Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JOSE ARTURO VARGAS LOPEZ (A- No. 1:26-cv-03666 DAD CSK

221-489-631),

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Petitioner,

13 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

v.

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WARDEN, CENTRAL VALLEY

15 ANNEX, et al.,

16 Respondents.

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18 Petitioner Jose Arturo Vargas Lopez (A-221-489-631), a native and citizen of Guatemala

19 who entered the United States without inspection on or around May 2023, filed a verified petition

20 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 On February 18, 2026, petitioner was

21 arrested and detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers. This

22 habeas action concerns petitioner’s February 18, 2026 detention. For the reasons that follow, the

23 Court recommends granting the petition and that petitioner be provided with a bond hearing

24 within seven days of the adoption of these findings and recommendations.

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1 Petitioner paid the filing fee and is proceeding through counsel. This matter proceeds before

28 the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c)(17).

1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

2 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States without inspection

3 on or around May 2023, and has resided in the United States continuously since that time. (ECF

4 No. 1 at 13-14; ECF No. 14-1 at 1.) On February 18, 2026, petitioner was stopped and detained

5 by ICE agents in Adelphi, Maryland while on his way to work. (ECF No. 1 at 14; ECF No. 14-1

6 at 2-3.) Petitioner was a passenger in the stopped vehicle and was not the target of the stop.

7 (ECF No. 14-1 at 2-3.) Petitioner has no criminal history. (Id. at 3.) This was petitioner’s first

8 interaction with immigration officials following his entry into the country on or around May

9 2023. (Id.) On February 18, 2026, petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear in INA Section 240

10 (8 U.S.C. § 1229a) removal proceedings, which are standard removal proceedings.3 (Id. at 5.) In

11 addition, the Notice to Appear does not allege petitioner is an “arriving alien,” though the Notice

12 does include a place to designate this information. (Id.) Petitioner was transferred to the Central

13 Valley Annex on or around February 25, 2026. (ECF No. 1 at 15.) On April 21, 2026, an

14 immigration judge denied petitioner’s request for bond due to lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s

15 request for custody determination. (ECF No. 14-2 at 7.) On April 27, 2026, an immigration

16 judge ordered petitioner removed to Guatemala. (Id. at 1-4.) On May 15, 2026, the Board of

17 Immigration Appeals received petitioner’s appeal of the immigration judge’s order. (Id. at 5-6.)

18 Petitioner’s appeal remains pending. See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation.4

19 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

20 On May 12, 2026, petitioner, through counsel, filed his verified petition for writ of habeas

21 2 Petitioner filed a verified habeas petition. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) A court “may treat the allegations

of a verified . . . petition [for writ of habeas corpus] as an affidavit.” Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d

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919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987)).

23 3 Removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (INA § 240) are standard removal

proceedings, which are different from expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

24 § 1225(b)(1) (INA § 235(b)(1)).

4 The court may take judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute

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because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), including undisputed information posted on

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official websites. Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.

27 2010). The Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) adjudicates immigration cases,

and the EOIR Automated Case Information website is an official website of the United States

28 Government. The address of this official website is https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/.

1 corpus. (ECF No. 1.) On May 18, 2026, respondents filed an answer to the petition. (ECF No.

2 14.) On May 26, 2026, petitioner filed a reply. (ECF No. 15.) Briefing is now complete.

3 III. LEGAL STANDARD

4 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every

5 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)

6 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in

7 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure

8 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas

9 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the

10 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has

11 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

12 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s

13 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

14 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

15 IV. DISCUSSION

16 Generally, noncitizens are subject to civil immigration detention only if the noncitizen

17 presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (holding that

18 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize indefinite detention). Petitioner alleges that he has been

19 detained for almost three months without a bond hearing where an immigration judge conducted

20 an individualized flight risk and dangerousness assessment. (ECF No. 1 at 9-10.) Petitioner

21 challenges his continued detention based on the following: (1) violation of the Immigration and

22 Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Administrative Procedure Act (claim one); and (2) violation of

23 petitioner’s Fifth Amendment right to due process (claims two and three). (Id. at 26-29.)

