Virtue

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JANICE VIRTUE,

Plaintiff,

-against- 25-CV-6345 (JGLC)

HB1 ALTERNATIVE HOLDINGS, LLC, et OPINION AND ORDER

al.,

Defendants.

JESSICA G. L. CLARKE, United States District Judge:

This case stems from Plaintiff Janice Virtue’s eviction. She had strained to stop her

eviction: she fought foreclosure in state court; she filed multiple bankruptcy actions,

automatically staying her eviction; and she even filed suit before this Court. But she was

unsuccessful: on July 17, 2025, Westchester County law enforcement officials forced her from

her home.

Now, she attempts to revisit and reverse the state court decisions that led to her eviction.

She alleges multiple causes of action—from constitutional violations to state tort claims—

against multiple defendants—from County law enforcement officers to the company that

purchased her home to the law firms involved in, and the judge who presided over, her

foreclosure proceedings—in an effort to reclaim her property. Those defendants now move to

dismiss her claims.

For the reasons stated below, the Court grants their motions. Because Plaintiff seeks to

overturn the state court’s foreclosure decisions, the Court finds that it does not have subject

matter jurisdiction over the majority of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court also declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining claims for conversion and intentional

infliction of emotional distress.

BACKGROUND

In considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a

district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the

complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.” DiFolco v.

MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Lapa v. JP Morgan Chase

Bank, N.A., No. 21-CV-4737 (NSR), 2023 WL 4706827, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2023)

(explaining that a court may “consider documents attached to the complaint, statements or

documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, matters of which judicial notice may be

taken, public records, and documents that the plaintiff either possessed or knew about, and relied

upon, in bringing the suit”). The following facts are, unless otherwise noted, taken from the

Amended Complaint (“AC”), ECF No. 25, and presumed to be true for the purposes of this

motion. See LaFaro v. N.Y. Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009). The

Court also takes judicial notice of prior state court and bankruptcy court decisions relevant to this

case. See Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 816 F. App’x 532, 534 (2d Cir. 2020).

This case arises out of Plaintiff’s eviction. ¶ 1. For years, Plaintiff Janice Virtue (“Virtue”

or “Plaintiff”) lived with her mother at 87 Brookside Avenue in Mount Vernon, New York 10553

(the “Property”). ¶¶ 1, 7, 13. In early 2017, a non-defendant bank brought a lawsuit to foreclose

on the Property. ECF Nos. 7-1, 7-2. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s mother, Janette Virtue, were among

the named defendants. ECF No. 7-3. Then, in February 2020, Plaintiff’s mother passed away

intestate. ¶ 13. More than three years later, in an order dated September 8, 2023, and entered on

September 21, 2023, Defendant the Honorable Charles D. Wood, Justice of the Supreme Court of

the State of New York (“Justice Wood”), issued a judgment for the foreclosure and sale of the

Property. ECF No. 22-2 (the “Foreclosure Judgment”).

Pursuant to that Foreclosure Judgment, on November 14, 2023, a referee sold the

Property at auction to Defendant HB1 Alternative Holdings, LLC (“HB1”). ECF No. 7-4. On or

about December 22, 2023, the referee recorded a deed naming HB1 as the purchaser and vested

title in HB1. ¶ 14, ECF No. 22-3 at 1. Early the following year, on February 7, 2024, HB1 moved

for a writ of assistance to put HB1 into possession of the Property and to direct the Sheriff of

Westchester County (the “County”) to remove Plaintiff from the Property.1 ECF No. 7-5. On

0F

March 22, 2024, Justice Wood issued the writ of assistance (the “Writ”). ¶ 15, ECF No. 22-3.

On June 14, 2024, the County issued a Notice of Eviction alerting Plaintiff to a scheduled

eviction two weeks later, on June 28, 2024. ECF No. 1 at 29. Three days before the eviction was

slated to take place, however, a duty judge issued a stay. ECF No. 7-7. Plaintiff had filed a last-

minute affidavit with the court requesting “more time to pack up . . . and find another place to

live.” Id. at 3. “We have been fighting to keep our house,” she wrote. Id. The court ordered HB1

to show cause at a hearing on July 12, 2024, as to why the eviction should not remain stayed. Id.

at 2.

