McBride

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

STEVEN MCBRIDE,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 3:26-cv-801-MMH-SJH

J.P. MORGAN CHASE, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint for a Civil Case (“Complaint”),

against J.P. Morgan Chase (“Chase”), Joshua Webb (“Webb”), Courtney Keller

(“Keller”), and Savannah Young (“Young”). Doc. 1. Plaintiff also sought leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Doc. 2. The Court entered an Order allowing

Plaintiff to proceed IFP and staying the service-of-process provision in 28 U.S.C. §

1915(d) and the service-of-process period in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), pending further

Order following review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Doc. 3.

On review of the Complaint, on April 29, 2026, the Court then entered an Order

(“Prior Order”) finding the Complaint deficient and giving Plaintiff an opportunity to

file an amended pleading, directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint by May 20,

2026. Doc. 4. On May 19, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint for a Civil Case

(“Amended Complaint”). Doc. 6. As such, the Amended Complaint is the operative

pleading. See Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 35 (2025); Malowney

v. Federal Collection Deposit Group, 193 F.3d 1342, 1345 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999); see also

Doc. 4 at 7–8; Doc. 7. For the reasons herein, because the Amended Complaint fails

to state a claim on which relief may be granted, the undersigned respectfully

recommends that this case be dismissed.

I. Standard

The Court is obligated to review the Amended Complaint and to dismiss it if

the Court determines the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Brown v. Hall, No. 3:23-

cv-537-BJD-LLL, 2023 WL 5069482, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 16, 2023).

In considering whether a party has sufficiently stated a claim under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the same standards applicable under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule(s)”) apply. See Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252

(11th Cir. 2008). A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that

amount to “naked assertions” will not do. Id. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Rule 8(a)

demands “more than an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully harmed me

accusation.” Id. The well-pled allegations must nudge the claim “across the line from

conceivable to plausible[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Courts accept “all factual allegations in the complaint as true” but “need not

apply this rule to legal conclusions.” Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 626 F.3d

1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus, “a court is not required to credit ‘conclusory

allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as

facts.’” Warren Tech., Inc. v. UL LLC, 962 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation

omitted); see also M.H. On behalf of C.H. v. Omegle.com LLC, 122 F.4th 1266, 1270 (11th

Cir. 2024). The duty to make inferences in favor of the plaintiff extends only to

“reasonable inferences” and does not require that courts “draw plaintiff’s inference.”

See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted),

abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 452–53 & n.2

(2012); see also Patton v. Carnival Corp., No. 22-13806, 2024 WL 1886504, at *3 (11th

Cir. Apr. 30, 2024).1 “And when determining whether the complaint crosses ‘the line

between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief,’ ‘courts may infer from the

factual allegations in the complaint obvious alternative explanations, which suggest

lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to

1 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent; however, they may be cited when

persuasive on a particular point. See United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289–90 (11th Cir.

2000); 11th Cir. R. 36-2.

infer[.]’” Doe v. Samford Univ., 29 F.4th 675, 686 (11th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted);

see also Patton, 2024 WL 1886504, at *2.2

Pro se pleadings are construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than

is applied to pleadings drafted by lawyers, but courts “cannot act as de facto counsel

or rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading to sustain an action.” Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC,

981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020); see also LaCroix v. W. Dist. of Ky, 627 F. App’x 816,

818 (11th Cir. 2015).

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Applying the foregoing standard,3 Plaintiff alleges as follows:

Plaintiff was party to an arbitration case against Chase based on allegations of

fraudulent activity on Plaintiff’s checking account (“Arbitration”). Doc. 6, Amended

Statement of Facts, at ¶¶ 3–4. Keller and Young are attorneys who represented Chase

in the Arbitration. Id. at ¶ 2. On December 6, 2024, Chase offered through its attorneys

to settle the Arbitration for $3,000, which Plaintiff accepted. Id. at ¶¶ 4–4-a. The

Arbitration was closed the following day. Id. at ¶ 4-b. Following some

communications about the status of the settlement, on December 18, 2024, Young

2 “A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading

for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1205

(11th Cir. 2007). And “when the exhibits contradict the general and conclusory allegations of

the pleading, the exhibits govern.” Griffin Indus., 496 F.3d at 1206; see also Marquez v.

