Opinion

Court: District Court, E.D. California
Filed: Jun 12, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.7%

The opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 Misti Gill, No. 1:25-cv-01683-GSA

12 Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER DIRECTING ENTRY

OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF

13 v. DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY AND AGAINST

14 Commissioner of Social Security, PLAINTIFF

15 Defendant. (ECF Nos. 13, 15)

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Misti Gill seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying her application for supplemental security income (SSI) pursuant to Title XVI of

the Social Security Act.

II. Procedural Background

On June 7, 2023, Plaintiff applied for SSI. Plaintiff alleged disability as of June 7, 2023.

These claims were denied initially on December 13, 2023, and on reconsideration on June 14, 2024.

On November 27, 2024, a hearing was held before an ALJ. On December 12, 2024, the

ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. The Appeals Council denied the request for review on

September 30, 2025. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in this Court on November 26, 2025.1

III. The Disability Standard

28 1 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. ECF Nos. 7, 8.

1 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g), this court has the authority to review a decision by the

2 Commissioner denying a Claimant disability benefits. “This court may set aside the

3 Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal

4 error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180

5 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is evidence within the

6 record that could lead a reasonable mind to accept a conclusion regarding disability status. See

7 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It is more than a scintilla, but it is less than a

8 preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation and

9 quotations omitted).

10 When performing this analysis, the court must “consider the entire record as a whole and

11 may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Robbins v. Social

12 Security Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations and quotations omitted). If the

13 evidence could reasonably support two conclusions, the court “may not substitute its judgment for

14 that of the Commissioner” and must affirm the Agency’s decision. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d

15 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “[T]he court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision for

16 harmless error, which exists when it is clear from the record that the ALJ’s error was

17 inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035,

18 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

19 To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, a plaintiff must establish that he or

20 she is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or

21 mental impairment that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than

22 twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a disability

23 only if . . . his/her physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that s/he is

24 not only unable to do his/her previous work, but cannot, considering his/her age, education, and

25 work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

26 economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which s/he lives, or

27 whether a specific job vacancy exists for him/her, or whether s/he would be hired if s/he applied

28 for work. 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(B).

1 To achieve uniformity in the decision-making process, the Commissioner has established a

2 sequential five-step process for an ALJ to employ when evaluating the alleged disability of a

3 claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)-(f). The ALJ proceeds through the steps and stops upon

4 reaching a dispositive finding that the claimant is or is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927, 416.929.

5 Specifically, the ALJ is required to determine: 1- whether the claimant has engaged in

6 substantial gainful activity during the period for which Plaintiff is alleging he or she experiences a

7 disability; 2- whether the claimant has a medically determinable “severe impairments” affecting

8 the claimants ability to perform basic work activities; 3- whether these impairments meet or are

9 medically equivalent to one of the listed impairments set forth in the agency’s regulations (20

10 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1); 4- whether the claimant retained the residual functional

11 capacity (“RFC”) to perform past relevant work; and 5- whether the claimant has the ability to

12 perform other jobs existing in significant numbers at the national and regional level. 20 C.F.R. §

13 416.920(a)-(f). While the Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, the burden

14 shifts to the commissioner at step five to prove that Plaintiff can perform other work in the national

15 economy given the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work experience. Garrison v. Colvin, 759

16 F.3d 995, 1011 (9th Cir. 2014).

17 IV. The ALJ’s Decision

18 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

19 June 7, 2023, the application date. AR 20. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the

20 following severe impairments: right tibia and fibula fracture, degenerative disc disease of the

21 cervical and lumbar spine, anxiety disorder, and bipolar disorder. AR 20.

22 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination

23 thereof that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part

24 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 20–22.

25 Prior to step four, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC) and

26 concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 416.967(b), except:

27 she can occasionally climb ramps and stairs but cannot climb ladders, ropes or

scaffolds. She can occasionally balance as that term is defined in the Dictionary of

1 Occupational Titles (DOT), stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She can understand,

remember and carry out simple instructions and can interact with supervisors, co-

workers and the general public frequently.

3 AR 22–28.

4 At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. AR 28. At step five,

5 relying on the Vocational Expert’s testimony, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s vocational

6 profile (age, education, work experience and RFC), Plaintiff could perform the following jobs

7 existing in significant numbers in the national economy: cashier II, sales attendant, and

8 housekeeping cleaner. AR 28–29.

9 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time since the

10 application date of June 7, 2023. AR 29.

11 V. Issues Presented

12 Plaintiff asserts two claims of error: 1- “the ALJ improperly omitted significant medical

13 findings from Dr. Bilik in assessing the residual functional capacity” (MSJ at 4); 2- “the ALJ

14 impermissibly rejected Gill’s subjective symptom testimony.” (MSJ at 12).

15 A. Medical Opinion; RFC (Claim #1)

16 1. Applicable Law

17 Before proceeding to steps four and five, the ALJ determines the claimant’s residual

18 functional capacity (RFC) which is “the most [one] can still do despite [his or her] limitations” and

19 represents an assessment “based on all the relevant evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The

20 RFC must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, severe or not. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e),

21 416.945(a)(2). “The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of

22 the facts and conflicting evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.”

23 Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989).

24 For applications filed on or after March 27, 2017, new regulations eliminate a hierarchy of

25 medical opinions and provide that “[w]e will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight,

26 including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s),

27 including those from your medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Instead, when evaluating

1 any medical opinion, the regulations provide that the ALJ will consider the factors of supportability,

2 consistency, treatment relationship, specialization and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c).

