Opinion

Howard

Court: District Court, N.D. Ohio
Filed: Jul 7, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.6%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISON

VINCENT HOWARD, ) CASE NO. 1:25-cv-00971-JPC

)

) DISTRICT JUDGE J. PHILIP CALABRESE

Petitioner,

)

) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

) REUBEN J. SHEPERD

)

WARDEN JAY FORSHEY,

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Respondent. )

I. Introduction

On May 9, 20251, Petitioner Vincent Howard (“Howard”), a prisoner in state custody,

filed a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF Doc. 1). Respondent

filed his Return of Writ, along with the state court record and trial transcripts, on October 10,

2025. (ECF Doc. 11 and attachments). On December 22, 2025, Howard filed his Traverse. The

matter is therefore fully ripe for review.

II. Factual Background

Ohio’s Eighth District Court of Appeals summarized the facts of Howard’s case as

follows:

{¶ 3} On August 17, 2020, Howard was charged with eight counts related to the

alleged sexual assault of C.S. This case was tried to a jury, and on August 19, 2022,

Howard was found guilty of three counts of forcible rape and one count of GSI. On

1 Federal district courts apply the prison mailbox rule, accepting filings as of the date placed in the prison

mail system. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988).

September 15, 2022, the court sentenced Howard to an aggregate prison term of

15-17.5 years.

. . .

II. Trial Testimony and Evidence

{¶ 5} The state presented three witnesses: nurse Denise Robinson, C.S., and police

officer Berri Cramer. Howard testified in his own defense.

A. Denise Robinson

{¶ 6} Denise Robinson (“Robinson”) testified that she is the forensic program

coordinator for University Hospitals and “primarily works with patients who have

been victims of sexual assault, domestic violence, or victims of crimes.” Robinson

is also a SANE nurse, which means she is a certified sexual-assault nurse examiner

who performs rape kits on sexual-assault victims. Robinson was working on

February 3, 2020, and she treated C.S. as well as filled out C.S.’s sexual-assault

forensic report (the “rape-kit report”). The state introduced this rape-kit report into

evidence.

{¶ 7} According to Robinson, C.S. was 19 years old at the time Robinson treated

her. C.S. named Howard as the person who sexually assaulted her. C.S. described

Howard as her “Godfather.” Robinson collected swabs from “dried stains” on C.S.’s

head, breast, thighs, back, and hands because, according to C.S.’s “story[,] those

are the areas that she mentioned that may have been touched. So those are the areas

that I would swab.” Robinson further testified about direct questions that she asked

C.S., such as, “Did the finger touch or penetrate your vaginal, anal, or oral areas?”

Robinson testified that C.S. answered “yes to vaginal.”

{¶ 8} Robinson testified that, although C.S.’s narrative in the rape-kit report does

not “really mention” digital penetration, Robinson “documented what [C.S.] told

me in the narrative” by writing the word “yes” on the report in answer to the

question, “Did finger touch or penetrate” C.S.’s vagina. To clarify, the prosecutor

asked Robinson the following question: “But earlier [C.S.] did say that [Howard’s]

finger did go in there, but when she told you the whole story the finger wasn’t

mentioned, correct?” Robinson answered, “Yes, yes.”

{¶ 9} Robinson testified that C.S. stated to her as follows during the examination:

“He gave me oral. He tried to make me get on top of him when he was giving me

oral. My legs were shaking. My heart was beating real fast. He asked why I was

shaking.” According to Robinson, C.S. was “[s]oft-spoken [and] tearful

throughout” the examination, and C.S. told Robinson that she felt sick.

B. C.S.

{¶ 10} C.S. testified that she has known Howard since she was four years old when

he was dating C.S.’s mother. C.S.’s mother passed away when C.S. was seven years

old, but Howard remained in C.S.’s life. C.S. referred to Howard as her godfather,

testifying that “he stepped up and fulfilled the role of father in my life.” C.S. resided

primarily with her grandmother, although she spent most weekends while she was

growing up with Howard and his children.

