The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JOANNE KIM,
Plaintiff,
No. 1:24-cv-05234 (LAP)
-against-
OPINION AND ORDER
REGENERON PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
and ASHUTOSH KATIYAR
Defendants.
LORETTA A. PRESKA, Senior United States District Judge:
Before the Court is Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(“Regeneron”) and Ashutosh Katiyar’s (“Katiyar”) (collectively,
“Defendants”) joint motion for partial dismissal1 of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint (see Am. Compl., dated Oct. 7, 2024 [dkt. no.
15]) filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff opposes the motion.2 For the reasons set forth below,
Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. Background
A. Factual Allegations
For the purposes of this motion, the Court assumes that the
following allegations are true and draws all reasonable inferences
1 (See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Defendants’
Mem.”), dated Oct. 28, 2024 [dkt. no. 19]; Reply Memorandum for
Partial Dismissal (“Defendants’ Reply”), dated Dec. 9, 2024 [dkt.
no. 23].)
2 (See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Partial Motion to Dismiss (“Pl.
Opp.”), dated Nov. 25, 2024 [dkt. no. 22].)
in favor of Plaintiff. See Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d
141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012).
As alleged in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Joanne Kim
(“Plaintiff”) is a woman and the primary caregiver of her disabled
child. (Am. Compl. ¶ 14.)3 Plaintiff worked in New York City as
the Director of Customer Insights & Analytics (“CIA”) of Regeneron
from June 5, 2020 until her February 9, 2024 termination. (Id.)
One of Plaintiff’s responsibilities was to create and lead a new
department within CIA called Competitive Intelligence (“CI”).
(Id. ¶¶ 19-20.) Plaintiff was successful at her job and regularly
received positive performance reviews. (Id. ¶¶ 24-27.) Plaintiff
initially reported to the head of the CIA department, Arvind
Balasundaram (“Balasundaram”). (Id. ¶ 21.)
In August 2022, Regeneron restructured CI such that it no
longer operated as a separate group. Instead, all CI employees
were reassigned to one of Regeneron’s primary commercial business
units. Plaintiff was reassigned to the Eylea group, one of the
company’s most popular brands. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30.) Defendant Katiyar
(“Katiyar”) then became head of the Eylea group, making him
3 Due to a drafting error, the paragraph numbers 52-60 and 71-76 appear twice
in the Amended Complaint. For the sake of clarity, the Court identifies the
section and paragraph numbers for the affected paragraphs.
Plaintiff’s direct manager. (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff’s previous
manager, Balasundaram, became her dotted line manager.4 (Id.)
Plaintiff’s young daughter suffers from a myriad of health
conditions and disabilities that require her to attend special
schools and receive extraordinary care. (Id. ¶¶ 32-33.) Plaintiff
shared these challenges with Balasundaram, who in turn shared the
information with Katiyar when Katiyar became Plaintiff’s manager.
(Id. ¶¶ 34-35.) On several occasions, Plaintiff spoke directly to
Katiyar about her daughter’s challenges. For example, when
Plaintiff had to reschedule or was late to meetings to care for
her child, Plaintiff told Katiyar that her daughter’s poor health
was the reason for her unavailability. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.)
In March 2023, Plaintiff explained her child’s condition to
Dana Jones (“Jones”) in Human Resources (“HR”). (Id. ¶ 40.)
Plaintiff asked Jones about the available medical leave options.
Despite being qualified for leave under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”), Jones did not inform Plaintiff of her rights.
(Id. ¶ 41.)
A few months later, in June 2023, Plaintiff broke her hand
and required six weeks of recovery time. (Id. ¶ 42.) An
unspecified Regeneron employee informed Plaintiff that she was
qualified for medical leave under the FMLA. Plaintiff decided to
4 Plaintiff’s complaint does not define the term “dotted line manager.”
Accordingly, the Court assumes nothing more than that Balasundaram was one of
Plaintiff’s superiors.
exercise this right and take six weeks away from work. (Id. ¶ 43.)
When Plaintiff informed Katiyar that she would be taking leave,
Katiyar complained that Plaintiff was burdening him and made his
frustration clear. Katiyar hired two consultants to handle
Plaintiff’s work during her absence. (Id. ¶ 45.)
Upon Plaintiff’s return, she was met with several instances
of hostile behavior from Katiyar. On one occasion, Katiyar shouted
at Plaintiff that her work was useless, which frightened Plaintiff.
(Id. ¶ 46.) On another, Katiyar pounded his fists on the table
and screamed at Plaintiff again. Katiyar thereafter refused to
include Plaintiff in meetings with stakeholders. (Id. ¶ 47.)
In September 2023, Plaintiff notified Jones that she would
need time off due to a concerning development in her daughter’s
health. Plaintiff also explained her child’s health conditions to
Jones in greater detail. (Id. ¶ 50.) Jones again neglected to
inform Plaintiff of her eligibility to take protected leave under
the FMLA. (Id. ¶ 51.) Plaintiff did not further inquire about
the possibility of taking leave because she was concerned about
how Katiyar would react given his harsh reaction to her previous
time off. (Id. § IV ¶ 52.)
