The opinion
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6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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9 JUAN J. VARGAS, Case No. 1:26-cv-03073-EPG (PC)
10 Plaintiff,
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
11 v. RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION
BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE FOR
12 FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE
TO PROSECUTE, AND FAILURE TO
13 KERN VALLEY STATE PRISON, et al., COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER
14 Defendants. (ECF No. 8)
15 THIRTY (30) DAY DEADLINE
16
ORDER TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE
17
18 Plaintiff Juan J. Vargas is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in
19 this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1, 7). In his complaint filed on
20 April 22, 2026, Plaintiff sues Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP) and a KVSP prisoner, alleging
21 failure-to-protect, denial-of-medical-care, and negligence claims. (ECF No. 1).
22 On April 28, 2026, the Court screened the complaint and concluded that Plaintiff failed
23 to state any cognizable claims. (ECF No. 8). The Court gave Plaintiff thirty days to file a first
24 amended complaint or to notify the Court that he wanted to stand on his complaint. (Id. at 10).
25 The Court warned Plaintiff that “[f]ailure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal
26 of this action.” (Id.).
27 The deadline to respond to the screening order has expired, and Plaintiff has not filed an
28 amended complaint or otherwise responded to the Court’s order. Accordingly, for the reasons
1 given below, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed, with prejudice, for
2 failure to state a claim, failure to prosecute, and failure to comply with a court order.
3 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
6 The Court must dismiss a complaint, or a portion of it, if the prisoner has raised claims that are
7 frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
8 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),
9 (2). Additionally, as Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 7), the Court may
10 screen the complaint on these same bases under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
11 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
12 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
13 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
14 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
15 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient
16 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.
17 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting
18 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are
19 not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677,
20 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s
21 legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
22 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal
23 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
24 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).
25 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT1
26 Plaintiff sues KVSP and KVSP prisoner Andres Vizcarra. (ECF No. 1, p. 2). He alleges
27
28 1 For readability, minor alterations, like omitting capitalization, have been made to some of Plaintiff’s
quotations without indicating each change.
1 three claims.
2 In his first claim, Plaintiff states that he was beaten by his cellmate2 for two days
3 “without staff doing their job and making sure [he] was well and safe.” (Id. at 3). This beating
4 resulted in Plaintiff being unable to see and fractures to his spine.
5 In his second claim, Plaintiff states that he “was in the infirmary for three months and . .
6 . made . . . a speedy recovery and [he still is] in very bad back pain.” (Id. at 4).
7 In his third claim, Plaintiff states that KVSP was negligent by failing “to make sure [he]
8 was safe under their care.”3 (Id. at 5). And in the relief section of the complaint, Plaintiff states
9 that he “would like to sue [KVSP] for their negligence to keep [him] safe while in their
10 custody.” (Id. at 6).
11 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
12 A. Section 1983
13 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:
14 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
15 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
16 secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
17
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely
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provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor,
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490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see
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also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los
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Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir.
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2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
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To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under
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2 Plaintiff does not explain Defendant Vizcarra’s role in violating his constitutional rights, but, from
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context, the Court assumes that Defendant Vizcarra is the cellmate that allegedly assaulted Plaintiff.
27 3 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s complaint checks “Yes” on the portions of the complaint form
regarding whether he exhausted his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 1, p. 5). However, Plaintiff also
28 states that he is “still waiting on a reply.” (Id.). While the Court will not address this issue now,
Plaintiff’s complaint may be subject to dismissal for lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
1 color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or
2 federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
3 Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of
4 state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983,
5 ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an
6 act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is
7 made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007)
8 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)).
9 “The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a
10 ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others
11 to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d
12 at 743). This standard of causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation
13 of proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981);
14 see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
15 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the
16 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual
17 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have
18 been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
19 691, 695 (1978).
20 B. Failure to Protect
21 Plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment claim based on an alleged failure to protect him.
22 “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit
23 inhumane ones . . ..” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citation and quotation
24 marks omitted). Among other things, the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take
25 reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of . . . inmates.” Id. (citation omitted). “Being
26 violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
27 their offenses against society.” Id. at 834 (citation and quotation marks omitted). To establish a
28 failure to protect claim, a prisoner must establish that prison officials were deliberately
1 indifferent to a sufficiently serious threat to the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 837.
2 “‘Deliberate indifference’ has both subjective and objective components.” Labatad v.
