The opinion
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0192p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
┐
PATRICE NELSON, as personal representative of the
│
Estate of Jaqueline Nelson; GEORGES MICO NELSON,
│
individually, and as personal representative of the
│
Estate of Jacqueline Nelson, > No. 25-1940
Plaintiffs-Appellants, │
│
│
v. │
│
MILLERKNOLL, INC., fka Herman Miller, Inc. │
Defendant-Appellee. │
┘
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 1:23-cv-00464—Robert J. Jonker, District Judge.
Argued: June 3, 2026
Decided and Filed: July 7, 2026
Before: BOGGS, CLAY, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Gaetan Gerville-Réache, WARNER, NORCROSS + JUDD LLP, Grand Rapids,
Michigan, for Appellants. Mark L. Durbin, BARNES & THORNBURG LLP, Chicago, Illinois,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Gaetan Gerville-Réache, Brian Wasson, WARNER, NORCROSS +
JUDD LLP, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Donna Tobin, ROYER COOPER COHEN
BRAUNFELD, New York, New York, Doris Rygalski, NORMAN, HANSON & DETROY,
Portland, Maine, for Appellants. Mark L. Durbin, Megan Krivoshey, BARNES &
THORNBURG LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Anthony C. Sallah, BARNES & THORNBURG LLP,
Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 2
_________________
OPINION
_________________
CLAY, Circuit Judge. The son of furniture designer George Nelson and other Plaintiffs
sued the furniture company MillerKnoll, Inc. alleging trademark infringement under the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and state law. Plaintiffs also brought several related state law tort
claims against MillerKnoll. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all
claims. For the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Bubble Lamp
George Nelson was a renowned mid-century furniture designer who spent much of his
career as the Design Director of the furniture company Herman Miller, Incorporated, now
renamed MillerKnoll (referred to herein as “HMI”). While employed at HMI, Nelson designed
one of his most famous pieces: a geometric, cloth-covered hanging light fixture referred to as
the “Bubble Lamp.”
During his employment, Nelson never entered into a formal written agreement with HMI
with respect to its ownership or use of Bubble Lamp-related intellectual property rights. Instead,
Nelson relied on a verbal agreement with the company under which he would be paid a royalty
on “all designs submitted by [Nelson] to Howard Miller . . . for production and sale on an
exclusive basis.” Ltr., R.233-32, PageID #3469. In 1957, when Nelson no longer worked at
HMI, the parties entered into a written agreement, under which HMI agreed “to provide Mr.
Nelson royalties for furniture products and patterns designed by him.” 2006 Royalty Agreement,
R.220-2, PageID #2111.
Nelson never registered any trademarks relating to the Bubble Lamps with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). However, as is explained in greater detail
below, other parties did register USPTO trademarks relating to the Bubble Lamps following
Nelson’s death, which were later acquired by HMI. This lawsuit concerns HMI’s use and
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 3
ownership of three Bubble Lamp trademarks: two different configuration marks, which protect
the design of the lamps, and the wordmark “BUBBLE LAMP” (referred to collectively as the
“Bubble Lamp IP”).
B. 2006 Royalty Agreement
When Nelson died in 1986, any intellectual property rights that he owned passed to his
widow, Jacqueline Nelson. Jacqueline also did not register any Nelson-related or Bubble Lamp-
related trademarks. However, in 2006, Jacqueline entered into a royalty agreement with HMI,
which “supersede[d] all previous agreements” between Nelson and HMI. 2006 Royalty
Agreement, R.220-2, PageID #2111. Under the 2006 Royalty Agreement, HMI agreed to pay
“Mrs. Nelson the royalty rate . . . of 1.5% per unit sold” in exchange for certain rights to Nelson
designed furniture products. Id. at PageID #2112. The dispute in this case centers around
exactly what rights were granted to HMI in the 2006 Royalty Agreement: Plaintiffs contend that
the Agreement is merely a licensing agreement giving HMI only use rights in the IP; Defendants
contend that the Agreement actually confers ownership of the IP on HMI.
The full details of the 2006 Royalty Agreement are discussed in greater detail below, but,
in short, the Agreement establishes that HMI has rights with respect to certain products, which
the Agreement defines as “all Nelson designed products, as to which HMI owns the right to
George Nelson designs . . . .” Id. at PageID #2111. The Agreement also included an attached
exhibit, which the parties agreed “constitute[d] a list of Nelson designed products which are
owned, currently manufactured, and sold by HMI.” Id. The 2006 Royalty Agreement did not
cover the Bubble Lamp IP, but it did establish that the parties could, in the future, add additional
products to be covered by the terms of the 2006 Royalty Agreement.
C. George Nelson Foundation
In 2010, HMI leadership formed the George Nelson Foundation (“GNF”). GNF’s
purported goal was to protect and promote the legacy of George Nelson’s work, including by
protecting his IP rights. In February of 2013, Jacqueline Nelson assigned all of her George
Nelson IP rights to GNF through an Intellectual Property Assignment Agreement (“IPAA”).
Jacqueline agreed to “irrevocably” assign “all rights, title, and interest” she had “in and to all
Intellectual Property” to GNF. IPAA, R.220-4, PageID #2126. The IPAA defined “Intellectual
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 4
Property” as “all furniture designs, lamp designs, clock designs . . . (including without limitation
the . . . ‘Bubble lamp’).” Id. at #2125. In exchange for the assignment of those rights, GNF
agreed to pay Jacqueline all royalties that GNF would receive under any licensee arrangement
with a third party. Id. at #2126. The IPAA did not “supersede or contradict any licensing and/or
commercial arrangements . . . but rather . . . provide[d] a mechanism by which to protect against
infringement by others . . . .”—meaning that the 2006 Royalty Agreement remained intact.