In December 2023, Plaintiff contracted COVID for the second
time and used two sick days to recover. Katiyar allegedly implied
that he believed Plaintiff was lying about contracting COVID again
and seemed to be “further enrage[d]” by her use of sick days. (Id.
§ IV ¶ 53.)
On January 24, 2024, Plaintiff asked Katiyar to allow her to
return to stakeholder meetings. (Id. § IV ¶ 54.) In response,
Katiyar became angry and told Plaintiff she would never be promoted
because “it’s all about . . . what perceptions you create to
people.” He then “lectured [Plaintiff] about ‘team dynamics,’ how
she ‘collaborate[s] with others,’ and how she ‘behave[s].’” (Id.
§ IV ¶ 55.) Katiyar also told Plaintiff that her role performed
“only a ‘tactical function’ and was ‘just providing some insight
back to the business unit [which is] not the role that will get
promoted afterwards.’” (Id. § IV ¶ 56.) Katiyar then told
Plaintiff that her position “was not going to work for her long
term” and would “always . . . make [her] unhappy.” (Id. § IV
¶ 59.)
Katiyar’s comments deeply upset Plaintiff. (Id. § IV ¶ 60.)
As a result, on January 25, 2024, Plaintiff decided to inform Jones
that one of her superiors was treating her in an abusive and
threatening manner and that she was afraid her job would be
affected if she made a formal HR complaint. (Id. § V ¶ 53.) Jones
told Plaintiff that if the issue was something that could be
investigated and resolved in a way that satisfied Plaintiff, that
would likely be the best option. (Id. § V ¶ 57.) Jones then told
Plaintiff that if she felt her job was no longer the right fit for
her, HR could “probably could put together some type of package
for [Plaintiff].” (Id. § V ¶ 58.) Plaintiff then revealed
Katiyar’s identity and began explaining the specifics of what had
occurred, at which point Plaintiff and Jones reached the end of
their scheduled call time. (Id. § V ¶¶ 60, 62.) Before the call
ended, Plaintiff made it clear that she did not fully explain her
situation. (Id. ¶ 62.)
About a week later, on February 1, 2024, Plaintiff met Jones
in person to inform Jones that Plaintiff’s child’s medical team
recommended that Plaintiff’s child be admitted to a program that
required Plaintiff to be available at specific times during the
day. (Id. ¶¶ 64-65.) As a result, Plaintiff told Jones she needed
temporary schedule flexibility.5 Jones understood that Plaintiff
had made a request for an accommodation, as Jones informed
Plaintiff that Regeneron had “an accommodation process” to
facilitate schedule flexibility. (Id. ¶ 67.) Plaintiff then told
Jones that she did not feel comfortable telling Katiyar about her
request given how Katiyar reacted to Plaintiff’s previous medical
leave. (Id. § V ¶ 71.) Plaintiff reiterated Katiyar’s hostile
behavior and reminded Jones that Katiyar had been leaving Plaintiff
out of meetings. (Id. § V ¶ 72.)
5 Am. Compl. § V ¶ 64 (“[Plaintiff] specifically told Jones that she had a
‘special needs child’ who had not been in school for the entire year and now
required a ‘higher level of care.’”).
Jones, however, allegedly excused Katiyar’s behavior and
explained that he just “expressed himself in a ‘really bad way.’”
Jones again neglected to inform Plaintiff that Plaintiff was
qualified for FMLA protected leave. (Id. § V ¶¶ 73, 75.) Jones
then directed Plaintiff to email Katiyar to set forth her request
for schedule flexibility. (Id. § V ¶ 76.) Plaintiff did so on
February 5, 2024. (Id. § VI ¶ 71.) The email to Katiyar expressed
that Plaintiff’s child was experiencing severe health problems.
It also notified Katiyar that Plaintiff would need schedule
flexibility over the following six to eight weeks to accommodate
her child’s health needs.6 A few days later, on February 8, 2024,
Plaintiff told Balasundaram about Katiyar’s “increasingly abusive
behavior.” (Id. § VI ¶ 74.) Balasundaram allegedly dismissed
Plaintiff’s concerns, stating: “don’t worry about [Katiyar]; he’s
harmless.” (Id.)
On February 9, 2024, four days after Plaintiff emailed Katiyar
to request a flexible schedule, Jones and Katiyar terminated
Plaintiff with immediate effect. (Id. § VI ¶ 75.) Katiyar
explained that the Company had decided to eliminate Plaintiff’s
role because it had become “more challenging since the
6 The request portion of Plaintiff’s email stated as follows: “My hours may
require me to work some non-traditional working hours during this period, where
I plan to either stay up late into the evening, or wake up extra early in the
mornings, to get my work done. Please know that I take my position very
seriously, and will work hard to make meetings and deadlines. However, I ask
for some flexibility and understanding, as we are navigating very difficult
times. Should there be days that require me to be out, I will let you know in
advance, and use my personal days . . . ” (Am. Compl. § VI ¶ 71.)
reorganization.” (Id. ¶ 77.) However, Plaintiff’s role was
“eliminated in name only,” as Regeneron hired consultants to
perform Plaintiff’s responsibilities. (Id. ¶ 82.) The rest of
Plaintiff’s CI team continued to work at Regeneron. (Id. ¶ 79.)
