Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No.: 2:26-cv-00956-AB-ASx Date: June 30, 2026

Title: Elisabeth Pompeo, et al. v. RATP Dev USA, LLC, et al.

Present: The Honorable ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR., United States District Judge

Evelyn Chun N/A

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):

None Appearing None Appearing

Proceedings: [In Chambers] ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR REMAND [Dkt. No. 15]

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Elisabeth Pompeo’s (“Plaintiff”)

Motion for Remand (“Motion,” Dkt. No. 15). Defendants RATP Dev USA, LLC

and RATP Dev USA, Inc. (“Defendants”) filed an opposition (“Opp’n,” Dkt. No.

16) and Plaintiff filed a reply (“Reply,” Dkt. No. 19). For the following reasons,

Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 16, 2025, Plaintiff Elisabeth Pompeo filed her Complaint in

the Santa Barbara County Superior Court on behalf of herself and others similarly

situated, alleging eleven causes of action for violation of various sections of the

Cal. Labor Code and the Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 17200. See Compl. (Dkt. No.

2-1). On January 29, 2026, Defendants RATP Dev USA, LLC and RATP Dev

USA, Inc., removed the case to this Court on two grounds: federal question

jurisdiction through complete preemption pursuant to § 301 of the Labor

Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), and diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §

1332(a)(1). See Notice of Removal (“NOR,” Dkt. No. 1) ¶ 15. Plaintiff’s Motion

for Remand argues that the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction because her

claims are not preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, and that the Court lacks diversity

jurisdiction because Defendants have not established that the amount in

controversy is not satisfied.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to federal court if the

federal court has original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). There is

a strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, so it “must be rejected if there is

any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Geographic Expeditions,

Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). Accordingly, the removing

party bears a heavy burden of establishing that removal is proper. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Not Preempted By Labor Management Relations

Act Section 301

Defendants removed this action to federal court on the ground that Plaintiff’s

claims are preempted by LMRA § 301 because she seeks to represent a putative

class that would include individuals whose employment is governed by a

collective-bargaining agreement (“CBA”) negotiated between Defendants and the

relevant unions. Plaintiff argues that her claims are not preempted because she is

not a union member, cannot access the union grievance procedures in the CBAs,

and her claims arise from California law.

Section 301 of LMRA provides that “[s]uits for violation of contracts

between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an

industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United

States having jurisdiction of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Supreme Court

has held that this provision is “a congressional mandate to the federal courts to

fashion a body of federal common law to be used to address disputes arising out of

labor contracts.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985) (Lueck)

(citing Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456-57

(1957). This federal common law, in turn, “preempts the use of state contract law

in CBA interpretation and enforcement.” Cramer v. Consol. Freightways Inc., 255

F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (Aug. 27, 2001) (en banc). “Preemption

under § 301 is not limited to ‘cases specifically alleging contract violation’ [] but

also applies ‘when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon

analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor

contract’.’” Matson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir.

2016) (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 202).

The Ninth Circuit created “a two-part test to determine whether a state law

claim is preempted under § 301.” Matson, 840 F.3d at 1132 (citing Burnside v.

Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2007)). First, a court must

first ask “whether a particular right inheres in state law or, instead, is grounded in a

CBA.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060. “If the right exists solely as a result of the

CBA, then the claim is preempted, and our analysis ends there.” Id. at 1059. “If,

however, the right exists independently of the CBA, we must still consider whether

it is nevertheless ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining

agreement.’” Id. To determine whether a state law right is “substantially

dependent” on the terms of a CBA, a court must decide whether the claim can be

resolved by “look[ing] to” rather than interpreting the CBA. Id. at 1060 (alterations

in original) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987);

Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994)). “If the latter, the claim is

preempted; if the former, it is not.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060.

1. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Not Grounded in a Collective-Bargaining

Agreement

To determine whether a right is independent of a CBA, a court must focus

on “the legal character of a claim, as ‘independent’ of rights under the collective-

bargaining agreement, . . . and not whether a grievance arising from ‘precisely the

same set of facts’ could be pursued. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123–24 (citation

omitted). “Only if the claim is ‘founded directly on rights created by [a] collective-

bargaining agreement[ ]’ does § 301 preempt it.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l

Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

Defendants argue that because Plaintiff seeks to represent a putative class

that includes members covered by at least one CBA between Defendants and the

unions, her claims are preempted by § 301. Opp’n at 9. Plaintiff responds that the

Court must determine preemption based on her claims alone because she is the

only named plaintiff in this action. Reply at 8.