24 In the answer, respondents argue: “Because petitioner was lawfully detained in accord

25 with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)’s requirement the only Because this arrest showed she poses a danger to

26 the community, DHS was justified in detaining her in accordance with statute. And so, the only

27 relief she can access is the bond hearing available to noncitizens detained under § 1226(a).”

28 (ECF No. 14 at 3.) The Court does not understand this argument as it contains an incomplete

1 sentence and refers to a female petitioner (petitioner in the instant action is male). In addition, the

2 Form I-213 states that petitioner has no criminal history. (See ECF No. 14-1 at 3.) For these

3 reasons, this Court finds that respondents’ argument that petitioner’s arrest shows a danger to the

4 community is not well supported (and likely does not apply to petitioner). Respondents do not

5 argue that petitioner is a flight risk. Respondents go on to argue if the Court finds that petitioner

6 “is not detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), it should order a bond hearing held in accord with

7 § 1226(a). Petitioner was properly detained under § 1226(a) and so the procedures in the statute

8 provide sufficient process to protect any rights he has developed.” (ECF No. 14 at 3.)

9 A. Statutory Claim (Claim One)

10 The issue here is whether petitioner, who has lived in the United States since May 2023, is

11 detained pursuant to § 1226(a), as petitioner contends, or whether petitioner is subject to

12 mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), as respondents appear to argue. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)

13 mandates detention during removal proceedings for applicants “seeking admission” and does not

14 provide for a bond hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) “provides the general process for arresting and

15 detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the United States and eligible for removal.” Rodriguez

16 Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196. Under § 1226(a), the government makes an initial custody determination,

17 and the noncitizen will be released upon a showing “to the satisfaction of the officer that such

18 release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the [noncitizen] is likely to

19 appear for any future proceeding.” Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). Section 1226(a) provides

20 “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be represented by

21 counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new hearing when

22 circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. Therefore, “[i]f the noncitizen is detained under

23 section 1226(a), she is entitled to a bond hearing.” Labrador-Prato v. Noem, 2025 WL 3458802,

24 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018)).

25 This Court concludes that § 1226(a) applies to petitioner. This Court agrees with and

26 joins the majority of courts nationwide, including the Eastern District of California, in rejecting

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1 respondents’ new interpretation5 of Sections 1225 and 1226. See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock,

2 802 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1303, 1328-30 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (concluding, after a thorough

3 analysis, that “the government’s [interpretation of § 1225] belies the statutory text of the

4 [Immigration and Nationality Act], canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and

5 longstanding agency practice”); J.Y.L.C. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 3169865, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 12,

6 2025) (collecting cases rejecting the government’s assertion that § 1225 empowers DHS to arrest

7 and hold a noncitizen present without legal status who has spent years in the U.S.); Cardona-

8 Lozano v Noem, 2025 WL 3218244, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025) (“Repeatedly, [district

9 courts across the country] have found that DHS and the [Board of Immigration Appeals’]

10 construction of the [Immigration and Nationality Act] is incorrect and that petitioners who have

11 long resided in the United States but are being held under § 1225 are entitled to relief.”)

12 (collecting cases)); Faizyan v. Casey, 2025 WL 3208844, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025)

13 (holding that § 1226 applies to a petitioner who “DHS has consistently treated” as subject to

14 discretionary detention and “who has been residing in the United States for two years” (internal

15 quotation marks and citation omitted)); Josue I.C.A. v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3496432, at 3 n.6 (E.D.

16 Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) (collecting cases); Morales-Flores v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D.

17 Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (collecting cases) (“Courts nationwide, including this one, have

18 overwhelmingly rejected respondents’ arguments and found DHS’s new policy unlawful.”); J.S.