3 Supportability and consistency are the two most important factors, and the agency will

4 articulate how the factors of supportability and consistency are considered. Id. “Even under the

5 new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating doctor's opinion as unsupported or

6 inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.” Woods v.

7 Kijakazi, 2022 WL 1195334, (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2022) at *6.

8 With respect to “supportability,” the new regulations provide that “[t]he more relevant the

9 objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to

10 support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more

11 persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. §

12 416.920c(c)(1). Regarding “consistency,” the regulations provide that “[t]he more consistent a

13 medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other

14 medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s)

15 or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2)..

16 2. Analysis

17 On reconsideration, state agency physician Dr. Bilik, PsyD., reviewed Plaintiff’s medical

18 file. AR 135–147. Dr. Bilik identified impairments of Depressive, Bipolar and Related Disorders,

19 Anxiety, and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders. AR 142. Dr. Bilik opined that Plaintiff had

20 moderate limitations in the ability to: 1- maintain attention and concentration for extended periods;

21 2- interact appropriately with the general public; and 3- complete a normal workday and workweek

22 without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, and to perform at a consistent pace

23 without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. AR 144–46. The 3rd limitation is the

24 one at issue here.

25 The ALJ addressed the opinion as follows:

26 On reconsideration, Harvey Bilik, Psy.D., found the claimant’s mental impairments

caused mild limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information,

27 moderate limitations in interacting with others, moderate limitations in

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and mild limitations in adapting or

1 managing oneself. Dr. Bilik opined that the claimant could understand and

remember simple and detailed instructions despite any limitations in this domain.

The claimant could carry out simple and detailed tasks despite any limitations in this

domain. The claimant could interact appropriately with others, but may benefit from

reduced contact with the general public. The claimant could adapt despite any

4 limitations in this domain (Exhibit B7A/8, 12).

5 . . .

6 However, I find Dr. Bilik’s opinion partially persuasive. I do not find the mild

limitation in understanding, remembering and applying information to be supported.

7 In light of the claimant’s alleged difficulty remembering to take medication,

following instructions, and taking medications without reminders, I find a moderate

limitation more consistent with the overall evidence. Further, the reduced contact

9 with the general public is not supported. Although the claimant reported difficulty

getting along with others, she was able to interact appropriately with her providers.

10 She was able to relay her history and medical needs. She was not longitudinally

irritable; in fact, her medical providers did not often note this to be an issue (Exhibits

11 B2F; B5F; B8F; B9F; B12F). This does not suggest that the claimant would benefit

from reduced contact with the general public. As these aspects of the opinion are

not entirely consistent with the evidence or supported by the other opinions in this

13 case (namely the opinions of Dr. Hamill), these aspects of the opinion are not

persuasive. Otherwise, I find this opinion generally well supported by and consistent

14 with the evidence to be persuasive.

15 AR 28 (emphasis added).

16 Plaintiff argues that other than the mild limitation in understanding, remembering and

17 applying information, and reduced contact with the general public, the ALJ found the remainder of

18 Dr. Bilik’s opinion to be supported yet omitted a key corresponding limitations in the RFC and

19 failed to explain why. Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in omitting moderate

20 limitations in completing a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from

21 psychologically based symptoms, and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable

22 number and length of rest periods.

23 Plaintiff sets forth the following concerning this argument:

24 Donald J.M. v. O'Malley, No. 22-cv-1926-MMP, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58365, at

*52-59 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2024) citing Morinskey v. Astrue, 458 F. App'x 640, 641

(9th Cir. 2011); see also Martin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 472 F. App’x 580

26 (9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“The administrative law judge (ALJ) erred when

formulating Martin’s residual functional capacity (RFC) because the RFC neither

27 incorporated Dr. Steiner’s opinion of Martin’s work limitations nor gave specific

and legitimate reasons for rejecting it.”); Bain v. Astrue, 319 F. App’x 543, 545−46

1 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding ALJ erred in not discrediting or including consultative

examining psychologist’s moderate limitations in the RFC, despite specifically

crediting these limitations in the opinion); Harrell v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-00614-

GSA, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184794, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 24, 2021) (“The ALJ

was under no obligation to accept a medical opinion he found unsupported by the

4 record. But, having clearly stated that he was according [the physician]’s opinion

great weight, the ALJ was under an obligation to account for the moderate

5 limitations [the physician] identified irrespective of the broader reasoning in support

of the RFC.”); Christopher G. v. Saul, No. 2:19-cv-06150- AFM, 2020 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 76761, at *15-20 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2020) (error where the ALJ afforded

7 weight to a medical opinion but did not explicitly reject the opinion and provided

no reason for failing to include the limitations in her RFC assessment); Sahyoun v.

8 Saul, No. 2:18-cv-576-EFB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54098, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar.

27, 2020) (same). Simply put, an ALJ errs when they do not explain why they did

9 not adopt all findings or limitations from a persuasive opinion. Patterson v. Comm'r

of Soc. Sec., No. 2:23-cv-00635 AC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167482, at *22-23

(E.D. Cal. Sep. 17, 2024).