Amazon.com, Inc., 69 F.4th 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2023); Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1292

(11th Cir. 2009).

3 Given the standard of review, these may not be the actual facts, or the facts for other

purposes.

emailed Plaintiff a “revised” settlement agreement, which included a provision

conditioning payment on Plaintiff providing a W-9 tax form. Id. at ¶¶ 5–5-c.4 Plaintiff

objected to this provision, but Chase insisted on it and made clear that it would not

pay Plaintiff until he agreed to provide a W-9 form. Id. at ¶¶ 5-d–5-e, 8-b. After months

of wrangling over the W-9, Webb was retained to represent Keller and Young; Webb

reiterated that Plaintiff would not receive any settlement check until he agreed to the

W-9 provision. Id. at ¶¶ 2-a, 6–6-a.

On March 19, 2025, one week after Webb entered the picture, Chase capitulated

and sent the $3,000 settlement check to Webb, who delivered it to Plaintiff on April 2,

2025, despite Plaintiff never having delivered the W-9 form. Id. at ¶¶ 6-b–6-d. Plaintiff

is black; Keller, Young, and Webb are white (and Chase is “controlled by” white

persons). Id. at ¶¶ 1–1-c. The release agreement resolving the Arbitration is attached

as Exhibit “C” to the Amended Complaint (“Agreement”). See id. at ¶ 3; Doc. 6-1 at

10–13.5 It does not specify a time for payment but makes clear that payment is “subject

to and conditioned upon Chase’s receipt of this Release signed by [Plaintiff] and a

current, properly executed IRS W-9 form signed by” Plaintiff. Doc. 6-1 at 10.

4 Though the pleading describes the “revised” settlement agreement, it does not

describe or attach any prior draft(s) of the agreement. Id. Although the pleading alleges Young

had “made an oral agreement” to swiftly provide the settlement without mention of a W-9

form, the terms of such purported agreement are not disclosed. Id. In any event, the final

signed Agreement includes a merger provision specifying that it contains the parties’ entire

agreement. See Doc. 6-1 at 11.

5 The date Plaintiff signed the Agreement is not entirely legible, but it appears to have

been in December 2024. See Doc. 6-1 at 13.

III. Applicable Law

Plaintiff alleges three claims: discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (“§ 1982”),

discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”), and retaliation under § 1981. Doc.

6 at 12–13.

To state a discrimination claim under either § 1981 or § 1982, a plaintiff must

plausibly allege, among other things, that the defendant intentionally subjected the

plaintiff to racial discrimination. See Humphrey v. United Parcel Serv., 200 F. App’x 950,

952 (11th Cir. 2006) (“For a successful claim under § 1981, [the plaintiff] was required

to demonstrate that [the defendants] intentionally discriminated against him because

of his minority status with regard to certain enumerated activities. Similarly, for a

§ 1982 claim, [he] was required to demonstrate that he was deprived of his property

interest because of an intentional act based on racial animus.” (internal citations

omitted)); see also Woods v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, No. 5:26-cv-13-JSS-PRL, 2026 WL

445041, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2026). Under § 1981, a plaintiff must also allege that

“the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in” § 1981,

which include the right “to make and enforce contracts[.]” Jimenez v. Wellstar Health

Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Under § 1982, a

plaintiff must also allege that the discrimination interfered with the plaintiff’s rights or

benefits connected with the ownership of his property. See Woods, 2026 WL 445041,

at *6; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Thus, § 1981 and § 1982 are similar, with the former

focusing on rights to make and enforce contracts and the latter on rights related to the

ownership of property. See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446 (2008);

Woods, 2026 WL 445041, at *6. “To state a retaliation claim under § 1981, a plaintiff

must allege a defendant retaliated against him because the plaintiff engaged in

statutorily protected activity. As with other statutory retaliation claims, such a claim

under § 1981 requires that the protected activity involve the assertion of rights

encompassed by the statute.” Jimenez, 596 F.3d at 1311 (internal citations omitted).

