Opinion

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 JUAN LUIS MARTINEZ HERNANDEZ, Case No. 1:25-cv-01772-SAB-HC

11 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S

AMENDED MOTION TO ENFORCE AND

12 v. DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO

ENFORCE AND MOTION FOR

13 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

ANNEX ICE DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,

14 (ECF Nos. 18, 29, 30)

Respondents.

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17 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is an immigration detainee who proceeded with a

18 petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The parties have consented to

19 the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF Nos. 10, 12, 13.)

20 I.

21 BACKGROUND

22 On December 8, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging

23 his prolonged immigration detention on procedural due process grounds. (ECF No. 1.) On

24 February 18, 2026, the Court granted the petition and ordered that within thirty days Petitioner

25 be provided “with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge that complies

26 with the requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011)[.]” (ECF No.

27 15 at 10.1)

1 On March 16, 2026, an immigration judge (“IJ”) held a bond hearing and denied bond.

2 (ECF No. 18 at 9.) On April 6, 2026, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a motion to enforce

3 judgment. (ECF No. 18.) On May 4, 2026, Respondents filed an opposition. (ECF No. 23.) On

4 May 15, 2026, the Court granted the Federal Defender’s amicus motion to reconsider

5 appointment of counsel and appointed counsel. (ECF No. 26.)

6 On April 21, 2026, an IJ ordered Petitioner removed from the United States. (ECF No. 33

7 at 3–6.) On May 21, 2026, Petitioner attempted to appeal the IJ’s order, but the Board of

8 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) rejected his notice of appeal for failing to pay the required fee and

9 gave him fifteen days to cure the defect by paying the fee or submitting a fee waiver. (Id. at 8–9.)

10 On May 28, 2026, the BIA rejected Petitioner’s second notice of appeal for the same reason,

11 again giving him another fifteen days to cure the defect. (Id. at 11–12.)

12 On June 2, 2026, Petitioner filed an amended motion to enforce habeas order. (ECF No.

13 30.) Additionally, Petitioner filed a motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”) “to preserve

14 this Court’s jurisdiction by staying Petitioner’s removal from the United States pending

15 resolution of the Amended Motion to Enforce Habeas Order[.]” (ECF No. 29 at 1.) On June 10,

16 2026, Respondents filed an opposition to the motion for TRO and amended motion to enforce.

17 (ECF No. 32.)

18 II.

19 DISCUSSION

20 In the amended motion to enforce, Petitioner asserts:

21 The March 15, 2026 bond hearing was a constitutionally deficient proceeding that

failed to comply with this Court’s order in three critical respects: (1) the IJ shifted

22 the burden of proof onto Petitioner; (2) the government’s evidence was legally

insufficient to establish either flight risk or danger to the community by clear and

23 convincing evidence; and (3) the IJ failed to conduct a meaningful, individualized

assessment, instead relying on stale convictions, dismissed charges, and

24 categorical reasoning.

25 (ECF No. 30 at 2.)

26 A “district court ha[s] authority to review compliance with its earlier order conditionally

27 granting habeas relief.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing

1 jurisdiction to determine whether a party has complied with the terms of a conditional order in a

2 habeas case); Phifer v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, 53 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 1995) (“When a

3 habeas petitioner alleges noncompliance with a conditional order, jurisdiction exists for the

4 purpose of determining whether the [government] acted in accordance with the court's

5 mandate.”); Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, 157 (9th Cir. 1972) (“The equitable jurisdiction of

6 a federal court extends to supplemental or ancillary bills brought for the purpose of effectuating a

7 decree of the same court.”)).

8 In Leonardo, a petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition challenging his prolonged

9 detention, the district court ordered the government to provide the petitioner with a bond hearing,

10 an immigration judge (“IJ”) held a hearing, concluded that the petitioner posed a danger to the

11 community, and denied bond, and the petitioner filed a motion for review of the bond decision in

12 the habeas case arguing that the hearing failed to satisfy due process or conform to the district

13 court’s order. Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1159. The district court denied relief because the

14 government complied with the court’s order by providing a bond hearing before an IJ and the

15 court lacked jurisdiction to consider the due process claims. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit

16 rejected “Leonardo’s contention that the district court should have addressed his challenges to

17 the IJ’s decision based on the court’s authority to ensure compliance with its earlier habeas

18 order” because the district court “exercised its authority to ensure compliance with its

19 conditional grant of relief and construed Leonardo’s legal challenges following the IJ’s hearing

20 as raising new arguments not covered by the earlier order” and “was under no obligation to

21 address Leonardo’s new arguments under the ambit of ensuring compliance with the earlier

22 order.” Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 11561.

23 Here, in granting the petition, the Court ordered in pertinent part:

24 Within thirty (30) days of the date of service of this order, Respondents SHALL

provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration

25 judge that complies with the requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d

1196 (9th Cir. 2011), and where “the government must prove by clear and

26 convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is a flight risk or a danger to the community

to justify denial of bond,” id. at 1203. In the event Petitioner is “determined not to

27 be a danger to the community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require

detention without bond,” the immigration judge should consider Petitioner’s

1 financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release. Hernandez v.

Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017).

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3 (ECF No. 15 at 10–11.)