MSJ at 4–5

Initially, it is important note that despite the limitation in question,2 Dr. Bilik’s examination

resulted in a finding of non-disability. Additionally, although this limitation was not independently

15 articulated by Dr. Bilik, it was nevertheless one of several work-related abilities included on a form

16 Dr. Bilik filled out. This form requested the clinician to identify a rating (not limited, moderately

17 limited, etc.,). At the outset the form states, “The questions below help determine the individual’s

ability to perform sustained work activities. However, the actual mental residual functional capacity

[MRFC] assessment is recorded in the narrative discussion(s).” AR 145, 146 (emphasis added).

The moderate limitation at issue here is found under a domain titled, “Sustained Concentration and

Persistence Limitation.” AR 145. At the place where the form requests a narrative explanation

23 regarding this domain, Dr. Bilik types, “SEE BELOW.” AR 145. Dr. Bilik then skips down to the

24 next domain on the form which is titled, “Social Interaction Limitation.” At this location on the

form is where Dr. Bilik inserts his narrative explanation. Although his explanation is located at

27 2 Completing a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based

symptoms, and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest

28 periods.

1 the end of the Social Interaction domain, it is logical to infer that it applies to both domains given

that he typed the word “SEE BELOW” when he was directed on the form to explain his opinion

concerning Plaintiff’s capabilities for sustained concentration and persistence. This appears so

notwithstanding that the wording in his explanation includes “in this domain”. Dr. Bilik’s full

explanation follows and is found under the heading, “MRFC Additional Explanation”:

7 The claimant can understand and remember simple and detailed instructions despite

any limitations in this domain. The claimant can carry out simple and detailed tasks

8 despite any limitations in this domain. The claimant can interact appropriately with

others, but may benefit from reduced contact with the general public. The claimant

9 can adapt despite any limitations in this domain.

AR 146 (emphasis added).

Further, and just as important, because Dr. Bilik found only a moderate limitation in this

domain, which is the basis of Plaintiff’s first claim of error, this finding would not necessarily

preclude Plaintiff from carrying out simple tasks as the RFC indicates, nor would it likely even

15 preclude Plaintiff’s from carrying out detailed tasks which is beyond what the RFC requires.

16 Plaintiff ‘s argument continues:

17 While the limitation of Gill to simple instructions may reflect Dr. Bilik’s

moderate limitation in attention and concentration for extended periods, the ALJ’s

residual functional capacity assessment clearly does not contain Dr. Bilik’s

19 limitation on completing a normal workday and to perform at a consistent pace

without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods.

20 That is because a limitation to simple work does not adequately account for

limitations on completing a normal workday/workweek or the need for an

21 unreasonable number of rest periods.

MSJ at 6 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff goes on to cite caselaw which stands for the proposition that a limitation to simple

work, as the RFC specifies here, does not adequately account for limitations on completing a

normal workday/workweek without the need for an unreasonable number of rest periods. Plaintiff’s

27 citations follow:

28 Harrell v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-00614- GSA, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184794, at

1 *17-18 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 24, 2021) (finding that the more recent weight of authority

refutes the “notion that a limitation to simple/routine tasks with limited public

contact adequately accounts for other limitations in social interaction, maintaining

attendance, completing a normal workday without interruptions from a psychiatric

condition, and handling work related stressors”)(collecting cases); D.L. v. Kijakazi,

4 No. 2:22-cv-07523-SHK, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199338, at *19-20 (C.D. Cal. Nov.

6, 2023) (limitation to simple tasks does not adequately account for moderate

5 limitations in the ability to maintain regular attendance or complete a normal

workday); and Donna M. v. Saul, No. 19-cv-03134-DMR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

204573, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2020) (noting limitation to simple, routine tasks

7 with no public interaction in RFC failed to address other moderate limitations, such

as plaintiff's ability to relate to and interact with coworkers, associate with day-to-

8 day work activity, maintain regular attendance in the workplace and perform work

activities on a consistent basis, and perform work activities without special or

9 additional supervision). The ability to perform work activities on a consistent basis

without unreasonable rest periods and/or maintain attendance and complete a

normal workday/workweek are key limitations. See Macias v. Saul, No. 1:19-cv-

11 01187- BAM, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43161, at *15-18 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2021)

(collecting cases noting that limitation to simple tasks does not account for moderate

12 limitations, such as working on a consistent basis without special or additional

instruction and completing a normal workday or workweek without interruptions

13 from a psychiatric condition).

However, the limitation in question here is actually the inverse of Plaintiff’s argument.

Specifically, it is not whether a moderate limitation in this particular domain3 would allow for the

performance of simple work, but rather as Dr. Bilik articulated on the form, the moderate limitation

identified would not preclude Plaintiff from performing simple work.

19 In sum, Plaintiff establishes no error as to this claim.

20 B. Subjective Symptoms (Claim # 2)

3 There is also authority indicating that moderate limitations are not work preclusive, and that a

claimant with such limitations can still function satisfactorily. See, e.g., Rose M. E. v. Saul, 2021

23 WL 1612091, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2021) (SSA defines moderate limitations to mean ‘[t]here

is more than a slight limitation in this area, but the individual can still function satisfactorily.’”).

24 There is also caselaw indicating that a limitation to simple work, while not a catchall, does

adequately account for many work restrictions. Messerli v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 3782986, at *11

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2017), Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 490 F. App’x 15 (9th Cir.

