Krantz

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 CORY JAMES WHITE, Case No.: 1:20-cv-00892-KES-CDB (PC)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER ADDRESSING PLAINTIFF’S

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

13 v. TO STAY BRIEFING

14 RON KRANTZ, et al., ORDER DENYING CONSTRUED MOTION

FOR RECUSAL AND REASSIGNMENT

15 Defendants.

(Doc. 69)

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18 Plaintiff Cory James White is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights

19 action. This action proceeds on Plaintiff’s Free Exercise Clause claims against Defendants

20 Krantz, Howard, Gonzales, and Lindsey. (See Doc. 37.)

21 I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

22 On November 3, 2025, the Court issued its Discovery and Scheduling Order. (Doc. 59.)

23 On April 15, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 66.)

24 On May 1, 2026, Defendants filed a motion to stay briefing on Plaintiff’s summary

25 judgment motion. (Doc. 67.)

26 On May 4, 2026, the Court issued its Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Stay Briefing

27 and Extend Deadlines for Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 68.)

1 Stay Briefing Deadlines.” (Doc. 69.)

2 II. DISCUSSION

3 Plaintiff’s Filing of May 26, 2026

4 Plaintiff states he makes “this limited and special appearance in opposition” to

5 Defendants’ motion “due to the continuous prejudice which does arise from the systematic

6 delays” caused by defense counsel, “especially considering they professed to want a jury trial.”

7 (Doc. 69 at 1.) Plaintiff states “[g]eneral orders of a judicial district, like a district court’s local

8 rules, may not conflict with federal law, let alone the constitution.” (Id.) Next, Plaintiff contends

9 he has been “diligently litigating these matters, but only through and by the inaction of

10 [Defendants’] counsel has this matter continued to be a burden upon the court record.” (Id. at 2.)

11 He argues prejudice is demonstrated by defense counsel’s “insistence that the Defendants bear no

12 liability,” that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals “recognized there was merit to” his claim,1 and

13 that settlement efforts were unsuccessful because defense counsel “cannot grasp the egregious

14 conscious denial of Plaintiff’s Free Exercise claims by his clients.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends

15 defense counsel is further delaying these proceedings with “stall [tactics]” resulting in prejudice.

16 (Id.)

17 Plaintiff asserts the Court should “deny the stay, and instead set a trial date.” (Doc. 69 at

18 3.) Next, Plaintiff states defense counsel “has stated he wanted a trial and has had continued the

19 matter before using discovery, while not performing any actual discoverable request” and

20 maintains summary judgment should issue for Plaintiff because there are no genuine issues of as

21 to any material fact which defense counsel “could allude to to justify a stay, and counsel should

22 had already performed his duties as to what may be discoverable from Plaintiff.” (Id.) Plaintiff

23 states the issue before the Court is “whether or not Defendants did violate Plaintiff’s Free

24 Exercise claim by denying Plaintiff Kosher meals …” and that “summary judgment should issue

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26 1 The Ninth Circuit determined Plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim was colorable and reversed the Court’s order

dismissing the claim and remanded with instructions to serve the complaint. (See Doc. 34 at 2 [Memorandum; Case

27 No. 23-15419].) In holding Plaintiff’s claim colorable or cognizable, the appellate court did not address the merits of

the claim; rather, it determined the claim was sufficiently pled to withstand screening and to proceed to further

1 for Plaintiff because there is no doubt that the foregoing did occur and by the individuals named

2 in this instant matter.” (Id.)

3 In an accompanying “Affidavit Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 144,” Plaintiff declares, in

4 relevant part, that he was preparing an opposition to Defendants’ motion to stay when he received

5 the Court’s order granting the stay “without leave of Plaintiff’s opposition[,] thus creating biases

6 and prejudices.” (Doc. 69 at 4.) Further, Plaintiff declares: “the Court through its assignment of a

7 magistrate judge, which Plaintiff did not approve to have a magistrate judge assigned to this case,

8 did abuse his discretion when he made a ruling and order without leave of the Plaintiff’s

9 opposition to the stay.” (Id.) Plaintiff declares his belief that “he cannot receive an impartial

10 proceeding from such a judge who continuously grants” Defendants’ “motions and effectively

11 preventing Plaintiff from prosecuting his claims” and he requests “the appointment of a district

12 judge and not a magistrate.” (Id.) Lastly, Plaintiff declares he “can [prove] that [Defendants’] did

13 violate his Free Exercise rights by denying him Kosher meals … and that they could have cured

14 their action on several occasions but instead doubled down on their behavior and conscious

15 denials.” (Id.)

16 Analysis re Plaintiff’s Opposition

17 Initially, the Court acknowledges that Plaintiff may oppose a defense motion pursuant to

18 the Court’s Local Rule 230(l). Nevertheless, Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

19 provides that “[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good

20 cause, extend the time … with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is

21 made, before the original time or its extension expires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A). Here, the

22 undersigned extended Defendants’ deadline to respond to Plaintiff’s pending summary judgment

23 motion, finding good cause to do so, and issued its order before the original time expired. More

24 specifically, in Defendants’ motion, defense counsel declared the requested stay would permit

25 him to complete Plaintiff’s deposition and to prepare and file a dispositive motion, and that his

26 current workload and its impending deadlines, specifically outlined therein, supported the request.