{¶ 11} On February 2, 2020, at approximately 6:00 p.m., C.S. arrived to work at an

Amazon fulfillment center. C.S. had a taser in her work bag, and when she entered

the facility, her taser set off the metal detector. C.S. was sent home from work that

evening. C.S. was upset, and she called her grandmother, then called Howard.

C.S.’s grandmother and Howard agreed that C.S. needed to be patient, and she

would be back at work in a few days. C.S. testified that Howard said to her, “[I]t’s

the Super Bowl, the game is on, you want to order a pizza and watch the game.”

C.S. then went to Howard’s house in Garfield Heights.

{¶ 12} When C.S. arrived at Howard’s house, he was home alone, and he had the

television on in his bedroom. C.S. and Howard went into his bedroom to watch the

Super Bowl. C.S. sat “[o]n the bed. In the corner toward the wall on the edge of the

bed.” C.S. testified as follows about what happened next:

After that he comes into the room and he sits at the head of the bed.

And I was talking to him, looking at the game, not really paying

attention to what was taking place, just trying to distract myself

somewhat. And he said I still looked sad and to come up to the head

of the bed so he could hold me. And he haven’t held me like that

since I was a kid. * * * And he told me with his arms out, as a hug,

to come in like a father.

{¶ 13} C.S. went to Howard and laid her head on his chest. Howard called C.S. his

“little baby.” Howard continued to watch the Super Bowl, and C.S. fell asleep still

“laying” on Howard. At some point later, C.S. woke up to Howard “caressing” her

arm and leg. C.S.’s testimony continued: “When I woke up, my sports bra and my

shirt being lifted and all — the game was off and the lights were off and the door

was closed. * * * My shirt was being lifted and my sports bra and I was on my

back.” According to C.S., Howard’s hands were on her breasts. C.S. testified that

she “[f]elt like a dead body. Like I felt like I couldn’t move. I felt like I got stuck

— just felt stuck. I just felt real heavy and stuck. Just like my body was just

paralyzed.”

{¶ 14} According to C.S., Howard was on top of her. “His hands were on my breasts

and he was making his way down towards my pants to pull them down. * * * He

was like on his like knees. He was laying down. As I was laying on my back, he

was maybe like laying over me. So as he was pulling my shirt up * * * he was

making his way down to pull my pants like down my body is what I am trying to

tell y’all.”

{¶ 15} C.S. testified that when she first woke up, Howard’s head “was like on my

breast. He was playing with my breasts, licking my breasts.” Howard took C.S.’s

pants and underwear off. C.S. did not tell Howard no, and she did not “try to fight

him off.” Asked why, C.S. testified as follows:

I was just preparing myself for what was about to happen because I

was feeling around for my phone and my keys, where they was at

before I fell asleep. And I couldn’t feel them nowhere. So I was just

preparing myself for what I knew — I knew what was about to

happen, thought was about to happened because the door was closed

and my phone and my keys was moved from the side of me and the

bedroom door was closed and all the lights was off. And he was on

top of me. So I was telling myself like no fighting this because of

the size. And I knew I can’t make a run for it because the door is

closed and I can’t call nobody because my phone and stuff was

moved from the side of me. So I just was bracing myself for the fact

that he going to rape me and then kill me right afterwards. That’s all

I kept trying to prepare myself for. I just kept telling myself over and

over.

{¶ 16} Asked if she cried, C.S. answered, “Yeah. I cried the whole time. I opened

my eyes to realize it wasn’t a dream.”

{¶ 17} C.S. testified that Howard did not say anything until he pulled her pants

down. “When he pulled my pants down, he performed oral on me and was

pleasuring hisself and that’s when he started talking and saying he was so sorry.”

Asked if Howard put his mouth on her vagina, C.S. answered, “Yes.” C.S.’s

testimony continued:

Q: While he’s down there using his mouth on your vagina, where

are his hands? What are his hands doing?

A: Pleasuring hisself. He was masturbating.

Q: Are either of his hands touching your vagina that you know of?

Was anything going inside of your vagina outside of his tongue at

that point?

A: I don’t remember. He just performed oral and was pleasuring

himself. I don’t remember.

