Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JOHN ROGERS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-1268

TAYLOR-SEIDENBACH, INC. ET AL. SECTION: “J”(1)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 117) filed by

Paramount Global. Plaintiffs and Cross Claimant Huntington Ingalls Incorporated

opposed the motion (Rec. Docs. 125, 128), and Paramount Global filed a reply

memorandum (Rec. Doc. 131). Having considered the motion and legal memoranda,

the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion for summary

judgment should be DENIED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December of 2023, John Rogers received a lung cancer diagnosis, which he

attributed to occupational asbestos exposure. Rogers initially brought this action for

negligence and strict products liability in the Civil District Court for the Parish of

Orleans, State of Louisiana against Taylor-Seidenbach, Inc. and Eagle Inc. After Mr.

Rogers filed his first amended petition, in which he joined additional defendants,

Huntington Ingalls Incorporated removed the matter to this Court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1442, the Federal Officer Removal Statute.

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For approximately four months in 1973, Mr. Rogers worked as a tacker/welder

at Avondale, which is now Huntington Ingalls Incorporated (hereinafter “Avondale).

Additionally, Rogers alleged occupational asbestos exposure when he was employed

by Dow Chemical in the 1970s and 1980s as an electrician’s helper, and when he used

asbestos-containing brake products to service automobiles from the 1970s through

the 1990s. Rogers died in February of 2026, at which point his spouse and adult

children substituted themselves as plaintiffs in the action, on behalf of John Rogers

and in their individual capacities.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075

(5th Cir. 1994). When evaluating whether a dispute as to any material fact exists, a

court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility

determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide

Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). All

reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but a party cannot

defeat summary judgment with “conclusory allegations” or “unsubstantiated

assertions.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citations omitted). To grant a motion for summary

judgment, a court ultimately must be satisfied that “a reasonable jury could not

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return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Delta, 530 F.3d at 399 (citing Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. If the dispositive issue

is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving

party “must come forward with evidence which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict

if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939

F.2d 1257, 1264–65 (5th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). The nonmoving party can then

defeat the motion either by demonstrating that a genuine issue of material fact exists,

or “by showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade

the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at

1265.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving party may satisfy its burden

by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

When the moving party meets this burden, the non-moving party “must go beyond

the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).

In an asbestos exposure case under Louisiana law, the claimant must

demonstrate that (1) “he had significant exposure to the product complained of,” and

that (2) this exposure “was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury.” Rando

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v. Anco Insulations, Inc., 2008-1163 (La. 5/22/09), 16 So. 3d 1065, 1091 (quoting

Asbestos v. Bordelon, Inc., 96-0525 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/21/98), 726 So. 2d 926, 948).

The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on both elements. Vodanovich v. A.P. Green

Indus., Inc., 2003-1079 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/3/04), 869 So. 2d 930, 932. When there are

multiple causes of injury, “a defendant’s conduct is a cause in fact if it is a substantial

factor generating plaintiff’s harm.” Id. (citation omitted).

To defeat a motion for summary judgment concerning the plaintiff’s exposure

to asbestos, a plaintiff “need only show that a reasonable jury could conclude that it

is more likely than not that [plaintiff] inhaled defendant’s asbestos fibers, even if

there were only ‘slight exposures.’” Williams v. Boeing Co., 23 F.4th 507, 512 (5th Cir.

2022) (citing Held v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 95-1788 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/3/96), 672 So.

2d 1106, 1109). However, “evidence of the mere physical presence of asbestos-

containing materials at a particular job site is insufficient to defeat an employer’s or

premises owner’s summary judgment motion,” so to prevail on a motion for summary

judgment, a plaintiff must present specific evidence that establishes both that he was

potentially exposed to asbestos-containing materials and that the defendant was

responsible for these materials. Steib v. Lamorak Ins. Co., 2020-0424 (La. App. 4 Cir.

2/3/21), 365 So. 3d 745, 754 (citations omitted). The same causation standard (the

substantial factor test) is used in cases involving product liability defendants and

premises owner defendants. Thomas v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 2005-1064 (La. App.

4 Cir. 5/31/06), 933 So.2d 843, 860 (citing Zimko v. Am. Cyanamid, 2003-0658 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 6/8/05), 905 So. 2d 465, 485).

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DISCUSSION

Defendant Paramount Global, formerly known as Westinghouse (hereinafter

“Westinghouse”), claims that Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that

Decedent John Rogers was exposed to asbestos-containing products for which

Westinghouse was responsible, nor that such exposure was a substantial factor in

causing Mr. Rogers’s lung cancer. As such, Westinghouse contends that it is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue of material fact.

It is undisputed that at the time of Mr. Rogers’s employment at Avondale,

Westinghouse supplied Fire Retardant Decorative Micarta (“FRDM”) to Hopeman

Brothers, Inc., a joiner subcontractor at Avondale. Employees of Wayne

Manufacturing, a wholly owned subsidiary of Hopeman, would then combine the

Micarta that Westinghouse produced with Marinite panels supplied by Johns-

Manville to create wall panels, and Hopeman Brothers’ employees would cut these

Micarta-containing wall boards to size and install them on vessels being constructed

at Avondale.