2012) (holding that an RFC for simple routine tasks, which did not expressly note the claimant’s

moderate limitations in interacting with others, nonetheless adequately accounted for such

27 limitations); Henry, 2016 WL 164956, at *18 (simple tasks accounted for moderate social

interaction limitations); Langford v. Astrue, No. 07-cv-0366-EFB, 2008 WL 2073951, at *7 (E.D.

28 Cal. May 14, 2008) (same).

1 1. Initial Overview of the Law

Before proceeding to steps four and five, the ALJ determines the claimant’s residual

functional capacity (RFC) which comprises the most that a claimant is still capable of doing despite

the claimant’s particular limitations. This RFC represents an assessment “based on all the relevant

evidence” contained within the Certified Administrative Record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). The

residual functional capacity must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, whether those

impairments are severe or non-severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(2). “The ALJ can meet

this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting evidence,

stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751

(9th Cir. 1989).

An ALJ performs a two-step analysis to determine whether a Plaintiff’s testimony regarding

subjective pain or symptoms is credible. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir.

2014); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281; S.S.R 16-3p at 3. First, the claimant must produce objective

medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of

the symptom or pain alleged. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281–82. If the

claimant satisfies the first step and the ALJ finds that there is no evidence of malingering in the

record, the ALJ must then evaluate the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the claimant’s

symptoms to determine the extent to which those symptoms limit the individual’s ability to perform

work-related activities. S.S.R. 16-3p at 2.

An ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s testimony must be supported by specific, clear and

convincing reasons. Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014); see also S.S.R. 16-3p

at *10. Subjective testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that the testimony is not entirely

corroborated by the objective medical evidence in the record. Nevertheless, the medical evidence

is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of Claimant’s pain and its disabling effects. See,

Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); S.S.R. 16-3p (citing 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(c)(2)).

In addition, other factors considered are: 1- daily activities; 2- the location, duration,

1 frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; 3- any applicable precipitating and aggravating

2 factors; 4- the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any prescribed medication; 5-

3 treatment other than medications that the claimant receives; 6- any other measures the claimant

4 uses to relieve pain or other symptom; and 7- other factors concerning the claimant’s functional

5 limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. See, 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3).

6 2. Analysis

7 a. Introduction

8 Plaintiff emphasizes her severe impairments of right tibia and fibula fracture, degenerative

9 disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, anxiety disorder, and bipolar disorder. Plaintiff

10 contends that given these impairments the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff capable of performing light

11 exertional work, and further contends that the ALJ erred when finding that Plaintiff’s activities of

12 daily living were consistent with her ability to perform such work. MSJ at 13 (citing AR 26).

13 Plaintiff concludes that the ALJ was in error because “Gill actually testified that the limitations she

14 suffers from as a result of the severe impairments limits and prevents her from performing any work

15 activity on a sustained basis let alone light exertion work.” Id. (citing AR 79-85, AR 346-353.).

16 b. Boilerplate Language; Sufficiency of Objective Evidence

17 To begin, Plaintiff points to the ALJ’s use of boilerplate language, e.g., claimant’s testimony

18 concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms is not consistent with

19 the record. Plaintiff acknowledges however that “ALJ’s include this substantially same language

20 as a matter of routine in nearly every decision” (MSJ at 15 (citing Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d

21 664, 678 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2017)), and adds that “The inclusion of this routine language itself is not

22 the error; rather the issue is whether the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for

23 his credibility determinations.” MSJ at 15.

24 Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ wrongly relied solely on objective medical evidence,4

4 Subjective testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that the testimony is not entirely

corroborated by the objective medical evidence in the record. Nevertheless, the medical evidence

27 is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of Claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.

See, Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); S.S.R. 16-3p (citing 20 C.F.R. §

28 404.1529(c)(2)).

1 and that subjective testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that the testimony is not entirely

2 corroborated by the objective medical evidence in the record. See, Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3

3 d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); S.S.R. 16-3p (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)).

4 Plaintiff then turns to a recitation of law along with argument.

5 c. Plaintiff’s Recitation of Law & Argument

6 Taken from Plaintiff’s motion for Summary Judgment is the following:

7 Also, the ALJ’s routine statement that Gill’s testimony is not entirely

consistent with the “other evidence in the record” (AR 25) is also not sufficient. This

8 statement of the ALJ is too vague to permit the Court to conclude the ALJ did not

arbitrarily discredit Gill’s testimony. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346

(9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] reviewing court should not be forced to speculate as to the

10 grounds for an adjudicator’s rejection of a claimant’s allegations of disabling

pain.”). While it is proper for the ALJ to consider the objective medical evidence in

11 making a credibility determination, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2), “[t]he ALJ may not

make a negative credibility finding ‘solely because’ the claimant’s symptom/pain

12 testimony ‘is not substantiated affirmatively by objective medical evidence,’” Karen

M. v. Saul, No. 2:20-cv-06202-GJS, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89868, at *10 (C.D.

Cal. May 11, 2021) (quoting Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883). That is precisely what the

14 ALJ did in this matter.

At no point did the ALJ “identify the specific testimony” that is undermined

15 by plaintiff’s treatment history. See Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1268 (“[T]he ALJ must

identify the specific testimony that he discredited and explain the evidence

16 undermining it.”). The lack of connection by the ALJ between Gill’s specific

testimony and the medical evidence is legal error. See Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d

1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding legal error where the ALJ “never connected the

18 medical record” to the claimant’s testimony and did not make “a specific finding

linking a lack of medical records to [the claimant’s] testimony about the intensity of

19 her . . . . pain”); see also Isis A. v. Saul, No. 18cv01728-W-MSB, 2019 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 130801, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2019) (“The ALJ’s generic references to

Plaintiff’s statements as ‘complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations’ . . . .