{¶ 18} According to C.S, Howard “came back up to the head of the bed and

wrapped his arms around” her. Howard again told C.S. that he was sorry, and she

was “too pretty for [her] own good.” C.S. testified that she was crying “[t]he whole

time.” C.S. testified about what happened next:

He kept trying to force his tongue into my mouth, was like kissing

me. I just kept my mouth shut, kept my lips shut, was crying. And

then he asked me like do you want me to continue. And I still was

just crying. I gave him no answer. And he said I’m going to just keep

going. He turned me on my — he turned me on my stomach and *

* * [s]aid I’m going to just continue.

* * *

So when he turned me on my stomach that’s when he — put his

thing inside of me. * * * I was on my stomach and he put his penis

inside of my vagina.

{¶ 19} Asked how long this lasted, C.S. answered, “It seemed like forever. I don’t

know how long it lasted.” Asked if Howard ejaculated, C.S. testified that she did

not know. Asked how she knew that it was Howard’s penis that penetrated her

vagina, C.S. answered, “Because he was moving his hands to be able to put it in.”

Howard asked C.S. if she “liked it,” and C.S. said “no” while she was crying into

the pillow. At that time, Howard “got off of” C.S., who “ran to the corner of the

room” looking for her pants, phone, and keys. Howard told her to “close [her] eyes

so he could turn the light on.” Howard then handed C.S. her keys and phone.

{¶ 20} C.S. got dressed and started to walk out of the door. Howard told C.S. that

she forgot her shoes. C.S. grabbed her shoes and left the house. C.S. recalled that

Howard “was just standing there” dressed in a “wife beater” and boxer shorts. C.S.

testified that her “body just felt heavy” and she “walked like a zombie to the car.”

C.S. also recalled that, although her truck was still parked in Howard’s driveway, it

was “turned around” and was facing the opposite direction “from where [she] had

parked it at.” According to C.S., “somebody” moved her truck. C.S. got in her truck

and went to her grandmother’s house. Along the way, C.S. stopped at a light on

Miles Road to throw up. C.S. told her grandmother what happened, and her

grandmother took her to the hospital.

{¶ 21} According to C.S., the police came to the hospital to talk to her that day, and

she met with a detective about a week later at her grandmother’s house. At the

detective’s directive, C.S. called Howard on February 10, 2020, and this call was

recorded. C.S. testified that she and the detective did not discuss what C.S. “would

say on that call” before C.S. made the call. According to C.S., her conversation with

Howard was “authentic.”

{¶ 22} A recording of this phone call was introduced into evidence and played for

the jury. The following is relevant to the instant appeal.

{¶ 23} Howard asked C.S. where she was. C.S., who was audibly sobbing during

this phone conversation, responded. Howard then said to C.S., “I am so sorry.”

Howard asked C.S. to come over and talk about what happened. C.S. said, “I’m not

coming over.” C.S. told Howard that she “need[ed] to understand” what occurred

that night. Howard said, “I, I, I, I, got confused and thought you were somebody

different. I thought you were this girl with a ‘black and mild’ smell * * * that I was

dating, Shonniece.” Howard further stated, “I, I, I that’s no excuse. I don’t know

why that was in my head or anything. * * * I would never, I should never. I don’t

even know what to say or do. I should never have done that to you.”

{¶ 24} C.S. stated to Howard, “You really raped me. * * * I can’t sleep.” Howard

said nothing. C.S. explained in excruciating detail the effect that Howard’s actions

had on her, including wetting the bed and throwing up in her sleep. Howard said,

“You know I would never * * * want to hurt you. I don’t have anything I can do to

explain or excuse myself.”

{¶ 25} After the audio recording was played, the prosecutor asked C.S. if she

consented “to any of this.” C.S. answered, “No.” The prosecutor then asked C.S.

the following question: “Had another man done this to you, who would you have

called?” C.S. answered, “Vince. I would have called Vincent Howard if another

man would have done this to me.”

C. Berri Cramer

{¶ 26} Berri Cramer (“Off. Cramer”) testified that she is a patrol officer with the

Garfield Heights Police Department. On February 3, 2020, Off. Cramer met with

C.S. at Ahuja Medical Center “for a possible rape report.” After speaking with C.S.,

Off. Cramer learned that Howard was the suspect of C.S.’s allegations.

