The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ROBERT A. RIVAS CAMPOS (A# 244- No. 1:26-cv-01330 DJC SCR
851-525),
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Petitioner,
13 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
v.
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CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al.,
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Respondents.
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18 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee who is proceeding through counsel with this
19 habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The matter was referred to a United States
20 Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. For the reasons
21 provided below, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s detention of nearly thirteen months is
22 excessive in relation to the purposes of such detention and therefore violates substantive due
23 process. Petitioner should be released from Respondents’ custody, subject to reasonable
24 conditions of release.
25 I. Factual and Procedural History
26 A. Section 2241 Petition
27 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela who fled the country with his partner and
28 two children to seek asylum in the United States. ECF No. 1 at 2, ¶ 2. On or around December
1 18, 2024, the family appeared for an appointment at the El Paso (Texas) Port of Entry he
2 scheduled through the CBP One app. Id. ¶ 3; ECF No. 2 at 6. Customs and Border Protection
3 (“CBP”) officials charged Petitioner as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for
4 lacking a valid entry document, and placed him in standard removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §
5 1229a. ECF No. 2 at 8-11. Petitioner received a notice to appear (“NTA”) before an immigration
6 judge (“IJ”) on April 7, 2027. CBP granted him humanitarian parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
7 1182(d)(5), allowing him to enter the United States lawfully. ECF No. 2 at 8.
8 On or around June 1, 2025, the Euless (Texas) Police Department arrested Petitioner for
9 public intoxication, Tex. Pen. Code § 49.02.1 ECF No. 1 at 15, ¶¶ 64-65; ECF No. 2 at 12. On
10 June 3, 2025, Petitioner was transferred to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
11 custody and detained at the Prairieland Immigration Detention Center. ECF No. 2 at 3-4.
12 Petitioner has remained in immigration detention since then and is currently held at the California
13 City Detention Center, within this judicial district. ECF No. 1 at 5, ¶ 16. Petitioner’s public
14 intoxication charge remains pending, as he has been unable to appear in Texas Court to contest it.
15 Id. at 16, ¶ 66.
16 On December 29, 2025, at about the six-month mark of his detention, Petitioner received a
17 bond hearing before an IJ pursuant to Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).2
18 ECF No. 1 at 16-17, ¶¶ 77-79; ECF No. 10-3. The government bore the burden of establishing
19 Petitioner’s flight or danger risk by clear and convincing evidence and submitted several exhibits,
20 including Petitioner’s NTA, Form I-213 (“Record of Deportable or Inadmissible Alien”), and
21 Form I-589 (application for asylum and withholding of removal). ECF No. 17-1 at 1-2.
22 Petitioner was represented by counsel and offered character declarations from his cousin/sponsor,
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1 “The offense of public intoxication is a Class C misdemeanor . . . punishable ‘by a fine not to
24 exceed $500.’” Graham v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 288 F. Supp. 3d 711, 743 (N.D. Tex. 2017).
2 In Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub. nom.
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Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Ninth Circuit granted a preliminary injunction to
putative subclasses of noncitizens subject to mandatory detention statutes, including 8 U.S.C. §
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1225(b), seeking individualized bond hearings after their detention had become prolonged. The
27 Court held the § 1225(b) subclass was “likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that §
1225(b) must be construed to authorize only six months of mandatory detention, after which
28 detention is authorized by § 1226(a) and a bond hearing is required.” Id. at 1144.
1 partner, and other supporters, as well as records pertaining to his misdemeanor proceedings in
2 Texas. Id. at 2.
3 The IJ found that the Petitioner was a flight risk and declined Petitioner’s request to
4 testify. ECF No. 17-1 at 10. After Petitioner’s counsel requested the IJ’s reasoning to aid in
5 appeal, the IJ explained:
6 [T]he court does not find that the . . . ties to the United States
are sufficiently strong. He’s only been in the United States
7 for a very short period of time . . . does not have any property.
The … family is limited to a female cousin, and the [] DHS
8 filed a copy of the I-589. Whether or not that gets granted, I
don’t know. But . . . there’s sparse detail in that. [O]n this
9 record, there’s insufficient evidence to show that the
respondent has a clear pathway to relief. [S]o those are . . .
10 some of the court’s concerns. Also . . . it’s not helpful that he
got himself arrested. I’m not making a danger finding, but
11 that’s not helpful to . . . flight risk either. [S]o those are . . .
some of the court’s reasons.
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Id. (cleaned up). After argument, the IJ issued a short, written decision that read in full: “DHS
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met its burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant’s release would
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pose such a significant flight risk that no amount of bond and/or alternatives to detention would
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be appropriate.” ECF No. 10-3 at 1. Citing futility, Petitioner acknowledges he did not appeal
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the ruling to the BIA. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 99-101. According to the EOIR automated system,
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Petitioner was ordered removed on May 28, 2026, and reserved appeal. The deadline to appeal
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the order of removal to the BIA is June 29, 2026.3
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Petitioner filed this habeas action on February 16, 2026, raising four claims. First, he
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contends his detention violates substantive due process because it is punitive and unrelated to a
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legitimate risk of flight or danger. ECF No. 1 at 19-20. Petitioner next alleges his detention
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without valid parole revocation violates procedural due process. Id. at 20-21. Petitioner’s third
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claim alleges that his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without valid revocation of parole
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violates the INA. Id. at 21-22. Finally, his fourth claim challenges the legal adequacy of his
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bond hearing. Id. at 22. By way of relief, Petitioner requests immediate release and an order
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3 The undersigned takes judicial notice of Petitioner’s EOIR case information page,
28 https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)-(c).