Email, R.233-18, PageID #3299.
Plaintiffs contend that HMI formed GNF “without Jacqueline Nelson’s knowledge,
without her approval, and without authorization to use the George Nelson name.” Appellants Br.
at 9. However, the record demonstrates that Jacqueline was involved with and supportive of
GNF’s creation. In July 2010, HMI CEO Brian Walker sent an official letter to Jacqueline
seeking her support for GNF, informing her that GNF would be an “independent authority” for
continued “authentication of all Nelson designs,” that it would “help to protect the authenticity of
George’s work and guard against knock-offs,” and that it would “serve[] to optimize the revenue
potential for [the Nelson] estate by increasing sales of authorized Nelson designs.” Ltr., R.233-
18, PageID #3291. In reply, Jacqueline stated: “it is with great pleasure that I add my support to
the development of a George Nelson Foundation.” Ltr., R.233-12, PageID #3268. When the
foundation was formed, Jacqueline was named an honorary board member.
D. Modernica Lawsuit
Meanwhile, in the 1990s, a furniture company called Modernica (not a party to this suit)
began manufacturing and selling Nelson designed and branded Bubble Lamps—unbeknownst to
HMI or the Nelson family. See George Nelson Found. v. Modernica, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 3d 635,
640 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Jacqueline eventually became aware of that fact and, in 2010, alerted
relevant contacts at HMI and GNF. GNF engaged an attorney to investigate Modernica’s use of
the George Nelson IP. He discovered that, in 2010, Modernica had registered the “NELSON”
and “GEORGE NELSON” wordmarks with the USPTO. In 2011, Modernica also obtained a
trademark registration for the word mark “BUBBLE LAMPS,” and two configuration marks for
the trade dress of the Bubble Lamps.
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 5
In May 2013, GNF sued Modernica for trademark infringement in the Southern District
of New York. Complaint, The George Nelson Foundation v. Modernica, Inc., No. 13-cv-3427
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015). GNF also sought the cancellation of Modernica’s USPTO-registered
configuration marks based on fraudulent procurement. Id. at 12-13. Because HMI shared an
interest with GNF in protecting the Nelson name for its own business, HMI offered to advance
legal fees to GNF to cover the cost of its Modernica litigation. According to GNF’s attorney,
there was an “understanding . . . of what [the] achievable goals would be” through litigation:
although GNF hoped to cancel all Modernica registrations, the more realistic goal was
cancelation of registrations “in the areas outside of lighting.”1 Dorsey Dep. Tr., R.233-30,
PageID #3482, 3485.
In September 2015, GNF and Modernica settled. Modernica agreed to sell the Bubble
Lamp IP to HMI and the “NELSON” and “GEORGE NELSON” marks to GNF. The GNF board
reviewed the settlement and unanimously agreed to its terms. That same September, HMI
purchased Modernica’s entire Bubble Lamp business, including 100 percent “of the intellectual
property of [Modernica] used” in its Bubble Lamp business. Purchase Agreement, R.220-43,
PageID #2400. HMI thus came to own the registrations for the two Bubble Lamp configurations
marks and the “BUBBLE LAMP” word mark, which comprises the Bubble Lamp IP at issue in
this case.
According to Plaintiffs, “the mixed settlement structure—GNF receiving the NELSON
marks while HMI took title to [the Bubble Lamp IP]—was opaque.” Appellants Br. at 16-17.
Plaintiffs contend that they “expected GNF, as plaintiff and ostensible owner, to receive any
rights resolved in the Modernica case, including the Bubble Lamp IP, and then license that IP to
HMI.” Id. at 17. According to Plaintiffs’ theory of this case, this settlement and HMI’s
acquisition of the Bubble Lamp IP constituted one part of HMI’s surreptitious “theft of [George
Nelson’s] intellectual property.” Mico Nelson Dep. Tr., R.233-33, PageID #3502.
1
According to GNF’s attorney’s deposition testimony, GNF believed success in the lawsuit on the lamp
issue was unlikely because of the law on the issue of “abandonment” of intellectual property. Dorsey Dep. Tr.,
R.233-30, PageID #3483.
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 6
E. 2015 Addendum to 2006 Royalty Agreement
In July 2015—shortly before the Modernica settlement—Mico Nelson, the son of George
and Jacqueline Nelson who was acting under Jacqueline’s power of attorney, entered into an
addendum to the 2006 Royalty Agreement. It expanded the 2006 Royalty Agreement to add, as
new “Licensed Products,” both “Nelson branded Lamp Products” and all “Nelson branded
products not covered” by the original Agreement. 2015 Addendum, R.220-3, PageID #2120,
2122. The Addendum came after Mico, through his attorney Robert Giordanella, sent several
emails to HMI expressing the Nelson family’s eagerness to finalize an agreement with respect to
the Bubble Lamps.
The 2015 Addendum stated that “the parties acknowledge and agree that HMI shall have
the sole and exclusive right to manufacture, or have manufactured, use, and sell, and to grant
licenses to others to manufacture, have manufactured, use and sell Nelson branded lamp products
throughout the world.” 2015 Addendum, R.220-3, PageID #2121. It also noted that the
Addendum would become effective on “the date disclosed by HMI to Mrs. Nelson in writing as
the date on which HMI acquires the intellectual property rights necessary for HMI to
manufacture and sell” the Bubble Lamps. Id. at PageID #2120. HMI agreed to pay a royalty
rate of 5%—instead of the original 1.5%—to the Nelsons for the additional products, including
the lamps.