D. Howard

{¶ 27} Howard testified that he met C.S. in 2005 when he began dating C.S.’s

mother. At the time, C.S. was four years old. Asked what his relationship with C.S.

was, Howard testified that it “[w]as sort of a friendship, kinship to a fatherly role.”

C.S.’s mother passed away in 2007 when C.S. was six years old. C.S. was raised

by her maternal grandparents, but Howard and his children maintained their

relationship with C.S.

{¶ 28} On February 2, 2020, Howard was “home in bed, sick * * *. Fever,

headache.” According to Howard, he had plans to watch the Super Bowl that night

with his son, but Howard was “too sick to go into the living room and hang out with

him,” so Howard’s son went out. Howard drank “a cup and a half” of a Jack Daniel’s

“hot toddy.” In the early evening, C.S. called Howard with “a problem at work

where they wouldn’t let her go in because of [a] stun gun, so she was upset that she

couldn’t work.” Howard told C.S. that he “could just order her some pizza” and

they “could talk about it, like [they] always have.”

{¶ 29} C.S. arrived at Howard’s house approximately 30 minutes later. Shortly after

C.S. arrived, the pizza was delivered. Howard “grabbed a couple slices and headed

towards the bedroom.” C.S. also got pizza and took it into Howard’s bedroom.

According to Howard, he got into bed after he finished eating his pizza. The

television and the light were on, and the bedroom door was open. Howard testified

that he fell asleep watching the Super Bowl. Howard testified as follows about what

happened next:

Yeah, so I was in bed asleep and I find somebody crawl in bed and

lay three quarters across my chest and legs. * * * Felt the tugging

and caressing of my beard and kissing. * * * And then I began to

start to kiss back. * * * Then * * * my hand was on the back from

the left side, start caressing, start rubbing, working my way down.

{¶ 30} According to Howard, C.S. “initiated” the kissing. Howard testified that C.S.

has “never laid in the bed with me.” Howard also testified that when he woke up to

C.S. kissing him, the television and light were off. Howard explained that the

television will go into “dark mode” after a period of nonuse, but he did not turn the

bedroom light off. Howard did not recall whether the bedroom door was open or

closed.

{¶ 31} Howard testified that C.S. “had her thighs, leg sliding right against my

private areas.” Asked if “at that time could you tell that it was” C.S., Howard

answered as follows: “Yeah, shortly after that, I knew it wasn’t Shonniece.” After

realizing the woman in bed with him was C.S., Howard “started to get aroused [and]

just started returning the affection.”

Asked if C.S. ever told Howard to stop “or any of those words to that effect,”

Howard answered, “No.” Howard testified that he did not restrain or threaten C.S.

According to Howard, he touched and kissed C.S.’s breasts and “went down to give

oral” to C.S. Howard testified that C.S. was not crying when this encounter

occurred. Rather, Howard stated that C.S. was “moaning.”

{¶ 32} Howard testified that no other sexual activity between him and C.S.

occurred. Specifically, Howard denied penetrating C.S.’s vagina with his penis,

stating that he suffers from erectile dysfunction. Howard did not testify about

whether or not he digitally penetrated C.S.’s vagina.

{¶ 33} Howard testified that C.S. left his house that night, and he denied moving

C.S.’s car. Howard stated as follows regarding the phone call between him and C.S.

that was played for the jury:

We had sex, but it should have never happened between us. I had

always looked at her as a daughter, treated her as a daughter. We had

sex and I just could not wrap my head around it. I could not stop

beating myself up mentally over it. I mean, to the point where I’m

sleeping an hour, two hours at a time in the middle of the night then

shaking to wake up just looking around. * * * And then to hear her

cry destroys me. It always has.

{¶ 34} On cross-examination, the state asked Howard the following question after

Howard testified that his penis did not penetrate C.S.’s vagina: “Why do we find

your DNA inside [C.S.’s] vagina * * *? [E]xplain why your semen is in her vagina.”

Howard responded that “if I had any kind of leakage, anything on my shorts, or she

got on top where the opening is in my boxer brief, yeah, there’s my penis right

there.” According to Howard, “[t]here was no crying when [he and C.S.] had sex,”

and C.S. was “lying about that.”

