Opinion

JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARLON MAYO, an individual, 2:26-cv-05885-DSF-RAO

Plaintiff,

Order GRANTING Plaintiff’s

v. Motion to Remand (Dkt. 11)

ASPIRE BAKERIES, LLC., a

Delaware Corporation; and DOES

1 through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Defendant Aspire Bakeries, LLC removed this case from Los

Angeles Superior Court based on federal question jurisdiction. Dkt. 1

(NOR) at 2. Aspire moves to dismiss. Dkt. 7-1 (MTD). Plaintiff Marlon

Mayo opposes the motion to dismiss, dkt. 10 (Opp’n to MTD), and

moves for remand, dkt. 11 (MTR). Aspire opposes the motion to

remand. Dkt. 13 (Opp’n to MTR). The Court deems this matter

appropriate for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78;

Local Rule 7-15.

I. Background

Mayo was employed by Aspire, most recently as a Sanitation

Foreman, from approximately March 4, 1998 to June 17, 2024. Dkt. 1-

3 (Compl.) ¶¶ 9, 13. Mayo’s employment was governed by a collective

bargaining agreement. See Dkt. 1-2 (CBA). Due to the physical

demands of his work, Mayo developed “debilitating back and leg

conditions,” which impaired his ability to “stand, walk, lift, and perform

manual labor.” Compl. ¶ 10. He alleges this medical condition

constituted a physical disability, Aspire was aware of his disability, and

he needed medical treatment and related absences from work. Id.

Mayo also claims he was subject to unlawful payroll practices related to

Aspire’s failure to accrue sick leave properly, credit vacation time,

assess attendance “occurrences,” and administer discipline. Id. ¶ 11.

While employed by Aspire, Mayo filed formal grievances with his union

concerning what he considered violations of applicable labor laws. Id.

Around June 2024, Mayo requested a medical leave of absence

and reasonable accommodations for his disability. Id. ¶ 12. Shortly

following his request, Aspire terminated his employment on the basis of

his attendance. Id. ¶ 13. Mayo contends Aspire’s justification was

pretext for dismissing him based on his disability, need for medical

leave, and previous complaints regarding unlawful payroll practices.

Id. ¶¶ 13-15.

On April 29, 2026, Mayo filed a complaint in Los Angeles

Superior Court alleging eleven state law causes of action: (1) disability

discrimination; (2) failure to provide reasonable accommodations; (3)

failure to engage in the interactive process; (4) failure to prevent

discrimination; (5) retaliation in violation of California’s Fair

Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); (6) interference with rights

under the California Family Rights Act (CFRA); (7) retaliation in

violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5; (8) retaliation in

violation of California Labor Code section 98.6; (9) retaliation in

violation of California Labor Code section 234; (10) wrongful

termination in violation of public policy; and (11) unfair competition.

Compl. at 1.

II. Legal Standard

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “possess

only that power authorized by [the] Constitution and statute . . . .”

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A

defendant may remove an action to federal court if the federal court

could exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. §

1441(a).

“The removal statute is strictly construed against removal

jurisdiction” and “[t]he defendant bears the burden of establishing that

removal is proper.” Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome,

Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). If a defendant fails to meet

its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, the suit must be

remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Generally, doubts as to removability

are resolved in favor of remanding the case. See Shamrock Oil & Gas

Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-109 (1941); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

III. Discussion

Aspire argues that Mayo’s claims are preempted under Section

301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 20 U.S.C. § 185,

and therefore arise under federal law. NOR ¶ 35. It asserts this Court

has federal question jurisdiction over Mayo’s claims, NOR ¶¶ 13, 29,

34-36, and that preemption of Mayo’s claims warrants their dismissal,

MTD at 18. Mayo argues that his claims do not meet the test for

LMRA preemption and that the Court must remand for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction. MTR at 1-2.

A. Local Rule 7-3

Aspire argues that Mayo’s motion to remand should be denied

because his counsel failed to comply with the meet and confer

requirements of Local Rule 7-3. Opp’n to MTR at 2. Aspire asserts

that the parties did meet and confer regarding the motion to dismiss,

MTD at 4-5, but that Mayo did not contact Aspire’s counsel to discuss

the motion to remand, Opp’n to MTR at 2. Aspire does not claim any

prejudice due to Mayo’s failure to meet and confer, and the issues and

briefing concerning the motions to remand and dismiss are largely

identical; Aspire contends the LMRA preempts Mayo’s claims and

Mayo disagrees. Considering the extent to which the issues overlap

and the Court’s independent obligation determine its jurisdiction,

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006), the Court finds

Mayo’s failure to meet and confer insufficient grounds to deny his

motion.

