McIver

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TIYA L. MCIVER,

Plaintiff,

25-CV-34 (JPO)

-v-

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THE TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA

UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW

YORK, et al.,

Defendants.

J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Tiya L. McIver brings this action against the Trustees of Columbia University in

the City of New York, Columbia University School of Professional Studies Career Design Lab,

Kelly Ahn, Zelon E. Crawford, David Slotnick, and Diane Spizzirro (collectively,

“Defendants”). Before the Court is Defendants’ letter motion for a protective order limiting the

parties’ use of discovery materials to litigation purposes only. (ECF No. 36.) Plaintiff, who

opposes the letter motion, seeks to publicly disclose transcript and video excerpts from the

deposition of Defendant Zelon E. Crawford. (ECF No. 38.)

I. Background

This case concerns Plaintiff’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims against

Defendants. (See generally ECF No. 19.) The parties stipulated to a protective order (the

“Protective Order”) that governs this case. (ECF No. 18.) The Protective Order provides that a

party producing discovery material may designate as confidential those portions of such material

that consist of certain private information. (Id. ¶ 2.) With respect to deposition transcripts and

exhibits, a producing person or that person’s counsel may indicate on the record that a question

calls for confidential information, in which case the transcript of the designated testimony is

separately bound and marked as confidential. (Id. ¶ 3.) A party can designate discovery material

as confidential after production of such material by apprising all parties in writing. (Id. ¶ 4.)

Once material is designated as confidential, it cannot be disclosed to third parties. (Id. ¶ 5.)

On March 10, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed counsel for Defendants indicating

Plaintiff’s intent to publicly disclose “some or all” of Crawford’s deposition testimony. (ECF

No. 40-1 at 2.) Plaintiff’s counsel stated that Crawford’s testimony relates to “matters of public

interest” such as “the falsity of Defendants’ public denials of Plaintiff’s allegations” and “the

potential risks to the rights of others who may be affected by ongoing or prospective illegal

misconduct on the part of [Crawford]” and others. (Id.) The email does not identify which

portions of Crawford’s testimony relate to such matters and indicates that Plaintiff is “willing to

discuss a negotiated settlement that may adequately address her concerns without the need to

proactively bring public pressure to bear.” (Id.) Neither party suggests that the relevant portions

of Crawford’s deposition are designated confidential under the existing Protective Order.

Defendants filed the present letter motion on March 10, 2026. (ECF No. 36.) The next

day, the Court entered an interim order preventing Plaintiff from disseminating any discovery

materials to the public pending further order. (ECF No. 37.) On March 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed

an opposition to the motion. (ECF No. 38.) Plaintiff then filed, under seal, the email chain from

March 10, 2026 and the transcript of Crawford’s deposition. (ECF No. 40-1; ECF No. 40-2.)

The Court held a telephonic conference on April 1, 2026.

II. Discussion

Defendants seek a protective order limiting the use of discovery materials to litigation

purposes only and prohibiting dissemination of discovery materials, including deposition

transcripts and video clips, to media or any other third party. (ECF No. 36-1.) Defendants

rightfully argue that, at this early stage of litigation, neither the deposition transcript nor

deposition video qualify as judicial documents to which a presumptive right of access attaches.

(See ECF No. 36 at 2.) Here, no transcript or video excerpt of Crawford’s deposition “has been

placed before the court by the parties” for purposes related “to the performance of the judicial

function.” Mirlis v. Greer, 952 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).

“Documents that play no role in the performance of Article III functions, such as those passed

between the parties in discovery, lie entirely beyond the presumption’s reach[.]” United States v.

Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995). And Plaintiff did not turn the transcript of

Crawford’s deposition into a judicial document by filing it on the docket for purposes of

resolving this dispute. See S.E.C. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting

argument that document became a judicial document because the Court reviewed it in order to

determine whether to enter a protective order).

Because the transcript excerpts and video clips at issue “lie . . . beyond the presumption’s

reach,” Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1050, the Court considers Defendants’ motion for a protective order

only under the standard set forth by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. Rule 26 provides that

courts “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). Such

authority allows a court to, among other things, require that a deposition be sealed where good

cause warrants such measures. Id. “District courts in this Circuit have interpreted this standard

as requiring a showing that disclosure will result in a clearly defined, specific and serious

injury.” Laugier v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-6171, 2014 WL 6655283, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.

Nov. 24, 2014) (quotation marks omitted). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by

specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.” Id. (quotation

marks omitted).

Defendants fail to establish good cause. Their letter motion states in broad terms that

“[r]eleasing selective excerpts would serve no purpose other than to expose a private person to

unnecessary scrutiny” and “would inflict heightened annoyance and embarrassment,” especially

“in the current age of viral social media videos.” (ECF No. 36 at 3-4.) But Defendants do not

identify with any specificity the portions of the deposition that would cause such harm to

Crawford, do not explain why those portions would cause that harm, and do not articulate with

any detail what that harm would look like.1 Where defendants “ha[ve] not identified particular

0F

portions of the testimony that . . . are likely to cause harm if they are publicly available” and

instead “rely on conclusory and unverified assertions about online harassment, untethered either

to specific content or identifiable third-party actors,” they have failed to establish good cause.

The Authors Guild v. Nat’l Endowment for the Humanities, No. 25-CV-3657, 2026 WL 810422,

at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2026). Such broad allegations “do[] not establish the kind of ‘clearly

defined, specific and serious injury’ required for the entry of a protective order under Rule

26(c).” Id. (quoting In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 454 F. Supp. 2d 220, 222

(S.D.N.Y. 2006)).

1 Upon questioning by the Court at the April 1, 2026 conference, Defendants listed three

categories of deposition testimony that could be harmful to Crawford, but even that discussion

failed to identify the specific content of those comments or the harm that would be caused by

their publication. Such a high-level articulation of potentially harmful excerpts does not amount

to the “highly particularized finding of good cause” required in such a case. See In re Terrorist

Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 454 F. Supp. 2d 220, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for a further protective order (ECF No. 36) is

DENIED. The temporary restraint imposed by the Court’s March 11, 2026 interim order (ECF

No. 37) is hereby DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2026

New York, New York

J. PAUL OETKEN

United States District Judge