(ECF Doc. 11-2, pp. 143-54; see also State v. Howard (“Howard I”), 2023 WL 7041674, at *1-5

(Ohio Ct. App., Oct. 26, 2023).

III. Procedural History

A. State Conviction

On August 17, 2020, a Cuyahoga County grand jury returned an eight-count indictment

charging Howard with three counts of rape under O.R.C. § 2907.02(A)(2), first-degree felonies;

(Counts One, Three, and Five). (ECF Doc. 11-2, pp. 6-8). Count One was for engaging in

cunnilingus; Count Three, for digital penetration; and Count Five, for vaginal penetration. (Id.).

The grand jury also indicted him on three counts of rape under O.R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), also

first-degree felonies (Counts Two, Four, and Six). (Id. at pp. 7-9). Count Two was for engaging

in cunnilingus where the victim’s ability to resist or consent was substantially impaired; Count

Four, for digital penetration; and Count Six, for vaginal penetration. (Id.). The grand jury also

indicted him on two counts of gross sexual imposition (GSI) under O.R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) and

(A)(5) (Counts Seven and Eight) for touching and kissing the victim’s breasts by force and while

the victim was asleep on or about February 3, 2020. (Id. at p. 9).

On May 6, 2022, Howard’s counsel moved for a continuance of the June 3, 2022 trial

date, in part due to permit additional factfinding by a private investigator. (Id. at pp. 14-15).

Counsel renewed the motion for a continuance on June 3, 2022. (Id. at pp. 24-29). The state trial

court judge continued the pretrial conference from June 2 to June 8, 2022 to permit ongoing

discovery, but kept the trial date set for June 13, 2022. (Id. at p. 17). On June 8, 2022, the trial

was continued to August 15, 2022 at defendant’s request. (Id. at p. 314). Howard’s counsel again

moved on August 12, 2022 for a continuance of the August 15, 2022 trial date in order to obtain

and review information discovered by a private investigator. (Id. at pp. 19-22). This request was

denied and a jury trial was held August 15-18, 2022. (Id. at p. 314).

During a jury trial held on August 18, 2022, the State dismissed Counts Two, Four, and

Six; the court denied a Rule 29 motion of acquittal; and the jury was instructed and deliberated.

(Id. at p. 31). The jury found Howard guilty of rape under O.R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) on Counts One,

Three, and Five; guilty of GSI under O.R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) on Count Seven; and not guilty of

GSI under R.C. 2907.05(A)(5) on Count Eight; Counts Two, Four, and Six were nolled. (Id. at p.

33).

On September 15, 2022, the court imposed five years each on Counts One, Three, and

Five, to run consecutively for a total of 15 years; and 18 months on Count Seven, concurrent, for

an aggregate term of 15 to 17.5 years. (Id. at p. 33). In addition, the court advised Howard that

each of Counts One, Three, and Five were subject to Reagan Tokes Law, meaning that each

count had an indefinite sentence, with minimum sentences of 3 to 4.5 years and maximum

sentences of 11 to 16.5 years. (Id.). Howard was also subject to a mandatory five years of post-

release control. (Id. at p. 34). The court informed Howard of his obligations as a Tier III sex

offender, with Tier I registration also noted in the entry. (Id. at pp. 33-35).

A nunc pro tunc entry of September 27, 2022 corrected the sentencing entry to reflect a

total prison term of 15 to 17.5 years under S.B. 201 (Reagan Tokes Law). (Id. at pp. 37-39). A

September 27, 2022 nunc pro tunc entry corrected the sentencing entry to reflect Count Three

instead of Count Two; a December 7, 2022 nunc pro tunc entry corrected the total prison term as

in the September 27 entry, and typographical errors; and a December 22, 2022, nunc pro tunc

entry again corrected the count references to reflect Count Three instead of Count Two. (Id. at

pp. 41-43; 215-17; 219-21).

