The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘Oo’
Case No. = 2:26-cv-00519-CAS-MBKx Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
Present: The Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
Catherine Jeang Maria Bustillos N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
Christopher DeVivo Sherief Morsy
Theodore Maya Justin Holmes
Proceedings: ZOOM HEARING RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
(Dkt. 32, filed on April 6, 2026)
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 16, 2026, plaintiffs Andrew Cheung and Nina Harris (“plaintiffs”),
individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed a class action complaint
against defendant Slickdeals, LLC (“defendant” or “Slickdeals”). Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”).
Plaintiffs assert six claims for relief: (1) violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act
(“VPPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2710, et seq.: (2) violation of the Federal Wiretap Act as
amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §
2510, et seg.; (3) violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. Penal
Code § 631; (4) violation of CIPA, Cal. Penal Code § 638.51; (5) violation of the
California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.:
and (6) unjust enrichment. Id. 9 155-228.
On April 6, 2026, defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss for lack of standing
and failure to state a claim. Dkt. 32 (“Mot.”). On May 4, 2026, plaintiff filed an
opposition. Dkt. 33 (‘Opp.”). On May 18, 2026, defendant filed a reply. Dkt. 34
On June 29, 2026, the Court held a hearing. Having carefully considered the
parties’ arguments and submissions, the Court finds and concludes as follows.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘Oo’
Case No. = 2:26-cv-00519-CAS-MBKx Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
Il. BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
Plaintiffs allege that defendant is a Delaware limited liability company
headquartered in Las Vegas, Nevada. Compl. 418. Plaintiffs allege that defendant owns
and operates a website located at https://www.slickdeals.net and
https://www.slickdeals.com (collectively, the “Website”), which is a popular deal-
aggregation and consumer-discovery platform that allows users to browse, search for, and
engage with curated and user-submitted deals, discounts, and promotions across a wide
range of products and services. Id. Plaintiffs further allege that defendant generates
revenue by monetizing user engagement on the Website through advertising, affiliate
marketing, analytics, and related data-driven technologies. Id. Plaintiffs allege that in
connection with these activities, defendant deploys and permits third-party tracking
technologies (the “Tracking Tools’) that collect, intercept, and transmit users’ browsing
activity, interactions, and device identifiers to advertising and analytics partners (the
“Tracking Entities”). Id.
Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Nina Harris (“plaintiff Harris”) is a California
resident who accessed and used the Website to browse deal listings, promotional offers,
and related consumer content from California. Compl. § 16.
Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Andrew Cheung (“plaintiff Cheung”) is a
Washington resident who accessed and used the Website to browse deal listings,
promotional offers, and related consumer content from Washington state. Id. § 17.
B. Defendant’s Use of Tracking Tools
Plaintiffs allege that defendant operates the Website and installed the Tracking
Tools on it. Id. § 39. Plaintiffs allege that these Tracking Tools operate invisibly,
tracking the Website’s visitors’ activity surreptitiously. Id. Plaintiffs allege that upon a
user’s initial visit to the Website, defendant immediately begins placing and transmitting
third-party tracking technologies before users receive any meaningful notice or
opportunity to control the interception or dissemination of their data. Id. § 3.
Plaintiffs allege that defendant transmits users’ electronic communications and
online activity to the Tracking Entities, including Meta (also referred to as Facebook),
Google, and Reddit, through the Tracking Tools. Id. 43. Plaintiffs allege that the
Tracking Tools enable the Tracking Entities to monitor users’ activity, including
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘Oo’
Case No. = 2:26-cv-00519-CAS-MBKx Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
webpage browsing activity, views of specific products, and initiation of checkout to
purchase products, across the Website in real time and the Tracking Tools associate
users’ site activity with persistent identifiers. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that the Tracking Tools collect information about users’ site
activity when events specified by defendant—like searching for a product or checking out
to purchase a product—are triggered. Id. Plaintiffs allege that parameters set by
defendant determine just how much data is collected, and how specific that data is. Id. J
41. Plaintiffs allege that the Tracking Tools capture detailed interaction and behavioral
data, including links, buttons, forms, and other on-page elements interacted with by users,
as well as information entered into search fields. Id. ] 4. Plaintiffs allege that the data
also includes routing and addressing information, including location information, IP
addresses, and persistent identifiers used to identify the source of communications and
the destination for the data. Id. Plaintiffs allege that the Tracking Tools also capture and
transmit device and technical identifiers such as device type, operating system, browser
type, user identifiers that enable recognition across sessions and websites, and
approximate geolocation data. Id. Plaintiffs allege the Tracking Entities use this data to
infer users’ interests, preferences, age, or other characteristics based on the users’
behavior on the Website. Id. Plaintiffs collectively refer to this information in the
complaint as “Sensitive Information.” Id.
