The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 MARIO MERCADO, No. 2:25-cv-3072 CSK P
12 Plaintiff, ORDER
13 v.
14 SGT. PEREZ, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
18 § 1983 and requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This
19 proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
20 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
21 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C.
23 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in
24 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct
25 the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and
26 forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff is obligated to make monthly payments
27 of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account. These
28 payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the
1 amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C.
2 § 1915(b)(2).
3 As discussed below, plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.
4 I. SCREENING STANDARDS
5 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
6 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
7 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raised claims that are legally
8 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
9 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
10 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
11 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
12 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an
13 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
14 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
15 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
16 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.
17 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably
18 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at
19 1227.
20 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain
21 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
22 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic
23 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
24 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a
25 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations
26 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555.
27 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the
28 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v.
1 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal
2 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as
3 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the
4 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236
5 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
6 II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
7 Named as defendants are Sergeant Perez, Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”) Warden,
8 MCSP Captain and MCSP. (ECF No. 1 at 2.)
9 Plaintiff claims that on July 27, 2025, he was denied access to religious services by
10 defendants Perez, MCSP Warden and MCSP Captain. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that 1 block
11 inmates were allowed to attend protestant service while 2 block inmates were not. (Id.)
12 Plaintiff’s claims are described in more detail in a copy of a grievance attached to the complaint.
13 (Id. at 9-11.) Plaintiff claims that on July 27, 2025, defendant Perez told plaintiff that there would
14 be no chapel service because of a staff assault that happened in building 4 the evening before.
15 (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff claims that there was a worship service for Christians, but only three inmates
16 from building 1 were allowed to attend. (Id.) Plaintiff later asked Correctional Officer Lopez
17 why plaintiff was not allowed to attend church. (Id.) Correctional Officer Lopez told plaintiff
18 that defendant Perez was supposed to send custody staff to escort plaintiff and other Christians,
19 but it turned out that defendant Perez had a barbeque picnic while there was supposed to be
20 chapel services. (Id.) In the complaint, plaintiff claims that he has been continually denied the
21 right to exercise his religion. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims that there are Sundays when custody staff
22 delay program. (Id.)
23 As legal claims, plaintiff alleges violation of the First Amendment, the Religious Land
24 Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), the right to due process, the Eighth
25 Amendment and retaliation. (Id. at 3-5.)
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1 III. DISCUSSION
2 A. First Amendment and RLUIPA
3 1. Legal Standard for First Amendment Claim
4 The First Amendment guarantees a prisoner the right to the free exercise of his religion.
5 See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322-23 (1972). A prisoner’s right to free exercise of religion “is
6 necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration.” Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1993)
7 (citing O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (“[T]he free exercise right ... is necessarily
8 limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate
9 correctional goals or to maintain prison security.”).
10 A prisoner’s rights under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause are implicated
11 when a prison official, without justification that is reasonably related to a legitimate penological
12 interest, burdens the prisoner’s practice of his religion by preventing him from engaging in
13 conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with his faith. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d
14 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008). In addition, to violate the Constitution, the interference with religious
15 practice must be more than an inconvenience; it must substantially burden the exercise of
16 religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds
17 as recognized in Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-85.
18 2. Legal Standard for RLUIPA Claim
19 “To state a claim under RLUIPA, a prisoner must show that: (1) he takes part in a
20 ‘religious exercise,’ and (2) the State’s actions have substantially burdened that exercise.”
21 Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Shakur, 514 F.3d at 888-89 (9th
22 Cir. 2008)). “If the prisoner satisfies those elements, then the State must prove its actions were
23 the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.” Id. (citing
24 Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005)).
25 “RLUIPA does not define ‘substantial burden,’ but [the Ninth Circuit] has held that ‘a
26 substantial burden on religious exercise must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon
27 such exercise.’” Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting San Jose
28 Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)). “In the context of a
1 prisoner’s constitutional challenge to institutional policies, this court has held that a substantial
2 burden occurs ‘where the state ... denies [an important benefit] because of conduct mandated by
3 religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to
4 violate his beliefs.’” Id. (quoting Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005)).
5 3. Analysis
6 While plaintiff claims that he has been continually denied the right to practice his religion,
7 plaintiff identifies only one occasion when he was denied access to religious services, i.e., July
8 27, 2025. Under either the First Amendment or RLUIPA, plaintiff’s conclusory claim that he has
9 been continually denied the right to practice his religion is insufficient to demonstrate that he was
10 denied the right to practice his religion on more than the one occasion alleged in the complaint.
11 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
12 of action, support by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice [to state a § 1983 claim].”).
13 Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied access to chapel services on July 27, 2025 does not
14 demonstrate that defendants placed a substantial burden on plaintiff’s exercise of religion in
15 violation of the First Amendment or RLUIPA. Courts in the Ninth Circuit have routinely held
16 that the denial of a religious practice on a single, isolated occasion does not constitute a
17 “substantial burden” and thus does not violate the First Amendment. See, e.g., Howard v.