1 enjoining his re-detention absent a pre-deprivation hearing. Id. at 22-23.
2 Respondents oppose the petition and assert that Petitioner is subject to mandatory
3 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and received proper notice of his parole revocation per 8
4 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). ECF No. 10 at 3-4. Respondents further argue that Petitioner has no
5 substantive liberty interest as an applicant for admission under § 1225(b). Id. at 4-6. Finally,
6 respondents argue that Petitioner received a lawful bond hearing, and that he has waived any
7 argument that the IJ erred in denying his release by failing to timely appeal to the BIA. Id. at 6-7.
8 B. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
9 Petitioner filed a motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”) on February 17, 2026,
10 tracking the petition’s procedural due process (Count 2) and bond hearing (Count 4) claims. ECF
11 No. 7. District Judge Calabretta denied the TRO motion on March 4, 2026, writing that Petitioner
12 had not established an abuse of discretion by the IJ. ECF No. 12. Judge Calabretta did not
13 consider Petitioner’s procedural due process claim, explaining that “[t]he remedy for any
14 violations of Petitioner’s parole revocation would be a deprivation hearing, and because Petitioner
15 was given a hearing, the Court considers only the constitutionality of the hearing he received in
16 December 2025.” Id. at 3, n.1.
17 C. Post-TRO Briefing
18 Following Judge Calabretta’s referral, the undersigned requested additional briefing on
19 why the TRO order should not dictate the outcome of the merits of the § 2241 petition. ECF No.
20 13. Petitioner clarified that he seeks an order that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),
21 “because such holding will allow Petitioner, at a minimum, to seek custody redetermination
22 request based on materially changed circumstances.” ECF No. 14 at 2. Petitioner also reiterates
23 that respondents’ revocation of his parole violates due process and that the post-deprivation
24 hearing he received was inadequate to remedy such a violation. Id. at 2, 8. Regarding his
25 substantive due process claim, Petitioner alleges that his detention “is not related to any
26 permissible basis for civil detention” and that he received a “wholly inadequate custody hearing.”
27 ECF No. 14 at 8. Petitioner adds that he has “no scheduled hearing date and no assigned
28 immigration judge,” and likely faces further prolonged detention due to the uncertainty of his
1 removal proceedings and the appeals that will follow.4 Id. Petitioner also provides more context
2 for the length of his detention, explaining that he was previously ordered removed to Uganda
3 (over his objections) but that DHS has since then reopened his removal proceedings. Id. at 8.
4 Respondents counter that Judge Calabretta’s TRO ruling should dictate the outcome of
5 Petitioner’s procedural due process, substantive due process, and INA claims. ECF No. 15 at 2.
6 “Judge Calabretta concisely explained that even assuming Petitioner’s parole revocation was a
7 statutory or constitutional violation, which Respondents dispute, Petitioner received the remedy
8 for any such violation.” Id. Regarding Petitioner’s fourth claim challenging his bond hearing,
9 Respondents argue Judge Calabretta properly concluded that the IJ did not abuse his discretion in
10 finding the government satisfied its burden of proving Petitioner was a flight risk. Id.
11 II. Legal Standards
12 A. Constitutional Standards
13 The Supreme Court has held that “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within
14 the United States, including [non-citizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
15 temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). Similarly, Ninth
16 Circuit precedent holds that the Due Process Clause applies to noncitizens regardless of whether
17 they are “seeking admission” or are “admitted” under immigration law. Wong v. United States,
18 373 F.3d 952, 973 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S.
19 537 (2007); see also Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 412 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“If
20 excludable [non-citizens] were not protected by even the substantive component of constitutional
21 due process, ... we do not see why the United States government could not torture or summarily
22 execute them. ... [W]e conclude that government treatment of excludable [noncitizens] must
23 implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”). The Due Process Clause “protects
24 individuals against two types of government action: violations of substantive due process and
25 procedural due process.” United States v. Quintero, 995 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal
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27 4 As noted above, the EOIR system indicates that Petitioner was ordered removed in late May
2026. It thus appears that an IJ was ultimately assigned to his case and presided over an
28 individual merits hearing in immigration court.
1 quotation omitted). As a matter of substantive due process, governmental action may only
2 infringe a fundamental right if “the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
3 interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
4 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first step is determining
5 whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause. The second step
6 examines the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest
7 accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
8 460 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due
9 process applies, the question remains what process is due.”). In deciding what process is due to
10 immigration detainees, the Ninth Circuit has assumed, without deciding, that the three-part test
11 articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), applies. See Rodriguez Diaz v.
12 Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2022). Under Mathews, the court considers three
13 factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest;
14 and (3) the government’s interest involved including any fiscal or administrative burden that
15 additional procedures would include. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
16 An as-applied challenge “contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the
17 litigant's particular [circumstances], even though the law may be capable of valid application to
18 others.” Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
19 B. Statutory and Regulatory Immigration Framework
20 A non-citizen taken into custody at or near the border without valid entry documents is
21 normally ordered removed “without further hearing or review” pursuant to an expedited removal
22 process. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if such non-citizen “indicates either an intention to
23 apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution,” then that non-citizen is referred for an asylum
24 interview. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). While awaiting this credible fear interview, the non-
25 citizen is to remain detained. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). If an immigration officer
26 determines after that interview that the non-citizen has a credible fear of persecution, “the [non-
27 citizen] shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. §
28 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). At that point, the asylum applicant will receive full consideration of the asylum
1 claim in a standard removal hearing.