Plaintiffs allege that the network requests intercepted by the Tracking Entities
include request URLs that include the names of the products users browse and/or
purchase. Id. § 111. Plaintiffs allege that defendant’s use of the Tracking Tools enabled
the Tracking Entities to intercept Request URLs that specify the content users accessed
on webpages on the Website. Id. § 115.
Plaintiffs allege that defendant did not obtain plaintiffs’ express or implied consent
to be subjected to data sharing with the Tracking Tools for the purposes of fingerprinting
and de-anonymization. Id. ¥ 104. Plaintiffs allege that defendant did not obtain
plaintiffs’ or Class Members’ express or implied consent to be subjected to data sharing
with the Tracking Entities for the purposes of fingerprinting and de-anonymization, nor
did defendant obtain a court order. Id. 4 106. Plaintiffs allege that defendant does not
provide a “distinct and separate” form for users to provide “informed, written consent.”
Id. § 134. Plaintiffs also allege that no court order to install a trap and trace device via
the Tracking Tools was obtained by defendant. Id. 4 105.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. = 2:26-cv-00519-CAS-MBKx Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
Plaintiffs allege that defendant’s privacy policy tells users that it may engage with
data providers who collect information from users and target them with ads through the
use of opt out form. Id. § 124. Plaintiffs allege that the privacy policy goes on to falsely
assure users that these cookies “contain no personally identifiable information.” Id.
Plaintiffs additionally allege that defendant’s privacy policy fails to disclose the use of
several Facebook tracking cookies that allow Facebook to link users to their collected
data, including the c user cookie, the datr cookie, and the fr cookie. Id. 125.
Plaintiffs allege that defendant features both movies and video games in its
“Featured Deal Categories” section, curating and providing access to them for
consumers. Id. 126. Plaintiffs allege that defendant earns a commission from every
sale resulting from consumers clicking on links on the Website to purchase items,
including video content. Id. | 127. Plaintiffs allege that defendant actively solicits deals
and sales from partners. Id. 128. Plaintiffs allege that partners, including those selling
video content, can pay defendant to submit their deals to the Website, gain feedback on
those deals, including setting pricing, and have those deals advertised on the frontpage of
the Website to increase sales. Id. Plaintiffs allege that defendant posts many deals on the
Website, including those for prerecorded audio-visual materials. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that defendant solicits individuals to subscribe to the Website, and
defendant sends subscribers emails advertising deals, including those for prerecorded
audio-visual materials. Id. { 129. Plaintiffs allege that defendant, through the Website,
engages in the business of providing prerecorded audio-visual materials to subscribers,
including plaintiffs and the other Class Members, and other users. Id. § 130. Plaintiffs
allege that the Website provides offers of videos and video games for purchase to
subscribers, including to plaintiffs and the other Class Members, by advertising
discounted videos and video games on the Website and directing users to purchase video
materials through partnered retailers. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that defendant and the Tracking Entities benefitted from the
interception of plaintiffs’ communications by reading and subsequently using the
intercepted communications to build detailed profiles based on plaintiffs’ browsing
habits, and using that profile to target plaintiffs with advertising. Id. 4118. Plaintiffs
allege that the Tracking Entities independently benefit from the interception of plaintiffs’
communications by using data collected by the Tracking Tools to improve their own
products and advertising services, and marketing those advertising capabilities to other
potential businesses seeking to market to users, including plaintiffs. Id. 4 119.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
1. The Facebook Pixel
Plaintiffs allege that Facebook offers its own tracking pixel (the “Facebook Pixel”)
to website owners for the purpose of monitoring user interactions on their websites,
which can then be shared with Facebook. Id. 45. Plaintiffs allege that with respect to