IV. Discussion

Even liberally construed, the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly state a

claim for relief. Plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination and retaliation are wholly

conclusory and insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Anthony, 626 F.3d at 1321; see

also Jackson v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1270–74 (11th Cir. 2004);

Woods, 2026 WL 445041, at *6.

In addition, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege any statutorily protected conduct

or interference with any contractual or property rights. Rather, as discussed, the crux

of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is that the payment of settlement proceeds was

conditioned, at least for a time, on his providing a W-9 form. But the Agreement

Plaintiff signed and attached to the Amended Complaint expressly conditions the

settlement payment on his providing a W-9 form. That provision is valid and

enforceable, and there is nothing improper about insisting on its inclusion in the

Agreement and/or insisting on compliance with it as a condition to payment. See

Christopher v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., No. 3:23-cv-1608-JAH-DEB, 2025 WL

3251573, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025) (“Defendant’s request for Plaintiff’s W-9 tax

form is not frivolous or harassing, but instead clearly reasonable. Plaintiff is incorrect

in his argument that Defendant has violated law, or engaged in ‘bad faith and

unmerited requests’ when the Defendant requires Plaintiff to provide his W-9 tax form

as a condition of settlement.”); see also Ramos v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:15-cv-1444-VAB,

2018 WL 1368905, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 16, 2018); Watson v. Bank of Am. Corp., No.

13-cv-81137, 2015 WL 5011947, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2015), report and

recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 13776954 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2015).6

The factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are similar to those in the

Complaint. As such, the analysis herein has largely tracked that of the Prior Order,

and the pleading is similarly deficient. See generally Doc. 4.7 A few further points merit

brief discussion.

First, that Plaintiff has now increased in number and/or emphasized his

conclusory allegations of discrimination does not advance his claims. See generally Doc.

6. Regardless of number or typeface, conclusory allegations (of discrimination or

otherwise) are insufficient to plausibly state a claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678; Omegle.com LLC, 122 F.4th at 1270–71; Doe, 29 F.4th at 685–88; see also Mondy v.

Boulee, 805 F. App’x 939, 942 (11th Cir. 2020); Woods, 2026 WL 445041, at *6.

6 Indeed, such provisions are routine and flow from federal tax requirements; even

where they are not expressly included in an agreement, courts may in certain circumstances

imply such a provision. See Floyd v. Saber Fitness Hegenberger, LLC, No. 24-cv-1278-TSH, 2026

WL 523406, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2026).

7 Plaintiff objected to the Prior Order but nevertheless filed the Amended Complaint

that was directed in the Prior Order, rendering the objections moot. See Docs. 5–7. The Prior

Order is not cited directly for its substantive analysis but rather its reflection of Plaintiff’s

notice of, and opportunity to amend his pleading to address, the pleading deficiencies prior

to dismissal.

Second, noting the instructions on the W-9 form and a footnote in the Prior

Order, Plaintiff appears to assert that Chase could have complied with applicable law

by making the settlement payment to him subject to a 24% backup withholding in lieu

of requiring a completed W-9 form. See Doc. 6, Amended Statement of Facts, at ¶ 2-

d–2-h, 2-j–2-k, 8-e; see also Doc. 4 at 7 n.7 (discussing authority that in certain

circumstances absent a completed W-9 form a payment made subject to backup

withholding may be deemed compliant). Perhaps—but even if Chase could have

complied with applicable law in more than one way, insistence on a particular method

of compliance would not be unlawful (let alone discriminatorily so).