2 Non-citizens who are instead covered by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a different
3 process. Those noncitizens “shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title”
4 if an immigration officer “determines that [they are] not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
5 admitted’ into the country.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). “Read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and
6 (b)(2) thus mandate detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have
7 concluded. Section 1225(b)(1) [non-citizens] are detained for ‘further consideration of the
8 application for asylum,’ and § 1225(b)(2) [non-citizens] are in turn detained for [removal]
9 proceeding[s].” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297.
10 The statutory mechanism for release of a noncitizen detained under either § 1225(b)(1) or
11 § 1225(b)(2) is temporary release on parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public
12 benefit.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)); see also 8 C.F.R §§
13 212.5(b), 235.3. Such parole, however, “shall not be regarded as an admission of the [non-
14 citizen].” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Instead, when the purpose of the parole has been served,
15 “the [non-citizen] shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled
16 and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other
17 applicant for admission to the United States.” Id.
18 Under a DHS regulation, humanitarian parole is “justified only on a case-by-case basis for
19 ‘urgent humanitarian reasons’ or ‘significant public benefit,’ provided the [noncitizens] present
20 neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). With regard to
21 termination of parole, the regulation states that “[p]arole shall be automatically terminated
22 without written notice (i) upon the departure from the United States of the [noncitizen], or, (ii) if
23 not departed, at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized[.]”5 8 C.F.R. §
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5 The undersigned changed “alien” to “noncitizen” in these passages. This has become
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commonplace among jurists at the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit in recent years. See Patel v.
Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022) (Barrett, J.); United States v. Palomar-Santiago, 593 U.S. 321
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(2021) (Sotomayor, J.); Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222, 226 n.2, (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.) (“This
27 opinion uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’”) (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(3); Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525 (9th Cir. 2023); Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796
28 (9th Cir. 2018).
1 212.5(e)(1). In all other cases, “upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was
2 authorized or when . . . neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the continued
3 presence of the [noncitizen] in the United States, parole shall be terminated upon written notice to
4 the [noncitizen] and he or she shall be restored to the status that he or she had at the time of
5 parole.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). “When a charging document is served on the [noncitizen], the
6 charging document will constitute written notice of termination of parole[.]” Id.
7 III. Analysis
8 A. Applicable Detention Statute
9 “Where a [noncitizen] falls within [the] statutory scheme can affect whether his detention
10 is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes
11 to contest the necessity of his detention.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir.
12 2008). Respondents contend that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §
13 1225(b)(2), ECF No. 10 at 3, whereas Petitioner states his detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. §
14 1226(a), ECF No. 14 at 2.
15 Based on Petitioner’s placement in removal proceedings under § 1229a, his parole under §
16 1182(d)(5), and receipt of a Robbins hearing, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner is
17 detained under § 1225(b).6 He remains subject to that provision given that his order of removal is
18 not administratively final. See Avilez, 69 F.4th at 531 (detention shifts to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 “on
19 the latest of either (1) the date a noncitizen’s ‘order of removal becomes administratively final,’
20 (2) the date of a court’s final order, if the noncitizen’s removal order is judicially reviewed and
21 [the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals] stays the noncitizen’s removal, or (3) the date the noncitizen
22 is released from criminal detention or confinement.”) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).
23 Section 1225(b) is a “mandatory” detention statute under which a bond hearing is not authorized
24 by statute or regulation. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288.
25 6 Petitioner’s initial NTA does not reflect an asylum application or that Petitioner was placed on
the 1225(b)(1) track. See ECF No. 2 at 8. His detention, at least initially, was then governed by §
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1225(b)(2). See Innovation L. Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 2019) (“All
27 applicants for admission who are not processed for expedited removal are placed in regular
removal proceedings under § 1225(b)(2)(A). That process generally entails a hearing before an
28 immigration judge pursuant to § 1229a.”).
1 Petitioner’s arguments for § 1226(a) are unavailing. As Petitioner observes (see ECF No.
2 11 at 2, n.1), the Form I-200 used in his arrest does cite INA § 236—i.e., 8 U.S.C. § 1226—as the
3 basis for his re-detention. ECF No. 10-1. Respondents make no effort to explain this
4 discrepancy, which is just one of many errors strewn throughout Petitioner’s immigration record.7
5 But despite the form’s reference to § 1226, by operation of law, the basis of Petitioner’s detention
6 reverted to § 1225(b) upon termination of parole. “[W]hen the purpose of the parole has been
7 served, ‘the [non-citizen] shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was
8 paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any
9 other applicant for admission to the United States.’” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (citing §
10 1182(d)(5)(A)); see also Matter of Castillo-Padilla, 25 I. & N. Dec. 257, 259 (BIA 2010) (“After
11 the purpose of the parole has been served, the [non-citizen] returns to custody, and his or her case
12 is dealt with in the same manner as any other applicant for admission.”). While the Court is
13 sympathetic to Petitioner’s arguments that ICE unlawfully revoked his parole, that does not mean
14 that some other statute now governs his detention.
15 Further, Petitioner’s argument that “[a]n ever-growing chorus of federal courts have found
16 that § 1225(b) is inapplicable where a noncitizen has been paroled into the U.S., the parole has
17 not been revoked, and rearrest occurs” misstates those holdings. ECF No. 1 at 3-4, ¶ 10. Some of
18 the cases Petitioner cites involved an order of release under the Due Process Clause but did not
19 question § 1225(b) as the applicable detention statute. See e.g., Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d
20 1083, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding Petitioner established a likelihood of success in showing
21 “he has an interest in his continued liberty and that mandatory detention under section
22 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) would violate his due process rights unless he is afforded adequate process”).