Westinghouse presents a two-part argument for summary judgment. First,

Westinghouse asserts that Plaintiffs have not presented evidence that Decedent John

Rogers was exposed to any asbestos-containing products or equipment that

Westinghouse manufactured, sold, or supplied. To support this assertion,

Westinghouse relies on a statement Mr. Rogers gave during a deposition in which he

“specifically testified that he did not associate Westinghouse with any asbestos-

containing products or equipment that he worked with or around during his career

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and specifically denied any asbestos exposure attributable to Westinghouse.” (Rec.

Doc. 117-1, at 7). Huntington Ingalls and Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that

this testimony is not dispositive because Mr. Rogers worked for Avondale when he

was only nineteen years old, more than fifty years prior to his deposition, and he did

so for only about four months. In other words, they maintain that Mr. Rogers could

not be expected to know or recall the name of the manufacturer of any asbestos-

containing products to which he was exposed in 1973.

Furthermore, Mr. Rogers testified in his deposition that he recalled working

around individuals who cut wall board and hung it, thereby creating dust within the

enclosed compartment in which Mr. Rogers worked. (Rec. Doc. 125-2, at 8–11). Mr.

Rogers also attested that he inhaled this dust. Mr. Rogers’s direct deposition

testimony creates a genuine issue as to a material fact concerning whether he was

exposed to asbestos-containing products for which Westinghouse was responsible.

Next, Westinghouse asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment based on

the time period and the types of vessels on which Mr. Rogers recalled working. During

his deposition, Mr. Rogers explained that he remembered working on one Coast

Guard vessel and one Navy Destroyer Escort while at Avondale. According to

Westinghouse, FRDM “was never approved for use on U.S. Navy vessels,” and “none

of the Coast Guard vessels which Hopeman worked on were under construction

during the brief time that Mr. Rogers worked at Avondale.” (Rec. Doc. 117-1, at 3). To

counter this argument, Plaintiffs and Huntington Ingalls point to evidence that at

least four LASH vessels were under construction at Avondale during Mr. Rogers’s

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employment, and Hopeman Brothers employees performed joiner operations on these

vessels as well. Therefore, Plaintiffs and Huntington Ingalls contend that for reasons

also explained above, Mr. Rogers simply might have been mistaken about exactly

which type of vessel he was working on “at the time he observed contractors cutting

wallboard with Skil-saws.” (Rec. Doc. 125, at 6).

As its third basis for summary judgment, Westinghouse contends that Mr.

Rogers worked the night shift at Avondale, whereas the affidavit of John E. Baker,

former Vice President and Secretary of Hopeman Brothers, Inc., indicates that

Hopeman employees worked during the day at Avondale. (Rec. Doc. 117-1, at 3 (citing

Rec. Doc. 117-8, at ¶ 6)). Furthermore, Mr. Rogers attested that he did not perform

labor on vessels that had already been launched, but Westinghouse claims that

“Hopeman’s work with FRDM only occurred after vessels had been launched and

were berthed over water.” Id.

First, Plaintiffs and Huntington Ingalls take issue with Defendants’

interpretation of John Baker’s affidavit. Mr. Baker specifically attested that

“Hopeman Brothers, Inc. regularly and customarily provided joiner services to

Avondale Shipyards during the ‘day shift’ and it was not Hopeman Brothers’ ordinary

practice to be present in the shipyard at night.” (Rec. Doc. 117-8, at 3). Thus,

Huntington Ingalls and Plaintiffs maintain that while Hopeman Brothers employees

might not have typically worked at Avondale at night, the possibility remains that

“Hopeman Brothers employees were present at Avondale from time to time during

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the night shift, when necessary in order to meet construction contract deadlines.”

(Rec. Doc. 125, at 5).

Each of Westinghouse’s grounds for summary judgment presents a genuine

dispute over material facts in this litigation. As the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly

affirmed, a plaintiff’s proof of asbestos exposure may “rest[] on the common sense idea

that, if defendants’ products are likely to be present at a specific location within the

workplace, plaintiffs are likely to have been exposed to the products if they worked

near those specific locations, even without explicit testimony that the plaintiff worked

near the specific product.” Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 172 (5th Cir.

1991). Plaintiffs and Huntington Ingalls have designated direct evidence, i.e., Mr.

Rogers’s deposition testimony, in addition to circumstantial evidence, which shows

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Stated another way, Plaintiffs and Huntington

Ingalls have shown “that a reasonable jury could conclude that it is more likely than

not that [plaintiff] inhaled defendant’s asbestos fibers, even if there were only ‘slight

exposures.’” Williams v. Boeing Co., 23 F.4th 507, 512 (5th Cir. 2022). The Court finds

that this evidence precludes summary judgment.

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Paramount Global’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Rec. Doc. 117) is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 7th day of July, 2026.

CARL J. BAR

UNITED STA DISTRICT JUDGE