19 v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-02016 DC SCR, 2026 WL 125258, at *1, *3-5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16,

20 2026), findings and recommendations adopted, 2026 WL 297304 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2026)

21 (finding § 1226(a) applicable to immigration detainee who lived in the United States for

22 approximately 33 years before being detained by ICE).

23 “These courts examined the text, structure, agency application, and legislative history of

24 1225(b)(2) and concluded that it applies only to noncitizens ‘seeking admission,’ a category that

25 does not include noncitizens like [petitioner], living in the interior of the country.” Salcedo

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27 5 Until DHS changed its policy in July 2025, the Government consistently applied Section

1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2), to noncitizens residing in the United States who were detained

28 by immigration authorities and subject to removal. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196.

1 Aceros v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (collecting cases). By

2 contrast, “[t]he government’s proposed reading of the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of

3 section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would

4 render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of

5 prior statutory interpretation and practice.” Guerro Lepe v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2716910, at *4

6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting cases). This Court incorporates and adopts the thorough

7 and persuasive reasoning of the district court in Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *3-9.

8 Although not cited by respondents, this Court also finds Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th

9 494 (5th Cir. 2026) and Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25

10 2026) are not persuasive. This Court instead finds the analysis in Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of

11 Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060-62 (7th Cir. 2025), Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-

12 3141, 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026) and Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, et al., 2026 WL

13 1283891, at *1 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026)6, to be more persuasive. See also Hernandez Alvarez v.

14 Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, No. 25-14065, 2026 WL 1243395 (11th Cir. May 6, 2026);

15 Gurvinder Singh v. Chestnut, 2026 WL 413839 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2026); Singh v. Baltazar,

16 2026 WL 352870, at *3-6 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026) (rejecting the Buenrostro majority in its

17 interpretation of § 1225 as nonbinding and highlighting the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’

18 disagreement with the Buenrostro majority) (citing Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland

19 Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 2025)); Tomas Nicolas v. Warden, 2026 WL 364399, at *3

20 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 10, 2026) (disagreeing with Buenrostro majority and declining to follow);

21 Chachipanta Cando v. Bondi, 2026 WL 357551, at *5 n.6 (D. Neb. Feb. 9, 2026) (same); Aroca

22 v. Mason, 2026 WL 357872, at *15 n.40 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 9, 2026) (same). As the Second

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6 The full case citation also includes the following: Juan Manuel Lopez-Campos (25-1965); Juan

24 Carlos Sanchez Alvarez (25-1969); Jose Daniel Contreras-Cervantes; Fredy De Los Angeles-

Flores; Mariela Virginia Ocando-Leon; Luis Felipe Jarquin-Jarquin; Debbie Vasquezcruz; Jairo

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Manuel Godoy-Perez; Marifer Diaz-Alcantar; Miguel Angel Reyes-Sanchez (25-1978); Jesus

Jose Pizarro Reyes (25-1982) v. Kevin Raycraft, Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Acting Dir. of Detroit

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Field Off., Enf’t & Removal Operations (25-1965/1969/1978/1982); Markwayne Mullin, Sec’y of

27 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (25-1965/1969); Todd W.

Blanche, Acting U.S. Att’y General; Exec. Off. of Immigr. Rev. (25-1965), 2026 WL 1283891, at

28 *1 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026).

1 Circuit explained in Barbosa da Cunha:

2 Today, although we part ways with two other circuits that have

addressed this question, we join the overwhelming majority of

3 federal judges across the Nation to consider it and conclude that the

government’s novel interpretation of the immigration statutes defies

4 their plain text. That text makes clear that Section 1226(a) governs

detention of noncitizens like Petitioner. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does

5 not apply to such noncitizens, who are present in the United States

after entering the country without inspection and admission, and who

6 were not apprehended while entering the country or shortly

thereafter.

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This result is dictated by the plain text of these provisions, and further

8 confirmed by the statute’s context, structure, history, and purpose. It

likewise comports with the Supreme Court’s established

9 understanding of Sections 1225 and 1226. It reflects Executive

Branch practice over thirty years and across five Presidential

10 administrations. Moreover, it explains why Congress has never

challenged that settled practice despite making numerous

11 amendments to the immigration laws.