23 Many others involved a release pursuant to § 1226, not the humanitarian parole of an applicant
24 for admission under § 1182(d)(5). See, e.g., Luis Alberto R.C. v. Murray, No. 1:25-CV-01618-
25 KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3648143, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025); M.K. v. Arteta, No. 25-CV-
26
7 For example, despite Petitioner’s CBP One appointment and release on parole, the Form I-213
27 falsely states that he “illegally entered the United States on December 18, 2024” and is “illegally
present” in the country. See ECF No. 2 at 5-6. The form’s “encounter data” field also reflects the
28 name of a different noncitizen. Id. at 5.
1 9918 (LAK), 2025 WL 3720779, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2025).
2 Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1225(b) and is
3 not entitled to the procedural protections of § 1226(a). For this reason, Petitioner is not entitled to
4 relief on his INA claim (Count 3), which alleges that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) does not lawfully
5 authorize his detention. ECF No. 1 at 21-22, ¶¶ 116-120.
6 B. Procedural Due Process Analysis
7 i. Liberty Interest
8 Respondents argue that Petitioner lacks a protected liberty interest as an “arriving alien.”
9 ECF No. 10 at 4-5. District courts within this Circuit have repeatedly rejected this argument, and
10 the undersigned finds it particularly troubling in the context of a humanitarian parolee who
11 arrived in the United States pursuant to a CBP One appointment and who has developed
12 meaningful ties to the United States. Still, the undersigned will briefly explain why this argument
13 is wholly without merit.
14 First, the undersigned joins other district courts in rejecting Respondents’ argument, based
15 on Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), superseded by statute as
16 recognized by Xi v. I.N.S., 298 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002), that the Due Process Clause does not
17 apply to Petitioner because he has not effected an entry into the United States. ECF No. 10 at 4-
18 5. For instance, in R.A.N.O. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-1535 KES EPG (HC), 2026 WL 40507
19 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2026), a judge of this Court explained that “‘the statute interpreted in Barrera-
20 Echavarria no longer exists,’ and subsequent amendments to the immigration laws ‘introduced an
21 entire set of legal concepts purporting to redefine the “basic territorial distinction” at play in
22 immigration law.’” 2026 WL 40507, *3 (quoting Xi, 298 F.3d at 838)); see also Ortega v. Noem,
23 No. 1:25-cv-1663 DJC CKD, 2025 WL 3511914, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2025) (rejecting
24 government’s “narrow statutory reading,” drawing from Barrera-Echavarria, that “because
25 Petitioner’s legal status is circumscribed by the statutory provision requiring mandatory detention
26 under § 1225(b)(2), the Due Process Clause does not apply”).
27 Second, Respondents’ reliance on Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
28 103, 139 (2020), for a similar proposition is misplaced. The Thuraissigiam Court’s “discussion of
1 due process is necessarily constrained to challenges to admissibility to the United States” and
2 “[t]he Court answered no broader question.” Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F.
3 Supp. 3d 1163, 1171-72 (W.D. Wash. 2023); see also Sadeqi v. LaRose, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1090,
4 1093 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (interpreting Thuraissigiam as “circumscribing an arriving alien’s due
5 process rights to admission, rather than limiting that person’s ability to challenge detention.”)
6 (emphasis in original). Moreover, Thuraissigiam concerned an individual arrested mere yards
7 from the border a short time after entering the United States without inspection, and who DHS
8 had never released into the country, not an individual like Petitioner who, again, was released on
9 humanitarian parole and established meaningful ties to the United States.
10 Instead, the undersigned agrees with other district courts in this Circuit that have found
11 that a noncitizen like Petitioner, who was released on parole into the United States, has a liberty
12 interest in his continued release and is entitled to certain due process protections. See M.B. v.
13 Noem, No. 1:26-cv-0005 DJC AC, 2026 WL 74155, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2026); Chavarria v.
14 Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-1755 DAD AC, 2025 WL 3533606, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025);
15 Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025); see also Rodriguez
16 v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting in case involving § 1225(b) and related
17 statutes that “[a]rbitrary civil detention is not a feature of our American government,” and
18 expressing “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without
19 any process is constitutional”). “[T]he government’s decision to release an individual from
20 custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will
21 be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to the ... conditions [of release].” Pinchi v. Noem, 792
22 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482) (modifications in
23 original). “Accordingly, a noncitizen released from custody pending removal proceedings has a
24 protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-6924
25 EMC, 2025 WL 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025).
26 ii. Procedures Necessary to Safeguard Liberty Interest
27 To be clear, under the Mathews framework, and consistent with Judge Calabretta’s prior
28 decisions on the issue, the undersigned finds that the June 2025 revocation of Petitioner’s parole
1 without notice or pre-deprivation hearing violated procedural due process. See Ortega, 2025 WL
2 3511914, at *3; Torres-Zuluaga v. Wofford, No. 1:26-cv-0318 DJC EFB, 2026 WL 184662, at
3 *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2026); M.B., 2026 WL 74155, at *3. However, Petitioner has already
4 received a remedy for this due process violation, albeit belatedly, in the form of the December
5 2025 bond hearing. As another judge explained in a factually similar case:
6 The fact that a post-deprivation bond hearing may be insufficient to
cure a procedural due process violation at the moment of re-detention
7 does not render the resulting bond decision legally irrelevant . . . .
Accordingly, even assuming a legal error occurred at the outset of
8 Petitioner’s detention, the IJ’s subsequent bond denial supplies a
lawful basis for his detention unless and until Petitioner demonstrates
9 separate legal error invalidating that decision.