Plaintiff asked to be reassigned to a different position, and Jones
claimed the Company would not be able to do so because there was
a hiring pause. (Id. ¶ 81.)
B. Procedural Background
On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action. (See
Complaint, dated July 11, 2024 [dkt. no. 1].) Plaintiff then filed
the operative amended complaint on October 7, 2024, asserting
eleven claims for relief: Interference in violation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”) against
all Defendants (Count One); Retaliation in violation of the FMLA
against all Defendants (Count Two); Discrimination in violation of
the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq.
(“NYSHRL”) against all Defendants (Count Three); Retaliation in
violation of the NYSHRL against all Defendants (Count Four);
Discrimination in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law,
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq. (“NYCHRL”) against all
Defendants (Count Five); Retaliation in violation of the NYCHRL
against all Defendants (Count Six); Disability Discrimination in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101
et seq. (“ADA”) against Defendant Regeneron (Count Seven);
Retaliation in violation of the ADA against Defendant Regeneron
(Count Eight); Discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) against
Defendant Regeneron (Count Nine); Retaliation in violation of
Title VII against Defendant Regeneron (Count Ten); and Retaliation
and Interference in violation of the Earned Safe and Sick Time
Act, N.Y.C. Admin Code § 20-911 et seq. (“ESSTA”) against Defendant
Regeneron (Count Eleven). (See Amended Complaint, dated October
7, 2024 [dkt. no. 15].)
On October 28, 2024, Defendants filed a partial motion to
dismiss seeking dismissal of claims Three through Eleven in the
Amended Complaint. (See Defendants’ Mem.) On November 25, 2024,
Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. (See Pl.
Opp.) On December 9, 2024, Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff’s
opposition. (See Defendants’ Reply.)7
II. Legal Standards
A. Pleading Standard Under Rule 12(b)(6)
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the
7 The case was reassigned to this Court on November 5, 2025.
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That
“standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must “accept as
true all factual allegations and draw from them all reasonable
inferences” in a plaintiff’s favor. Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d
82, 94 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). The Court is not
required, however, “to credit conclusory allegations or legal
conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Id. (citations
omitted). Pleadings that offer only “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation
omitted).
For employment discrimination suits at the pleading stage, a
plaintiff is not required to prove discrimination or even allege
specific facts establishing every element of the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
508 (2002); see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). There is no heightened pleading standard for
employment discrimination suits. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508.
Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, allegations must simply
provide "plausible support to the reduced requirements" of the
prima facie case. Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297,
311 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511.
B. NYSHRL Pleading Standard
The NYSHRL previously “utilized the same standard as Title
VII” but was “amended in 2019 to align with the NYCHRL’s more
liberal pleading standards.” Qorrolli v. Metro. Dental Assocs.,
124 F.4th 115, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2024). The 2019 amendment to the
NYSHRL required that the NYSHRL “be construed liberally” and that
“exceptions . . . be construed narrowly in order to maximize
deterrence of discriminatory conduct.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 300. The
New York Court of Appeals has therefore held that courts must
construe the NYSHRL, like the NYCHRL, “broadly in favor of
discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction
is reasonably possible.” Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., 41 N.Y.3d 446,
451 (2024) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also
Udoh v. New York City Dep't of Prob., 2025 WL 2199613, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2025) (“[C]ourts must now scrutinize
discrimination claims brought pursuant to the NYSHRL under the
same lenient pleading standard . . . under which NYCHRL
discrimination claims are analyzed.”) (quoting Moore v. Hadestown
Broadway Limited Liability Co., 722 F. Supp. 3d 229, 245 (S.D.N.Y.
2024)). Under that lenient pleading standard, Plaintiff must only
allege sufficient facts to show she was treated “less well” due to
her “membership in a protected class.” Moore, 722 F.Supp. 3d at
246 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
1. NYSHRL Discrimination
The NYSHRL makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice
“[f]or an employer . . . to discharge from employment . . . or to
discriminate against . . . [an employee] in compensation or in
terms, conditions or privileges of employment” because of an
individual’s sex or disability status. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a).
In addition, the statute renders it unlawful for “any person to
aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts
forbidden under [the statute], or to attempt to do so.” N.Y. Exec.
Law § 296(6). The law also prohibits discrimination against an
individual because of their known association with a disabled
person, known as “associational discrimination.” Barra v. Edward
D. Jones & Co., L.P., No. 23-CV-5844 (NSR), 2025 WL 1114183, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2025).
2. NYSHRL Retaliation
The NYSHRL provides for direct liability under a theory of
retaliation. The statute makes it unlawful for “any
person . . . to retaliate or discriminate against any person
because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden [by the
statute].” N.Y. Exec. Law. § 296(7). To state a prima face case
for retaliation under the NYSHRL, Plaintiff must plead that “(1)
she engaged in protected activity; (2) the [Defendants were] aware
of this activity; (3) the [Defendants] took adverse action against
[her]; and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected
activity and adverse action.” McHenry v. Fox News Network, LLC,
510 F.Supp. 3d 51, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).8
C. NYCHRL Pleading Standard
Courts must analyze NYCHRL claims separately and
independently from any federal and state law claims, construing
the NYCHRL's provisions "broadly in favor of discrimination
plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably
possible." Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715
F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013). Like the NYSHRL, to survive a motion
to dismiss under the NYCHRL, a plaintiff must only plead that he
or she was treated less well because of his or her membership in
a protected class. Moore, 722 F. Supp. at 245.