12 Barbosa da Cunha, 2026 WL 1146044 at *2. In any event, neither Buenrostro-Mendez nor Avila

13 are binding on this Court.

14 Following the majority of courts, this Court also rejects the government’s new

15 interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and their contention that petitioner is an “applicant for

16 admission” subject to § 1225(b)(2). This Court finds that petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C.

17 § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations because petitioner has resided in this country for

18 almost three years and petitioner’s February 18, 2026 detention was not upon his arrival to the

19 United States. “Federal regulations provide that [noncitizens] detained under § 1226(a) receive

20 bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R.

21 § 236.1(d)(1)). If, at this hearing, the detainee demonstrates that he or she is not “a threat to

22 national security, a danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail

23 risk,” the immigration judge will order his or her release. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F. 4th at

24 1197 (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006)). As such, petitioner should

25 have been provided a bond hearing pursuant to these standards before his re-detention and is

26 entitled to relief on his statutory claim.

27 B. Petitioner’s Other Claims for Relief

28 Because petitioner’s statutory claim provides petitioner adequate relief, this Court need

1 not address petitioner’s Administrative Procedure Act claim raised in claim one and petitioner’s

2 constitutional claims (claims two and three).

3 V. REMEDY

4 As relief, petitioner requests immediate release from custody, or, in the alternative, that

5 respondents be ordered to provide petitioner with a bond hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 37-38.)

6 Considering § 1226(a)’s discretionary detention framework, and the absence of any prior release

7 on bond pursuant to § 1226(a), this Court finds that an order directing respondents to provide a

8 bond hearing, rather than immediate release, is the appropriate remedy. See 8 U.S.C.

9 § 1226(a)(1) (authorizing the Attorney General to arrest and detain noncitizens pending removal

10 proceedings); Rodriguez Vazquez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1263 (explaining “the specific harm

11 [petitioner] alleges—that he is unlawfully barred from receiving a bond hearing on the merits—is

12 remedied by granting his request for a bond hearing under Section 1226(a)[.]”); see also J.S. v.

13 Wofford, 2026 WL 125258, at *8 (ordering bond hearing where no prior release on bond pursuant

14 to § 1226(a)); Cresencio Sandoval Alvarez v. Warden, 2026 WL 913250, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3,

15 2026) (same). The Court further concludes that the appropriate burden of proof at this initial

16 bond hearing is on petitioner where there was no prior release and in the absence of a prolonged

17 detention finding. See J.S. v. Wofford, 2026 WL 297304, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2026); 8 C.F.R.

18 §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1003.19; Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1197 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1),

19 1003.19)). At this hearing, “[p]etitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is not a risk of

20 flight or danger to the community.” J.S. v. Wofford, 2026 WL 297304, at *2 (where petitioner

21 not previously released by immigration authorities or subject to prolonged detention, granting

22 bond hearing where petitioner bears burden of proof), adopting findings and recommendations,

23 2026 WL 125258, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2026).

24 VI. CONCLUSION

25 In summary, the Court recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted

26 on petitioner’s statutory claim raised in claim one.

27 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

28 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED.

] 2. Respondents be ordered to provide petitioner Jose Arturo Vargas Lopez (221-489-

2 631) with a bond hearing within seven days of the adoption of these findings and

3 recommendations where petitioner has the burden to demonstrate that he is not a flight

4 risk or danger to the community. Petitioner shall be allowed to have his counsel

5 present at the bond hearing.

6 3. If petitioner is granted release on bond, respondents shall return all of petitioner’s

7 documents and possessions at the time of release.

8 4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of petitioner and close

9 this case.

10 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

11 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days of

12 | the date of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the

13 || court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

14 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be

15 || filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that

16 || failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

17 || Court’s order. See Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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19 | Dated: June 10, 2026 A aA

Aan Spe |

CHI SOO KIM

71 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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