the Facebook Pixel, defendants added a parameter to track events being triggered, among
other parameters. Id. { 43. Plaintiffs allege that receiving this information enables
Facebook and defendant to build valuable personal profiles for website users to inform its
targeted advertising campaigns, enhancing marketing effectiveness and increasing the
chance of converting users into paying customers. Id. 51. Plaintiffs allege that the
harvested data improves defendant’s advertising by pinpointing audience demographics
by interests, gender, or location and finding the people who are most likely to take action
and view content. Id. 752. Plaintiffs allege that the Facebook Pixel tracks user-activity
on web pages by monitoring events, which when triggered, causes the Pixel to
automatically send users’ sensitive information directly to Facebook. Id. 457. Plaintiffs
allege that the Website tracks user-activity events including: (1) a user loading a page
with a Pixel installed (the “PageView event”): (11) when a user views pre-designated
content, like products for sale (the “ViewContent” event): (111) when a user clicks a pre-
designated button (the “SubscribedButtonClick” event): and, (iv) the “InitiateCheckout”
event (collectively with PageView event, ViewContent event, and SubscribedButtonClick
event, the “Pixel Events”). Id. Plaintiffs allege that defendant’s use of the Facebook
Pixel on the website follows a user’s journey to purchasing a product. Id. § 61.
Plaintiffs allege that to make use of the Facebook Pixel, defendant agreed to
Facebook’s Business Tool Terms (the “Facebook Terms”). Id. § 63. Plaintiffs allege that
Facebook directs parties implementing the Facebook Pixel—here, defendant—to encrypt
request information before data can be shared. Id. 66. Plaintiffs allege that Facebook
further provides Facebook Pixel users, such as defendant, guidance on responsible data
handling, and details how data is acquired, used, and stored, including which information
is shared with Facebook. 67. Plaintiffs allege that as a sophisticated party entering
into a business arrangement with another sophisticated party, defendant was on notice of
the potential privacy violations that would result from use of the Facebook Pixel, and
ignored Facebook’s warnings to safely handle its users’ data and to warn its users that the
Website would disclose information in a manner that threatened users’ private
information. Id. § 69.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
2. The Reddit Pixel
Plaintiffs allege that defendant installed a tracking pixel on its Website created by
social media platform, Reddit (the “Reddit Pixel”). Compl. § 70. Plaintiffs allege that in
defendant’s use of the Reddit Pixel, defendant configured the Reddit Pixel to include a
parameter called “id” which identifies defendant’s Reddit Pixel ID as
“a2 hy8hf63ygflx”. Id. 474. This data is sent both when receiving communications
from the Website and as users send communications to the Website. Id. Plaintiffs allege
that Reddit uses this data to help advertisers, including defendant, gauge the effectiveness
of their ad campaigns, improve their ability to attribute activity to specific ad campaigns,
track visitors across devices, and help them create more precisely targeted ad campaigns.
Id. § 75. Plaintiffs allege that defendant’s use of the Reddit Pixel on the Website follow a
user’s journey to searching for and purchasing a product on the Website. Id. § 77.
Plaintiffs allege that to utilize the Reddit Pixel, defendant agreed to Reddit’s
Business Tool Terms (the “Reddit Terms”). Id. | 78. Plaintiffs allege that the Reddit
Terms informs website owners, such as defendant, that the employment of the Reddit
Pixel will result in data sharing, including with Reddit, of users’ website actions, email
addresses, cookie IDs, and device IDs, among other “matching parameters.”’ Id. {| 79.
Plaintiffs allege that the Reddit Terms make clear that the onus is on defendant to provide
all necessary transparency notices, and obtain all necessary rights, permissions, and
lawful bases, including consent, to share information with TikTok. Id. 4 80. Plaintiffs
allege that as a sophisticated party entering into a business arrangement with another
sophisticated party, defendant was on notice of the potential privacy violations that would
result from use of the Reddit Pixel, and ignored Reddit’s warnings to safely handle its
users’ data and to warn its users that the Website would disclose information in a manner
that threatened users’ private information. Id. § 82.