18 Skolnik, 372 F. App’x 781, 782 (9th Cir. 2010) (summary judgment on free exercise claim was
19 appropriate where inmate’s allegation of two incidents where prison staff interfered with his
20 fasting did not amount to a substantial burden); Pouncil v. Sherman, 2018 WL 646105, at *3
21 (E.D. Cal. Jan 31, 2018) (free exercise claim dismissed at screening because allegation of denial
22 of meals for a single night of Ramadan did not present a substantial burden); Murie v. Crossroads
23 Corr. Ctr., 2017 WL 2265145, at *3 (D. Mont. Feb. 24, 2017) (free exercise claim dismissed at
24 screening because allegation that plaintiff was not allowed to attend a sweat lodge on a single
25 occasion did not present a substantial burden); Hampton v. Ayers, 2011 WL 2565358, at *14-15
26 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2011), findings and recommendations adopted, 2011 WL 2563246 (C.D. Cal.
27 Jun. 28, 2011) (summary judgment in favor of defendant appropriate because a single incident of
28 interrupting a religious service was not a substantial burden on plaintiff’s religious exercise);
1 Glover v. Evans, 2007 WL 3022249, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2007) (religious exercise claim
2 dismissed at screening because allegation of not being provided with religion-appropriate meal on
3 a single occasion did not state a constitutional violation). Plaintiff’s claim that he was denied
4 access to religious services on July 27, 2025 also fails to demonstrate a substantial burden on his
5 right to exercise his religion under RLUIPA. See Camacho v. Shields, 368 Fed. Appx. 834, 835
6 (9th Cir. March 3, 2010) (prison official’s interruption of a prisoner’s prayers on one occasion did
7 not constitute a substantial burden under RLUIPA). Accordingly, plaintiff’s First Amendment
8 and RLUIPA claims are dismissed.
9 If plaintiff files an amended complaint, plaintiff is informed that the Civil Rights Act
10 under which this action was filed provides as follows:
11 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation
12 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .
. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
13 or other proper proceeding for redress.
14 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the
15 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See
16 Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
17 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the
18 meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or
19 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which
20 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
21 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of
22 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant
23 holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional
24 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);
25 Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague
26 and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights
27 violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
28 If plaintiff files an amended complaint raising First Amendment and RLUIPA claims,
1 plaintiff must link each named defendant to the alleged deprivations.
2 B. Remaining Claims
3 Plaintiff claims that the denial of access to religious services on July 27, 2025 violated his
4 right to due process, the Eighth Amendment and constituted retaliation. Plaintiff fails to explain
5 how his denial of access to religious services on July 27, 2025 violated his right to due process
6 and this Court does not find that these allegations state a potentially colorable due process claim.
7 Accordingly, plaintiff’s due process claim is dismissed.
8 The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual
9 Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)
10 (citations omitted). To establish a violation of this duty, a prisoner must first demonstrate an
11 objectively serious deprivation, one that amounts to the denial of “the minimal civilized measures
12 of life’s necessities.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Rhodes v.
13 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)). Second, a prisoner must demonstrate that prison officials
14 acted with “deliberate indifference.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). A prison
15 official is liable for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement only if “the official
16 knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be
17 aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
18 exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Based on these legal
19 standards, this Court finds that plaintiff’s claim that he was denied access to religious services on
20 July 27, 2025 fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
21 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five
22 basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate
23 (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s
24 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate
25 correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005). To properly
26 allege retaliatory motive, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that plaintiff’s protected
27 conduct was the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind defendant’s conduct. See Brodheim
28 v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff pleads no facts demonstrating that his
1 denial of access to religious services on July 27, 2025 was based on retaliation for his protected
2 conduct. Accordingly, plaintiff’s retaliation claim is dismissed.
3 C. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendant MCSP
4 For the following reasons, this Court finds that plaintiff’s claims against defendant MCSP
5 are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
6 “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state,
7 its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep’t of Public
8 Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal
9 courts from hearing a Section 1983 lawsuit in which damages or injunctive relief is sought against
10 a state, its agencies (such as CDCR) or individual prisons, absent “a waiver by the state or a valid
11 congressional override....” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). “The
12 Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief against a state, ‘an
13 arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi,
14 Cal., 302 F.3d 928, 957 n.28 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citations omitted). “The State
15 of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought
16 under § 1983 in federal court....” Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1025–26 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v.
17 Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)). Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against defendant MCSP are
18 barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff shall not name MCSP as a defendant in an
19 amended complaint.
20 IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
21 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions
22 about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See e.g.,
23 West, 487 U.S. at 48. Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named
24 defendant is involved. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). There can be no liability
25 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s
26 actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167
27 (9th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil
28 rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
1 In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to
2 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended
3 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists
4 because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ramirez
5 v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) (“an ‘amended complaint
6 supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’” (internal citation
7 omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any
8 function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim
9 and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
10 V. CONCLUSION
11 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
12 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.
13 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff
14 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
15 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the
16 Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently
17 herewith.
18 3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.
19 4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached
20 Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:
21 a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and
22 b. An original of the Amended Complaint.
23 Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the
24 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must
25 also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.”
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1 | Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the dismissal of
2 || this action.
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4 Dated: May 29, 2026 >
Cha Spo
5 CHI SOO KIM
6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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g Mercado3072.14/2
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 MARIO MERCADO, No. 2:25-cv-3072 CSK
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. NOTICE OF AMENDMENT
14 SGT. PEREZ, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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Plaintiff submits the following document in compliance with the court’s order
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filed on ______________ (date).
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Amended Complaint
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(Check this box if submitting an Amended Complaint)
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DATED:
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23 Plaintiff
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