Bradshaw

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 ALBERT BONDS, JR., Case No. 2:26-cv-01017-DJC-CSK (PS)

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS &

RECOMENDATIONS

14 BRADSHAW,

(ECF Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)

15 Defendant.

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18 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Albert Bonds Jr.’s application to proceed in

19 forma pauperis (“IFP”), ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), and ex

20 parte application for an order staying proceedings.1 (ECF Nos. 2, 3, 4). Plaintiff is

21 appearing without counsel. Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the Court submits the motions

22 upon the record and briefs on file.

23 For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s application to proceed

24 IFP and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) with leave to amend.

25 Further, the Court recommends DENYING Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO and ex parte

26 application to stay proceedings.

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1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ.

28 P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c).

1 I. PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR IFP

2 Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 2.)

3 Plaintiff’s application in support of the IFP request makes the required financial showing.

4 Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP request.

5 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

6 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis

7 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to

8 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a

9 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith,

10 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an

11 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In

12 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual

13 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and

14 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Neitzke, 490

15 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960

16 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).

17 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

18 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal).

19 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable

20 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d

21 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does

22 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007);

23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

24 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough

25 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A

26 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

27 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

28 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the

1 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be

2 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80

3 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).

4 III. DISCUSSION

5 A. Operative Complaint and Duplicative Filings

6 Plaintiff initiated this action on March 20, 2026. (ECF No. 1.) On May 20, 2026,

7 Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (ECF No. 5) against Defendants City of

8 Vallejo, Vallejo Police Department, George’s Towing Company, and a driver named

9 Gustavo, and Officers Jsesus Becelema, Coleman, Brock, Wherli, and Heron. Id. Plaintiff

10 also filed a motion for a TRO and application for an order staying proceedings (ECF Nos.

11 3, 4). A plaintiff may amend the complaint once as a matter of course no later than 21

12 days after service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (a)(1). Because Plaintiff filed the FAC before

13 serving the Complaint, Plaintiff has amended the Complaint as a matter of course

14 pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1) and the FAC is the current operative complaint. Therefore, the

15 Court screens the FAC.

16 On May 28, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint and included

17 another TRO in his filing. (ECF No. 6.) Because Plaintiff did not request or obtain leave

18 of court to further amend his complaint as required, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), the

19 Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6) is STRICKEN and will be disregarded.

20 B. The FAC

21 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

22 The FAC does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as required by

23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims and the

24 grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of

25 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v.

26 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). A review of Plaintiff’s FAC reveals it consists

27 of “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements” of his causes of action and fails to state a claim

28 for relief under Section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights,

2 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

3 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (internal quotation marks

4 omitted). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely provides a

5 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.

6 266, 271 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To state a cognizable §

7 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right protected by the Constitution

8 and laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed by a

9 person who acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Florer v.

10 Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2011). An individual

11 defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish the defendant's

12 personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal connection between

13 the defendant's wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Hansen

14 v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th

15 Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable

16 for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

17 Plaintiff’s six causes of action against all Defendants include a claim for violation

18 of the Fourth Amendment under Section 1983. FAC. at 1. Plaintiff also alleges a violation

19 of the Bane Act under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, conversion under Cal. Civ. Code § 3336,

20 replevin, involuntary depositary under Cal Civ. Code § 2080, and unlawful fees under

21 Cal. Veh. Code § 22851.3. Id. Because the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

22 under Section 1983, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

23 state claims.

24 a. Section 1983 Claim against Defendant Officers

25 The FAC appears to bring a Fourth Amendment claim against all Defendants for

26 unlawful search and seizure of Plaintiff’s vehicle. FAC at 4. “The Fourth Amendment,

27 which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects against

28 unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement officers.” Holt v. Forsyth, 2025

1 WL 2654134, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025). “The impoundment of an automobile is a

2 seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429

3 F. 3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2005).

4 The FAC alleges Defendants seized Plaintiff’s 1972 Cadillac Fleetwood from the

5 curtilage of his home on May 15, 2026 without “a warrant, probable cause, consent, or

6 exigent circumstances.” FAC at 2. This allegation groups all Defendants together without

7 further elaboration.