That same day, July 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed the first of three bankruptcy actions that she

would file over the next nine months. See ECF No. 21 at 2 (citing Virtue, Nos. 24-BK-22612, 24-

BK-22878, 25-BK-22309 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.)); see also ECF Nos. 7-9, 7-10, 7-11. These cases

automatically stayed the eviction further. See In re Salov, 510 B.R. 720, 726 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

2014) (“The filing of a bankruptcy petition invokes the powerful protection of the automatic stay

under 11 U.S.C. § 362.”). On August 28, 2024, Justice Wood lifted the state court’s temporary

stay—finding that “the purchaser in the public auction sale is entitled to possession of the

mortgaged premises.” ECF No. 7-8 at 2. And on June 26, 2025, the bankruptcy court dismissed

1 The motion was dated February 6, 2024, but was entered on February 7, 2024. ECF No. 7-5.

the last of Plaintiff’s three cases, lifting the automatic stay. ECF No. 7-13 at 2 (“Bankruptcy

Order”) (“determin[ing] that the filing of the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition was part of a scheme

to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors that has involved multiple bankruptcy filings”); see also

AC at 18.

Then, on July 17, 2025, Plaintiff was evicted from the Property. ¶¶ 1, 16, 38. During the

eviction, multiple County law enforcement officers approached the Property “with visible

weapons and a battering ram.” ¶ 27. The officers threatened to break down the door. Id. Plaintiff

had just left the bathroom, so she asked for a moment to get dressed. Id. In response, the officers

kept yelling—demanding that Plaintiff immediately open the door. Id.

Plaintiff told the officers that “legal proceedings were still pending concerning the

property,” but one of the officers, Lieutenant Samuel Fagin (“Fagin”), replied: “We don’t care

about that.” ¶ 28. “[I]t’s going down no matter what you say,” Fagin said. Id. “You’re leaving

with us.” Id. The officers monitored Plaintiff closely as she tried to collect her belongings. ¶ 29.

Another officer, Officer Christian Gutierrez (“Gutierrez”), ordered Plaintiff to “grab your

medicine and important things so we can go.” Id. Fagin warned that if Plaintiff returned to the

Property, she would be arrested for trespassing. Id.

The officers removed Plaintiff and her family from the Property. ¶ 31. Her “possessions

were ransacked, broken, and stolen.” Id. In spite of all this, according to Plaintiff, the officers

never produced an active warrant, writ, or judicial order to justify their actions. ¶ 28. The officers

never showed Plaintiff a valid eviction order. Id. Lieutenant Fagin only pointed to a “missed

bankruptcy adjournment as the basis for enforcement.” Id. Ultimately, after being evicted from

her home, Plaintiff was forced into a shelter. ¶ 31.

On August 1, 2025, Plaintiff commenced this action, proceeding pro se. ECF No. 1. She

sued the County, Commissioner-Sheriff Terrance Raynor (“Raynor”), Lieutenant Fagin, and

other law enforcement officers who executed the eviction—Officers Gutierrez, Mill Lau

(“Officer Lau”), David Johnson (“Officer Johnson”), and Jesse Maracallo (“Officer Maracallo”)

(collectively, the “County Defendants”); Justice Wood, the judge who issued the Foreclosure

Judgment and Writ; HB1, the company that purchased the Property; and LOGS Legal Group,

LLP (“LOGS Legal”) (formally known as Shapiro, DiCaro & Barak, LLC), and McCalla

Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLP (“MRLP”), two law firms involved in the foreclosure and eviction

proceedings. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7–11. She also named as Defendants two companies allegedly

involved in her eviction, National Field Representatives and All Ready Moving & Storage, as

well as John Does 1–10, various locksmiths, movers, and participants in the eviction.2 See

1F

generally ECF No. 1. On October 3, 2025, she filed an Amended Complaint naming the same

Defendants. AC. The Court takes the Amended Complaint to be Plaintiff’s operative complaint.

Id.