8 As is the case with NYSHRL discrimination claims, post-amendment
NYSHRL retaliation claims are treated with the same broad deference
that extends to NYCHRL claims. Qorrolli, 124 F.4th at 122-23
(noting that the post-amendment NYSHRL retaliation standard aligns
with the NYCHRL standard). However, the NYSHRL retaliation
provision differs from the law’s discrimination provision in that
it authorizes claims against any individual who engages in
retaliation, as opposed to an employer. Nezaj v. PS450 Bar &
Rest., 719 F.Supp. 3d 318, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (“[A]lthough the
NYSHRL does not provide for direct liability for discrimination
other than by an ‘employer,’ it makes it unlawful for ‘any person’
to retaliate.”).
1. NYCHRL Discrimination
The NYCHRL dictates that “[i]t shall be an unlawful
discriminatory practice . . . [f]or an employer . . . because of
the actual or perceived . . . gender [or] disability . . . of any
person, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from
employment such person.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a). The
law additionally prohibits “discrimination against a person
because of the actual or perceived . . . disability . . . of a
person with whom such person has a known relationship or
association.” Id. § 8-107(20).
2. NYCHRL Retaliation
The NYCHRL makes it an unlawful practice “[f]or an
employer . . . to discharge . . . or otherwise discriminate
against any person because such person has opposed any practices
forbidden under [the statute] . . . or requested a reasonable
accommodation.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7). To establish a
prima facie NYCHRL retaliation claim, Plaintiff must allege that
“(1) [she] participated in a protected activity known to
[D]efendants; (2) [D]efendants took an action that disadvantaged
[her]; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected
activity and the adverse action.” Fletcher v. Dakota, Inc., 948
N.Y.S.2d 263, 269 (2012) (cleaned up).
III. Discussion
A. ADA Claims
1. ADA Discrimination (Count Seven)
Through Count Seven, Plaintiff alleges two theories of
discrimination under the ADA. First, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants discriminated against her directly (due to her broken
hand and COVID illness). Second, Plaintiff alleges a form of
“associational discrimination” arising from her care for her
disabled child.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded a
case of direct discrimination arising from her own purported
disabilities. However, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a theory
of associational discrimination.
a. Direct Discrimination
The ADA prohibits “discriminat[ing] against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The statute
further prohibits “excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or
benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability
of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to
have a relationship or association.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life
activities . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
To establish a prima facie ADA discrimination claim, a
plaintiff must allege the following: “(1) the defendant is covered
by the ADA; (2) plaintiff suffers from or is regarded as suffering
from a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (3) plaintiff was
qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or
without reasonable accommodation; and (4) plaintiff suffered an
adverse employment action because of [her] disability or perceived
disability.” Romano v. A360 Media, LLC, No. 20-CV-08988-LTS, 2023
WL 348459, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2023).
Plaintiff fails adequately to allege a case of direct
discrimination on the basis of her broken hand and COVID illness.
First, Plaintiff’s broken hand impaired her mobility for just six
weeks, after which she was able to return to work. (Am. Compl.
¶ 42.) Such a minor injury fails to meet the definition of
disability under the ADA. It is well-established that injuries
lasting only a few months are insufficient to meet the ADA’s
substantial limitation requirement. See De La Rosa v. Potter, 427
F. App'x 28, 29 (2d Cir. 2011) (cleaned up); Francis v. Hartford
Bd. of Educ., City of, 760 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding
that restrictions lasting a few months, for which plaintiff was
expected to and did fully recover, insufficient to qualify as ADA
disabilities because the injuries were “too brief and too minor.”).
For similar reasons, a standard temporary COVID-19 infection also
does not qualify as an ADA-recognized disability. See Apuzza v.
NYU Langone Long Island, No. 2:22-CV-7519 (NJC) (JMW), 2023 WL
9022790, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2023).
Further, even if Plaintiff did have a qualifying disability,
she does not allege the required nexus between her disability and
the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff merely claims that Katiyar
generally lashed out at her “for taking [medical] leave” and
thereafter refused to include her in meetings. (Am. Compl ¶ 46-
47.) While those comments may well provide strong support for
Plaintiff’s FMLA claims (which Defendants do not move to dismiss),
a negative reaction towards employees taking medical leave
generally does not evidence discriminatory animus against disabled
people specifically. The ultimate question under the ADA is not
whether Defendants reacted unfavorably towards Plaintiff because
she took medical leave; it is whether Defendants reacted
unfavorably because of an ADA-cognizable disability. Even
assuming that Plaintiff had a qualifying disability, Plaintiff
does not allege that any disparaging comments were made about her
or similarly disabled people. Nor does she allege that non-
disabled employees were treated more favorably when they took
temporary medical leave. See McCrain v. Metro. Transportation
Auth., No. 17-CV-2520-RA, 2020 WL 1285634, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
18, 2020) (explaining that Plaintiff must “establish that [her]
disability was the but-for cause of the adverse employment
action.”).