10
Singh v. Noem, No. 2:26-cv-0304 GJL, 2026 WL 482389, *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 20, 2026). Thus,
11
the undersigned agrees with Judge Calabretta’s conclusion in his TRO ruling that Petitioner has
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already received a remedy for the violation of his procedural due process rights.8 Accordingly,
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Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his procedural due process claim (Count 2).
14
C. Substantive Due Process Analysis
15
Petitioner also argues his detention violates substantive due process because it does not
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further the government’s legitimate goals of ensuring his appearance during removal proceedings
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and preventing danger to the community. ECF No. 1 at 20, ¶¶ 107-109 (citing Zadvydas, 533
18
U.S. at 690); ECF No. 14 at 8. Respondents do not meaningfully engage with Petitioner’s
19
substantive due process claim and related post-TRO arguments. In their own post-TRO brief,
20
Respondents insist only that the TRO ruling “should control” as to both due process claims. ECF
21
No. 15 at 2. But Petitioner did not raise a substantive due process claim in his TRO. Petitioner
22
23
8 Although a habeas writ does not provide a retrospective remedy for the roughly six months of
24 detention without bond, a claim for damages challenging this period of allegedly unconstitutional
detention is a potential vehicle for Petitioner’s claim. See Lanuza v. Love, 899 F.3d 1019, 1026
25
(9th Cir. 2018) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court in Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017) did
not “bar[] extending Bivens remedies to an immigration case” or preclude the possibility of
26
extending Bivens “to a case involving the substantive and procedural clauses of the Fifth
27 Amendment”); but see Mirmehdi v. United States, 689 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2012) (decision to
detain noncitizen pending resolution of immigration proceedings fell within discretionary
28 function exception to waiver of sovereign immunity under Federal Tort Claims Act).
1 applied the Mathews factors to argue that Respondents revoked his parole in violation of
2 procedural due process. See ECF No. 7 at 7-12. In denying the TRO motion, Judge Calabretta
3 held Petitioner received a remedy “for any violations of [his] parole revocation,” ECF No. 12 at 3,
4 n.1, which, again, was the premise of Petitioner’s procedural due process claim. See ECF No. 1
5 at 21, ¶¶ 114-115 (alleging his re-detention without pre-deprivation hearing violates procedural
6 due process). Accordingly, the undersigned will proceed to Petitioner’s substantive due process
7 claim as a matter of first impression.
8 “At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
9 reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” Jackson v. Indiana,
10 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). In the context of pretrial detention, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[a]
11 [substantive] due process violation occurs when detention becomes punitive rather than
12 regulatory, meaning there is no regulatory purpose that can rationally be assigned to the detention
13 or the detention appears excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose.” United States v. Torres,
14 995 F.3d 695, 708 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987)). A
15 judge within this Circuit analogized this framework to the immigration detention context as
16 follows:
17 As the Court in Zadvydas explained, “the Due Process Clause
applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including
18 aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.” 533 U.S. at 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491.
19 Due process protects against immigration detention that is not
reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of effectuating
20 removal or protecting against danger and flight risk. See id.
at 690-91, 121 S.Ct. 2491.
21
Padilla, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1171-72; see also Larios v. Wofford, No. 1:26-cv-1498 DJC CKD,
22
2026 WL 765019, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2026) (recognizing availability of substantive due
23
process claims in the context of immigration detention).
24
Petitioner does not suggest a framework for evaluating whether his detention has become
25
punitive. Several judges, including judges of this Court, Doe v. Chestnut, 810 F. Supp. 3d 1169
26
(E.D. Cal. 2025), have adopted the following five-factor balancing test developed by Judge Pitts
27
of the Northern District of California: (1) the length of detention and whether it is excessive in
28
1 relation to its regulatory purpose; (2) the government’s contribution to any delay; (3) the evidence
2 supporting the determination that detention is warranted to prevent flight risk or community
3 danger; (4) whether the government interests in ensuring appearance at future proceedings and
4 protecting the community could be protected through alternatives to detention that are less harsh;
5 and (5) the conditions of detention and how they compare to conditions under which pretrial
6 criminal detainees or people convicted of crimes are held. See Doe v. Becerra, 732 F. Supp. 3d
7 1071, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2024) “(Doe v. Becerra II”). Applying these Doe v. Becerra II factors to
8 conclude that Petitioner’s current detention violates substantive due process.
9 i. Length of Detention
10 “[A]t some point, [civil] detention can ‘become excessively prolonged, and therefore
11 punitive,’ resulting in a due process violation.” Torres, 995 F.3d at 708 (quoting Salerno, 481
12 U.S. at 747 n.4). “But while the existence of some threshold of per se due process violation may
13 be ‘undisputed,’ . . . it has also never been clearly delineated in the context of immigration
14 detention.” Doe v. Becerra, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1006, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (“Doe v. Beccera I”)
15 (internal citation omitted).
16 Ultimately, though, whether this prolonged detention is
excessive and therefore punitive is a relative question. The
17 duration of detention itself must be weighed against . . . the
regulatory purposes for detention—preventing flight risk and
18 protecting public safety. Whether the duration of detention is
excessive depends in part on the degree of those risks and the
19 extent to which [the petitioner’s] detention mitigates them.
20 Doe v. Becerra II, 732 F. Supp. 3d at 1083 (emphasis in original); see also Torres, 995 F.3d at
21 708 (“The point at which detention constitutes a due process violation requires a case-by-case
22 analysis.”).