21 did not specifically identify the statements that the ALJ was discrediting.”), report

and recommendation adopted sub nom. Avina v. Saul, No. 18-CV-1728-W (MSB),

22 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140324 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2019).

The ALJ’s articulated rationale simply that Gill’s statements and testimony

23 are inconsistent with the objective medical evidence is not enough. AR 25

(statements are “inconsistent because those allegations are greater than expected in

light of the objective evidence of record.”). Rejecting a claimant’s testimony simply

25 because it is inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and residual functional

capacity is plainly disallowed. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1103 (ALJ’s allegation that a

26 claimant’s testimony is not consistent with the objective medical evidence is

insufficient to reject that testimony); Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d at 678 n. 6 (9th

27 Cir. 2017) (rejecting a claimant's subjective symptoms as inconsistent with the

residual functional capacity assessment inverts the responsibility of an ALJ and

1 indicates that the ALJ fails to properly incorporate a claimant's testimony regarding

subjective symptoms and pain into the residual functional capacity finding as

required).

The ALJ also articulates that Gill’s activities suggest that Gill is not as

limited as she describes and in fact support that she can perform work. AR 25. The

4 ALJ is wrong. That is because nothing in Gill’s descriptions of her limitations or as

described by the ALJ or anywhere else in the record or in the decision indicates that

5 she is capable of maintaining substantial gainful work activity as defined by the

Commissioner, let alone the demands of medium exertion5 work.

Substantial gainful work activity is the ability to sustain work activity “8

7 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” Social Security

Ruling 96-8p. Substantial gainful work activity is certainly not defined as requiring

8 an individual’s disability and limitations render him comatose or totally disabled.

See Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (disability does not mean

9 that a claimant must vegetate in a dark room excluded from all forms of human and

social activity).

An ALJ may rely on Gill’s activities to discount Gill’s statements about her

11 symptoms and limitations only when those activities either: (1) “contradict” the

testimony; or (2) “meet the threshold for transferable work skills”—that is, where

12 Gill “is able to spend a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving the

performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting.” Orn v.

13 Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Ghanim v.

Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014) (same).

Gill’s sporadic activities as described in her testimony (AR 79-85, AR 346-

15 353) or in this record do not contradict her testimony nor do they demonstrate an

ability to spend a substantial part of the day doing activities transferable to a fulltime

16 work setting. The fact that Gill has some ability some of the time to perform

something is not reason enough to find a lack of credibility. See Lester v. Chater, 81

17 F.3d at 833 (“Occasional symptom-free periods - and even the sporadic ability to

work - are not inconsistent with disability” because the ALJ must evaluate the

claimant's “ability to work on a sustained basis”). Evidence that a claimant can

19 participate in basic human function “is not determinative of disability.” Magallanes

v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756 (9th Cir. 1989). (Emphasis added)

20 But the ALJ ignores that by itself the fact that an individual may perform

some activities like Gill does not affect credibility; rather it is an individual's daily

21 activities and the relation of those activities to gainful work which offer insight to

an individual's credibility. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998)

(“Only if the level of activity were inconsistent with Claimant's claimed limitations

23 would these activities have any bearing on Claimant's credibility”).

Gill’s descriptions of her activity levels in her testimony are far short of what

24 is needed to demonstrate the capacity to perform work activity on a sustained basis.

The ALJ points to Gill’s reported ability to perform basic activities such as cook,

clean, and help her mother. AR 26. The ALJ is wrong because the ALJ focus is on

what is being done and not how it is done and whether it relates to the ability to

perform work activity for 8 hours a day.

27 The ALJ ignores that it is not only an individual's daily activities but the

28 5 The RFC was for light work, not medium work. AR 22.

1 relation of those activities on a sustained basis to gainful work which offer insight

to an individual's credibility. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998)

(“Only if the level of activity were inconsistent with Claimant's claimed limitations

would these activities have any bearing on Claimant's credibility”). The ALJ makes

no effort to state how those activities relate to the ability to perform sustained work

4 activity over an 8-hour workday. AR 26. Something that is required. Social Security

Ruling 96-8p.

5 To reject Gill’s statements about her symptoms and limitations her activities

must contradict the testimony; or to invert it, Gill’s statements about her symptoms

and limitations and her activities must support the ability to physically and mentally

perform medium level exertion6 as the ALJ unreasonably concludes. The testimony

of Gill does not support the conclusion that she can mentally and physically perform

8 medium exertion work.7 Social Security Ruling 83-10.

9 MSJ at 17-21.

An ALJ may rely on Gill’s activities to discount Gill’s statements about her

11 symptoms and limitations only when those activities either: (1) “contradict” the testimony;

or (2) “meet the threshold for transferable work skills”—that is, where Gill “is able to spend

a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical

13 functions that are transferable to a work setting.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir.

2007) (citation omitted); see also Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014)

14 (same).

15 MSJ at 19 (emphasis added)

16 Notably, the portions of the above which contain argument are bereft of specific supporting

facts drawn from the record. For example, Plaintiff refers to “her symptoms and limitations,” but

does so without identifying which symptoms or limitations.