3. Google Ads and Analytics
Plaintiffs allege that Google Ads is an advertising platform developed by Google
that allows advertisers to bid to display advertisements, service offerings, product
listings, or videos to web users. Compl. 4 84. Plaintiffs allege that Google AdSense
works in conjunction with the Google Ads bidding system and allows website owners to
display Google Ads on their websites and earn a revenue share when ads are viewed or
clicked. Id. { 84. Plaintiffs allege that the search terms bid on through Google Ads are
used by website owners participating in Google AdSense, allowing those owners to share
in advertising revenue generated by Google. Id. Plaintiffs allege that Google Ads
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. = 2:26-cv-00519-CAS-MBKx Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
intercepted plaintiffs’ search terms on the Google search engine and that Google profits
from the Website’s use of the Google search engine. Id. § 88.
Plaintiffs also allege that like the Facebook Pixel, Google Analytics (“GA”)
collects data about user interactions with a website, including link clicks, button clicks,
form submissions, conversions, shopping cart abandonment, items added to or removed
from carts, file downloads, scrolling behavior, video views, call to action performance,
table of contents clicks, and other customizable events. Id. § 93. Plaintiffs allege that
Google acknowledges the legal implications of those practices and assigns responsibility
for user disclosure to website developers, including defendant. Id. 495. Plaintiffs allege
that defendant’s Google Tag ID 1s included in transmissions sent to and from users’
devices. Id. 97. Plaintiffs allege that defendant added GA to the Website, which
caused plaintiffs’ search terms to be intercepted and transmitted to Google. Id. § 98.
Plaintiffs allege that Google products then analyze that information and provide feedback
that allows defendant to monetize the collected data through targeted advertising. Id. §
99.
C. Plaintiff Harris
Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Harris makes purchases through the Website on a
monthly basis, at a minimum. Id. § 5. Plaintiffs allege that through defendant’s
placement of Tracking Tools on the Website, plaintiff Harris’s personal information,
including browsing activity, page interactions, purchase activity, and device identifiers,
was intercepted and transmitted as soon as plaintiff Harris visited the Website. Id. § 16.
Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Harris did not authorize defendant or any Tracking Entity to
monitor, record, or disclose her website communications. Id. 4 5.
Plaintiffs allege that on one or more occasions, as recently as January 6, 2026,
plaintiff Harris’s information was intercepted by and sent to the Tracking Entities. Id. J
16. Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Harris began receiving targeted or unsolicited
advertisements related to the content and products she viewed on the Website. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Harris would not have accessed or used the Website had she
known that her information would be intercepted and disclosed without her knowledge.
Id.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
D. ‘Plaintiff Cheung
Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Cheung visits the Website nearly daily. Id. 4 6.
Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Cheung has an account on the Website. Id. 4/17. Plaintiffs
allege that plaintiff Cheung uses the Website to, among other things, browse deal listings,
accept offers for discounted goods, and similar consumer activities. Id. 76. Plaintiffs
allege that plaintiff Cheung makes purchases through the Website several times a year, at
a minimum, including of pre-recorded video materials such as video games. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that through defendant’s placement of the Tracking Tools on the
Website, plaintiff Cheung’s personal information, including browsing activity, page
interactions, purchase activity and device identifiers, was intercepted and transmitted as
soon as plaintiff Cheung visited the Website. Id. § 17. Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff
Cheung did not authorize defendant or any Tracking Entity to monitor, record, or disclose
his website communications. Id. § 6.
Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Cheung purchased four video games, including
“Warhammer 40,000: Space Marine 2” on November 26, 2025; “Helldivers IT” on
November 24, 2025; “Split Fiction” on March 10, 2025, and “Elden Ring” on November
21, 2024, by navigating to the webpage for each game on the Website and clicking
through links on the Website to purchase each game. Id. □□ 17, 131. Plaintiffs allege that
all four of these video games contain video cutscenes, which are pre-recorded audio-
visual animations that provide narratives for the video game story. Id. Plaintiffs allege
that plaintiff Cheung’s sensitive information, including audio-visual material and
personally identifiable information, was intercepted by and sent to Tracking Entities. Id.