4 Petitioner contends that the “bond hearing record demonstrates that the IJ shifted the

5 burden onto Petitioner,” arguing that the IJ’s statement “that ‘the fact that you were not

6 convicted does not mean that you are innocent’” regarding dismissed domestic violence and

7 animal cruelty charges “effectively requir[ed] Petitioner to prove his innocence rather than

8 requiring the government to prove dangerousness,” which “is precisely the burden-shifting that

9 this Court’s order prohibits.” (ECF No. 29 at 5.)

10 Generally, in the absence of any red flags, we take the BIA at its word. For

example, “[w]hen nothing in the record or the BIA’s decision indicates a failure to

11 consider all the evidence,” we will rely on the BIA’s statement that it properly

assessed the entire record. Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771 (9th Cir. 2011). We

12 do not require the BIA to “discuss each piece of evidence submitted.” Id.

Similarly, we accept that the BIA “applied the correct legal standard” if the BIA

13 “expressly cited and applied [the relevant caselaw] in rendering its decision.” See

Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 980 (9th Cir. 2009). But when there is

14 an indication that something is amiss, like if the BIA “misstat[es] the record” or

“fail[s] to mention highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence,” we do

15 not credit its use of a “catchall phrase” to the contrary. Cole, 659 F.3d at 771-72.

16 Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2024). Here, the bond hearing recording reflects

17 that the IJ stated multiple times during the hearing that the Department of Homeland Security

18 bore the burden by clear and convincing evidence. The IJ’s written order also states that “the

19 Department has established by clear and convincing evidence that: [Petitioner] is a danger, AND

20 that he is such a significant flight risk that no combination of release conditions can adequately

21 mitigate that risk.” (ECF No. 18 at 9.) Petitioner relies on an alleged statement by the IJ that “the

22 fact that you were not convicted does not mean that you are innocent,” citing to “ECF No. 22 at

23 12–13”. (ECF No. 29 at 5.) That citation refers to Petitioner’s pro se reply brief in support of the

24 first motion to enforce, but such a statement does not appear in the bond hearing transcript and

25 upon review of the recording of the hearing, the Court did not hear the IJ make such a statement.2

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2 In the opposition, Respondents state: “At no point during her ruling or anywhere else in the record did the IJ state

27 ‘the fact that you were not convicted does not mean that you are innocent’ as alleged by Martinez Hernandez.” (ECF

No. 32 at 7.) Respondents also note that “it appears from audio tape of the hearing” that DHS counsel “did not”

1 Accordingly, the Court finds that the IJ applied the proper burden of proof at the bond hearing,

2 and Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground.

3 Additionally, Petitioner argues that “the government’s evidence was legally insufficient

4 to establish either flight risk or danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence” and

5 “the IJ failed to conduct a meaningful, individualized assessment, instead relying on stale

6 convictions, dismissed charges, and categorical reasoning.” (ECF No. 30 at 2.) However, this

7 Court’s order did not “determine the precise scope of the hearing that would be required to

8 conform with due process, other than to note the standard of clear and convincing evidence” and

9 that the IJ should consider Petitioner’s financial circumstances and alternative conditions of

10 release in the event Petitioner was determined not to be a danger and not to be so great a flight

11 risk as to require detention without bond. Doe v. Becerra, No. 2:25-cv-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025

12 WL 1233883, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2025). Petitioner’s additional arguments “extend well

13 beyond the scope of the original Habeas Petition and this Court’s Order.” Id. “Petitioner may

14 ultimately be correct that the bond hearing he was afforded did not comport with due process.

15 However, the Court’s review here concerns whether the Government complied with the Court’s

16 Order and provided Petitioner with a bond hearing.” Id. at *3. “As Petitioner was provided with a

17 bond hearing where the IJ stated and seemed to apply the appropriate burden of proof and

18 standard, the Government complied with the Order.” Doe, 2025 WL 1233883, at *3.

19 Accordingly, the amended motion to enforce will be denied.

20 “Petitioner may challenge the adequacy under due process of the hearing and whether the

21 IJ’s finding that the Government had met its burden was in error,” but “such a challenge is not

22 properly brought as a motion to enforce the Court’s prior Order.” Doe, 2025 WL 1233883, at *4.

23 Rather, “[s]ubsequent challenges to the sufficiency of the IJ’s determination constitute a new and

24 separate basis for relief which must be brought in a habeas proceeding after Petitioner has

25 exhausted his administrative remedies.” Id. See Fernandez Vasquez v. Cruz, No. 1:26-cv-00476-

26 DAD-EFB, 2026 WL 252055, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2026) (rejecting contention “that the

27 lengthy process of appealing his bond determination to the BIA constitutes irreparable harm that

1 | errors Petitioner assigns to his bond hearing, the fact remains that he received a bond hearing”

2 | and thus the case was “readily distinguishable from those involving continued detention without

3 | any process” (citation omitted)).

4 Hil.

5 ORDER

6 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that:

7 1. The amended motion to enforce (ECF No. 30) is DENIED; and

8 2. The motion to enforce (ECF No. 18) and motion for temporary restraining order (ECF

9 No. 29) are DENIED as moot.

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1 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAA Le

12 | Dated: _ June 12, 2026

STANLEY A. BOONE

13 United States Magistrate Judge

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