The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 NICHOLAS ROBINSON, No. 2:26-cv-0725 AC P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 UNKNOWN,
15 Defendant.
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17 Plaintiff is a county inmate who filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
18 without a lawyer. He has requested leave to proceed without paying the full filing fee for this
19 action, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration showing that he cannot
20 afford to pay the entire filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to
21 proceed in forma pauperis is granted.1
22 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
23 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a
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1 This means that plaintiff is allowed to pay the $350.00 filing fee in monthly installments that
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are taken from the inmate’s trust account rather than in one lump sum. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a),
26 1915(b)(1). As part of this order, the prison is required to remove an initial partial filing fee from
plaintiff’s trust account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). A separate order directed to the appropriate
27 agency requires monthly payments of twenty percent of the prior month’s income to be taken
from plaintiff’s trust account. These payments will be taken until the $350 filing fee is paid in
28 full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
1 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). A
2 claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
3 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on
4 an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Id. at 327. The
5 critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable
6 legal and factual basis. Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded by
7 statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
8 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than
9 “naked assertion[s],” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
10 cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007). In other words,
11 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
12 statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the
13 court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial
14 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
15 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation
16 omitted). When considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the
17 allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and construe the
18 complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421
19 (1969) (citations omitted).
20 II. Factual Allegations of the First Amended Complaint
21 The first amended complaint2 alleges that defendants Delise, Stevers, Felix, and
22 Zimmerman violated plaintiff’s rights. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff alleges that an officer used force on
23 him, “harming [his] person, wrists, chest & body” and that a “parole officer would not let [him]
24 practice reentry with family & family planning.” Id. at 3. He further asserts that the city of
25 Oakdale condemned land, while the city of Ceres “violated religious practices.” Id. Finally,
26 plaintiff appears to allege that the Stanislaus County jail subjected him to “cruel punishment.” Id.
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2 Before the court could screen the original complaint, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint.
28 The court will therefore proceed to screen the first amended complaint.
1 III. Failure to State a Claim
2 Having conducted the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court finds that the
3 complaint does not state a valid claim for relief against any defendant. Plaintiff makes only
4 vague claims that his rights have been violated without presenting any specific factual allegations
5 regarding the conduct he believes caused the violations. He also fails to identify conduct by any
6 specific defendant, and though he appears to be attempting to make claims against the cities of
7 Oakdale and Ceres and the Stanislaus County Jail, he has not named any of these entities as
8 defendants. Because of these defects, the court will not order the complaint to be served on
9 defendants.
10 Plaintiff may try to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. In deciding
11 whether to file an amended complaint, plaintiff is provided with the relevant legal standards
12 governing his potential claims for relief which are attached to this order. See Attachment A.
13 IV. Legal Standards Governing Amended Complaints
14 If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the conditions
15 about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode,
16 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). The complaint must also allege in specific terms how each named
17 defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
18 There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or
19 connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. Duffy,
20 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official
21 participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,
22 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
23 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make
24 his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be
25 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an
26 amended complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir.
27 1967) (citations omitted). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, any previous complaint no
28 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original
1 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
2 V. Plain Language Summary of this Order for Party Proceeding Without a Lawyer
3 Your complaint will not be served because the facts alleged are not enough to state a
4 claim. You are being given a chance to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. If
5 you file an amended complaint, pay particular attention to the legal standards attached to this
6 order. Be sure to provide facts that show exactly what each defendant did to violate your rights.
7 Any claims and information not in the amended complaint will not be considered.
8 CONCLUSION
9 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
10 1. Plaintiff’s requests for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 6, 9) are
11 GRANTED.
12 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff
13 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
14 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the
15 appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith.
16 3. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see 28
17 U.S.C. § 1915A, and will not be served.
18 4. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended
19 complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil
20 Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket
21 number assigned this case and must be labeled “Second Amended Complaint.”
22 5. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a
23 recommendation that this action be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
24 Procedure.
25 ////
26 ////
27 ////
28 ////
1 6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint
2 | form used in this district.
3 || DATED: June 1, 2026 □ ~
Httven—
4 ALLISON CLAIRE
5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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1 Attachment A
2 This Attachment provides, for informational purposes only, the legal standards that may
3 apply to your claims for relief. Pay particular attention to these standards if you choose to file an
4 amended complaint.
5 I. Personal Involvement
6 “Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant,”
7 Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
8 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980)), and “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil
9 rights violations are not sufficient,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)
10 (citations omitted). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,
11 within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s
12 affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the
13 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.
14 1978) (citation omitted). In other words, to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff
15 must link each individual defendant with some affirmative act or omission that shows a violation
16 of plaintiff’s federal rights.
17 II. Excessive Force
18 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force
19 purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v.
20 Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015). “[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and
21 circumstances of each particular case’” and must be determined “from the perspective of a
22 reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20
23 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 397 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
24 Considerations such as the following may bear on the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of the force used: the relationship between the
25 need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of
the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to
26 limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at
issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the
27 plaintiff was actively resisting.
28 Id. at 397.
1 III. Religious Freedom
2 The First Amendment protects the right to the free exercise of religion. A religious claim
3 must satisfy two criteria to merit protection under the free exercise clause of the First
4 Amendment: (1) the claimant’s belief must be “sincerely held” and (2) “the claim must be rooted
5 in religious belief, not in purely secular philosophical concerns.” Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330,
6 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The free exercise right,
7 however, is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to
8 achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security. O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S.
9 342, 348 (1987). To state a First Amendment, free-exercise-of-religion claim, a prisoner must
10 therefore show that a defendant burdened the practice of his religion by preventing him from
11 engaging in a sincerely held religious belief and that the defendant did so without any justification
12 reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th
13 Cir. 2008). To substantially burden the practice of an individual’s religion, the interference “must
14 be more than an inconvenience.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997),
15 overruled in part by Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85 (overruling the objective centrality test).
16 IV. Municipal Liability
17 Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their
18 employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is
19 when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
20 whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
21 government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694. Municipalities are considered
22 “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore may be liable for causing a constitutional
23 deprivation. Id. at 690 (1978); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.
24 2006). To properly plead a Monell claim based on an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy,
25 plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived;
26 (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) such policy amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's
27 constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.
28 See Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). The
1 municipal policy at issue must be the result of a “longstanding practice or custom which
2 constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.” Price v. Sery, 513
3 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968,
4 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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