23 Petitioner’s detention has reached nearly thirteen months, which is undoubtedly
24 prolonged. See Chen v. Aitken, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding
25 Petitioner’s seven-month detention under § 1225(b) was “prolonged” because it “has lasted well
26 beyond the typical period described in Demore[ v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003)]” and “neither
27 release nor removal are imminent”). Petitioner’s recent order of removal further suggests that he
28 “faces an undetermined, but likely significant, period of mandatory detention through the appeals
1 process.” Gao v. LaRose, 805 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2025). But while prolonged,
2 the current one-year duration of Petitioner’s detention, standing alone, does not violate
3 substantive due process. See Torres, 995 F.3d at 699 (identifying the 21-months of pre-trial
4 detention as “likely approaching the outer bounds of due process.”). However, Petitioner has
5 offered ample other evidence that this duration is excessive in relative to the minimal evidence of
6 danger or flight risk.
7 ii. Government Contribution to Delay
8 Relevant to this analysis is whether the government is responsible for “delays that have
9 contributed to the duration of detention.” Doe v. Becerra II, 732 F. Supp. 3d at 1083; see also
10 United States v. Gelfuso, 838 F.2d 358, 359 (9th Cir. 1988) (the due process limit on the length of
11 pretrial detention requires consideration of “the length of confinement in conjunction with the
12 extent to which the prosecution bears responsibility for the delay that has ensued”). In his post-
13 TRO brief, Petitioner explained that the government successfully moved to reopen his removal
14 proceedings on January 29, 2026, after he was ordered removed to Uganda, over his counsel’s
15 objections. ECF No. 14 at 8; see also Petitioner’s EOIR Case Information page, supra n.2. As a
16 result, at the time he filed his petition, Petitioner was in detention without a hearing date or an
17 assigned IJ. Id. While Petitioner ultimately received a hearing and was ordered removed about
18 four months later, Respondents do not refute that the government is responsible for extending
19 Petitioner’s removal proceedings and, by extension, his detention. Moreover, Respondents have
20 not explained why they sought to remove Petitioner—who is from Venezuela—to Uganda in the
21 first place. The resulting four-month delay, coupled with the government’s unlawful, six-month
22 delay in providing Petitioner with a bond hearing following revocation of his parole without
23 notice or opportunity to be heard, factors toward a violation of substantive due process.
24 iii. Evidence of Flight and Danger Risk
25 Further, determining whether Petitioner’s prolonged detention has become punitive
26 requires consideration of the extent to which it serves its regulatory purposes of preventing flight
27 and danger to the community. “This inquiry requires evaluating the degree to which [Petitioner]
28 poses a flight risk or danger, which in turn requires the Court to consider the evidence related to
1 those risks.” Doe v. Becerra II, 732 F. Supp. 3d at 1086. As the IJ did not make a danger finding
2 and Respondents do not assert here that Petitioner is a danger, this factor will turn on the evidence
3 related to Petitioner’s flight risk.
4 The IJ ostensibly applied the discretionary factors identified by the BIA in Matter of
5 Guerra, 24 I & N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006):
6 (1) whether the [noncitizen] has a fixed address in the United
States; (2) the [noncitizen’s] length of residence in the United
7 States; (3) the [noncitizen’s] family ties in the United States,
and whether they may entitle the alien to reside permanently
8 in the United States in the future; (4) the [noncitizen’s]
employment history; (5) the [noncitizen’s] record of
9 appearance in court; (6) the [noncitizen’s] criminal record,
including the extensiveness of criminal activity, the recency
10 of such activity, and the seriousness of the offenses; (7) the
[noncitizen’s] history of immigration violations; (8) any
11 attempts by the [noncitizen] to flee persecution or otherwise
escape authorities, and (9) the [noncitizen’s] manner of entry
12 to the United States.
13 The IJ commented that Petitioner’s arrest was “not helpful” to flight but expressly made a flight
14 risk determination based on other factors: minimal family ties, lack of property ownership, short
15 duration in the U.S., and limited availability of immigration relief. ECF No. 17-1 at 10.
16 The IJ’s determination notwithstanding,9 the undersigned finds that the evidence that the
17 IJ reviewed, and that Petitioner resubmitted here for the Court’s review, reflects minimum flight
18 risk. Petitioner and his family entered the United States not through unlawful means but with an
19 appointment through the CBP One app. Regarding family ties, Petitioner offered a declaration
20 from his sponsor/cousin who attested that Petitioner lived with her in Euless, Texas, prior to his
21 re-detention, and that she would house and financially support him if he were released from
22
23 9 The undersigned’s review of bond hearing evidence for purposes of the substantive due process
analysis is wholly separate from the abuse of discretion analysis required to review Petitioner’s
24 challenge to his bond hearing (Count 4). As a fellow judge of this district has explained: “This
Court is not bound by the IJ’s determinations . . . and this Court is not reviewing the IJ’s
25
determinations under the abuse of discretion standard, see Martinez[v. Clark], 124 F.4th [775,]
784 [9th Cir. 2024)]. Rather, this Court is making an independent assessment of Petitioner’s . . .
26
flight risk in the context of Petitioner’s substantive due process claim.” Doe v. Chestnut, 810 F.
27 Supp. 3d at 1186; see also Doe v. Becerra II, 732 F. Supp. 3d at 1086 (“This [substantive due
process] inquiry requires evaluating the degree to which Mr. Doe poses a flight risk or danger,
28 which in turn requires the Court to consider the evidence related to those risks.”).