In another example, Plaintiff states:

Gill’s sporadic activities as described in her testimony (AR 79-85, AR 346-

353) or in this record do not contradict her testimony nor do they demonstrate an

22 ability to spend a substantial part of the day doing activities transferable to a fulltime

work setting. The fact that Gill has some ability some of the time to perform

23 something is not reason enough to find a lack of credibility. MSJ at 19 (emphasis

added).

In this example, Plaintiff merely references roughly 15 pages of testimony (e.g. AR 79-85,

6 The RFC is for light work, not medium work. AR 22.

28 7 Same

1 and AR 346-353) without drawing the Court’s attention to any specific activity.

Of final note, Plaintiff misidentifies the exertional level as medium and does so three times

in the above quoted pages when the actual exertional level provided by the ALJ was an ability to

perform light exertional work. See, e.g., MSJ at 19 (“let alone the demands of medium exertion

work”) (emphasis added); MSJ at 21 (“her activities must support the ability to physically and

7 mentally perform medium level exertion as the ALJ unreasonably concludes”) (emphasis added);

8 MSJ at 21 (“The testimony of Gill does not support the conclusion that she can mentally and

9 physically perform medium exertion work.”) (emphasis added).

d. Applicable Law

As a starting point, an ALJ may not summarily dispense with a Plaintiff’s testimony

concerning symptom severity by simply stating that it is inconsistent with the record. An ALJ

needs to identify the testimony in question and then when relevant identify where it is inconsistent

with the record. When an ALJ evaluates a claimants subjective complaints, the following is

instructive:

17 In evaluating the credibility of a claimant's testimony regarding subjective complaints, an

ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.

2009). First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical

19 evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the

symptoms alleged. Id. The claimant is not required to show that his/her impairment "could

20 reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom [they have] alleged; [they]

need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom." Id.

21 (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)). If the claimant meets

the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant's

testimony about the severity of the symptoms only if they give "specific, clear and

23 convincing reasons" for the rejection. [*14] Id. As the Ninth Circuit has explained: The

ALJ may consider many factors in weighing a claimant's credibility, including (1) ordinary

24 techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation for lying, prior

inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that

appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment

26 or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant's daily activities. If the

ALJ's finding is supported by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in second-

27 guessing. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted);

see also Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2009).

1 Other factors the ALJ may consider include a claimant's work record and testimony from

physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of

which he complains. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997).

Further,

While "an individual's statements of symptoms alone are not enough to establish the

5 existence of a physical or mental impairment or disability, ... if an individual alleges

impairment-related symptoms, [the Agency] must evaluate those symptoms." SSR 16-3p,

2016 SSR LEXIS 4, 2017 WL 5180304. Importantly, "subjective symptom evaluation is

7 not an examination of an individual's character." SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, 2017 WL

5180304, at *2. Instead, the ALJ must first determine if there is medical evidence of an

8 impairment that could reasonably produce the symptoms alleged. Garrison v. Colvin, 759

F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). "In determining whether there is an underlying medically

9 determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce an individual's

symptoms, [ALJs] do not consider whether the severity of an individual's alleged symptoms

is supported by the objective medical [*12] evidence." SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4,

11 2017 WL 5180304, at *3. "In this analysis, the claimant is not required to show that her

impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has

12 alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the

symptom." Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014 (citation omitted). "Nor must a claimant produce

13 objective medical evidence of the pain or fatigue itself, or the severity thereof." Id. (citation

omitted).

If the claimant satisfies the first step as mentioned above, the ALJ must then "evaluate the

intensity and persistence of those symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit

an individual's ability to perform work-related activities." SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, 2017

WL 5180304, at *3. If there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear

and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony about the symptom severity. Trevizo,

871 F.3d at 678 (citation omitted); see also Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th

Cir. 2006).

Again, unless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative evidence thereof,

he or she may only find an applicant not credible by making specific findings as to credibility and

stating clear and convincing reasons for each. “This is not an easy requirement to meet: The clear

and convincing standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases." Garrison, 759

F.3d at 1015 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the ALJ's decision "must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the

individual's symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated

1 so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the

2 individual's symptoms." SSR 16-3p, 2016 SSR LEXIS 4, 2017 WL 5180304, at *10. "Ultimately,

3 the 'clear and convincing' standard requires an ALJ to show his work ...." Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53

4 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022). "If the ALJ fails to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons

5 for discounting the claimant's subjective symptom testimony, then the ALJ's determination is not

6 supported by substantial evidence." Ferguson v. O'Malley, 95 F.4th 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024).

7 Sandra C.H. v. O'Malley, No. EDCV 23-1583 PVC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158907, at *11-14

8 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 3, 2024).

9 Finally, as to a reviewing court’s role, as explained in the Defendant’s Responsive Brief:

Because the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity,

persistence and limiting effects of [her alleged] symptoms are not entirely consistent

12 with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained

in this decision,” the Court must apply the following standard of review for this

13 finding which, “isn’t whether [a reviewing] court is convinced, but instead whether

the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v.

14 Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022)

e. Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints

Plaintiff explained her intolerance to extended standing and sitting due to back spasms, her

intolerance to walking due to screws in her ankle, her ability to lift no more than 15 pounds, had

anxiety around too many people, and had anxiety with too many things going on at once.

As to the ability to lift no more than 15 pounds, this is not materially different from the

demands of light work which requires 20 pounds.