B. Federal Question Jurisdiction and Preemption

District courts have original federal question jurisdiction over “all

civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Under the “well-pleaded complaint

rule, . . . federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “[N]ormally,

federal preemption is a defense that does not authorize removal to

federal court.” Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th

Cir. 2019). However, preemption under § 301 of the LMRA is an

exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. Section 301 has “such

‘extraordinary pre-emptive power’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state

common law complaint into one stating a federal claim.’” Id. (quoting

Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). “In other words, a

civil complaint raising claims preempted by § 301 raises a federal

question that can be removed to a federal court.” Id.

Section 301 of the LMRA provides that “[s]uits for violation of

contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing

employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any

district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties.”

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). “Although § 301 contains no express language of

preemption, the Supreme Court has long interpreted the LMRA as

authorizing federal courts to create a uniform body of federal common

law to adjudicate disputes that arise out of labor contracts.” Curtis,

913 F.3d at 1151 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,

210 (1985)).

The Ninth Circuit has devised a two-step test to determine if a

claim is preempted by § 301. First, the district court “ask[s] whether

the asserted cause of action involves a right that exists solely as a

result of the CBA.” Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1152 (citation omitted). “If so,

‘then the claim is preempted, and [the] analysis ends there.’” Id. at

1153 (quoting Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th

Cir. 2007)). The second step asks “‘whether a plaintiff's state law right

is substantially dependent on analysis of [the CBA],’ which turns on

whether the claim cannot be resolved by simply ‘look[ing] to’ versus

‘interpreting’ the CBA.” Id. (quoting Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l

Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016)). Interpretation, in this

context, is defined narrowly and “it means something more than

‘consider,’ ‘refer to,’ or ‘apply.’” Matson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840

F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2016). “[W]hen the meaning of contract terms

is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining

agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly

does not require the claim to be extinguished.” Livadas v. Bradshaw,

512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994). Further, “[i]f the claim is based on state law,

§ 301 preemption is not mandated simply because the defendant refers

to the CBA in mounting a defense.” Matson, 840 F.3d at 1132 (quoting

Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 591 (9th Cir. 2001)

(en banc)).

1. Judicial Estoppel

Arise argues that Mayo is judicially estopped from contending the

claims are not governed by the CBA. Opp’n to MTR at 6-7. It points to

Mayo’s prior admission in a related lawsuit that the CBA covers the

disputes and requires employees to resolve issues through the

grievance process provided in the CBA. Id. at 6; see NOR ¶ 30.

Judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a claim in a

legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim on which it has

prevailed in a previous proceeding. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S.

742, 749 (2001). The Supreme Court identified three factors courts

should consider in determining whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel

applies in a particular case:

First, a party’s later position must be clearly inconsistent

with its earlier position. Second, courts regularly inquire

whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to

accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial

acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding

would create the perception that either the first or the

second court was misled. . . . A third consideration is

whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent

position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an

unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.

New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750–51 (citations omitted).

Aspire argues that “any contention now that the CBA does not

apply” is irreconcilably inconsistent with Mayo’s counsel’s declaration

that the CBA contains language that compels employees to resolve

issues through the prescribed grievance process. Opp’n to MTR at 7.

Mayo contends that judicial estoppel does not apply because he does

not dispute in his motion to remand whether the CBA applies—only

whether his claims are preempted by the LMRA. Id. at 3.

The Court agrees with Mayo that counsel’s statements in

previous state court litigation are not inconsistent with Mayo’s

argument against preemption. The standard for finding LMRA

preemption is not whether the CBA or its terms will ultimately govern

Mayo’s claims, but whether the right Mayo seeks to vindicate either

“exists solely as a result of” or “is substantially dependent on analysis

of” the CBA. Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1152. Mayo’s statements in prior

litigation about the CBA’s grievance process do not establish either

prong of the test. Additionally, this Court has an independent

obligation to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction.

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A previous

declaration in state court about the CBA’s grievance procedure does not

assist in that endeavor. Therefore, Aspire cannot use judicial estoppel

at this stage of litigation to establish federal jurisdiction to support

removal.1

2. Step One of the Preemption Test

Aspire argues that the CBA governs the aspects of Mayo’s

employment at issue in this litigation, and that therefore the rights he

seeks to vindicate “flow directly from and exist solely by virtue of the

1 Because the Court does not find that Mayo’s positions are clearly

inconsistent, it does not reach the second and third New Hampshire factors.

governing CBA.” Opp’n to MTR at 8. Aspire then concludes that “those

rights arise from the CBA rather than from any independent source of

state law[.]” Id.

In Renteria-Hinojosa v. Sunsweet Growers, Inc., 150 F.4th 1076

(9th Cir. 2024), the Ninth Circuit rejected reasoning similar to Aspire’s

argument here. There the district court dismissed claims as preempted

under the LMRA and remanded the remaining state law claims.