417. Plaintiffs allege that when consumers engage with defendant’s offers on the
Website, the Tracking Entities discover the identities of consumers through the Tracking
Tools, via identifiers transmitted to the Tracking Entities along with information
identifying the purchased video material. Id. 4 133. Plaintiffs allege that the Tracking
Tools informed the Tracking Entities, including Facebook, each time plaintiff Cheung
purchased these video games, along with his personally identifying information. Id. □ 17.
Plaintiffs allege that plaintiff Cheung began receiving targeted or unsolicited
advertisements related to the content and products viewed on the Website. Id. Plaintiffs
allege that plaintiff Cheung would not have accessed or used the Website had he known
that his sensitive information would be intercepted and disclosed without his knowledge.
Id.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss an action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) raises the
objection that the federal court has no subject matter jurisdiction over the action. This
defect may exist despite the formal sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. T.B.
Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 226 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
1964). When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenging the substance of
jurisdictional allegations, the Court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may
review any evidence, such as declarations and testimony, to resolve any factual disputes
concerning the existence of jurisdiction. See McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558,
560 (9th Cir. 1988).
Once a Rule 12(b)(1) motion has been raised, the burden is on the party asserting
jurisdiction. Sopcak v. N. Mountain Helicopter Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 818 (9th Cir. 1995):
Ass’n of Am. Med. Coll. v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2000). If
jurisdiction is based on a federal question, the pleader must show that he has alleged a
claim under federal law and that the claim is not frivolous. See 5B Charles A. Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1350, pp. 211, 231 (3d ed. 2004).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
A motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. Under this Rule, a district court
properly dismisses a claim if “there is a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence
of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Conservation Force v.
Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,
901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his “entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[F]lactual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In considering a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all
material allegations in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn
from them. Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). The complaint must be
read in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sprewell v. Golden State
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. = 2:26-cv-00519-CAS-MBKx Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “a court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see Moss v. United States
Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[F]or a complaint to survive a motion
to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that
content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to
relief.”). Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Unless a court converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary
judgment, a court cannot consider material outside of the complaint (e.g., facts presented
in briefs, affidavits, or discovery materials). In re American Cont’l Corp./Lincoln Sav. &
Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 1537 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds sub nom
Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). A court
may, however, consider exhibits submitted with or alleged in the complaint and matters
that may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Inre Silicon
Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 1999); see Lee v. City of Los
Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001).
As a general rule, leave to amend a complaint which has been dismissed should be
freely granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend may be denied when “the
court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading
could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture
Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed because plaintiffs’
allegations fail to establish Article [II standing and fail to state a claim. Mot. at 2.
A. Standing
To establish Article III standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) that he suffered an
injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury
was likely caused by the defendant; and (111) that the injury would likely be redressed by
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992)).
Here, defendant focuses on the injury requirement. Mot. at 3. Defendant argues
that plaintiffs have not identified any concrete, particularized harm sufficient to confer
standing. Id. Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations that they suffered
an “invasion of privacy” are insufficient, and that plaintiffs admit to voluntarily
interacting with the Website and providing it their IP addresses. Id. at 5. Defendant
argues that plaintiffs do not allege any specific example of how the Website’s purported
use of tracking pixels has harmed them in any way. Id. Defendant argues that an
invasion of privacy claim related only to an IP address is insufficient to confer standing.
Id. Defendant also argues that plaintiffs’ damages allegations are not traceable to their
use of the Website, as the Website directs users to external links to complete purchases.
Id. Defendant argues that plaintiff Harris does not specify when, what, and how she input
her sensitive information into the Website, making it impossible to trace her interactions
with the Website to any damages she suffered. Id. at 5-6. Defendant argues that
although plaintiff Cheung provides details about items purchased through links on the
Website, he does not disclose which external websites he completed the purchases on,
nor does he allege to have received advertisements relevant to those purchases. Id. at 6.
Defendant concludes that plaintiffs’ complaint is nothing more than vague allegations
failing to allege any actual injury-in-fact. Id.