8 Among the Officer Defendants, the FAC only names Defendant Officer Brock

9 without any additional allegations that connect Defendant to the unlawful search and

10 seizure cause of action. Id. The FAC does not refer to any of the additional Officer

11 Defendants. See FAC. The FAC fails to give these Defendants notice of the claims and

12 grounds on which they rest and allege their acts with some degree of particularity. See

13 Kimes, 84 F.3d, at 1129. Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s 1983 claim against

14 the Officer Defendants.

15 b. Monell Liability

16 Next, the FAC fails to properly allege Monell liability against Defendants City of

17 Vallejo and Vallejo Police Department. “In order to establish municipal liability [under

18 Monell], a plaintiff must show that a ‘policy or custom’ led to the plaintiff’s injury.” Castro

19 v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell

20 v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To impose

21 liability under Monell, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was deprived of a constitutional

22 right; (2) the municipality has a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to

23 plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the

24 constitutional violation. Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing

25 Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994)). The complaint must identify the

26 particular policy that plaintiff alleges caused his constitutional injury. See Lee v. City of

27 Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563

28 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for “their own

1 illegal acts,” and therefore to impose liability on a local government, plaintiffs must prove

2 that an “action pursuant to official municipal policy” caused their injury) (citations

3 omitted). Further, the policy at issue must be the result of a decision of a person

4 employed by the entity who has final decision or policymaking authority. Monell, 436

5 U.S. at 694. There must be a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the

6 injury, and a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that his injury resulted from a

7 permanent and well-settled practice. Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070.

8 The FAC only pleads a theory of Monell liability against Defendant City of Vallejo

9 and does not plead Monell liability against Defendant Vallejo Police Department. See

10 FAC. The FAC only alleges Defendant City of Vallejo “maintain[ed] a policy, custom, or

11 practice of authorizing unconstitutional tows from private property.” FAC at 2. This

12 allegation is conclusory and fails to satisfy the elements of a Monell claim, thus the Court

13 dismisses Plaintiff’s 1983 claim against Defendants City of Vallejo and Vallejo Police

14 Department.

15 c. Improper Defendants Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

16 Last, the FAC fails to allege significant state action against Defendants George’s

17 Towing Company and an individual named Gustavo. Generally, private parties do not act

18 under color of state law. Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991); Sutton v.

19 Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a private

20 entity’s action may be “under color of state law” where there is “significant” state

21 involvement in the action. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 444 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation

22 omitted). To determine whether actions committed by private actors that allegedly

23 caused the deprivation of a right are fairly attributable to the state, the court must

24 determine whether the depriving party is “a person who may fairly be said to be a state

25 actor.” Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011)

26 (citation omitted).

27 The FAC does not plead facts to show significant state involvement. See FAC.

28 Plaintiff alleges “the City pays George’s Towing with taxpayer funds for tows.” FAC at 2.

1 However, no additional allegations are brought against Defendant George’s Towing and

2 Defendant Gustavo. While the Ninth Circuit has held that towing companies may be

3 state actors under Section 1983 upon a showing of significant state involvement, the

4 FAC fails to make sufficient allegations showing Defendants acted under the color of

5 state law. See Goichman v. Rheuban Motors, Inc. 682 F. 2d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982)

6 (finding a private towing company acted under color of state law at the behest of a police

7 officer and pursuant to a statutory scheme designed to accomplish the state’s purpose of

8 enforcing traffic laws). Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s 1983 claim against the

9 private actors, Defendant George’s Towing and Defendant Gustavo.

10 d. State Law Claims

11 Plaintiff also seeks to bring a claim pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, along with

12 state law claims under Cal. Civ. Code § 3336, replevin, Cal. Civ. Code § 2080, and Cal.

13 Veh. Code § 22851.3. As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under

14 federal law. Accordingly, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction under

15 Plaintiff’s state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Campos v. Fresno Deputy

16 Sheriff’s Association, 535 F. Supp. 3d 913, 931 (E.D. Cal. 2021); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.