Plaintiff’s direct ADA discrimination claims therefore fail.
b. Associational Discrimination
Despite the failure of Plaintiff’s direct discrimination
claims, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded an ADA discrimination
claim under a theory of associational discrimination. To plead a
prima facie case of associational discrimination, a complaint must
allege: “1) that [the plaintiff] was qualified for the job at the
time of an adverse employment action; 2) that she was subjected to
adverse employment action; 3) that she was known at the time to
have a relative or associate with a disability; and 4) that the
adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising a
reasonable inference that the disability of the relative or
associate was a determining factor in the employer's decision.”
Graziadio v. Culinary Inst. of Am., 817 F.3d 415, 432 (2d Cir.
2016).
There are at least three recognized theories of associational
discrimination: “1) ‘expense,’ in which an employee suffers
adverse action because of [her] association with a disabled
individual covered by the employer's insurance, which the employer
believes (rightly or wrongly) will be costly; 2) ‘disability by
association,’ in which the employer fears that the employee may
contract or is genetically predisposed to develop the disability
of the person with whom [s]he is associated; and 3) ‘distraction,’
in which the employer fears that the employee will be inattentive
at work due to the disability of the disabled person.” Id.
In determining whether a plaintiff has adequately pleaded one
of these theories of associational discrimination, a district
court must not “consider potential nondiscriminatory reasons for
termination.” Imhof v. New York City Hous. Auth., No. 23-CV-1880-
JPC, 2024 WL 3376084 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2024) (cleaned up).
Rather, courts must “examine the complaint to determine whether it
contains at least minimal support for the proposition that the
employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Id. (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to support the inference
that her termination was motivated by fear that she would be
inattentive at work due to the disability of her child. Plaintiff
was terminated just four days after she asked for a flexible
schedule that accommodated her daughter’s needs, which supports an
inference of associational discrimination. See Kelleher v. Fred
A. Cook, Inc., 939 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that
adverse employment action resulting from accommodation requests
supports an inference of discrimination); Graziadio, 817 F.3d at
431 (relying on close temporal proximity between plaintiff’s leave
to provide medical care for disabled family members and her
termination to conclude that her termination was motivated by leave
attempt); Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 312 (dictating that the sequence
of events leading up to a plaintiff’s termination can be used to
establish unlawful conduct).
Additionally, allegations of pretext can support an inference
of discrimination sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See
Stratton v. Dep't for the Aging for City of New York, 132 F.3d
869, 879 (2d Cir. 1997). Pretext can be alleged from
“inconsistencies[] or contradictions” in the employer’s
explanation for its actions. Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737
F.3d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 2013). Plaintiff adequately alleges that
the purported nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination were
pretextual. Katiyar claimed that Plaintiff was terminated because
her role was eliminated, yet the Company hired “consultants” to
fulfill Plaintiff’s same job responsibilities. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77,
82.) The Court of Appeals has recognized that pretext may be
inferred when the duties of a terminated employee—supposedly fired
due to position elimination—are absorbed by other employees rather
than eliminated along with the position. See Montana v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Rochester, 869 F.2d 100, 105 (2d Cir.
1989). In light of the Complaint’s allegations that Plaintiff’s
work was reassigned to other employees, Plaintiff has plausibly
alleged that Defendants’ nondiscriminatory justifications for
Plaintiff’s termination are pretextual. Id.
Moreover, the Company refused to reassign Plaintiff to a new
role and claimed the reason for doing so was because of a hiring
pause. (Am. Compl. ¶ 81.). This motive, too, is belied by
Plaintiff’s allegation that Regeneron hired consultants to perform
Plaintiff’s work following her termination.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count Seven against
Defendant Regeneron is DENIED.
2. ADA Retaliation (Count Eight)
The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate
against any individual because such individual has opposed any act
or practice made unlawful by [the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
To establish a prima facie case of ADA retaliation, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that “(1) [s]he engaged in an activity protected
by the ADA (2) the employer was aware of this activity; (3) the
employer took adverse employment action against [her]; and (4) a
causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and
the protected activity.” Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d
713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002). Under the ADA, requests for reasonable
accommodations constitute protected activity. Weixel v. Bd. of
Educ. of City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2002); Clark
v. Jewish Childcare Ass'n, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 237, 262 (S.D.N.Y.
2015).
Defendants argue that, because the ADA does not require
employers to provide accommodations that better enable employees
to care for disabled family members, Plaintiff’s request cannot
constitute protected activity. However, it is immaterial whether
Plaintiff in fact had a right to the requested accommodation. What
matters is that Plaintiff had a right not to be terminated for
making the request. Requests for reasonable accommodations are
protected activity “even if the plaintiff's claim that [s]he was
entitled to a reasonable accommodation is mistaken, so long as it
was made in good faith.” Rodriguez v. Atria Sr. Living Grp., Inc.,
887 F. Supp. 2d 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (cleaned up). Accordingly,
non-disabled employees who make such requests in good faith are
protected against retaliation. Conley v. United Parcel Serv., 88
F. Supp. 2d 16, 20 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-
Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1999). Indeed,
an employer’s reaction to accommodation requests, even if not
legally required to honor them, can be used to support inferences
that “subsequent adverse employment action was motivated by
associational discrimination.” Kelleher, 939 F.3d at 469.