3 Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013). The prisoner must show that “the
4 official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate . . . safety; the official must
5 both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
6 serious harm exists, and [the official] must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
7 “Liability may follow only if a prison official ‘knows that inmates face a substantial risk of
8 serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’”
9 Labatad, 714 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). “[I]n order to satisfy the
10 objective prong, it is enough for the inmate to demonstrate that he was exposed to a substantial
11 risk of some range of serious harms; the harm he actually suffered need not have been the most
12 likely result among this range of outcomes.” Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726
13 F.3d 1062, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013).
14 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim under these legal standards. Although Plaintiff
15 alleges that he was assaulted in prison, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that any individual
16 person acted with deliberate indifference to his safety because he or she knew of an excessive
17 risk to his safety and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.
18 Rather, Plaintiff only alleges that unidentified “staff” did not do “their job and mak[e] sure [he]
19 was well and safe.” (ECF No. 1, p. 3).
20 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim that any prison official violated Plaintiff’s
21 constitutional rights by failing to protect him from being assaulted by his cellmate.
22 C. Medical Needs
23 Plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his serious
24 medical needs.
25 “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an
26 inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d
27 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires
28 Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a
1 prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton
2 infliction of pain,’” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately
3 indifferent.” Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992)),
4 overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en
5 banc).
6 Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of
7 and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d
8 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Deliberate indifference can be established “by
9 showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need
10 and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citation omitted). Civil
11 recklessness (failure “to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known
12 or so obvious that it should be known”) is insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment
13 violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–37 & n.5 (1994) (citations omitted).
14 A difference of opinion between an inmate and prison medical personnel—or between
15 medical professionals—regarding appropriate medical diagnosis and treatment is not enough to
16 establish a deliberate indifference claim. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).
17 Additionally, “a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a
18 medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth
19 Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because
20 the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. “To show deliberate indifference, the
21 plaintiff must show that the course of treatment the [official] chose was medically unacceptable
22 under the circumstances and that the [official] chose this course in conscious disregard of an
23 excessive risk to the plaintiff’s health.” Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 786 (9th Cir.
24 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
25 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim under these legal standards. Plaintiff alleges
26 that he “was in the infirmary for three months and . . . made . . . a speedy recovery” but he still
27 has “very bad back pain.” (ECF No. 1, p. 4). Rather than support his claim for deliberate
28 indifference to his serious medical needs, these allegations suggest that Plaintiff received
1 adequate medical care—i.e., that he was cared for in the infirmary for three months, allowing
2 him to quickly recover. And to the extent that Plaintiff alleges that he is currently not receiving
3 any medical care for his back pain, he fails to allege facts showing that any prison official acted
4 with deliberate indifference by being aware of his medical needs yet failing to respond to them.
5 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim that any prison official violated
6 his constitutional rights by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
7 D. Improper Defendants
8 Plaintiff’s complaint is also subject to dismissal because it only names KVSP, rather
9 than any specific person as a defendant. Further, Defendant Vizcarra, a KVSP prisoner, is not a
10 state actor for purposes of § 1983.
11 First, KVSP is immune from relief because “[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars suits
12 which seek either damages or injunctive relief against a state, ‘an arm of the state,’ its
13 instrumentalities, or its agencies.” Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995);
14 Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[t]he State of California has
15 not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in
16 federal court”); Brown v. California Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The
17 district court correctly held that the California Department of Corrections and the California
18 Board of Prison Terms were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Roberts v.
19 Huckleberry, No. 1:18-CV-01237-SAB (PC), 2019 WL 8195114, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 20,
20 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1157689 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2020)
21 (“Therefore, since Defendant KVSP is a part of the California Department of Corrections and
22 Rehabilitation, a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, KVSP is immune
23 from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.”).
24 Second, as noted above, § 1983 prohibits “persons” from violating another’s Federal
25 rights. However, “[s]tate agencies . . . are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983, and are
26 therefore not amenable to suit under that statute.” Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th
27 Cir. 2004); see Howlett By & Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990) (“[A]n entity
28 with Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983.”).
1 Accordingly, KVSP is not a “person” subject to sue under § 1983. See Green v. California,
2 No. 2:23-CV-2243 KJM SCR P, 2025 WL 950519, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2025) (noting that
3 High Desert State Prison “is a state defendant that cannot be sued under § 1983” because it is
4 not a “person”).
5 Lastly, as to Defendant Vizcarra, a KVSP prisoner, Vizcarra cannot be considered to
6 have acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. See Silva v. Jackson, No. 1:25-CV-
7 01893-SAB (PC), 2026 WL 115345, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2026), report and
8 recommendation adopted, No. 1:25-CV-01893-KES-SAB (PC), 2026 WL 585481 (E.D. Cal.
9 Mar. 2, 2026) (“Courts have consistently rejected attempts by prisoner plaintiffs to sue fellow
10 inmates under § 1983.”). “Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot succeed in stating a section 1983 claim
11 against fellow inmate [Vizcarra] in this case as inmates are not state actors.” Id.