Finally, Plaintiff appears to theorize that Chase never required the W-9 form

because it ultimately capitulated (after a new lawyer had to be brought in) and paid

Plaintiff the full settlement amount despite his refusing to ever provide the form. See

Doc. 6, Amended Statement of Facts, at ¶ 6-d. But, even putting aside the absence of

plausible allegations of discrimination, such a theory, if anything, further undermines

Plaintiff’s claims. The plain language of the Agreement conditioned payment to

Plaintiff on his providing a completed W-9 form. See Doc. 6-1 at 10. As discussed,

such a provision is valid. See Christopher, 2025 WL 3251573, at *2; see also Ramos, 2018

WL 1368905, at *4; Watson, 2015 WL 5011947, at *5. So Plaintiff’s rights were not

impaired during any period in which Chase (or the lawyers acting at its direction)

insisted on inclusion or enforcement of that provision. Nor were they impaired if

Chase (or the lawyers acting at its direction) eventually capitulated and waived the

contractual provision or made a gratuitous payment to which Plaintiff was not

contractually entitled.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, despite notice of and the opportunity to amend to

attempt to cure pleading deficiencies outlined in detail in the Prior Order, Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint is deficient. His allegations of discrimination and retaliation are

wholly conclusory, and his theory of impaired rights is inconsistent with the

Agreement he signed and applicable law. Thus, the undersigned recommends that this

case be dismissed with prejudice.8 Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that:

1. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

8 Before dismissing claims with prejudice, a pro se party must be afforded at least one

chance to amend his pleading if a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim. See

Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2018). Here, as

discussed, Plaintiff had detailed notice of the pleading deficiencies and a full opportunity to

amend and address them, which he attempted to do in an amended pleading. See Docs. 4, 6.

As such, dismissal with prejudice is warranted. See Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291–92; see also

Gurrera v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 657 F. App’x 886, 894 n.5 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Our

precedent does not require affording pro se plaintiffs multiple opportunities to amend.”);

Bradley v. Baker, No. 6:23-cv-2281-CEM-RMN, 2024 WL 5671528, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29,

2024) (dismissing amended pleading with prejudice and explaining that “the Eleventh Circuit

‘case law does not require a district court to give a pro se litigant multiple opportunities to

amend’” (citation omitted)). To be sure, that a pro se party must be afforded at least one chance

to amend his pleading if a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim does not

foreclose the possibility that, in certain circumstances, “an extra dose of grace” and additional

opportunity to amend may be appropriate. See Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123,

1132–33 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Gurrera, 657 F. App’x at 894 n.5 (affirming dismissal with

prejudice of second amended complaint and noting the plaintiff’s two prior opportunities at

amendment). But further leave to amend is neither necessary nor appropriate here. To the

contrary, even a pro se party need not receive any opportunity to amend, much less multiple

opportunities, where amendment would be futile. See Silberman, 927 F.3d at 1132–33;

Muhammad v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, 567 F. App’x 851, 853–55 (11th Cir. 2014). And, for

the reasons in the Prior Order and herein, and given the plain language of the Agreement,

which expressly conditioned payment of any settlement to Plaintiff on his providing a W-9

form, it is apparent that further amendment would be futile. For this additional reason,

dismissal with prejudice is warranted.

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to terminate any pending motions and

close the file.

Notice

“Within 14 days after being served with a copy of [a] recommended disposition,

a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and

recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). “A party may respond to another party’s

objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.” Jd.

A party’s failure to serve and file specific objections to the proposed findings

and recommendations impacts the scope of review by a district judge and by an

appellate court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); 11th Cir. R. 3-

1. “The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s

disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “A party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation ... waives the right to

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal

conclusions|.]” 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

DONE AND ENTERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on June 8, 2026.

[Z J. Horovitz

United States Magistrate Judge

11

Copies to:

The Honorable Marica Morales Howard

Pro Se Plaintiff