 challenges, petitioner does not argue that section 1226’s procedures violate her due process rights.

9 See id.; ECF No. 1. I find that “relaxing the exhaustion requirements in this case would

10 encourage others to immediately seek habeas review if they deem the federal courts to be a more

11 sympathetic forum.” See Martinez v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-1538-TSZ-GJL, 2025 WL 2689844, at

12 *5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2689066 (W.D.

13 Wash. Sept. 19, 2025).

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1 Third, I find that “administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own

2 mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. The

3 BIA “has the authority to correct . . . erroneous factual determinations and evidentiary errors.”

4 See Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *5 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii)). There is no

5 indication in the record that the BIA would decline to exercise jurisdiction over petitioner’s

6 appeal. Indeed, as noted, the immigration judge decided petitioner’s custody status on the merits.

7 Under these circumstances, I find that the third factor weighs in favor of prudential exhaustion.

8 Accordingly, while the first factor weighs against prudential exhaustion, the second and

9 third factors support the finding that petitioner has failed to exhaust prudentially required

10 administrative remedies.

11 As noted, a court may waive exhaustion if “administrative remedies are inadequate or not

12 efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will

13 result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Id. To the extent that petitioner argues

14 that the BIA will not provide effective relief, I disagree. As the court in Martinez held when

15 considering a similar argument:

16 Even assuming arguendo Petitioner had shown that immediate

federal judicial review of his claims would be more efficient, this is

17 not the same as demonstrating that the available administrative

processes are inadequate and inefficient. Indeed, a version of

18 Petitioner’s argument could be made by virtually every litigant

attempting to bypass the administrative process by proceeding

19 directly to the federal courts. Permitting Petitioner to avoid the

administrative scheme based solely on the additional time required

20 to pursue administrative remedies would create an exception to

exhaustion that would swallow the rule.

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22 Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *6 (emphasis in original).

23 I agree with the analysis in Martinez and find that petitioner has not established that her

24 “administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988.

25 Petitioner therefore has not demonstrated that the court should waive the exhaustion requirement.

26 Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed without prejudice. See

27 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 (holding that a petition may be dismissed without prejudice where

28 the petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies); Okoth, 2026 WL 45199, at *4

1 | (dismissing the petition because the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies);

2 | Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *7 (same).

3 Conclusion

4 Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

5 1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be dismissed without

6 || prejudice.

7 2. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.

8 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

9 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of

10 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the

11 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to

12 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed

13 | within fourteen days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

14 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See

15 |) Turner vy. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

16 | 1991).

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18 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ June 25, 2026 Q_——_

20 JEREMY D. PETERSON

51 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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