12 In short, for the reasons explained above, Defendants KVSP and Vizcarra are subject to
13 dismissal as improper defendants for any constitutional claims.
14 E. Negligence
15 Plaintiff brings a negligence claim against KVSP under California law for failing “to
16 make sure [he] was safe under their care.” (ECF No. 1, p. 5).
17 As an initial matter, although a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction
18 over state law claims, a court may do so only if the case also includes a federal claim that
19 provides the court with original federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family
20 Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that § 1367(a)’s
21 “plain language makes clear that supplemental jurisdiction may only be invoked when the
22 district court has a hook of original jurisdiction on which to hang it”).
23 Here, as discussed above, the complaint does not allege a cognizable federal claim;
24 accordingly, the Court lacks original federal jurisdiction. Without original federal jurisdiction,
25 the Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state negligence claim.
26 Ever setting aside this issue, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for negligence.
27 Under California law, [t]he elements of negligence are: (1) defendant’s
obligation to conform to a certain standard of conduct for the protection of
28 others against unreasonable risks (duty); (2) failure to conform to that standard
(breach of the duty); (3) a reasonably close connection between the defendant’s
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conduct and resulting injuries (proximate cause); and (4) actual loss (damages).
2 Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 572 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and quotation marks
3 omitted).
4 Here, Plaintiff’s summary allegations about KVSP failing “to make sure [he] was safe”
5 fail to establish any of the elements of negligence, e.g., that KVSP breached any duty.
6 Lastly, California’s Government Claims Act requires that a claim against the State or its
7 employees “relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person” be presented to the
8 Department of General Services’ Government Claims Program no more than six months after
9 the cause of action accrues. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2.
10 Presentation of a written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim, are conditions precedent
11 to suit. State v. Superior Court of Kings County (Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1245 (Cal. 2004);
12 Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a tort
13 claim against a public entity or employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance with the
14 Government Claims Act. Bodde, 32 Cal.4th at 1243. Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege
15 compliance with California’s Government Claims Act.
16 For all the above reasons, Plaintiff cannot maintain a negligence claim against KVSP.
17 IV. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND COMPLY WITH COURT ORDER
18 The Court will likewise recommend dismissal based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute
19 this case and to comply with the Court’s screening order. (ECF No. 8).
20 In determining whether to dismiss a[n] [action] for failure to prosecute or failure
to comply with a court order, the Court must weigh the following factors: (1) the
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public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to
22 manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the
availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring
23 disposition of cases on their merits.
24 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d
25 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992)).
26 “‘The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.’”
27 Id. (quoting Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, the
28 first factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
1 As to the Court’s need to manage its docket, “[t]he trial judge is in the best position to
2 determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the
3 public interest. . .. It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to
4 routine noncompliance of litigants. . ..” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to respond to
5 the Court’s screening order. (ECF No. 8). This failure to respond is delaying the case and
6 interfering with docket management. Therefore, the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
7 Turning to the risk of prejudice, “pendency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in
8 and of itself to warrant dismissal.” Id. (citing Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991). However, “delay
9 inherently increases the risk that witnesses’ memories will fade, and evidence will become
10 stale,” id. at 643, and it is Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and to prosecute this
11 case that is causing delay. Therefore, the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
12 As for the availability of lesser sanctions, given that Plaintiff has chosen not to
13 prosecute this action and has failed to comply with the Court’s order, despite being warned of
14 possible dismissal, there is little available to the Court which would constitute a satisfactory
15 lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further unnecessary expenditure of its scarce
16 resources. Considering Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status, it appears that monetary sanctions
17 are of little use to prompt him to comply with future orders. And given the stage of these
18 proceedings, the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is not available. Further, as noted above,
19 Plaintiff has failed to state a claim or respond to the Court’s screening order despite being given
20 the relevant legal standards and the opportunity to file an amended complaint. Thus, the lack of
21 any viable claim supports a dismissal with prejudice rather than a lesser sanction. Therefore,
22 the fourth factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
23 Finally, because public policy favors disposition on the merits, this final factor weighs
24 against dismissal. Id.
25 After weighing the factors, the Court concludes that dismissal with prejudice is
26 appropriate.
27 V. ORDER, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
28 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to assign a District
1 || Judge to this case.
2 Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:
3 1. This action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, failure to
4 prosecute, and failure to comply with a court order.
5 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.
6 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
7 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty
8 || (30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file
9 || written objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to
10 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any objections shall be limited to no
11 |] more than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits.
12 Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in
13 || the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014)
14 || (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
15
16 IT IS SO ORDERED.
17 Dated: _ Sune 17, 2026 [Je heey —
18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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