Renteria-Hinojosa, 150 F.4th at 1083. Defendant employer appealed

the remand orders, arguing the claims were preempted because they

“necessarily allege[d] a breach of the CBA.” Id. at 1089. The Ninth

Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that “a state law claim is preempted [at

step one] only if a CBA is the ‘only source’ of the right underlying the

claim, as opposed to an additional source.” Id. (emphasis added). The

circuit held that, where “state law is a source” for a claim, “it does not

matter whether [the plaintiff’s] factual allegations could also support

claims for breach of the CBAs at step one.” Id. (emphasis added).

Aspire asserts that all of Mayo’s claims arise solely from the CBA

with no basis in state law. MTR at 7-8. It argues that Mayo’s “right to

be free from improper [attendance] occurrence-accumulation, to have

his sick and medical leave credited, to receive progressive discipline

before discharge, and to pursue workplace grievances are not rights

conferred by state law independent from contract; they are rights that

flow directly from and exist solely by virtue of the governing CBA.”

Opp’n to MTR at 8. But Aspire lists issues governed by the CBA that

might be relevant to this litigation, not the actual rights Mayo seeks to

vindicate in his state law claims. And, that Mayo’s claims could have

been brought for breach of the CBA does not, on its own, establish

preemption. See Renteria-Hinojosa, 150 F.4th at 1089. Instead, for

Mayo’s claims to be preempted at step one, Aspire must show that the

CBA is not only a source, but the “only source” of Mayo’s rights.

Renteria-Hinojosa, 150 F.4th at 1089. It has not done so here.

3. Step Two of the Preemption Test

Aspire argues that, to the extent Mayo’s claims are not

preempted under the first step of the test, they are preempted under

the second step because “their resolution substantially depends on

interpretation of the CBA’s specific provisions.” Opp’n to MTR at 10.

The Court will consider the claims in the order in which Aspire

presents them in its opposition to Mayo’s motion to remand.

a. Wrongful Termination Claim

In his tenth cause of action, Mayo claims he was wrongfully

terminated in violation of public policy as reflected in California state

law, including FEHA and CFRA. Compl. ¶¶ 96-100. Aspire provides a

laundry list of CBA provisions it asserts must be interpreted to resolve

Mayo’s wrongful termination claim. Opp’n to MTR at 10. Aspire cites

provisions governing attendance “occurrences,” whether those

“occurrences” were excused as sick leave, the application of progressive

discipline, termination for “just cause,” grievance procedures, and

discharge for union activity, as well as the interplay among those

provisions. Id. at 10-12 (citing CBA, Arts. 7, 13, 20, 21, 22). It argues

that evaluating Mayo’s allegations of improper attendance discipline

and his ultimate termination—which Aspire justified based on his

attendance “occurrences”—necessarily requires “interpretation” of the

various cited provisions. Id. at 10.

In his motion to remand and opposition to Aspire’s motion to

dismiss, Mayo argues that Aspire raises only factual questions about

the CBA’s application, not any disputed language or provisions

requiring the Court’s interpretation. MTR at 6-7; Opp’n to MTD at 7-8.

The Court agrees that merely listing relevant CBA provisions, as

Aspire does here, does not demonstrate “any interpretive dispute about

a CBA term that must be resolved to determine” the outcome of Mayo’s

claim. Renteria-Hinojosa, 150 F.4th at 1090 (emphasis added). Ninth

Circuit precedent requires more than mere application of the CBA for

LMRA preemption under step two. See Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1153.

“‘Interpretation’ is construed narrowly,” and “claims are only

preempted [at step two] to the extent there is an active dispute over the

meaning of contract terms.” Id. (citation omitted).

Aspire responds by asserting that there is a “direct dispute about

what the CBA’s occurrence provisions mean and how they operate”

rather than “how they were applied to a particular employee in a

discriminatory manner” because Mayo’s allegations that “the

occurrences themselves were incorrectly counted” mean the Court must

answer several questions requiring interpretation of the CBA. Opp’n to

MTR at 19-20. Those questions include determining what an

“occurrence” is under the CBA, when an absence qualifies as paid sick

leave, how the rolling twelve-month lookback is calculated, whether

Mayo’s absences were properly classified, whether Aspire correctly

applied the half-occurrence rule, and whether the doctor’s note was

satisfied and the consequences thereof. Id.

However, despite using the word “dispute,” Aspire fails to

identify how answering these questions constitutes interpretation as

defined by the Ninth Circuit’s LMRA preemption test. It is true that a

court may need to read the CBA, analyze the complex interplay of its

provisions, and apply it to the facts to determine whether Aspire or

Mayo is correct. But mere application of the CBA—even if

complicated—does not rise to the level of interpretation required for the

Court to find the wrongful termination claim preempted.