As the Court highlighted in its discussion of Plaintiff’s ADA
discrimination claim, Plaintiff was terminated just four days
after she requested a flexible schedule that would better enable
her to care for her disabled child. (Am. Compl. § VI ¶¶ 71, 75.)
The Court of Appeals recognizes that the requisite causal
connection for a retaliation claim “can be established indirectly
by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in
time by the adverse action.” Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d
1170, 1178 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count Eight against
Defendant Regeneron is DENIED.
B. Title VII Claims
1. Title VII Discrimination (Count Nine)
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from
“discharge[ing] any individual . . . because of such
individual's . . . sex[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Court
of Appeals recognizes that “stereotyping of women as caregivers”
or stereotyping motherhood as incompatible with employment can
qualify as sex-based discrimination. Back v. Hastings On Hudson
Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir. 2004).
Title VII claims ultimately require establishment of a prima
facie case of discrimination. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230
F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.2000). However, a prima facie case is not
required to survive a motion to dismiss. Barbosa v. Continuum
Health Partners, Inc., 716 F.Supp.2d 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y.2010). The
facts alleged in the complaint “need only give plausible support
to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” Littlejohn,
795 F.3d at 311.
While this is a relatively low bar, the complaint must still
allege enough facts from which discriminatory motivation can be
inferred. Perry v. State of New York Dep't of Lab., No. 08-CV-
4610-PKC, 2009 WL 2575713, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2009). Without
facts that allege preferential treatment given to similarly
situated employees outside the protected class or disparaging
comments about the plaintiff’s membership in the protected class
(or the protected class itself), “dismissal at the pleading stage
is warranted.” Id. See also Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246,
252 (2d Cir.2001) (“It is axiomatic that mistreatment at
work . . . is actionable under Title VII only when it occurs
because of an employee's sex, or other protected characteristic.”)
(emphasis added).
Plaintiff has failed to allege that similarly situated
individuals outside of her protected classes (i.e., women without
children and/or men) received preferential treatment. There is no
allegation that these individuals received accommodations for
caretaking that were denied to Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff has
not accused any employee at Regeneron of making disparaging
comments about women or the ability of mothers to be competent
employees. Instead, Plaintiff highlights the comment Katiyar made
after Plaintiff returned from being out sick with COVID for two
days (in which Katiyar told Plaintiff she’d never be promoted
because “it’s all about . . . what perceptions you create to
people.”) (Am. Compl. ¶ 55.) Plaintiff alleges that this comment
was “clearly” a reference to Plaintiff’s requests for leave and
her responsibilities taking care of her child. Id. But Plaintiff
offers no factual allegations to support that claim other than her
own conclusory interpretation. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. It
is well-established that a plaintiff’s subjective belief that a
comment is discriminatory in nature does not, standing alone,
support an inference of discrimination. See Paupaw-Myrie v. Mount
Vernon City Sch. Dist., 653 F. Supp. 3d 80, 97-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2023);
Williams v. Wellness Med. Care, P.C., No. 11-CV-5566-KMK, 2013 WL
5420985, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) (“[W]ithout sufficient
facts, even the most sincerely held beliefs do not comprise a
sufficient basis for withstanding a 12(b)(6) attack.”).
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count Nine against
Defendant Regeneron is GRANTED.
2. Title VII Retaliation (Count Ten)
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful to
discriminate against any induvial because she “opposed any
unlawful employment practice” made unlawful by Title VII. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated in
retaliation for reporting Katiyar’s behavior. It is true that
Plaintiff informed Jones that she felt Katiyar was “verbally
abusive and threatening” and “unprofessional” and that Katiyar
excluded Plaintiff from important meetings. (Am. Compl. § V ¶¶ 53,
56, 60.) However, Plaintiff did not express to Jones that
Plaintiff felt the treatment was related to Plaintiff’s status as
a woman or a mother. Accordingly, these reports fail to qualify
as protected activity because Plaintiff did not make it clear that
she was complaining of Title VII-prohibited discriminatory
conduct. See Int'l Healthcare Exch., Inc. v. Glob. Healthcare
Exch., LLC, 470 F. Supp. 2d 345, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[A]mbiguous
complaints that do not make the employer aware of alleged
discriminatory misconduct do not constitute protected activity.”).
See also Ramos v. City of New York, No. 96-CV-3787 (DLC), 1997 WL
410493, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1997) (“Unfair treatment . . . is
not actionable under the civil rights laws and a complaint about
it does not constitute protected activity. To be actionable, the
unfair treatment must be due to one's membership in a protected
class and the complaint must make that point sufficiently clear.”).
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count Ten against
Defendant Regeneron is GRANTED.
C. NYSHRL Claims
1. NYSHRL Discrimination (Count Three)
a. Claims Against Katiyar
As a threshold matter, Katiyar argues that the NYSHRL
discrimination claim must be dismissed with respect to him because
he does not qualify as an “employer” under the NYSHRL and,
therefore, is not subject to direct liability. (Defendants’ Mem.
at 20-21.)