Giordanella initially expressed some hesitation about adding the Bubble Lamps to the
2006 Royalty Agreement. In an email he sent to GNF’s attorney, he noted that he was “troubled
by the fact that the Bubble Lamp and all other Nelson branded products are being added to the
existing Royalty Agreement rather than a separate agreement” because “[t]he Royalty Agreement
is not so much a license as it is a means to compensat[e] Nelson for the rights owned by HM.”
Email, R.233-42, PageID #3567. He continued: “[b]y adding the bubble lamp and other Nelson
branded products to the definition of Licensed Products, aren’t we saying that the foundation no
longer owns the rights to those items?” Id.
A few days later, Giordanella emailed Mico, explaining that “HM has worked out a deal
to purchase from Modernica the rights to the bubble lamp as well as other lighting products. In
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 7
exchange for using the ‘Nelson’ name with those lighting products, they will pay the Nelson
family a royalty of 5%. The lighting products will be added to the list of products currently
covered by the royalty agreement.” Email, R.220-21, PageID #2311. He added that “[b]ecause
it is expending . . . a significant amount of money to purchase the rights to the bubble lamp and
other lighting products from Modernica, HM will have the same broad rights with respect to the
lighting products that it has with the other products covered by the Royalty [A]greement.” Id.
Mico responded, thanking Giordanella “for the very clear email.” Email, R.220-31, PageID
#2351.
About a month later, Mico (still acting under his power of attorney on Jacqueline’s
behalf) sent a signed copy of the Addendum to Giordanella. Before Giordanella sent the signed
Addendum to HMI, he sought HMI’s confirmation that it had agreed to acquire Modernica’s
“rights in the Bubble [L]amp.” Email, R.220-22, PageID #2313. HMI confirmed that it reached
an agreement with Modernica to buy the IP rights. When Giordanella sent the final signed copy
of the 2015 Addendum to HMI, he reiterated the Nelsons’ condition: “The addendum is
submitted on the condition that HMI closes on the transaction with Modernica for the purchase
of the bubble lamp rights.” Email, R.220-23, PageID #2315. As of his deposition on August 13,
2024, Mico had never refused to accept or offered to return a royalty payment.
F. IPAA Nunc Pro Tunc
In 2017, the Plaintiffs sued GNF, GNF’s attorney for the Modernica suit, and Giordanella
in Illinois state court. Plaintiffs primarily challenged the IPAA which assigned all of Jacqueline’s
IP rights to GNF, arguing that she was incapacitated when she signed the IPAA, rendering it
invalid. They also brought malpractice claims against both attorneys, arguing that they failed to
adequately advise the Nelson family of their rights in the Nelson IP and about the Modernica
lawsuit and its consequences.
The parties settled their lawsuit in 2022, with GNF agreeing to undo the IPAA via the
execution of a Nunc Pro Tunc. This meant that GNF gave any rights it held in the Nelson IP—
including the “NELSON” and “GEORGE NELSON” trademarks—to the Nelson family. There
was no specific mention of any rights related to the Bubble Lamp IP in the agreement.
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 8
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 17, 2021, Plaintiffs—Mico Nelson, Mico’s wife Patrice, and the Estate of
George Nelson—filed this suit in the Southern District of New York. They asserted six claims
against HMI (aka MillerKnoll), GNF, and several GNF executives:2 fraud (Count I); conspiracy
to commit fraud (Count II); Unjust Enrichment (Count III); trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Count IV); common law trademark infringement and unfair
competition (V); and cancellation of the Modernica/HMI design registrations pursuant to
15 U.S.C. §§ 1119, 1052(d) (Count VI).
On April 28, 2023, the district court in the Southern District of New York granted
Defendants’ motion to transfer this suit to the Western District of Michigan based on the forum
selection clause in the IPAA. It determined that, although the IPAA had been rescinded at the
time of the filing of the motion to transfer, under both Michigan and federal law, the forum
selection clause of the IPAA constituted a severable and thus enforceable component of the
contract. After transfer, the district court in the Western District of Michigan denied Defendants’
motion to dismiss, finding that “Plaintiffs [had] stated Twombly-plausible claims and established
at least a prima facie case of standing for the trademark claims.” Ord., R.110, PageID #265.
Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all
counts. In the court’s view, “Plaintiffs’ case hinge[d] on whether HMI is unlawfully using and
possessing the Bubble Lamp IP because of fraud in procuring the Bubble Lamp IP from
Modernica, Jacqueline Nelson, or both.” Ord., R.281, PageID #5014. The court then determined
that HMI’s use of the Bubble Lamp IP was not unlawful because Plaintiffs authorized HMI’s use
and ownership of that IP in the 2015 Addendum to the 2006 Royalty Agreement and then also
ratified HMI’s conduct by accepting millions in royalty payments from HMI.
Plaintiffs appealed.
2
GNF and the GNF executives were dismissed from the suit on July 6, 2022.
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 9
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Miller v.
Admin. Off. of the Courts, 448 F.3d 887, 893 (6th Cir. 2006). A party is entitled to summary
judgment if, based on the record as a whole, there are no “genuine dispute[s] of material fact”
that could lead a factfinder to find for the moving party’s opponent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see
also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position” is
“insufficient” to defeat the moving party’s motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Ultimately, we must decide “whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52. In doing so, the evidence is
construed, and all reasonable inferences are drawn, in favor of the nonmoving party. Hawkins v.