27 (Doc. 67 at 1-2, ¶ 3.) Counsel further declared he would complete Plaintiff’s deposition prior to

1 motion, that the stay should not significantly impact “the progress of this case or unfairly

2 prejudice Plaintiff” because it extends only the briefing scheduling for Plaintiff’s motion, that a

3 trial date has not yet been set, and the request was not made for the purpose of harassment, undue

4 delay, or for any other improper purpose. (Id., ¶¶ 4-7.) That amounts to good cause and therefore

5 the undersigned determined that it was not necessary to consider any opposition by Plaintiff. See,

6 e.g., Nuno v. Eslick, No. 1:21-cv-00769-KES-SAB (PC), 2026 WO 1374657, at *2 (E.D. Cal.

7 May 15, 2026) (finding good cause to grant plaintiff an extension of time to file an opposition to

8 defendants’ summary judgment motion on the same day plaintiff filed his request, citing Fed. R.

9 Civ. P. 6(b)); Uvalles v. Rueter, No. 2:23-cv-0160 DJC AC P, 2026 WL 879797, at *1 (E.D. Cal.

10 Mar. 31, 2026) (granting defendant’s motion nunc pro tunc to extend the responsive pleading

11 deadline and deeming answer timely, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), and without awaiting response

12 by plaintiff).

13 Moreover, this Court has broad discretion to manage discovery and to control the course

14 of litigation under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hunt v. County of Orange,

15 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012). Again, as indicated above and noted in the Court’s May 4

16 Order, the undersigned determined good cause existed to grant Defendants’ motion. (Doc. 68.)

17 Significantly too, the stay on briefing is limited and brief, extending Defendants’ deadline to

18 oppose Plaintiff’s pending summary judgment motion by 120 days to September 3, 2026. (Id.)

19 Further, the scheduling order provides that discovery is to be completed no later than July 3,

20 2026, and dispositive motions are to be filed by September 14, 2026 — those deadlines have not

21 yet passed. (See Doc. 59.) By granting Defendants’ requested stay on briefing pertaining to

22 Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, the Court intends to consider any summary judgment

23 motion filed by Defendants, together with Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, as the briefing

24 on both motions will be completed close in time. Hunt, 672 F.3d at 616 (the court has broad

25 discretion to manage discovery and to control the course of litigation).

26 Further, the undersigned perceives no prejudicial delay caused by defense counsel, nor is

27 there an indication that defense counsel is not participating in discovery in accordance with the

1 To the extent Plaintiff contends summary judgment should issue in his favor immediately

2 because there exist no genuine issues of material fact concerning his claims against Defendants,

3 that is a determination for this Court. Indeed, Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion will be

4 considered in due course – with the benefit of both parties having engaged in the full period

5 provided for taking discovery – as will any summary judgment motion submitted by Defendants.

6 Next, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s misunderstanding concerning the undersigned’s

7 assignment as magistrate judge. Plaintiff appears to believe that because he declined to consent to

8 the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge, that a magistrate may not be assigned to this action. Not so.

9 The Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39, governs the jurisdiction and authority

10 of federal magistrates. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. The Act provides that certain matters (for example,

11 non-dispositive pretrial matters) may be referred to a magistrate judge for decision, while certain

12 other matters (such as case-dispositive motions, petitions for writs of habeas corpus) may be

13 referred only for evidentiary hearing, proposed findings, and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. §

14 636(b)(1)(A), (B). The Act also provides that a magistrate judge may be “assigned such

15 additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 28

16 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). “Congress intended magistrates to play an integral and important role in the

17 federal judicial system.” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991). When a party declines

18 magistrate judge jurisdiction, that “decision entitles him to have all dispositive matters in the case

19 resolved by the assigned district judge. It does not, as he seems to believe, entitle him to have all

20 non-dispositive matters handled by the district judge.” Kokolios v. Diaz, No. 2:20-cv-0933-KJM-

21 EFB P, 20202 WL 3640244, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2020) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Bolin v.

22 Brown, No. 1:12-cv-00077-LJO-GSA-PC, 2012 WL 639464, at * 1-2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012)

23 (denying reconsideration and holding, “To the extent that the basis for Plaintiff’s objection is his

24 decision to decline Magistrate Judge jurisdiction, Plaintiff misunderstands the effect of

25 consenting to or declining Magistrate Judge jurisdiction”). Stated another way, although Plaintiff

26 filed a declination of magistrate judge jurisdiction in this action (see Doc. 7), the undersigned

27 may properly issue findings and recommendations on dispositive matters (e.g., summary

1 concerning pretrial motion deadlines, discovery motions, motions seeking the appointment of

2 counsel). See 28 U.S.C. § 636; Local Rules 302, 304.