1 immigration custody. ECF No. 7-1 at 8-10. Petitioner also submitted a declaration from his
2 partner that explains why their immigration status requires her to reside in Oakland, California,
3 and how Petitioner financially supports her and their two minor children from Texas. Id. at 11-
4 15. These family ties do not tend to show flight risk.
5 The undersigned further observes that immigration officials released Petitioner on
6 humanitarian parole in December 2024 under either an express or implicit finding that he was
7 “neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b). The other bases of the IJ’s
8 decision—Petitioner’s short duration in the United States, lack of property ownership, and
9 unlikelihood of immigration relief—do not represent materially changed circumstances from that
10 initial finding. See Qazi v. Albarran, 2025 No. 2:25-cv-02791-TLN-SCR, 2026 WL 2769837, at
11 *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2025) (“Petitioner was previously released pursuant to a finding that he
12 was not at risk of fleeing or harming others, and as such, due process prevents him from being re-
13 detained except upon a showing of a material change in circumstances.”); Kumar v. Noem, No.
14 1:26-CV-01148-DJC-AC, 2026 WL 983129, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2026) (“[A]t a minimum, it
15 cannot be said that the limited availability of relief is evidence of flight that remotely approaches
16 the clear and convincing standard the IJ purported to apply.”). In sum, for purposes of the
17 substantive due process analysis, the undersigned finds minimal, if any, risk of flight.
18 Citing the lack of evidence, Petitioner argues that the purpose of his detention is “not to
19 facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for
20 other reasons—namely, to meet newly imposed DHS quotas[.]” ECF No. 1 at 20, ¶¶ 110. For
21 support, he offers news articles regarding EOIR leadership intervention in IJ bond determinations
22 (ECF No. 18 at 3-4) and the supplemental declaration of Dr. Joseph Gunther,10 who analyzed
23 publicly available data relating to bond grant and denial rates for C. White, the IJ in Petitioner’s
24 case. ECF No. 18-1. Dr. Gunther identified a “marked contrast” between IJ White’s grant rates
25
10 Dr. Gunther is an “independent researcher and editor” who current research focuses on “using
26
public datasets to analyze immigration courts and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
27 arrests. ECF No. 18-1 at 2, ¶4. He holds a bachelor’s degree in mathematics from the University
of Chicago, a masters’ degree in mathematics from the University of Texas at Austin, and a Ph.D.
28 in mathematics from the City University of New York Graduate Center. Id., ¶ 3.
1 in recent months compared to the first six months of 2025:
2 From January 2025 through June 2025, IJ White granted bond
more often than he denied it: 105 grants and 100 denials, for
3 an overall grant rate of 51.2% in those first six months.
Conversely, from July 2025 through December 2025, he
4 granted bond 56 times and denied it 198 times, for a grant rate
of 22.0%. In the last three months of available data—
5 February 2026 through April 2026—his grant rate has
declined further. In those three months, IJ White granted
6 bond 20 times and denied it 114 times, for a grant rate of
14.9.%.
7
8 ECF No. 18-1 at 5.
9 Respondents object to Dr. Gunther’s declaration as improper under Rule 7(b) of the Rules
10 Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section 2254. ECF No. 20 at 2. They further claim that
11 his declaration is “unhelpful and irrelevant,” as the change in denial rates “could be caused by a
12 variety of factors including but not limited to an uptick in arrests of noncitizens with serious
13 criminal history, the publication of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)
14 during the relevant period, and other factors which are not addressed in the analysis of the data by
15 Dr. Gunther.” Id.
16 Respondents’ objections are unavailing. Rule 7 authorizes district courts “to expand the
17 record to include additional material relevant to the determination of the merits of a petitioner’s
18 claims.” Williams v. Schriro, 423 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1002 (D. Ariz. 2006); see also Sossa v. Diaz,
19 729 F.3d 1225, 1237 n.13 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing dismissal of habeas petition as untimely and
20 remanding with instructions to expand the record pursuant to Rule 7). The particular provision
21 Respondents invoke, Rule 7(b), expressly states that “[a]ffidavits may also be submitted and
22 considered as part of the record.” Rule 7(b), Rules Governing Section § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.
23 foll. § 2254. Thus, the undersigned finds Dr. Gunther’s supplemental declaration proper under
24 Rule 7 and potentially relevant to the merits of Petitioner’s substantive due process claim.
25 Dr. Gunther’s findings, viewed together with the lack of evidentiary support for
26 Petitioner’s flight or danger risk, may support Petitioner’s claim that his detention is punitive.
27 The precipitous drop in the IJ’s bond grant rate—from 51.2% in mid-2025 to 14.9% roughly a
28 year later—shows that it is more likely than not that Petitioner’s hearing did not involve an
1 individualized determination. The undersigned would hardly be the first jurist to reach this
2 conclusion. See Singh v. Valdez, No. 26-CV-1109-WJM, 2026 WL 890240, at *5 (D. Colo. Apr.
3 1, 2026) (“[T]he mounting evidence that bond determination hearings conducted in Immigration
4 Court under § 1226(a) have preordained outcomes has become impossible to ignore.”); Garcia
5 Ortiz v. Henkey, No. 1:26-CV-00043-BLW, 2026 WL 948275, at *4 (D. Idaho Apr. 7, 2026)
6 (noting evidence that “Immigration Judges across the country are systemically denying bond to
7 [noncitizen] detainees, regardless of the weight of the evidence.”). However, despite Petitioner’s
8 counsel contending that Dr. Gunther evaluated only IJ White’s substantive decisions—excluding
9 decisions where IJ White found no jurisdiction for a bond hearing—that contention is not clear
10 from Dr. Gunther’s declaration. As a result, the undersigned gives only minimal weight to Dr.