In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges ten causes of action: (1) unlawful seizure in

violation of the Fourth Amendment, ¶¶ 36–41; (2) denial of her procedural due process rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment, ¶¶ 42–46; (3) violation of her substantive due process rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment, ¶¶ 47–53; (4) an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment, ¶¶ 54–57; (5) pursuant to Monell, a claim that the County had a policy, practice, or

custom of evicting individuals from their homes without due process, see ECF No. 8 (“County

MTD”) at 7; (6) a claim for declaratory relief and to quiet title pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and

2 Defendants National Field Representatives, All Ready Moving & Storage, and John Does 1–10

have not appeared.

New York Real Property and Procedure Law (“RPAPL”) § 1501, ¶¶ 58–66; state law claims for

(7) trespass, ¶¶ 67–70; (8) conversion, id.; and (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”), ¶¶ 71–74; and (10) a claim against the two law firm Defendants, LOGS Legal and

MRLP, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for participating in an unlawful eviction

in violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, ¶¶ 75–80. Other than the last claim, she appears to

assert all other claims against all Defendants.

This is not Plaintiff’s first federal case arising from the same set of facts. On February 10,

2025, while her second bankruptcy case was pending, Plaintiff commenced a different action

before this Court. See Complaint, Virtue v. Fed. Rsrv., No. 25-CV-1215 (JGLC) (S.D.N.Y. Feb.

10, 2025), ECF No 1. In that case, Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order to stop the

ongoing state court eviction action. Order, Virtue, No. 25-CV-1215 (JGLC) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14,

2025), ECF No. 30. However, citing the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and the Younger

abstention doctrine, the Court explained that it was barred from enjoining an ongoing state court

proceeding—including an ongoing foreclosure or eviction proceeding. Id.; Order, Virtue, No. 25-

CV-1215 (JGLC) (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2025), ECF No. 35. Accordingly, on June 5, 2025, slightly

before the bankruptcy court dismissed the last of Plaintiff’s three bankruptcy cases, see ECF No.

7-13, this Court dismissed Plaintiff’s first federal case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

Order, Virtue, No. 25-CV-1215 (JGLC) (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2025), ECF No. 35.

Again, less than two months later—on August 1, 2025, after she had been evicted—

Plaintiff then commenced this action. ECF No. 1. Three days after that, on August 4, 2025,

Plaintiff filed a separate suit in state court. Notice of Removal, Virtue v. HB1 Alt. Holdings, LLC,

No. 25-CV-6688 (JGLC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025), ECF No 1. That case, filed in Westchester

County Supreme Court, also challenged Plaintiff’s eviction, and alleged the same claims against

the same defendants. See id. Nine days later, on August 13, 2025, the County Defendants

removed that case to this District. Id. This Court then consolidated the removed case and the

instant case, and closed the removed case. ECF No. 34.

Meanwhile, in this case, the appearing Defendants each moved to dismiss on multiple

grounds. First, the County Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state

any of her federal constitutional or state law claims against the County or its officers, and that

Defendants Raynor, Fagin, Gutierrez, Lau, Johnson, and Maracallo (collectively, the “County

Officer Defendants”) are entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity. County MTD at 11–23.

They also moved to consolidate this case with the removed state case, which the Court granted.

ECF No. 34.

Next, MRLP moved to dismiss. ECF No. 10. It argues that Plaintiff failed to properly

serve the law firm, and that the case must therefore be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 ECF No. 11 (“MRLP MTD”).

2F

Then, LOGS Legal moved to dismiss. ECF No. 12. It argues that Plaintiff’s case should

be dismissed pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6) because, inter alia,

“Plaintiff has failed to set forth any valid causes of action” and “cannot use this court as an

appeal of the State Court.” ECF No. 13 (“LOGS Legal MTD”) at 1.

Justice Wood then moved to dismiss. ECF No. 20. In addition to claiming sovereign and

judicial immunity, he argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Section

1983 “because she has failed to allege specific facts supporting her Constitutional claims,” and

3 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the “Federal Rules” or “Rules” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

that res judicata bars Plaintiff’s state law claims “because they arise from the state foreclosure

judgment against her.” ECF No. 21 (“Justice Wood MTD”) at 1.