Additionally, Mayo’s claim rests on allegations that he was

terminated because of his disability in violation of California law, not

on allegations that Aspire violated the CBA. See Compl. ¶¶ 12-15, 96-

98. The second prong of the preemption test looks to “whether [Mayo’s]

state law right” requires interpretation of the CBA. Kobold, 832 F.3d at

1033 (emphasis added). “If the claim is plainly based on state law,” the

fact that Aspire may “refer[] to the CBA in mounting a defense” does

not mandate LMRA preemption. Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691 (“[T]he need

to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff’s

claim.”). Aspire asserts that “the resolution of [Mayo’s] claim turns on

what [] CBA provision[s] mean[],” referring to Mayo’s allegations that

the accumulation of attendance “occurrences” was pretext for his

unlawful termination. Opp’n to MTR at 18-19. Mayo does allege in his

complaint that Aspire used the accumulation of “occurrences” as

pretext for his firing. See Compl. ¶¶ 13, 14, 96-98. But the Court does

not agree that Mayo’s state law right is substantially dependent on

whether “occurrences” were correctly calculated; rather, accumulated

“occurrences” are relevant to Aspire’s defense that it properly

terminated Mayo according to the CBA’s terms. Therefore, Aspire has

not carried its burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, by way of

LMRA preemption, for the wrongful termination claim.

b. Disability, Accommodation, and Leave Claims

Aspire argues that Mayo’s first through sixth causes of action

cannot be resolved without interpretation of the CBA’s terms because

they “all turn on the same core factual dispute” of “whether [Mayo’s]

termination on the basis of accumulated attendance occurrences was

lawful.” Opp’n to MTR at 13. Aspire contends that “a court cannot

determine what accommodations were available to Plaintiff without

examining what positions exist and what constraints the CBA places on

reassignment.” Id. at 13-14 (citing CBA, Arts. 5, 7). Additionally,

Aspire argues that, because Article 16 of the CBA incorporates the

statutory obligations of state laws underlying Mayo’s CFRA and FEHA

leave and accommodation claims, adjudication of those claims requires

“interpretation” of the CBA. Id. at 14-15. But again, Aspire

demonstrates only that a court may have to examine or apply the

CBA’s provisions, not that there is any interpretive dispute over the

meaning of the CBA’s terms. See Renteria-Hinojosa, 150 F.4th at 1090;

Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1153. Finally, Aspire describes the terms of

Article 23 governing leaves of absence, Opp’n to MTR at 14-15, but does

not explain the provision’s relevance or application, let alone how it

must be interpreted to assess Mayo’s claims. Therefore, Aspire has

failed to establish that the disability, accommodation, and leave claims

are preempted by the LMRA under step two.

c. Labor Code Retaliation Claims

Aspire argues that Mayo’s seventh through ninth causes of action

for retaliation “invoke the CBA’s grievance procedures” and are

preempted because they are “inseparable from the CBA framework that

governed those complaints.” Opp’n to MTR at 15. Each retaliation

claim, Aspire contends, requires the Court to determine:

(1) whether Plaintiff’s absences constituted protected sick

leave under the CBA that could not be counted as

occurrences under Article 7; (2) whether the progressive

discipline steps imposed under the attendance policy were

properly applied under Article 7; (3) whether Plaintiff’s

“formal grievances” were filed through the CBA’s

mandatory grievance and arbitration procedures under

Article 22; and (4) whether Defendant’s termination of

Plaintiff was consistent with the CBA’s requirements for

just cause discharge under Article 21.

Id. at 16.

Again, Aspire catalogues CBA provisions requiring application

and analysis without identifying any interpretive dispute giving rise to

LMRA preemption. It has therefore not met its burden, and the

retaliation claims are not preempted.

d. Unfair Competition Claim

Aspire argues that Mayo’s eleventh cause of action for unfair

competition should be dismissed because it is derivative of other

preempted claims. Opp’n to MTR at 17. Because Aspire has not

established that any of Mayo’s claims are preempted by the LMRA, his

unfair competition claim is also not preempted.

C. Attorneys’ Fees

Mayo requests attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as a result of

removal. “An order remanding the case may require payment of just

costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a

result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “Absent unusual

circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only

where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for

seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 182, 141

(2005). Although it was unsuccessful, Aspire had an objectively

reasonable basis for removal. Mayo’s request for fees and costs is

DENIED.

IV. Conclusion

Mayo’s motion to remand is GRANTED and his request for

attorneys’ fees and costs is DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the

Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: July 6, 2026 MMB - Sree

Dale S. Fischer

United States District Judge

19