3 Given the above, Plaintiff’s request for “the appointment of a district judge and not a

4 magistrate” is improper because District Judge Kirk E. Sherriff already is assigned to this matter

5 and the undersigned remains properly assigned as magistrate judge. The undersigned will issue

6 findings and recommendations on any pending summary judgment motion (including addressing

7 the merits of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants) in this action following completed briefing

8 and in due course. Thereafter, District Judge Sherriff will consider the findings and

9 recommendations de novo, including any objections submitted, before issuing an order either

10 adopting or declining to adopt those findings. See Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1297

11 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (“The Court is not bound to adopt the magistrate judge’s findings and

12 recommendations; on the contrary, the court must exercise sound judicial discretion in making its

13 own determination on the record. The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

14 magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations” [citations omitted]); Webb v. Califano, 468

15 F.Supp 825, 828 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (a district court is under a mandatory obligation to make a de

16 novo review of a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations when timely

17 objection is made thereto; even when no objections at all are filed).

18 To the extent Plaintiff requests the Court set a trial date in this matter, his request is

19 denied as premature. Discovery has not yet been completed; the deadline for completing

20 discovery is July 3, 2026. Further, a trial will be scheduled, if warranted, only after Judge Sherriff

21 has issued an order addressing any summary judgment motions.

22 Analysis re Plaintiff’s Construed Motion for Recusal and Reassignment

23 The Court construes Plaintiff’s accompanying “Affidavit Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 144”

24 to be a motion for recusal and reassignment.

25 A party may seek recusal of a judge based on bias or prejudice:

26 Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and

files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the

27 matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him

or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further

1 therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.

[¶] The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief

2 that bias or prejudice exists ....

3 28 U.S.C. § 144.

4 A motion under section 144 is initially addressed to the judge whose impartiality is being

5 questioned. Brew v. Fehderau, No. 1:17-cv-00681-AWI-EPG-PC, 2017 WL 4539265, at *2 (E.D.

6 Cal. Oct. 11, 2017) (citing United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1978)). “Section

7 144 expressly conditions relief upon the filing of a timely and legally sufficient affidavit.” Id.

8 (quoting United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980)). “Only after the legal

9 sufficiency of the affidavit is determined does it become the duty of the judge to ‘proceed no

10 further’ in the case” and another judge is assigned to hear the proceeding. Id. (quoting Azhocar,

11 581 F.2d at 738). An affidavit is sufficient where it “specifically alleges facts that fairly support

12 the contention that the judge exhibits bias or prejudice directed toward a party that stems from an

13 extrajudicial source.” Id. (quoting Sibla, 624 F.2d at 868).

14 Nevertheless, “[t]he test for personal bias or prejudice in section 144 is identical to that in

15 [28 U.S.C.] section 455(b)(1).” Id. (quoting Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867). In either case, the substantive

16 standard is “[w]hether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that

17 the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Id. (quoting United States v.

18 Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997)). The bias must arise from an extrajudicial

19 source and cannot be based solely on information gained in the course of the proceedings. Id.

20 (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554-56 (1994)). “Judicial rulings alone almost never

21 constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Id. “In and of themselves ... they cannot

22 possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circumstances

23 evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required ... when no extrajudicial source is

24 involved.” Id. “To provide grounds for recusal, prejudice must result from an extrajudicial source.

25 A judge’s previous adverse ruling alone is not sufficient bias.” Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605,

26 607 (9th Cir. 1984).

27 Plaintiff has failed to offer a sufficient affidavit specifically alleging facts to support the

contention that the undersigned exhibits bias or prejudice towards him or his case. Brew, 2017

1 | WL 4539265, at *2. Plaintiff has not supported his motion with any evidence that the undersigned

2 | has a personal bias against Plaintiff from an extrajudicial source. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554-56;

3 | Hernandez, 109 F.3d at 1453. Plaintiffs disagreement with the Court’s ruling on Defendants’

4 || request to extend the deadline for opposing Plaintiff's summary judgment motion (Doc. 68),

5 | denial of Plaintiff's motion to compel as premature (Doc. 65), or its ruling granting Defendants an

6 || extension of time within which to respond to Plaintiff's written discovery requests (Doc. 63) are

7 | not legitimate grounds for seeking disqualification of a judge. Hernandez, 109 F.3d at 1453;

8 | Mayes, 729 F.2d at 607. In sum, the undersigned declines to recuse himself because there has

9 | been no showing of personal bias or prejudice.

10 Il. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

11 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that:

12 1. Plaintiff's opposition filed May 26, 2026, and related requests made therein, is

13 RESOLVED. The undersigned will issue findings and recommendations on any

14 summary judgment motion filed in this action following completed briefing and in due

15 course; and

16 2. Plaintiffs construed motion for recusal and reassignment is DENIED.

17 | ITIS SO ORDERED.

'S | Dated: _ May 28, 2026 | Wr bY

19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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