B. Direct Appeal

On October 7, 2022, Howard filed his notice of appeal. (Id. at pp. 45-57). He filed his

appellant’s brief on February 8, 2023. (Id. at pp. 59-103). In it, Howard presented three

assignments of error:

Assignment Of Error No. 1 - Appellant’s Trial Court Abused its Discretion by

Denying Defense Motions for a Continuance of the Trial, Thereby Denying

Appellant a Meaningful Opportunity to Present a Complete Defense Which Denied

Him Effective Assistance of Counsel in Violation of His Rights Under the Due

Process Clauses of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to The United

States Constitution and Sections 10 and 16, Article I, of The Ohio Constitution

Assignment Of Error No. 2 - Appellant’s was Deprived of His Constitutional Rights

to Due Process in Violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, as a

Consequence of the State’s Prosecutorial Misconduct

Assignment Of Error No. 3 – Appellant Convictions Were Not Supported by

Sufficient Evidence and Were Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence in

Violation of His Rights Under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of

the Ohio Constitution.

(Id. at p. 61). The State filed its appellee’s brief on March 20, 2023. (Id. at pp. 105-125). Howard

filed a reply brief on March 24, 2023. (Id. at pp. 127-42). On October 26, 2023, the Eighth

District Court of Appeals affirmed Howard’s conviction and sentence. (Id. at pp. 143-73; see also

Howard I, 2023 WL 7041674, (Ohio Ct. App., Oct. 26, 2023)).

Howard then filed a notice of appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court on December 11, 2023.

(ECF Doc. 11-2, pp. 175-97). In his memorandum in support of jurisdiction, Howard presented

the following three propositions of law:

First Proposition of Law – Prosecutorial Misconduct Which Damages the

Credibility of a Defendant, Denies the Defendant a Fair and Impartial Trial and

Violates His Constitutional Rights to Due Process and Equal Protection, in Cases

Where the Only Evidence of an Offense is the Testimony of the Accuser, and a

Court of Review May Not Conclude, in View of the Prosecu[t]orial Misconduct,

That the Accuser’s testimony is Sufficient to Satisfy Element of the Offense.

Second Proposition of Law – A Trial Court Abuses its Discretion and Denies a

Defendant a Meaningful Opportunity to Present a Complete Defense in Violation

of His Sixth Amendment Rights, When it Rejects a Defendant’s Reasonable

Request for a Trial Continuance Necessary to Permit the Defendant to Obtain

Evidence Essential to His Defense

Third Proposition of Law – Mere Disparities Between the Accused’s and the

Accuser’s Physical Sizes, and Conduct Normally and Naturally Taking Place

During Sexual Encounters, is Insufficient to Satisfy the Element of “Force,” as

Required Under Ohio’s Rape and Gross Sexual Imposition Statutes.

(Id. at p. 179). The State opposed. (Id. at pp. 199-211). On February 20, 2024, the Ohio

Supreme Court declined jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 213; see also State v. Howard (“Howard

II”), 227 N.E.3d 1267 (Ohio 2024) (Table).

C. Post Conviction Proceedings

On December 8, 2023, Howard filed with the state trial court a petition to vacate or set

aside judgment under O.R.C. 2953.21. (ECF Doc. 11-2, pp. 242-71). In it, he asserted two

grounds:

Claim Number One: Ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to obtain and

present medical records establishing that petitioner suffered erectile dysfunction

disorder; and

Claim Number Two: Petitioner was denied due process of law when the trial court

refused to grant a continuance of trial to allow the defense to obtain necessary

medical records establishing petitioner suffered from erectile dysfunction disorder.

(Id. at p. 243). On December 12, 2023, the State filed a combined response and motion for

summary judgment, arguing the petition was barred by res judicata and law-of-the-case because

the state appellate court had considered and rejected Howard’s claims regarding continuance and

ineffective assistance tied to the erectile dysfunction issue . Thus, no substantive grounds

warranted a hearing. (Id. at pp. 274-83, 285-94). The same day, Howard filed a reply brief to

clarify and distinguish that his first assignment of error concluded that the trial court’s denial of a

continuance request caused him to receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Id. at p. 299).