Katiyar is correct that “where a corporate entity is the
plaintiff’s employer, an individual affiliated with the entity
cannot himself qualify as the employer.” Nezaj v. PS450 Bar &
Rest., 719 F.Supp. 3d 318, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). Indeed, the New
York Court of Appeals has specifically held that where, as here,
a plaintiff is employed by a corporate entity, the employer is the
corporate entity itself for the purposes of a NYSHRL claim. Doe
v. Bloomberg L.P., 36 NY.3d 450, 459 (2021). Accordingly,
“shareholders, agents, limited partners, and employees”—such as
Individual Defendants—"are not employers.” Id.
However, it is possible for individual defendants to be liable
for NYSHRL discrimination on an aider-and-abettor theory.
Baptiste v. City Univ. of N.Y., 680 F.Supp. 3d 415, 427 (S.D.N.Y.
2023). Although one cannot aid and abet his or her own conduct
(Id.), aiding and abetting liability is permissible when a
corporate employer is considered the principal actor, even if it
is through vicarious liability stemming from an individual’s
actions. McHenry, 510 F.Supp. 3d at 73 (internal quotations,
emphasis, and citations omitted) (aiding and abetting liability
can be established “even where [an individual defendant’s] actions
serve as the predicate for the employer’s vicarious liability, so
long as the employer’s conduct has also been found to be
discriminatory under the NYSHRL.”).
As discussed below, the Court finds that NYSHRL
discrimination has been adequately pleaded against the principal
actor, Regeneron. Accordingly, Katiyar can be held liable under
an aider and abettor theory if he “actually participated” in the
conduct for which Regeneron is liable and “share[d] the intent or
purpose of the principal actor.” Id. at 68.
As noted in the Court’s discussion regarding ADA
discrimination, it is unlawful to terminate an employee out of
fear that he or she will be inattentive to his or her job because
he or she is responsible for the care of a disabled person.
Graziadio, 817 F.3d at 432. The Court also noted above that the
close temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s accommodation request
and her termination, as well as Plaintiff’s plausible allegation
of pretext, support the inference that this termination was
motivated by associational discrimination. Plaintiff made her
accommodation request directly to Katiyar, and he, along with
Jones, terminated Plaintiff. (Am. Compl. § VI ¶¶ 71, 75.) Katiyar
is therefore alleged to have been an active participant in the
alleged discrimination by Regeneron.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count Three against
Defendant Katiyar is DENIED.
b. Claims Against Regeneron
Regeneron, on the other hand, is an “employer” within the
meaning of the NYSHRL. The elements of a disability discrimination
claim under the NYSHRL are generally in line with those under ADA,
with the caveat that the NYSHRL “provides broader protection.”
Thomson v. Odyssey House, No. 14-CV-3857-MKB, 2015 WL 5561209, at
*18 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2015) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). As discussed above, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded
disability discrimination against Regeneron under the ADA.
Plaintiff therefore plausibly alleges discrimination under the
NYSHRL’s more lenient standard.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count Three against
Defendant Regeneron is DENIED.
2. NYSHRL Retaliation (Count Four)
The NYSHRL, unlike the ADA, does not recognize requests for
reasonable accommodation as protected activity. Medina v. AAM 15
Mgmt. LLC, 750 F. Supp. 3d 332, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff’s email to Katiyar in which she requested a flexible
schedule therefore does not provide a basis for Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim.9
Plaintiff offers an alternative theory of retaliation based
on her conversations with Jones about Katiyar’s behavior. However,
the pleading requirements for retaliation claims “are identical
9 The NYSHRL was amended, effective December 5, 2025, to recognize requests for
reasonable accommodations as protected activity for the purposes of retaliation
claims. See 2025 Sess. Law News of N.Y. Ch. 600 (S. 3398) (amending N.Y. Exec.
Law. § 296(7)). However, the amendment specified that it was to be applied
only to those actions “filed on or after the effective date.” Id. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s claim must be evaluated under pre-amendment interpretation of the
NYSHRL, which did not recognize accommodation requests as protected activity.
under Title VII and the NYSHRL.” Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro &
Assocs. Consulting Eng'rs, P.C., 716 F.3d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 2013).
As explained in the Court’s discussion of Title VII retaliation,
these conversations fail to qualify as protected activity because
Plaintiff did not adequately allege that she complained of
discrimination based on her status as a woman or a mother. Nor
did these reports express complaints of discrimination based on
her own “disabilities” or her association with a disabled person.
Because Plaintiff’s generalized complaints did not constitute
protected activity, she has likewise failed to meet the required
elements of a retaliation claim under NYSHRL.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count Four against
Defendants Regeneron and Katiyar is GRANTED.
D. NYCHRL Claims
1. NYCHRL Discrimination (Count Five)
The NYCHRL, unlike the NYSHRL, does not “exempt employees
from individual suits as employers.” Doe v. Bloomberg, L.P., 36
N.Y.3d 450, 459 (2021). Accordingly, individual defendants are
subject to personal liability for their own discriminatory
actions. Id.
The elements of a disability discrimination claim under the
NYCHRL generally comport with the ADA, although the NYCHRL pleading
standard is more liberal. Thomson, 2015 WL 5561209, at *18
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2015); Bueno v. Eurostars Hotel Co., S.L., No.
21-CV-535-JGK), 2022 WL 95026, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2022)
(explaining that the NYCHRL is to be construed “‘liberally for the
accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes
thereof.’”) (citations omitted). The Court has already found that
Plaintiff adequately pleaded ADA disability discrimination.