Finally, HB1 moved to dismiss. ECF No. 32. Similarly to other Defendants, it argues that

it was improperly served, that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman,

that Plaintiff failed to state a claim as to HB1, and that Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred by

res judicata. ECF No. 32-9 (“HB1 MTD”).

Plaintiff opposed HB1’s motion on February 20, 2026, ECF No. 37 (“Opp.”), and HB1

replied on March 2, 2026, ECF No. 38 (“HB1 Reply”).

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

the majority of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It thus dismisses with

prejudice Plaintiff’s claims for unlawful seizure, due process, and equal protection, her Monell

liability claim, her claim for declaratory relief and to quiet title, her claim against the two law

firm Defendants for participating in an unlawful eviction, and her trespass claim. The Court finds

that Justice Wood is also immune in both his official and individual capacities. And the Court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for conversion and IIED,

dismissing those claims without prejudice to their refiling in state court. Therefore, the Court

grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Court sets forth the legal standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

(lack of subject matter jurisdiction) and 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) because those are the

standards applicable to the Court’s analysis.

I. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)

when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v.

United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). “A plaintiff asserting subject matter jurisdiction

has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” Id. (internal citation

omitted). Thus, in resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court

“must accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint” but “may not draw any

jurisdictional inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Blecher v. Holy See, 146 F.4th 206, 216 (2d

Cir. 2025) (quoting J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004); citing

Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998)).

“Where, as here, [a] defendant moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), as well as on

other grounds, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge first since if it must dismiss

the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the accompanying defenses and objections

become moot and do not need to be determined.” Wise v. Combe Inc., 724 F. Supp. 3d 225, 232–

33 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Saint-Amour v. Richmond Org., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 3d 277, 286

(S.D.N.Y. 2019)).

II. Failure to State a Claim

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “constru[e] the

complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008)

(internal citation omitted). This is especially so in pro se cases, where “courts read pro se filings

‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Anderson Bey v. Roc Nation LLC, No. 1:24-

CV-02295 (ALC), 2025 WL 564248, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2025) (quoting Triestman v. Fed.

Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)). A claim will survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion only if the plaintiff alleges facts sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. If a complaint does

not state a plausible claim for relief, it must be dismissed. Id. at 679.

DISCUSSION

The discussion proceeds as follows. First, the Court evaluates whether it has subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because the Court finds that it does

not have subject matter jurisdiction over the majority of Plaintiff’s claims, it dismisses those

claims outright. Next, the Court finds that Justice Wood is also immune in both his official and

individual capacities. Finally, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s final two claims, for conversion and IIED, and dismisses those claims without

prejudice to their refiling in state court.

I. The Court Has No Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Majority of Plaintiff’s

Claims

“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction is an unwaivable sine qua non for the exercise of federal

judicial power.” Curley v. Brignoli, Curley & Roberts Assocs., 915 F.2d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1990).

Consistent with that proposition, Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must

dismiss the action.”

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack subject matter

jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-

court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district

court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The doctrine is named after two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v.

Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462 (1983), which together “established the clear principle that federal district courts

lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments.” Hoblock v.

Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

then, emerged as a response to complaints that ‘invited federal courts of first instance to review

and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments.’” Sung Cho v. City of New York, 910 F.3d 639,

644 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 283).

Rooker-Feldman has four elements: “First, the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in

state court. Second, the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment.

Third, the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment. Fourth, the

state-court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.”

Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85 (cleaned up). “While all four requirements must be met in order for

Rooker-Feldman to act as a jurisdictional bar,” the Second Circuit has stressed “that the second

requirement — that the plaintiff complains of an injury caused by a state-court judgment — is

the core requirement from which the other Rooker-Feldman requirements derive.” Sung Cho,

910 F.3d at 646 (cleaned up). This “causation requirement is only satisfied if ‘the third party’s

actions are produced by a state court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left

unpunished by it.’” Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 94 (2d Cir. 2015)

(quoting Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88).

The Second Circuit has also “applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine with some frequency

to cases involving suits directly against state-court judges, or in which error by state-court judges

in state-court proceedings is asserted, frequently in the foreclosure process.” Sung Cho, 910 F.3d

at 645; see also Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir.