As of this writing, the state trial court has not ruled on the motion. (See id. at p. 301; see

also Cuyahoga County Clerk of Courts, Case Search CR-20-652446-A,

https://cpdocket.cp.cuyahogacounty.gov/CR_CaseInformation_Docket.aspx?q=YRjVWoLON9

WojV9o-3tQ_MxvZMNlYu89lyO5yQtVDxM1 (last visited July 7, 2026)).

IV. Federal Habeas Corpus Petition

Howard brings two grounds for relief for this Court’s review:

GROUND ONE: Howard was denied a fair and impartial trial, in violation of his

due process rights, as a consequence of prosecutorial misconduct, and the state

court's rejection of his prosecutorial misconduct claim was contrary to or an

objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal precedent.

GROUND TWO: Howard was denied a meaningful opportunity to present a

complete defense and denied effective assistance counsel, in violation of his due

process rights, when the trial court unreasonably refused to grant a trial continuance

to provide Howard with additional time to obtain medical records essential to his

defense, and the state court's rejection of this claim was contrary to or an objectively

unreasonable application of clearly established federal precedent.

(ECF Doc. 1, pp. 18, 23).

V. Standard of Review

The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, PL 104-

132, April 24, 1996, 110 Stat 1214, 110 Stat. 1214 (“AEDPA”), apply to Howard’s petition for

writ of habeas corpus. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). “As amended by AEDPA, 28

U.S.C. § 2254 sets several limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ

of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).

This is so because “[s]tate courts are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights” and

AEDPA thus acts as a “formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims

have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013). As such, AEDPA

“dictates a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings which demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005)

(internal citation and quotation omitted).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts may “entertain only those applications alleging

that a person is in state custody ‘in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States’” and in most instances, federal courts may not grant habeas relief “unless . . . the

applicant has exhausted state remedies.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181, quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a),

(b), (c). Further, if an application for writ of habeas corpus involves a claim that was

“adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” the application

shall not be granted . . . unless the adjudication of the claim —

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181; Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100

(2011); Matthews v. Ishee, 486 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir. 2007). The burden of proof rests with the

petitioner. Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181.

First, clearly established federal law for purposes of AEDPA review includes “the

holdings, as opposed to dicta, of [U.S. Supreme Court] decisions.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412 (2000). A state court decision is contrary to U.S. Supreme Court precedent if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite that reached by the Court on a question of law or if the

state court decides a case differently than the Court despite both cases having materially

indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000); White v. Mitchell, 431

F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1047 (2006). However, a state court does

not act contrary to clearly established federal law where U.S. Supreme Court precedent is

ambiguous or otherwise unavailable. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003) (per

curiam).

A state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent where

the state court’s adjudication was “objectively unreasonable” and not merely erroneous or

incorrect. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-11; see also Machacek v. Hofbauer, 213 F.3d 947, 953 (6th

Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1089 (2001). Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court’s factual

determination will stand unless it is objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in

state court. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). “[A] federal habeas court may not

grant relief simply because it concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 365.

Next, “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be

correct. [Petitioner] shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear

and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2554(e)(1). And, as the U.S. Supreme Court has repeated,

“a state court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court

would have reached a different conclusion . . . .” Burt, 571 U.S. at 18. Federal courts must also

defer to a state court’s judgment on issues of state substantive and procedural law. Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29 (1982).

In all, federal habeas corpus relief is a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state

criminal justice systems,” and is different in kind from the relief available in direct appeal.

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102-03; see also Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 133 (2022)

(internal quotation omitted). Thus, to obtain “habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law

beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.

When a properly presented federal constitutional claim was not adjudicated on the merits

in the state courts, the reviewing federal court must apply the pre-AEDPA standard, reviewing de

novo questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 432

(6th Cir. 2007) (“When the state court has not assessed the merits of a claim properly raised in a

habeas petition, the deference due under AEDPA does not apply.”).

VI. Procedural Barriers to Federal Habeas Corpus Review

Before coming to federal court, a state habeas petitioner must overcome certain

procedural barriers, including exhaustion of state remedies and procedural default. See Daniels v.

United States, 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001). A federal court sitting in habeas review may review

claims that were evaluated on the merits by the state court. But claims that were not evaluated by

a state court, either because they were never fully presented to the state court (i.e., state court

remedies were unexhausted) or because they were not properly presented to the state court (i.e.,

they are procedurally defaulted) are not available for federal habeas corpus review. Bonnell v.