Anheuser–Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 332 (6th Cir. 2008).
B. Analysis
The basic theory of Plaintiffs’ case is that, around 2005, HMI leadership noticed a
resurgence in the popularity of mid-century modern furniture and saw an opportunity to profit.
They thus began a protracted campaign to win control over the George Nelson IP, and in
particular the Bubble Lamp IP, an especially iconic and lucrative component of Nelson’s
catalogue. To get that IP, HMI manipulated an elderly Jacqueline Nelson into signing the 2006
Royalty Agreement, created GNF to serve “as the vehicle to strip Jacqueline of her rights” to the
Nelson IP, and then convinced Jacqueline to assign all of her IP rights to GNF via the IPAA.
Appellant Br. at 10-11. The consummation of HMI’s deception, according to Plaintiffs, occurred
at the conclusion of the Modernica lawsuit, when HMI induced the GNF board to approve a
settlement under which Modernica assigned the Bubble Lamp IP to HMI instead of to GNF.
Plaintiffs claim that, at the time of the settlement, they thought the Bubble Lamp IP had been
transferred to GNF, and learned only later that HMI was asserting ownership. Plaintiffs also
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 10
contend that the Estate of George Nelson (and thus Mico as the Estate’s sole beneficiary) is the
true common law owner of the Bubble Lamp IP.
We agree with the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to Defendants on
all counts. Plaintiffs do not argue that either the 2006 Royalty Agreement or the 2015 Addendum
is invalid, and under the terms of those Agreements, HMI is authorized to use and own the
Bubble Lamp IP. Mico also ratified HMI’s use and ownership of the IP by accepting royalty
payments from HMI under the terms of the Agreements, including after he learned that HMI was
asserting ownership of the Bubble Lamp IP. Plaintiffs may not sustain infringement or tort
claims based on conduct that they authorized and ratified. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to
summary judgment on those claims. Plaintiffs also ask us to cancel HMI’s trademark
registrations for the Bubble Lamp IP, but have presented no evidence actually supporting their
cancellation claims. Accordingly, Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on that
count.
1. Authorization
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all counts because Plaintiffs authorized
them to own the Bubble Lamp IP via the 2006 Royalty Agreement as amended by the 2015
Addendum (the “Agreements”). Plaintiffs agree that they “cannot sustain a claim against a
defendant based on conduct [they] authorized . . . .” See Op MSJ, R.229, PageID #2648.
Accordingly, this case turns largely on whether the 2006 Royalty Agreement and the 2015
Addendum authorized Defendants to use and own the Bubble Lamp IP. We hold that they do.
Because the 2006 Royalty Agreement establishes that it “shall be interpreted under the
laws of the state of Michigan,” 2006 Royalty Agreement, R.220-2, PageID #2116, we use
Michigan state law regarding contract construction to interpret the Agreements, Cincom Sys., Inc.
v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 437 (6th Cir. 2009). Under Michigan law, we must give effect to
the plain meaning of unambiguous contract terms. See Wozniak v John Hancock Mutual Life Ins.
Co, 288 Mich 612, 615 (1939). In this case, the plain terms of the 2006 Royalty Agreement and
the 2015 Addendum, together, unambiguously authorize HMI to both own and use the Bubble
Lamp IP.
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 11
The 2006 Royalty Agreement established that HMI had rights with respect to certain
Nelson-designed products. Section 3 (“Product Description”) states that the products covered by
the Agreement “include all Nelson designed products, as to which HMI owns the right to George
Nelson designs for furniture products and patterns, including the products listed in Exhibit A.”
2006 Royalty Agreement, R.220-2, PageID #2111. This phraseology is inartful, but the meaning
is clear: that HMI will pay Jacqueline royalties on products that: (1) are designed by George
Nelson; and (2) HMI owns the rights to. This means that the parties agreed that HMI owned the
rights to the products included in the Agreement. Section 3 further drives this point home by
clarifying that “Exhibit A” to the Agreement “constitutes a list of Nelson designed products
which are owned, currently manufactured, and sold by HMI.” Id. (emphasis added).
Other sections of the Agreement confirm HMI’s ownership of the product designs
covered by the Agreement. Section 10 (“Design Origination”) states that “Mrs. Nelson
covenants and warrants that no other person, firm, or corporation, other than HMI . . . has any
title or ownership interest in the Licensed Products or in any United States disclosure document,
patents, patent applications, and design registrations relating thereto.” Id. at PageID #2113
(emphasis added). Section 12 (“Product Ownership and Licensees”) even more forcefully states
that “HMI shall have the exclusive right, title, and interest to all inventions and designs subject to
this Agreement, and shall own all prototypes, models, specifications, drawings, and other
materials pertaining to any product covered by this Agreement.” Id. at PageID #2114 (emphasis
added). These sections leave little doubt that the parties agreed that HMI had the exclusive rights
to the designs covered by the 2006 Royalty Agreement.