17 Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1992).

18 2. Leave to Amend

19 Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se

20 litigant’s complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and

21 succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). In

22 light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, and because it is at least conceivable that Plaintiff could

23 allege additional facts to state claims under Section 1983, the Court finds it appropriate

24 to grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the FAC. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31

25 (indicating that prior to dismissal, the court is to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the

26 complaint and provide an opportunity to cure – if it appears at all possible the defects

27 can be corrected).

28 If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, this new pleading should be titled

1 “Second Amended Complaint,” shall allege facts establishing the existence of federal

2 jurisdiction, and must contain a short and plain statement of Plaintiff's claim(s). The

3 allegations of the complaint must be set forth in sequentially numbered paragraphs, with

4 each paragraph number being one greater than the one before, each paragraph having

5 its own number, and no paragraph number being repeated anywhere in the complaint.

6 Each paragraph should be limited “to a single set of circumstances” where possible. See

7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Forms are available to help plaintiffs organize their complaint in the

8 proper way. They are available at the Clerk's Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200),

9 Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms.

10 The amended complaint must not require the Court and the defendants to guess

11 at what is being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th

12 Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally

13 guessing as to what facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain

14 defendants”). The amended complaint must not require the Court to spend its time

15 “preparing the ‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit.” Id.

16 at 1180. The amended complaint must not require the Court and defendants to prepare

17 lengthy outlines “to determine who is being sued for what.” Id. at 1179.

18 Plaintiff is informed that the Court cannot refer to a prior complaint or other filing in

19 order to make the amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an

20 amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a

21 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes prior complaint(s), and once the

22 amended complaint is filed and served, any previous complaint no longer serves any

23 function in the case. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012).

24 C. Motions for a Temporary Restraining Order

25 Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for a TRO seeks relief in the form of “commanding”

26 Defendants City of Vallejo, Vallejo Police Department, an unnamed Defendant officer,

27 George’s Towing, an unnamed driver, and Does 1-50 to (1) release Plaintiff’s 1972

28 Cadillac Fleetwood without payment of fees according to Cal. Veh. Code § 22851.3,

1 (2) issue an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue, and also

2 (3) issue an order prohibiting Defendants from “selling, transferring, lien-selling, or

3 damaging the vehicle pending hearing.” Pl. TRO at 1-2 (ECF No. 3).

4 Plaintiff also moves for an ex parte application “for an order staying any further

5 proceedings, sale, transfer, or distribution related to the real property located at 622

6 Pierce Street, Vallejo, California.” Pl. Appl. at 1. (ECF No. 4.) This filing contains a

7 declaration of irreparable harm and memorandum of points and authorities. Accordingly,

8 the Court will construe this filing as an additional ex parte motion for a temporary

9 restraining order.

10 Because the Court dismissed the FAC with leave to amend, there is presently no

11 operative complaint to this action, and the Court therefore recommends both TROs

12 should be denied without prejudice. See Carnero v. Elk Grove Financial, 2017 WL

13 1315575, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2017) (denying a TRO where there was no operative

14 complaint). In addition, the second TRO Plaintiff filed within ECF No. 6 on May 28, 2026,

15 should also be denied because there is presently no operative complaint.

16 IV. CONCLUSION

17 In accordance with the above, IT IS ORDERED that:

18 1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED;

19 2. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5) is DISMISSED with leave

20 to amend;

21 3. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this order to file an amended

22 complaint that complies with the instructions provided above. If Plaintiff

23 fails to timely comply with this order, the undersigned may recommend that

24 this action be dismissed; and

25 4. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6) is STRICKEN.

26 Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

27 1. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 3) be DENIED;

28 2. Plaintiff’s application for an order staying proceedings (ECF No. 4) be

1 DENIED; and

2 3. Plaintiff's second motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 6) be

3 DENIED.

4 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

5 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

6 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

7 || written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should

8 || be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any

9 || reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14

10 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time

11 | may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,

12 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

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14 | Dated: June 2, 2026 C i s

15 CHI SOO KIM

16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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