2014) (barring a claim under Rooker-Feldman because it would require “the federal court to

review the state proceedings and determine that the foreclosure judgment was issued in

error”); Worthy-Pugh v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 664 F. App’x 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2016) (same).

This is one such case. First, it “is well-settled that ‘a property owner who loses his or her

interest in the property through an in rem foreclosure proceeding in state court against the

property has lost in state court for the purposes of Rooker-Feldman’s first requirement.’” Lamour

v. Musarra, No. 24-CV-903 (JGLC), 2025 WL 485378, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2025) (citing

Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 103 (2d Cir. 2021)).

This case also satisfies Rooker-Feldman’s third and fourth requirements. Plaintiff

undeniably invites the Court to review and reject the Foreclosure Judgment and Writ that led to

her eviction. She argues that she was “unlawfully evicted” by Defendants acting “without a valid

writ, order, or warrant”; that the Property “was allegedly foreclosed upon in 2023”; that the “in

rem jurisdiction purportedly relied on by Defendants was void ab initio”; and, ultimately, that

Defendants “enabled the unconstitutional seizure of [her] home and property” without legal

process. AC ¶¶ 1, 14, 20, 38, 40. She requests “emergency and permanent injunctive relief to

restore her to possession” of the Property, “declaratory relief to invalidate the fraudulent deed

and expired writ” that transferred ownership of the Property and led to her eviction, and

“damages for constitutional violations and trespass” on a Property she claims is still her own. Id.

¶ 3. And she filed this action on August 1, 2025, long after the Foreclosure Judgment was entered

on September 21, 2023, or the Writ was issued on March 22, 2024, ECF Nos. 22-2, 22-3.

Finally, under the second element, Plaintiff complains of injuries that were caused or

“produced by [the] state-court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left

unpunished by it.” Sung Cho, 910 F.3d at 646 (quoting Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88). The

Foreclosure Judgment produced Plaintiff’s eviction; without that Judgment, Plaintiff would have

never been evicted. Her attempt to now “restore her[self] to possession” of the Property and

“invalidate” the state court decisions transferring her property is thus precisely “the type of claim

that Rooker-Feldman squarely forecloses, both because it addresses an injury caused by the state

court judgment, and because it would require the district court to review [and reverse] that

judgment.” AC ¶ 3; Dorce, 2 F.4th at 104. Indeed, this case reflects Rooker-Feldman’s “paradigm

situation”: Plaintiff has “repaired to federal court to undo the [state] judgment.” Exxon

Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293.

Plaintiff’s unlawful seizure claim, due process claims, equal protection claim, Monell

liability claim, claim for declaratory relief and to quiet title, and claim against the two law firms

are therefore barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. These claims all stem from one underlying

injury, produced by the state court’s Foreclosure Judgment: the allegedly unlawful eviction. The

same is true of Plaintiff’s trespass claim. “Under New York law, trespass is the intentional

invasion of another’s property.” Abbatiello v. Monsanto Co., 522 F. Supp. 2d 524, 541 (S.D.N.Y.

2007). For Plaintiff to claim that any of the Defendants intentionally invaded her property, she

would have had to own the Property at the time of the alleged trespass—during the eviction. In

other words, she would need to reverse the Foreclosure Judgment to plead a trespass claim.

Because Plaintiff’s “requested relief, if granted, would have the practical effect of

reversing the foreclosure judgment of the state court,” the Court dismisses these claims with

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Gomez v. Yisroel, No. 21-CV-2172 (PAC), 2021

WL 2138462, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2021); see id. at *4 (collecting cases) (“In reaching this

conclusion on the jurisdictional issue, the Court joins the overwhelming majority of Second

Circuit decisions that have applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to dismiss federal cases inviting

review of state court foreclosure and sale judgments.”).

II. Justice Wood Is Also Immune In Both His Official and Individual Capacities

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Justice Wood also fail because they are barred by

sovereign and absolute judicial immunity. See AC at 5.

A. The Eleventh Amendment Shields Justice Wood in His Official Capacity

“[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have

waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the

states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir.