Plaintiff therefore necessarily satisfies the NYCHRL’s more
lenient standard.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count Five against
Defendants Regeneron and Katiyar is DENIED.
2. NYCHRL Retaliation (Count Six)
The NYCHRL was amended in 2019 to state expressly that
requests for reasonable accommodations constitute protected
activity. Piligian v. Icahn Sch. of Med. at Mount Sinai, 490 F.
Supp. 3d 707, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Moreover, the required elements
of a prima facie retaliation claim are virtually identical under
the ADA and the NYCHRL.10 The Court has already found that
Plaintiff adequately alleges retaliation under the more stringent
federal ADA standard.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count Six against
Defendants Regeneron and Katiyar is DENIED.
10 Heiden v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 20-CV-10288-LJL, 2023 WL
171888 at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2023). The NYCHRL prima facie elements differ
from the ADA only to the extent that the NYCHRL does not require proof of an
adverse employment action. Id. This distinction is not relevant here.
E. Earned Safe and Sick Time Act Claim (Count Eleven)
New York City’s Earned Safe and Sick Time Act (“ESSTA”)
provides that employees are entitled to “use sick time for absence
from work [to] care of a family member who needs . . . treatment
of a mental or physical illness.” N.Y.C Admin Code § 20-914(a)(1).
ESSTA also contains a retaliation provision that makes it unlawful
for any person to “take any adverse action against an employee
that penalizes an employee for . . . exercising or attempting to
exercise rights under [the statute].” N.Y.C Admin Code § 20-
918(b). Previously, ESSTA violations could only be pursued by the
Department of Consumer and Worker Protection. N.Y.C Admin Code
§ 20-924(d). Effective March 20, 2024, however, ESSTA was amended
to provide a private cause of action. The relevant amendment
clarifies that “[s]uch civil action shall be commenced within 2
years of the date the person knew or should have known of the
alleged violation.” N.Y.C Admin Code § 20-924(f).
Given that the events leading up to and including Plaintiff’s
termination took place prior to the amendment’s effective date,
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is barred from bringing a cause of
action under ESSTA. The Court agrees.
The New York Court of Appeals, like our Supreme Court,
recognizes that “[a] statute has retroactive effect if ‘it
would . . . increase a party's liability for past conduct.’”
Regina Metro. Co., LLC v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Cmty.
Renewal, 35 N.Y.3d 332, 365 (2020) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244 at 278-280). And New York, like the Supreme
Court, applies a presumption against retroactivity based on the
right of individuals to “have an opportunity to know what the law
is and to conform their conduct accordingly.” Id. at 370 (quoting
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265). Accordingly, New York courts will not
apply a liability-imposing statute retroactively unless there is
a clear manifestation of legislative intent to do so. Id. at 370-
71.
ESSTA’s creation of a private right of action that did not
exist at the time Regeneron acted necessarily increases the
Company’s liability for past conduct and is therefore subject to
the presumption against retroactivity under New York law. See
S.S. v. Rockefeller Univ. Hosp., 239 A.D.3d 424, 426 (2025). As
such, Plaintiff’s claim hinges on whether the New York City Council
provided clear instruction that the ESSTA amendment was intended
to have retroactive effect.
The ESSTA amendment contains no such instruction. On the
contrary, while a different amendment to § 20-924 specifies
retroactive effect, the specific amendment creating a private
right of action does not. See N.Y.C. Local Law No. 172 for 2021
(amending N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 20-924). If anything, this
reinforces that the New York City Council intended that ESSTA would
not apply retroactively.
Plaintiff’s remaining argument—that the amendment should
nonetheless be applied retroactively because of its “remedial”
purpose—fails because the creation of a new cause of action is not
a remedial measure. Compare Rockefeller, 239 A.D. at 426, with
Spiegel v. 226 Realty LLC, 231 A.D.3d 562, 563-64 (2024) (holding
that a law had retroactive application “because the amendment at
issue was remedial in nature . . . intended to a correct a
discrepancy . . . not create a new cause of action.”).
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Count Eleven against
Defendant Regeneron is GRANTED.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. For the sake of clarity, the
Court will summarize the status of each count as to each Defendant:
• Count Four is dismissed as to all Defendants;
• Count Nine is dismissed as to all Defendants;
• Count Ten is dismissed as to all Defendants;
• Count Eleven is dismissed as to all Defendants.
The claims that survive as to each Defendant are as follows:
• Count One: interference in violation of FMLA (all
Defendants);
• Count Two: interference in violation of FMLA (all
Defendants);
• Count Three: discrimination in violation of NYSHRL (all
Defendants);
• Count Five: discrimination in violation of NYCHRL (all
Defendants);
• Count Six: retaliation in violation of NYCHRL (all
Defendants);
• Count Seven: ADA disability discrimination (Defendant
Regeneron);
• Count Eight: ADA retaliation (Defendant Regeneron);
The Clerk of the Court shall close Dkt. No. 18.
Counsel shall appear for a status conference on April 2, 2026
at 10:30 AM.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 25, 2026
New York, New York
LORETTA A. PRESKA
Senior United States District Judge
36