“The usual rule in class actions is that to establish subject matter jurisdiction

one looks only to the named plaintiffs and their claims.” Gonzalez v. United States

Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 975 F.3d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts eleven claims for relief: (1) failure to pay

minimum wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal

periods or pay compensation thereof; (4) failure to provide rest periods or pay

compensation thereof; (5) failure to provide vacation wages; (6) failure to properly

calculate and compensate sick pay; (7) failure to provide accurate itemized wage

statements; (8) failure to reimburse for necessary business expenditures; (9) failure

to keep accurate time and wage records; (10) failure to timely pay final wages

upon separation; and (11) unfair business practices. Compl. ¶¶ 39–102. Plaintiff’s

first ten claims arise under California’s Labor Code, and the last claim arises under

California’s Unfair Competition Law. Id. at ¶¶ 12–22.

The parties agree that Plaintiff is a non-union employee and is not subject to

a CBA. Mot. at 3; NOR ¶ 12. Because Plaintiff is not in a union, there is no CBA

that confers her rights and supplants or preempts the Labor Code relative to

Plaintiff; instead, Plaintiff’s rights derive from the California labor code. But

Defendants argue that by seeking to assert claims on behalf of all non-exempt

employees, including union employees, Plaintiff attempts to “stand in their shoes

for purposes of litigating” alleged wage and California Labor Code violations.

Opp’n at 9–10. But Courts in the Ninth Circuit look only to the named plaintiffs’

claims to determine subject matter jurisdiction. Gonzalez, 975 F.3d at 810.

Therefore, the Court’s analysis is informed only by Plaintiff’s employment status

and the claims she asserts and not those of putative class members. That Plaintiff

seeks to represent a class that includes union members is not relevant.

Because Plaintiff’s claims arise from rights conferred by California state law

and not from a CBA, her claims are not preempted under the first Burnside factor.1

2. Plaintiff’s Claims Do Not Substantially Depend on the Terms of a

CBA.

“[T]o determine whether a state law right is ‘substantially dependent’ on the

terms of a CBA,’ [a court must] ask ‘whether the claim can be resolved by

‘look[ing] to’ versus interpreting the CBA.’” Matson, 840 F.3d at 1132 (quoting

Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060). “If the latter, the claim is preempted; if the former, it

1 Because Defendants’ preemption argument turns entirely on the argument that

putative class members’ claims are relevant, and because this is not the law, the

Court questions whether it needs to go any further. Nevertheless, the Court will

address the second Burnside factor.

is not.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “the

term ‘interpret’ is defined narrowly [in this context]—it means something more

than ‘consider,’ ‘refer to,’ or ‘apply.’” Matson, 840 F.3d at 1132 (citation omitted).

While the “‘look to’/‘interpret’ distinction is ‘not always clear or amenable to a

bright-line test,’” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060, “a defendant cannot, merely by

injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law

claim, transform the action into one arising under federal law.” Caterpillar Inc.,

482 U.S. at 399. A state law claim may avoid preemption when “it does not raise

questions about the scope, meaning, or application of the CBA.” Curtis v. Irwin

Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2019).

The Court need not interpret a CBA between Defendants and union

members of the putative class because the putative class members are unnamed.

See Delgado v. Lakin Tired W., LLC, No. CV 24-10602-DMG (ASX), 2025 WL

1707196, at *1–3 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2025). Plaintiff’s eleven causes of action

arise under California state law. Compl. ¶¶ 39–102. The CBAs contain provisions

addressing meal periods, premium overtime wage rates, and grievance and

arbitration procedures for resolving disputes about union employees’ wages and

working conditions. Opp’n at 16. However, Plaintiff was not a union member at

any time during her employment. Mot. at 3; NOR ¶ 12. As such, the Court need

not interpret a CBA to resolve Plaintiff’s claims. Thus, Defendants are merely

attempting to inject a federal question into plainly state law claims. See Caterpillar

Inc., 482 U.S. at 399; see also Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060.