The 2006 Royalty Agreement did not cover the Bubble Lamp designs or IP, but it did
allow that the parties could add additional, new products to the terms of the Agreement. The
2006 Royalty Agreement defined the products it covered as “Licensed Products,” and
specifically stated that “HMI agrees that in the event other Nelson designed products (to which
HMI owns the rights) are manufactured and sold by HMI, HMI shall disclose such in its
quarterly reports . . . and that such disclosure shall constitute an addition to Exhibit A.” 2006
Royalty Agreement, R.220-2, PageID #2111-12. The 2015 Addendum then added “Nelson
branded Lamp Products” as a new “Licensed Product[]” covered by the 2006 Royalty
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 12
Agreement. 2015 Addendum, R.220-3, PageID #2122. The addition of lamp products
established that HMI had the same right to the Bubble Lamps as it did to the original products in
the 2006 Royalty Agreement—an ownership right.
Plaintiffs say that the terms of the Agreements are sufficiently ambiguous to raise a jury
issue as to whether they authorized HMI to own and use the Bubble Lamp IP, but their arguments
fall flat. We will begin with what is perhaps Plaintiffs’ best argument: the fact that the
Agreements use both the language of licensing and of ownership/assignment. Plaintiffs are
correct that the Agreements refer to the lamps and other covered products as “Licensed
Products,” which on its face would suggest a license to use IP, not an ownership interest.
However, “Licensed Product” is a defined term in the contract, so we must “apply the
definition[] . . . as set forth in the contract,” and not defer to the ordinary meaning of those terms.
Henderson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 225 Mich. App. 703, 709 (1997). The 2006 Royalty
Agreement defines “Licensed Product” to mean “the products described in the Product
Description” subsection, which, as is stated above, establishes that “Licensed Products” means
products owned by HMI. 2006 Royalty Agreement, R.220-2, PageID #2111-12. So, although
odd, the contract language is clear that “Licensed Product” does not mean products licensed by
HMI, but products owned by HMI. The usage of the term “Licensed Product” thus does not
create the ambiguity that Plaintiffs contend.
Next Plaintiffs contend that the term “lamp product” is ambiguous, creating a jury issue
as to what the 2015 Addendum actually covers. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the
term “lamp product” is not actually ambiguous: it is more general than a specific reference to,
say, a “Bubble Lamp product,” but because the Bubble Lamps are a type of “lamp product[],”
that term clearly encompasses the Bubble Lamps. Second, even assuming the “lamp product”
language was ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence clearly indicates that the parties meant for the
term to cover the Bubble Lamps. Mico expressly confirmed this understanding at his deposition,
stating that he understood that the outcome of the Modernica litigation would be for HMI to
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 13
acquire “the rights to sell the bubble lamps.” Mico Nelson Dep. Tr., R.220-5, PageID #2177.3
Additionally, the 2015 Addendum was entered into on the heels of the Modernica ligation, which
concerned the Bubble Lamp products.
Plaintiffs also argue that the term “Nelson branded lamp product” creates ambiguity
between the 2015 Addendum and the 2006 Royalty Agreement because the latter only uses the
term “Nelson designed.” Their position appears to be that “Nelson designed” and “Nelson
branded” must refer to different things, creating some general ambiguity as to what products the
2015 Addendum was referring to. This argument is also unavailing. The 2006 Royalty
Agreement establishes that it covers “Nelson designed products,” and that the parties may later
add other Nelson designed products to the Agreement. This means that the products referred to
as “Nelson branded” in the 2015 Agreement merely constitute a subcategory of the wider
universe of “Nelson designed” products referred to in the 2006 Royalty Agreement, such that a
Nelson branded product is necessarily also a Nelson designed product. There is thus no question
that the terms of the 2006 Royalty Agreement that govern Nelson designed products also apply
to the Nelson branded lamp products described in the 2015 Addendum.
Further homing in on the term “Nelson branded,” Plaintiffs argue that the 2015
Addendum refers only to products bearing the “NELSON” or “GEORGE NELSON” word
marks, but does not reach the word mark “BUBBLE LAMP” or the Bubble Lamp configuration
marks. Plaintiffs’ argument fails with respect to both the configuration mark and the “BUBBLE
LAMP” word mark. The 2006 Royalty Agreement clearly states that “HMI shall have the
exclusive right, title, and interest to all inventions and designs subject to the Agreement.” 2006
Royalty Agreement, R.220-2, PageID #2114 (emphasis added). This means that HMI has the
right to the designs of the Bubble Lamps. Conferring ownership of the designs to HMI
necessarily includes ownership of the configuration registrations for the Bubble Lamps, which
protect the “nonfunctional” “shape of the product”—in other words, the design of the Bubble
Lamps. See 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 7:94 (5th ed.); see also id.
3
Although he also clarified that he understood “the rights to sell” to mean “the licensing rights, the
manufacturing rights, the rights to use the bubble lamp,” but not ownership. Mico Nelson Dep. Tr., R.220-5,
PageID #2177.
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 14
(describing the “design of a grille for a HUMMER vehicle” as an example of a product
configuration trademark). The 2015 Addendum itself also clearly understood the term “Nelson
branded lamp products” to encompass design rights. The Addendum, on its own terms, gives
HMI the “sole and exclusive right to manufacture. . . use, and sell . . . Nelson branded lamp
products throughout the world.” 2015 Addendum, R.220-3, PageID #2121 (emphasis added). It
would not be possible for HMI to manufacture and sell Bubble Lamps without having the right to
the design configurations, which encompass the visual appearance of the lamps.
The Agreements together also confer ownership of the “BUBBLE LAMP” word mark.