2009) (cleaned up). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the

states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a

state.” Id. New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court,

and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting Section 1983. See Trotman v.

Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977).

The limited Ex Parte Young exception allowing state judges to be sued in their official

capacities when the “complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief

properly characterized as prospective” also does not apply. Walker v. NYS Just. Ctr. for Prot. of

People with Special Needs, 493 F. Supp. 3d 239, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Office for Prot. &

Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 254–56 (2011)); see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56

(1908). Plaintiff does not allege an ongoing violation of federal law or seek prospective relief—

she simply alleges that the Foreclosure Judgment and Writ, and her subsequent eviction, were

unlawful. See AC ¶¶ 45–46.

Insofar as Plaintiff asserts official-capacity claims under Section 1983 against Justice

Wood, who is an employee of the New York State Unified Court System, the Eleventh

Amendment bars such claims, and they are dismissed with prejudice.

B. Absolute Judicial Immunity Bars Plaintiff’s Individual-Capacity Claims

The Court must also dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Justice Wood under

the doctrine of judicial immunity. Under this doctrine, judges are absolutely immune from suit

for damages in their individual capacities for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial

responsibilities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–12 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or

related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt,

579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “[E]ven allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome

judicial immunity.” Id. at 209. This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would

be subject to harassment and intimidation.” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994).

Here, Plaintiff only alleges claims against Justice Wood for actions he took within the

scope of his judicial responsibilities—such as issuing the Foreclosure Judgment and Writ. See

AC ¶ 25. To the extent Plaintiff asserts such individual-capacity claims under Section 1983

against Justice Wood, then, Justice Wood is absolutely immune, and those claims are dismissed

with prejudice.

III. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s

Remaining State Law Claims

Plaintiff’s two remaining claims—for conversion and for IIED—are different in kind.

These allegations turn, at least conceivably, on how the eviction was executed, not just on the

fact that it occurred. The Court construes these claims to implicate only the County Defendants

and the non-appearing Defendants (National Field Representatives, All Ready Moving &

Storage, and John Does 1–10)—because those are the only actors who carried out the eviction.

Plaintiff alleges, for example, that Defendants “destroyed personal effects, antiques, and

food, stole items of value, and irreparably damaged [her] private possessions,” AC ¶ 69, and

caused Plaintiff “severe emotional and physical harm, including trauma, migraines, and chronic

distress,” id. ¶ 73. Arguably, these claims are not barred by Rooker-Feldman because they allege

violations in their own right—acts that were not caused by the Foreclosure Judgment and

therefore do not require this Court to sit as an improper court of appeals evaluating the state

court’s Judgment.

However, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 1367. “When all federal claims are dismissed, district courts should generally

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims.” Fisk v. Letterman,

501 F. Supp. 2d 505, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). In making this decision, “courts in this Circuit must

weigh considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Wilson v. Dantas,

No. 12-CV-3238 (GBD), 2013 WL 92999, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013), aff’d, 746 F.3d 530 (2d

Cir. 2014) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Here, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s “remaining common

law claims at this early stage of the proceeding—far from trial and before substantial discovery

has begun—does not create substantial unfairness or inconvenience to the parties.” Id. The

pendent claims do not implicate any “clearly articulated federal interest.” See Kolari v. New

York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 123 (2d. Cir. 2006). Additionally, “[c]omity and respect

for New York state courts dictate that where possible, state courts should decide matters of state

law, and that absent exceptional circumstances, this Court should decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over such claims.” Wilson, 2013 WL 92999, at *9,

Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

conversion and ITED claims and dismisses them without prejudice to their refiling in state court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s

unlawful seizure claim, due process claims, equal protection claim, Monell liability claim, claim

for declaratory relief and to quiet title, claim against the two law firms for participating in an

unlawful eviction, and trespass claim are all dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff’s remaining claims, for conversion and ITED, are DISMISSED

without prejudice to their refiling in state court.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate ECF Nos. 10, 12, 20, and 32, and

to close the case.

Dated: March 27, 2026

White Plains, New York

SO ORDERED.

JESSICA G. L. CLARKE

United States District Judge

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