Plaintiff’s claims are not preempted under the second Burnside factor.

Because none of Plaintiff’s claims are preempted under either Burnside

factor, this action is not preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, so such preemption

cannot provide federal question jurisdiction over this case.

B. Defendants Have Not Established that the Amount in Controversy

Exceeds $75,000 As Required to Establish Diversity Jurisdiction

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), a district court has original jurisdiction over an

action in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and which is between

citizens of different states. The parties do not dispute complete diversity, and the

Court finds that it is satisfied. See Compl. ¶ 1; see also NOR ¶¶ 26–32. However,

the amount in controversy is not satisfied.

For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the amount in controversy is the total

“amount at stake in the underlying litigation.” Theis Research, Inc. v. Brown &

Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005). “[T]his includes any result of the

litigation, excluding interests and costs, that ‘entails a payment’ by the defendant.”

Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2016).

“Among other items, the amount in controversy includes damages (compensatory,

punitive, or otherwise), the costs of complying with an injunction, and attorneys’

fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or contract.” Fritsch v. Swift

Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). “[T]he

removing defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.”

Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013)

(citation omitted).

To determine the amount in controversy, courts first look to the allegations

in the complaint. Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir.

2015). But “where it is unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court

complaint whether the requisite amount in controversy is pled[,]” courts apply a

preponderance of the evidence standard, which requires the defendant to provide

evidence showing that it is more likely than not that the $75,000.00 amount in

controversy is met. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 2007) (citing Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir.

1996)). To determine whether the removing defendant has satisfied its burden, the

court “may consider facts in the removal petition” and “summary-judgment-type

evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Singer v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Allen v.

R & H Oil & Gas. Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335–36 (5th Cir. 1995)). “[A] damages

assessment may require a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions . . . [but]

those assumptions cannot be pulled from thin air but need some reasonable ground

underlying them.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199.

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege an amount in controversy. In its Notice

of Removal, Defendants estimate that the amount put in controversy by Plaintiff’s

Complaint is $201,310.80. This calculation is based only on back pay

($66,589.80), front pay ($44,720), and attorneys fees and costs ($90,000). See

NOR ¶¶ 33–49. Defendants’ estimate is faulty and does not establish the amount in

controversy.

First, Defendants’ estimate includes two elements of damages that Plaintiff

does not seek—back pay or future pay. See Compl. Relief Requested p. 24 ¶¶ 2-19

(categories of relief requested, none of which is back pay or front pay). And

Plaintiff points out that back pay and front pay—which are typically recoverable

for wrongful termination claims—are not available for Plaintiff’s claims, which

arise under the Labor Code. Therefore, the Court ignores these amounts.

That leaves only Plaintiff’s claim for attorneys’ fees, which Defendants

estimate to be $90,000. But Defendants improperly attribute the entire $90,000

estimate of attorneys’ fees for this putative class action to Plaintiff. This is

inappropriate here because when “attorneys’ fees are not awarded solely to the

named plaintiffs in a class action [by the authorizing statute] they [ ] cannot be

allocated solely to those plaintiffs for purposes of amount in controversy.” Gibson

v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 942 (9th Cir. 2001), holding modified by Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005). This is because in this

action for violations of the Labor Code, “Defendants’ obligation to [the

employees] is not ‘as a group,’ but as ‘individuals severally.’” Urbino, 726 F.3d at

1122 (quoting Gibson, 261 F.3d at 944). The Complaint alleges that there are at

least 100 class members, see Compl. ¶ 32, so at most, $900 in fees is attributable to

Plaintiff—an amount far below the jurisdictional threshold.