Plaintiffs argue that the term “Nelson branded” encompasses only the word marks “NELSON”
and “GEORGE NELSON.” Interpreting the Agreements in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
as we must at summary judgment, we conclude that there is ambiguity around the scope of the
“Nelson branded” term. However, other provisions of the Agreements are clear. When § 12 of
the 2006 Royalty Agreement confers on HMI the “exclusive right, title, and interest to all
inventions and designs subject to [the] Agreement,” it also states that HMI “shall own all . . .
other materials pertaining to any product covered by the Agreement.” 2006 Royalty Agreement,
R.220-2, PageID #2114. The “BUBBLE LAMP” word mark necessarily “pertains to” the
Bubble Lamps themselves, meaning that the Agreement also confers ownership over the word
mark. Section 11 confirms this interpretation, when it states that “HMI shall have the sole right
at its sole discretion to bring actions to enforce any proprietary rights relating to the Licensed
Products.” Id. at PageID #2114. This naturally gives HMI the right to enforce the trademark
infringement of the “BUBBLE LAMP” work mark because it is a property right relating to the
Licensed Products. Conferring on HMI the sole right to enforce proprietary rights necessarily
indicates ownership of those rights, including the “BUBBLE LAMP” word mark. Additionally,
“a trade-mark right is [not] a right in gross or at large” and “[t]here is no such thing as property
in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection
with which the mark is employed.” United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97
(1918). Considering the “appurtenant” nature of a trademark, it would make very little sense to
separate ownership of the “BUBBLE LAMP” mark from ownership of the Bubble Lamp
designs.
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 15
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Agreements cannot constitute authorization of HMI’s use
and ownership of the Bubble Lamp IP because at the time Mico signed the 2015 Addendum, he
“believed HMI was negotiating a license with Modernica,” and did not believe he was approving
ownership. MSJ, R.229, PageID #2648 (emphasis in original). This argument is plainly
foreclosed by Michigan law, which is clear that “the unilateral subjective intent of one party
cannot control the terms of a contract.” Burkhardt v. Bailey, 260 Mich. App. 636, 656 (2004).
“It is beyond doubt that the actual mental processes of the contracting parties are wholly
irrelevant to the construction of contractual terms. Rather, the law presumes that the parties
understand the import of a written contract and had the intention manifested by its terms.”
Zurcher v. Herveat, 238 Mich. App. 267, 299 (1999) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Because the “language of [the Agreements] is clear and unambiguous,” our
“interpretation is limited to the actual words used” therein, which authorize HMI’s ownership of
the Bubble Lamp IP. Burkhardt, 260 Mich. App. at 656.
In short, the Agreements unambiguously authorize HMI to manufacture and sell the
Bubble Lamps, and to own and use the Bubble Lamp IP.
a. Infringement Claims
Having determined that the Agreements authorize HMI’s use and ownership of the
Bubble Lamp IP, we proceed to consider how this impacts each of Plaintiffs’ claims, starting with
their federal and state infringement claims. We hold that authorization defeats all of Plaintiffs’
infringement claims.
Plaintiffs first allege “trademark infringement and unfair competition pursuant to the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).” SAC, R.64, PageID #687. Section 1125(a), also commonly
referred to as “Lanham Act § 43(a)” or simply “§ 43(a),” creates liability for:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association
of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 16
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person . . .
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). Federal courts understand this subsection to create a Lanham Act
cause of action for infringement of unregistered trademarks. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (“[Section] 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered
trademarks and . . . the general principles qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the
Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining whether an unregistered mark is
entitled to protection under § 43(a)”); see also ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 921
(6th Cir. 2003) (“Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides a federal cause of action for
infringement of an unregistered trademark which affords such marks essentially the same
protection as those that are registered.”); 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 27:9 (5th ed.) (describing the § 1125(a)(1)(A) prong as “infringement of even unregistered
marks, names and trade dress.”).
This Circuit does not appear to have directly addressed the issue of authorization or
consent in the context of unregistered trademark infringement actions under § 1125(a).
However, in the context of registered trademark infringement claims under Lanham Act 15
U.S.C. § 1114(1), we have clearly recognized that “[t]he Lanham Act prohibits the use of a
trademark . . .‘without the consent of the registrant.’” Libertarian Nat'l Comm., Inc. v. Saliba,
116 F.4th 530, 539 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)) (discussing trademarks in the
context of franchiser-franchisee relationship specifically). This reading makes sense,
considering that § 1114(1) explicitly states that infringement occurs when the infringer uses the
mark “without . . . consent.”
Section 1125(a) does not contain the same “without consent” language. However, other
courts to consider this issue have interpreted § 1125(a) to similarly require that plaintiffs show
lack of consent or authorization to sustain an unregistered trademark infringement action. In
Segal v. Geisha NYC LLC, for example, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that unregistered trademark
infringement requires a likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff’s mark and the allegedly
infringing mark, and that “where the trademark holder has authorized another to use its mark,
there can be no likelihood of confusion and no violation of the Lanham Act.” 517 F.3d 501, 506
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 17
(7th Cir. 2008); see also Crystal Ent. & Filmworks, Inc. v. Jurado, 643 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th
Cir. 2011) (“To establish a prima facie case under section 43(a), ‘a plaintiff must show (1) that
the plaintiff had enforceable . . . rights in the mark or name, and (2) that the defendant made
unauthorized use of it ‘such that consumers were likely to confuse the two.’” (emphasis added)
(citation omitted)).