As to anxiety, the ALJ identified Plaintiff’s positive response to treatment and normal

mental status exams. As well, the RFC specifies a reduction to frequent interaction with peers,

supervisors and the general public. AR 22. (See below)

As to an ALJ not solely relying on objective evidence, the ALJ here did not. The ALJ relied

on the Plaintiff’s daily activities along with reports Plaintiff made to her providers of significant

symptom relief from treatment. Notably, reports of significant symptom relief are not considered

objective evidence, but subjective, and the mere fact that such evidence appears in a medical record

1 does not automatically make it objective.

2 Counsel’s discussion of her testimony is as follows:

3 Gill testified at her administrative hearing and submitted written statements.

AR 79-85, AR 346-353. Gill is unable to work because she cannot sit or stand for

very long. AR 80. Gill has to move around due to lower back spasms. AR 80-81.

5 Gill will have to sit down for relief due to muscle spasms in her back. AR 81. Gill

has difficulty walking due to screws in her ankle which cause her pain. AR 81, AR

6 346. Gill can lift only 10 to 15 pounds at most. AR 81. Gill can sit for about 30

minutes before she needs to get up and can be on her feet for 20 to 30 minutes before

7 she needs to sit down. AR 82.

Gill tries to do chores around the house but cannot do them for many minutes

at a time without having to sit down. AR 82. It hurts Gill to put on pants. AR 347.

9 Gill has had five suicide attempts. AR 83. Gill has anxiety around people and gets

overwhelmed. AR 84. Gill feels overwhelmed with too many things going on at

10 once. AR 84. Gill elevates her legs on the couch with a chair every day because of

the screws in her ankle which hurt. AR 84-85

The ALJ’s related discussion is as follows:

13 However, she reported that she was able to live with family; attend to her

personal care; take care of her elderly mother; take care of her pets; prepare her own

14 meals; do household chores; spend time with others in person and by text message;

go to the grocery store and Walmart regularly; shop for groceries; watch television;

and manage finances. The claimant testified that she cannot sit or stand for long

16 periods of time, she has difficulty walking to the mailbox, and she suffers from

shoulder spasms due to neck arthritis. her symptoms were treated with medications,

17 chiropractic care, physical therapy, and pain management. In addition, she reported

that she receives mental health treatment in the form of medication and she talks to

18 the doctor who prescribes her medication every three months. She acknowledged

that the medications help control her symptoms (Exhibits B2E, B3E, B11E; Hearing

Testimony).

AR 23.

As to the activity of living with family, this is not especially indicative of a claimant’s ability

to function in the workplace, whereas Plaintiff’s preparing her own meals, caring for her mother,

24 doing household chores, caring for pets, doing shopping for groceries and managing finances are

25 much more indicative of the ability to do light work in the workplace.

26 The ALJ also explained that Plaintiff reported “50% pain relief with medications and

injections, feeling better with physical therapy, no problems with balance or coordination, and pain

1 0 out of 10 on a pain scale of 1 to 10 (Exhibits B9F/2, 56, 71; B12F/1, 17, 19). Evidence of medical

treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of disability. See, Wellington v.

Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017).

/1/ Imaging

The ALJ explained as follows:

7 Lumbar spine imaging in July 2024 documented diffuse osteopenia, right convex

scoliosis, advanced L2-3 spondylosis with endplate sclerosis and vacuum disc

8 phenomenon, mild multilevel spondylosis and facet arthrosis throughout the

remainder of the lumbar spine, mild L2 and L3 retrolisthesis, and no spondylosis or

9 spondylolisthesis (Exhibit B8F/116). Cervical spine imaging in July 2024 found

diffuse osteopenia, moderate multilevel spondylosis and facet arthrosis, mild C4

anterolisthesis and C5 retrolisthesis, mild bilateral C5-6 and left C6-7 neural

11 foraminal stenosis, and no prevertebral soft tissue swelling (Exhibit B8F/118).

Additional imaging of the claimant’s cervical spine confirmed moderate

12 degenerative joint disease (Exhibit B9F/78) (emphasis added).

13 AR 23–24.

Here, the fact of three mild findings, one moderate finding, and several findings of unstated

severity,8 it is not unreasonable to conclude that Plaintiff’s imaging results do not sufficiently

corroborate her alleged inability to meet the demands of light exertional work. “Contradiction with

the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.” Carmickle

19 v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008).

20 /2/ Anxiety Disorder

21 Here, the ALJ explained as follows:

In addition, she reported that she receives mental health treatment in the form of

23 medication and she talks to the doctor who prescribes her medication every three

months. She acknowledged that the medications help control her symptoms

24 (Exhibits B2E, B3E, B11E; Hearing Testimony).

AR 23.

The ALJ further noted Plaintiff’s testimony:

8 “Diffuse osteopenia, right convex scoliosis, advanced L2-3 spondylosis with endplate sclerosis

28 and vacuum disc phenomenon.”

Q: And so, what is it that you are experiencing with regard to your mental

health issues? Can you kind of explain to me what you experience?

A: Yes. I get real bad anxiety when I get around too many people. Or even,

I get anxiety even getting into the car. It’s just the thought of getting

4 around that many people or, or, just, it gets me on my nerves and I can’t

do it. I – when it comes to not being able to go, and it just overwhelms

5 me with it.

Q: And does the medication seem to help? Does Ativan help?

A: Yes, yes it does. I’m able to do it for a little period of time.