Defendants’ opposition does not salvage their removal. The opposition

posits an amount in controversy of $116,467.50, consisting of $26,467.50 in

damages, and $90,000 in attorneys’ fees. But to reach $26,467.50 in damages,

Defendants abandon, without explanation, their allegations regarding front pay and

back pay and instead present entirely new calculations for other categories of

damages Plaintiff actually seeks in the Complaint (unpaid overtime, premiums for

meal and rest breaks, penalties, liquidated damages). Defendants present no

authority suggesting that it can invoke, in a brief, damages it did not raise in the

NOR. See Frederick v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 1242, 1245 (10th

Cir. 2012) (“In analyzing the propriety of removal, we have held that the burden is

on the party requesting removal to set forth, in the notice of removal itself, the

underlying facts supporting [the] assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds

[the jurisdictional minimum].”) (quotation omitted); Lowery v. Alabama Power

Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1216-17 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that the notice of removal is

the document which sets forth “the factual bases for federal jurisdiction”). Nor is it

clear that Defendants’ wholesale abandonment of the two categories of unpled and

unavailable damages that its NOR relies on, and its invocation of wholly different

categories of damages its NOR never addressed, is an “amendment” of the NOR

that may be permissible in this circuit. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Circle K Stores Inc.,

No. EDCV190469FMOSPX, 2019 WL 3026747, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2019)

(rejecting defendant’s argument that a new category of damages asserted in its

brief and never raised in the NOR was an amendment to the NOR; instead, it was

an attempt to add a new basis for removal after the thirty day removal period had

run, so the case was remanded). Here, Defendants did not even acknowledge their

maneuver, let alone justify it. The Court therefore declines to consider the new

categories of damages that Defendants invoke for the first time in their opposition.

But even if the Court did consider these new categories of damages,

Defendants still fail. This is because the new damages total only $26,467.502, and

as discussed above, at most only $900 in attorneys’ fees is attributable to Plaintiff.

Together, these amounts yield an amount in controversy of $27,367.50, far short of

the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold.

For these reasons, Defendants have not met their burden to establish that the

amount in controversy is satisfied, so they have not established diversity

jurisdiction.

Because Plaintiff’s claims are not preempted by the LMRA, and because

Defendant has not established diversity jurisdiction, the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over this case, so Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand is GRANTED.

C. The Court Awards Plaintiff Her Attorneys’ Fees

If the Court grants a motion for remand, it may order the defendant to pay

the plaintiff its “just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees,

incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “[T]he standard for

awarding fees [under § 1447(c)] should turn on the reasonableness of the removal.

Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees . . . only where

the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.

Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.”

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005).

Defendants lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removing this case.

Defendants’ preemption ground turned on the argument that LMRA preemption is

based on the putative class members’ status as union members and not solely on

the named plaintiff’s status—a proposition for which Defendants presented no

2 Plaintiff also argues that the violation rate assumptions underlying Defendants’

$26,467.50 estimate of these new damage categories are unreasonable. The Court

will not address this arguments because, even accepting Defendants’ $26,467.50

estimate, as discussed next, the amount in controversy is still not satisfied.

support and that is contrary to “[t]he usual rule in class actions [] that to establish

subject matter jurisdiction one looks only to the named plaintiffs and their claims.”

Gonzalez, 975 F.3d at 810.

Nor was it reasonable for Defendants to remove based on diversity

jurisdiction. The NOR was patently unreasonable because it relied on categories of

damages that Plaintiff does not seek and that are not even available in this wage

and hour case, and on an attorneys’ fee calculation that, contrary to binding case

law, attributed all fees to Plaintiff instead of apportioning them among the class

members. Even if it was arguably reasonable for Defendants to attempt to present,

in opposition, new calculations based on new categories of damages—and the

Court has its doubts—the new calculation also depended on attributing all

attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff—a fundamentally flawed and unreasonable position.

“Congress thought fee shifting appropriate in some cases” given that “[t]he

process of removing a case to federal court and then having it remanded back to

state court delays resolution of the case, imposes additional costs on both parties,

and wastes judicial resources.” Martin, 546 U.S. at 140. Defendants’ unreasonable

removal resulted in all of these negative consequences—delay, increased costs,

and, importantly, it wasted the Court’s already strained resources. The Court

therefore finds it appropriate to award Plaintiff her attorneys’ fees and costs.

Plaintiff seeks 14 hours at $475/hour, for a total of $6,650. This includes

four hours for drafting the reply and attending the hearing. Because the Court is

resolving this Motion without a hearing, the Court will reduce the request by 1

hour (assuming a Zoom hearing, and preparation for the same), yielding a total

award of $6,175.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for

Remand and REMANDS this action back to the Court from which Defendants

removed it.

The Court further AWARDS Plaintiff her attorneys’ fees of $6,175, to be

paid within 30 days of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.