11 Gunther’s declaration in finding that Petitioner’s prolonged detention is excessive in relation to
12 any purpose to prevent flight.11
13 iv. Conditions
14 Substantive due process also imposes outer bounds on the conditions of civil immigration
15 detention. Doe v. Becerra II, 732 F. Supp. 3d at 1080; Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th
16 Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen a [civil] detainee is confined in conditions identical to, similar to, or more
17 restrictive than, those in which his criminal counterparts are held, we presume that the detainee is
18 being subjected to ‘punishment.’”). Petitioner alleges he is “incarcerated in penal institution like
19 conditions at the California City Corrections Center,” ECF No. 1 at 19, ¶ 104, but does not
20 elaborate in a way that would permit meaningful analysis. While conditions do not strongly
21 factor towards a due process violation, the undersigned observes that other courts have noted poor
22 conditions at this facility. See Kaur v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 813 F. Supp. 3d
23 1167, 1172 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (noting allegations that the conditions at California City were
24 “abysmal,” with “frigid” temperatures and water that “tast[ed] like bleach or detergent”); Doe v.
25
11 As Petitioner asserts that he is not a flight risks, ECF No. 1 at 20, ¶ 109, he has not put forth
26
arguments reasonably related to the fourth factor, alternatives to detention to mitigate those risks.
27 However, to the extent Petitioner poses a cognizable risk of flight, there are routine and obvious
conditions that ICE could impose, including check-ins with ICE officials and electronic
28 monitoring.
1 Chestnut, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 1201 (“[T]he evidence now before the Court at least suggests several
2 important ways in which the conditions at [California City] are not only inherently harsh but also
3 worse than the conditions [. . . ] in state prison.”) (citing Doe v. Beccera II, 732 F. Supp. 3d at
4 1089); Tigranyan v. Warden of California City Det., No. 1:25-CV-01554-DJC-SCR, 2026 WL
5 91765, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2026) (noting investigation and report by Disability Rights
6 California finding that California City fails to provide necessary medical and mental health care
7 and fails to other meet basic needs), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:25-CV-01554-
8 DJC-SCR, 2026 WL 130843 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2026).
9 v. Conclusion as to Substantive Due Process Analysis
10 On balance, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has established that his detention is
11 excessive in relation to his minimal flight and danger risk. Petitioner has now spent nearly
12 thirteen months in immigration detention following an arrest for a low-level, Class C
13 misdemeanor with a maximum fine of $500. The record establishes that during that time,
14 Respondents have denied Petitioner the hallmarks of non-punitive, immigration detention—i.e., a
15 prompt individualized hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to ensure that the imprisonment
16 serves the government’s legitimate goals, Padilla, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1171-72, Salerno, 481 U.S.
17 at 750–51——and further extended his detention by seeking to remove him to Uganda and then
18 reopening his removal proceedings. Petitioner has offered ample evidence refuting the existence
19 of any flight risk. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s detention has become
20 punitive and recommends that the petition be granted on Count 1. In the interests of judicial
21 economy, the undersigned does not address Petitioner’s challenge to the legal adequacy of the
22 December 2025 bond hearing (Count 4).
23 IV. Remedy
24 The undersigned next turns to the appropriate remedy:
25 Federal habeas corpus practice, as reflected by the decisions
of [the Supreme] Court, indicates that a court has broad
26 discretion in conditioning a judgment granting habeas relief.
Federal courts are authorized, under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, to
27 dispose of habeas corpus matters ‘as law and justice
require.’” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 [] (1987).
28 “[H]abeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable remedy.” Schlup
1 v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319[] (1995). “Moreover, in
constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable remedies
2 are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and what
is workable.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 []
3 (1973) (footnote omitted).
4
Doe v. Chestnut, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 1202. The undersigned finds that appropriate remedy for this
5
violation of substantive due process is release with standard conditions of supervision. See id.
6
(ordering release with “appropriate conditions so that the government’s significant interests in
7
ensuring Petitioner’s appearance at future proceedings, protecting the community, and that, if
8
ordered removed, Petitioner will be successfully removed, are protected.”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
9
700 (“[T]he [noncitizen]’s release may and should be conditioned on any of the various forms of
10
supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances, and the [noncitizen] may no doubt be
11
returned to custody upon a violation of those conditions.”).
12
CONCLUSION
13
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
14
1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED on
15
Count 1 (substantive due process) as follows:
16
a. Respondents shall IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner Robert A. Rivas
17
Campos’ (A# 244-851-525) from custody. At the time of release, Respondents
18
must return all of Petitioner’s documents and possessions.
19
b. Respondents may place Petitioner on standard conditions of supervision upon
20
release.
21
2. The Clerk be directed to:
22
a. Serve the California City Detention Center with a copy of this Order; and
23
b. Enter judgment in Petitioner’s favor and close the case.
24
3. Any order adopting these findings and recommendations include language that it
25
does not address the circumstances in which Respondents may detain Petitioner in the event
26
Petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal and Petitioner receives notice
27
of that final order of removal.
28
] These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
2 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days after
3 | being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with
4 | the court and serve a copy on all parties. The undersigned finds that a shortened objection period
5 || is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as well as the fact that the parties
6 | have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written briefs. See United States v.
7 | Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets
8 | the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local Rule 304(b). The parties
9 || are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal
10 | the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
11 | DATED: June 24, 2026
12
13 /
14 SEAN C. RIORDAN
15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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