Mitchel, 301 F. Supp. 2d 698, 722 (N.D. Ohio 2004), aff’d sub nom. Bonnell v. Mitchell, 212 F.

App’x 517 (6th Cir. 2007).

A. Exhaustion

A petitioner must first give the state courts a “fair” opportunity to act on his claims.

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999) (emphasis in original). For a claim to have

been fairly presented, the factual and legal basis of the claim asserted by the petitioner must have

been raised at each and every stage of state review. Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 418 (6th Cir.

2009); McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir. 2000). It is not enough for the claim

raised in state court to be “somewhat similar” to the one raised in the habeas petition or implicate

the same facts; the state court must have been called upon to apply the legal principles of the

claim now presented to the federal courts. Jalowiec v. Bradshaw, 657 F.3d 293, 304 (6th Cir.

2011).

The petitioner also must have presented their “claim to the state courts as a federal

constitutional issue – not merely as an issue arising under state law.” Williams, 460 F.3d at 807

(quotation marks omitted). In this Circuit, this can be done in one of four ways:

(1) reliance upon federal cases employing constitutional analysis;

(2) reliance upon state cases employing federal constitutional analysis;

(3) phrasing the claim in terms of constitutional law or in terms sufficiently

particular to allege a denial of a specific constitutional right; or

(4) alleging facts well within the mainstream of constitutional law.

McMeans, 228 F.3d at 681 (paragraph breaks added).

Failure to exhaust occurs where state court remedies are still “available at the time of the

federal petition.” Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 806 (6th Cir. 2006). This failure to

exhaust can also lead to a petitioner procedurally defaulting his claims. If the petitioner has not

fully used his state remedies and has no legal mechanism to do so now, the claim he failed to

present is procedurally defaulted, and this Court cannot act on the claim either. See Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996); Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 809 (6th Cir.

2006).

B. Procedural Default

The procedural default doctrine limits federal review if the petitioner has failed to follow

the state’s procedural requirements for presenting his or her claim in state court. See Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991). This doctrine flows from the insight that courts must have

the authority to insist that “defendants present their arguments on time and according to

established procedures.” Benton v. Brewer, 942 F.3d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 2019). Thus, a federal

habeas court will not consider a habeas petition if “the last state-court judgment denying relief on

the claim rests on a procedural state-law ground that is ‘independent of the federal question and

is adequate to support the judgement.’” Lovins v. Parker, 712 F.3d 283, 295 (6th Cir. 2013)

(quotation marks omitted).

This Circuit consults a four-part test to determine whether a petitioner has procedurally

defaulted a claim. A petitioner procedurally defaults a claim if: (1) the petitioner fails to comply

with a state procedural rule; (2) the state courts enforced the rule; (3) the state procedural rule is

an adequate and independent state ground for denying review of a federal constitutional claim;

and (4) the petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice excusing the default. See Maupin v.

Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986).

Because the procedural-default bar to federal habeas review is harsh, courts have created

safety-valves to permit review in limited circumstances. A petitioner can obtain review of

procedurally defaulted claims if he or she shows: (1) “cause,” i.e., that some external factor kept

him from complying with the state rule or fairly presenting his claim; and (2) “prejudice,” i.e.,

that, assuming the petitioner’s constitutional claim has merit, there is a reasonable probability

that a different verdict would have resulted if the alleged constitutional violation hadn’t occurred.

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Wogenstahl v. Mitchell, 668 F.3d 307, 337

(6th Cir. 2012). A petitioner can also obtain review of a procedurally defaulted claim if the

procedurally defaulted claim is based on new evidence that the petitioner was factually innocent

of the crime of conviction. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 (“fundamental miscarriage of justice”

exception to procedural default); Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (A

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” can occur only when the procedurally defaulted claim

would establish that the petitioner was “actually innocent.”). But “[A]ctual[] innocen[ce]” means

“factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623

(1998). To overcome procedural default, an actual innocence claim must be supported by “new

reliable evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995).

VII. Discussion