Guided by this reasoning, we hold that authorization to use a mark defeats an
infringement claim under § 1125(a). Courts generally treat § 1125(a) and § 1114(1)(a) as parallel
statutes. The Supreme Court described in B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., for
instance, how the “Lanham Act. . . creates a federal cause of action for trademark infringement”
under which “[t]he owner of a mark, whether registered or not, can bring suit in federal court if
another is using a mark that too closely resembles the plaintiff’s.” 575 U.S. 138, 144 (2015)
(emphasis added). The Court then went on to cite § 1125(a)(1)(A) as creating the cause of action
for unregistered marks, and § 1114(1)(a) as creating the cause of action for registered marks. See
id. at 144-45. Other courts have opined that “[t]he principles of law underlying the validity and
infringement of a mark . . . are largely the same whether or not the mark has been registered.”
Appliance Liquidation Outlet, L.L.C. v. Axis Supply Corp., 105 F.4th 362, 373 n.4 (5th Cir.
2024). Because § 1125(a)(1)(A) and § 1114(1)(a) function to create corollary causes of action, to
the extent authorization defeats an infringement claim under § 1114(1)(a), it should also do so
under § 1125(a)(1)(A). It would also defy common sense to allow a plaintiff to sue a defendant
for using a trademark that the plaintiff told the defendant he could use.
Authorization also defeats Plaintiffs’ state common law infringement claims. Michigan
courts recognize a cause of action for infringement of common law trademarks. See Janet
Travis, Inc. v. Preka Holdings, L.L.C., 306 Mich. App. 266, 268 (2014). To show that a common
law trademark is being infringed, Michigan courts “require a plaintiff to show that (1) its mark
was valid . . . (2) plaintiff had priority in the mark (i.e., had used it before defendant),
(3) defendant's allegedly infringing mark was likely to confuse consumers as to the source of
defendant's products or services, and (4) defendant used the allegedly infringing mark.” Id. at
268-69. Neither party has fully briefed whether the “authorization” defense applies to state
common law trademark infringement actions, but both parties appear to accept that it does.
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 18
See, e.g., Op MSJ, R.229, PageID #2648 (“[I]t is true that a plaintiff cannot sustain a claim
against a defendant based on conduct the plaintiff authorized”). And although Michigan caselaw
does not definitively establish that authorization defeats an unregistered trademark infringement
claim, Michigan law concerning common law trademarks appear to closely mirror federal law on
the same issue. Michigan law, like federal law, requires that the holder of a common law
trademark show that there is a likelihood of confusion between his mark and the allegedly
infringing mark. See Janet Travis, 306 Mich. App. at 268. In Segal, the Seventh Circuit
determined that the authorization defense applied to unregistered trademark infringement actions
because of the likelihood of confusion element, noting that “where the trademark holder has
authorized another to use its mark, there can be no likelihood of confusion and no
[infringement].” 517 F.3d at 506. The same principle applies here, meaning that Plaintiffs’ state
common law infringement claim also fails because Plaintiffs authorized Defendants to use and
own the Bubble Lamp IP.4
b. State Law Tort Claims
Plaintiffs also allege fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and unjust enrichment under
state law. All of Plaintiffs’ tort claims center on HMI’s alleged fraudulent “theft” of IP.
Authorization also defeats Plaintiffs’ tort claims. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that
where a plaintiff consents to a defendant’s “allegedly tortious act,” claims based on those acts
“fail as a matter of law.” Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 462 Mich. 679, 686 (2000); see
also McMillian v. Nowicki, 2005 WL 658860, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2005) (“A person
who consents to another's conduct may not assert a claim in tort for that conduct's resultant
harm.”).
Although there do not appear to be authoritative Michigan cases discussing consent or
authorization specifically in the intellectual property context, the principle that consent to certain
actions via contract precludes tort liability based on those actions is well established.
4
Additionally, “[i]n our adversarial system of adjudication,” we trust the parties to “advanc[e] the facts and
argument entitling them to relief.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375-76 (2020) (citation omitted).
We, in turn, “decide only questions presented by the parties.” Id. at 376 (citation omitted). So even assuming that
authorization does not defeat a common law trademark infringement claim under Michigan law, Defendants still
prevail because Plaintiffs have presented no other arguments upon which to reverse the district court.
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 19
For example, in two cases, Michigan courts have found that, where a plaintiff signed a church’s
bylaws agreeing to acquiesce to and conform to the church’s practices, he could not sue in tort
for the same conduct he consented to in writing. See Calvary, 462 Mich. at 688; Hannewald v.
Schwertfeger, No. 295589, 2011 WL 711128, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2011). These cases
are closely analogous to the situation here, where Jacqueline’s and Mico’s assent to a contract
indicates consent to its terms.
All of Plaintiffs’ tort claims relate to HMI’s alleged “theft” and unauthorized use of the
Bubble Lamp IP, but, for all of the reasons explained above, the Agreements authorized HMI’s
use and ownership of the Bubble Lamp IP. Accordingly, we hold that Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on the state law tort claims.
2. Ratification
The district court also found, as an alternative basis for granting summary judgment to
Defendants, that Mico ratified HMI’s use and ownership of the Bubble Lamp IP by accepting
royalty payments per the terms of the Agreements. The district court was correct. “[A] party
may not avoid an agreement on grounds of fraud if, after acquiring knowledge of the fraud, he
affirms the contract by accepting a benefit under it.” Bank of the Ozarks v. Perfect Health Skin
& Body Ctr., PLLC, 835 Fed. App’x 49, 57-58 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(holding that a party “may not avail itself of the benefits of that contract, and then attempt to
escape its obligations thereunder by claiming the original contract was unenforceable”). In
Michigan, it is established that even if an individual “is induced by fraud to enter into a
contract,” if he discovers the fraud “while the contract remains wholly executory” and
“nevertheless executes it on his part, or requires performance on the part of the other party,” he
“waives the fraud and cannot subsequently maintain an action for damages therefor.” Van
Scherpe v. Ulberg, 232 Mich. 699, 701 (1925); see also Parkyn v. Ford, 206 Mich. 576, 580
(1919) (“[W]here a party with full knowledge of all the material facts, does an act which
indicates his intention to stand to the contract and waive all right of action for the fraud, he
cannot maintain an action for the original wrong practiced upon him. Where the affirmance of
the contract is equivalent to a ratification, all right of action is gone.”).