7 Q: You, can you explain what you mean by that?

A: Like, I’m able to – if I take an Ativan and, and I let it get hold of me,

8 I’m able to, like, go to the grocery store.

9 AR 84.

And then explained:

The claimant’s treatment included psychotropic medication for anxiety disorder and

12 bipolar disorder prescribed by the claimant’s primary care providers (Exhibits

B2F/20, 25; B12F/42). During treatment, the claimant reported insomnia due to

13 mental disorder, anxiety, depression and bipolar, and difficulty sleeping (Exhibits

B8F/14; B9F/15; B12F/2, 8). Despite the claimant’s allegations, mental status

examinations during treatment showed she was alert and oriented with normal

15 speech, goal directed thought processes, no distractibility noted, normal thought

content, intact cognition, good memory, good concentration, good mood, no suicidal

16 ideation, good insight, appropriate mood and affect, and normal judgement (Exhibits

B2F/229; B4F/50, 64; B7F/64; B12F/3, 8).

During the psychological consultative examination with Meghan Hamill, Psy.D. in

April 2024, the claimant reported symptoms from mental impairments, such as

19 depression, bipolar, and suicidal ideation. She provided a history of overdose

attempts on Norco and alcohol, as well as overdose attempts on drugs. She reported

20 being psychiatrically hospitalized at least twice for these reported attempts (B5F/1,

2). The claimant noted treatment off and on with medication, but the claimant

21 reported no mental health treatment with therapy (B5F/2). Regarding activities of

daily living, the claimant reported intact ability to bathe, cook, and run errands

(B5F/2, 3). During the examination, the claimant presented with slurred speech at

23 times and difficult to understand (B5F/3). Yet, the examination also found the

claimant was fully oriented with adequate grooming and hygiene, positive attitude

24 and cooperative, intact cognitive function, no overt impairment in concentration or

memory, and no evidence of psychosis (B5F/3, 4). Diagnoses included bipolar I

disorder, alcohol use disorder, in reported full remission, amphetamine use disorder,

in reported full remission, and cannabis use disorder (Exhibit B5F/4).

27 AR 25.

28 As reflected in Plaintiff’s testimony, Ativan provided at least some relief from her

1 symptoms, which Plaintiff does not contest. Evidence of medical treatment successfully relieving

symptoms can undermine a claim of disability. See, Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876

(9thCir. 2017).

Additionally, the ALJ described Plaintiff’s primary care visits, acknowledged Plaintiff’s

reported symptoms, and discussed the mental status examinations which reflected normal findings

7 as to alertness, orientation, speech, thought process, thought content, cognition, memory,

8 concentration, mood, affect, insight and judgment.

9 The ALJ further acknowledged Plaintiff’s history of difficulties with substance use,

attempted overdoses, and psychiatric hospitalizations. Nevertheless, the ALJ explained that

Plaintiff was treated with medication off and on.

The ALJ noted that Plaintiff reported she had “no mental health treatment with therapy”. A

claimant’s “unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment or follow a prescribed

15 course of treatment” can also undermine her allegations about the severity of an impairment. Fair

16 v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1989).

17 Finally, Plaintiff reported relatively intact activities of daily living, e.g. she could bathe,

cook and run errands. Where a claimant’s activities “suggest some difficulty functioning, they may

be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a

totally debilitating impairment.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir 2012).

In sum, the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons to discount Plaintiff’s testimony

23 concerning anxiety induced limitations. The ALJ provided a balanced discussion acknowledging

24 Plaintiff’s symptoms, psychiatric history, and hospitalizations.

Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that the evidence did not support more restrictive limitations

than the RFC set forth, namely that she can understand, remember and carry out simple instructions

and can interact with supervisors, co-workers and the general public frequently. And even if this

1 were the situation where the evidence could support two reasonable conclusions, one pointing to a

disability finding and the other to a finding of non-disability, where the evidence “is susceptible to

more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.” Burch v.

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir.2005).

As noted above, the standard of review “isn’t whether [a reviewing] court is convinced, but

7 instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v.

8 Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022). It is not the Court's role to "second-guess" an ALJ's

9 reasonable interpretation of a claimant's testimony. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th

Cir. 2001); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959 (affirming an ALJ's decision discounting a claimant's

testimony after finding that the claimant "was able to perform various household chores such as

cooking, laundry, washing dishes, and shopping"). See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 500 (9th

Cir. 2022).

15 h. Conclusion

16 In sum, the ALJ identified clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony

17 as to physical and mental symptoms which Plaintiff contends preclude light work. Specifically,

the ALJ relied on: 1- activities such as caring for her mother, cooking, cleaning, and shopping; 2-

positive response to pain medication and injections, “50% pain relief with medications and

injections, feeling better with physical therapy, no problems with balance or coordination, and pain

0 out of 10 on a pain scale of 1 to 10 (Exhibits B9F/2, 56, 71; B12F/1, 17, 19).”; 3- normal mental

23 status exams; 4- testimony as to positive response to mental health medication; and 5- o other

24 mental health treatment measures, such as therapy, were pursued.

VI. Order

Substantial evidence and applicable law support the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff was not

disabled.

1 Accordingly, it is ordered that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 13) is DENIED.

2. Defendant’s cross motion (Doc. 15) is GRANTED.

3. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED.

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant

Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 12, 2026 /s/ Gary S. Austin

10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.