In opposition, plaintiffs argue that courts in the Central District of California have
held that a plaintiff establishes Article III standing where a defendant deprives them of
control over their personal information and online activity through the use of tracking
tools without their consent. Opp. at 3 (citing cases). Plaintiffs argue that their allegations
align with these authorities because, here, plaintiffs allege that defendant procured the
Tracking Entities and their Tracking Tools to place tracking and identifying cookies on
plaintiffs’ devices, and those tracking cookies then shared plaintiffs’ private information,
including browsing activity, the titles of video games purchased, as well as other items
purchased through Slickdeals. Id. at 4 (citing Compl.). Plaintiffs argue that they further
allege that defendant and the Tracking Entities then used the insights derived from
plaintiffs’ personal information for marketing and targeted advertising purposes,
enhancing their bottom line. Id. (citing Compl.). Plaintiffs argue that the traditionally
actionable common law harm that their claims are analogous to is the unauthorized
disclosure of plaintiffs’ private information without consent, which also violates the
VPPA. Id. at 5. Plaintiffs argue that the private information disclosed extended well
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
beyond mere IP addresses and was personally identifiable. Id. Plaintiffs next argue that
defendant’s traceability argument is a red herring and unsupported by any relevant
authority. Id. Plaintiffs argue that their damages are traceable to their use of the Website
because the damages stem from the Tracking Tools procured and installed on the
Website, permitting the Tracking Tools and Tracking Entities to intercept and disclose
plaintiffs’ private information. Id. Plaintiffs argue that these damages are distinct from
any subsequent browsing by plaintiffs on third-party websites, which may be separately
liable for similar violations. Id.
In reply, defendant argues that plaintiffs fail to specify the specific sensitive
personal information that was purportedly collected by defendant, and instead plaintiffs
merely conclude, without support or specificity, that personally identifying or private
information was disclosed. Reply at 2. Defendant argues that plaintiffs fail to allege the
disclosure of sensitive personal information, alleging only the tracking of “browsing
activity, the titles of video games purchased, as well as other items purchased through
Slickdeals.” Id. (citing Opp. at 4). As to “browsing activity,” defendant argues that it is
unclear what plaintiffs are referencing, and such a blanket and speculative assertion is
insufficient to confer standing. Id. (citing cases). Defendant argues that for claims like
this to survive the pleading, there must be something more than the alleged disclosure of
innocuous information. Id. at 3. Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ allegations are
distinguishable from authorities that plaintiffs cited where it was alleged that tracking
was used to create a “cradle-to-grave profile” that included, for example, the user’s
“employment history and religious affiliations.” Id. (quoting In re Facebook Inc. Internet
Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 599 (9th Cir. 2020). Defendants also argue that to the
extent plaintiffs assert that a violation of the VPPA alone entails Article III standing, such
reasoning is flawed in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 594 U.S. at 430-31, requiring courts to assess whether plaintiffs have identified
a close historical or common law analogue for their asserted injury. Reply at 3 n.1.
The Court finds that plaintiff Harris lacks Article III standing to sue for each of her
two statutory claims and her UCL claim. Assuming arguendo, that plaintiff has alleged
facts that state claims for violations of Cal. Penal Code § 631 and §638.51, those
statutory violations alone would not be sufficient to establish Article III standing. See
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 427 (2021) (“Only those plaintiffs who have
been concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation may sue that private
defendant over that violation in federal court.”): Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330,
341 (2016) (“Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
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Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
statutory violation.”). In considering a plaintiffs standing to sue for statutory violations,
courts must “assess whether an individual plaintiff has suffered a harm that has
traditionally been actionable in our nation’s legal system.” Popa v. Microsoft Corp., 153
F.4th 784, 791 (9th Cir. 2025). “That inquiry asks whether plaintiffs have identified a
close historical or common-law analogue for their asserted injury.” TransUnion, 594
US. at 414.
Here, plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that defendant’s violation of CIPA “constitutes
an invasion of privacy” and “intrusion upon seclusion.” See Compl. 4 3, 7, 202.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit recognizes that “[v]iolations of the right to privacy have long
been actionable at common law.” Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 983 (9th
Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court also recognizes that intangible harms, such as intrusion
upon seclusion, can be concrete. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425 (citing Gadelhak v. AT&T
Services, Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 462 (7th Cir. 2020)). But a conclusory allegation that
defendant intruded upon plaintiffs seclusion is not enough to establish standing.