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 20
Although Mico accepted millions of dollars in royalty payments under the terms of the
Agreements, and has never declined a royalty check, Plaintiffs contend that this does not
constitute ratification because Mico did not have “an understanding of all the material facts
necessary to an intelligent assent” because he did not realize that the Agreements approved
HMI’s ownership of the Bubble Lamp IP. Hill v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 525 N.W.2d
905, 911 n.4 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994). That argument is foreclosed by the facts in the record. In
his deposition, Mico stated: “I had learned in 2017 . . . that Herman Miller had ownership of the
bubble lamp IP.” Mico Dep. Tr., R.220-5, PageID #2179. Still, he continued to accept royalties
long after 2017—this constitutes ratification.
Accordingly, Mico’s ratification of HMI’s use and ownership of the Bubble Lamp IP
provides an alternative basis for affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment on both
the infringement and state law claims.
3. Cancellation
Plaintiffs also seek to cancel what they allege were “fraudulently obtained and
maintained Modernica design registrations” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1119, 1052(d). “A request
for cancellation under § 1119 must be supported by a showing that (1) the party ‘has standing to
petition for cancellation because it is likely to be damaged,’ and (2) ‘there are valid grounds for
discontinuing registration.’” CFE Racing Prods., Inc. v. BMF Wheels, Inc., 793 F.3d 571, 593
(6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Coach House Rest. v. Coach & Six Rests., 934 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th
Cir. 1991)). As grounds for cancellation, Plaintiffs argue that Modernica committed fraud on the
USPTO to procure its registrations for the Bubble Lamp IP. According to Plaintiffs, because
Modernica’s initial registration was invalid, Modernica’s transfer of the Bubble Lamp IP rights to
HMI after the 2013 lawsuit was also invalid. The party seeking cancellation of a trademark on
the basis of fraud “must establish the following elements: 1) a false representation regarding a
material fact; 2) the registrant's knowledge or belief that the representation is false; 3) the
registrant's intent to induce reliance upon the misrepresentation; 4) actual, reasonable reliance on
the misrepresentation; and 5) damages proximately caused by that reliance.” OTR Wheel Eng'g,
Inc. v. W. Worldwide Servs., Inc., 897 F.3d 1008, 1019 (9th Cir. 2018). It must make this
showing by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 1020.
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 21
Defendants aptly point out that Plaintiffs have offered no real evidence showing that HMI
or Modernica made fraudulent statements upon which the USPTO relied in issuing and
maintaining the trademarks for the Bubble Lamp IP. Plaintiffs offer very little argumentation or
discussion as to this fraud issue in their brief on appeal, citing only a declaration signed by
Modernica President Frank Novak that they claim contains misrepresentations. On appeal,
Plaintiffs do not explain what these alleged misrepresentations were, but in their response to
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs claimed that Novak lied to the USPTO “by
implying that because Modernica used the specialized manufacturing process and equipment
required to produce the Bubble Lamps, it was the owner of the Configuration Marks” and by
claiming that “the enormous recognition and goodwill in the Bubble Lamp designs garnered for
over fifty years by George Nelson and his Estate . . . was now owned by Modernica.” MSJ,
R.41, PageID #2635, 2651-52. At summary judgment, Plaintiffs also contended that a
declaration submitted by another Modernica employee, Tim Lopez, to the USPTO contained
false statements, but they do not even cite this declaration in their opening appellate brief.
Plaintiffs have not offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Novak’s statements
were false. Plaintiffs’ trademark expert, Richard Biagi, testified that he “[thought Novak] issued
a false statement in connection with an acquired distinctiveness claim.” Biagi Dep., R.220-15,
PageID #2270. But Biagi never spoke to Novak, and he testified that his process for determining
that Novak’s statements were false was (1) reviewing the evidence in the record, (2) reviewing
Novak’s declaration, and (3) concluding that his statements were knowingly false. Id. “[E]xpert
witnesses, though qualified in one area, may not testify beyond their specific expertise,” and it is
unclear how Biagi would be qualified to offer admissible expert testimony on Novak’s state of
mind and whether he knowingly lied. Hill v. Med. Device Bus. Servs., Inc., No. 24-5797, 2025
WL 1950300, at *5 (6th Cir. July 16, 2025). Indeed, courts often look with skepticism on
“expert opinion testimony on another individual's state of mind.” Miles v. Bradley County, 2025
WL 4051563, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. June 30, 2025). And even assuming that Biagi’s testimony is
admissible, “conclusory assertions” of falsity “are not sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact
necessary for the denial of summary judgment.” Moore v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 8 F.3d
335, 343 (6th Cir. 1993). A jury would not be able to find, by clear and convincing evidence,
No. 25-1940 Nelson, et al. v. MillerKnoll, Inc. Page 22
that Novak committed knowing fraud on the USPTO based only on Biagi’s highly speculative
opinion.
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the cancellation claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Defendants.