Plaintiff must adequately allege that she suffered injury that is analogous to the common
law tort of intrusion upon seclusion, 1.e., “an intentional interference with [her] interest
in solitude or seclusion, either as to [her] person or as to [her] private affairs or concerns,
of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable [person].” Nayab v. Cap. One
Bank (USA), N.A., 942 F.3d 480, 491 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652B cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1977)).
Here, plaintiff Harris alleges that she visited the Website frequently, including as
recently as January 6, 2026, and that she “used the Website to, among other things,
browse deal listings, accept offers for discounted goods, and similar consumer activities.”
Compl. § 5. Plaintiff Harris further alleges that “[d]uring those visits,” her “browsing
activity and interactions” with the Website “were intercepted by and transmitted to the
Tracking Entities without her knowledge or consent.” Id. The complaint explains that
the Tracking Entities and Tracking Tools capture “links, buttons, forms, and other on-
page elements interacted with by users, as well as information entered into search fields,”
and the collected data “also includes routing and addressing information, including
location information, IP addresses, and persistent identifiers used to identify the source of
communications and the destination for the data,” as well as “device and technical
identifiers such as device type, operating system, browser type, user identifiers that
enable recognition across sessions and websites, and approximate geolocation data.” Id.
The complaint further alleges that the “Tracking Entities use this data to infer users’
interests, preferences, age, or other characteristics based on the users’ behaviour [sic] on
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Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
the Website.” Id. The complaint refers to these potential types of intercepted
information as “Sensitive Information,” but that is merely a conclusory allegation.
In re Facebook explains that a night to privacy “encompasses the individual’s
control of information concerning his or her person” and 1s violated when the defendant
“reveal[s| an individual’s likes, dislikes, interests, and habits over a significant amount of
time, without affording users a meaningful opportunity to control or prevent the
unauthorized exploration of their private lives.” 956 F.3d at 598-99. The collection of a
plaintiff's IP address and other device identifiers from her visit to a defendant’s website
“does not cause the kind of harm that can be vindicated in federal court.” Carolus v.
Nexstar Media Inc., No. 24-CV-07790-VC, 2025 WL 1338193, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9,
2025) (citing United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509-11 (9th Cir. 2008)): see also
Mitchener v. CuriosityStream, Inc., No. 25-CV-01471-NW, 2025 WL 2272413, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2025), appeal dismissed, No. 25-4990, 2025 WL 3191910 (9th Cir.
Oct. 23, 2025) (“If Defendant only collects information regarding the ‘metadata’ of the
communication, Plaintiff's right to privacy is not invaded because he has no expectation
of privacy as to that type of data (e.g., his IP address or general geographic location).”).
Here, plaintiff Harris alleges that defendant disclosed her browsing activity and
interactions with the Website to the Tracking Entities which resulted in plaintiff Harris
receiving “targeted or unsolicited advertisements related to the content and products
viewed on the Website.” Compl. § 16. Nevertheless, the complaint fails to specify what
personal information about plaintiff Harris defendant actually obtained from this tracking
activity. Vague references to “browsing activity” and “page interactions” are insufficient
for the Court to infer that defendant’s conduct “caused her to experience any kind of
harm that is remotely similar to the ‘highly offensive’ interferences or disclosures that
were actionable at common law.” Popa, 153 F.4th at 791 (explaining that “[plaintiff]
identifies no embarrassing, invasive, or otherwise private information collected by
defendant],” and comparing the defendant’s tracking of plaintiffs interactions with the
defendant’s website to “a store clerk’s observing shoppers in order to identify aisles that
are particularly popular or to spot problems that disrupt potential sales.”). Absent any
non-conclusory allegations that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her
“browsing activity” or “page interactions” with defendant’s Website, plaintiff Harris fails
to allege a concrete injury that is analogous to a common-law invasion of privacy tort.
In sum, without any specific allegations as to what of plaintiff's personal
information was collected by defendant, the Court cannot identify any harm to her
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CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
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Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
privacy, much less identify a “highly offensive” intrusion upon seclusion. See Hughes v.
Vivint, Inc., No. CV 24-3081-GW-KSX, 2024 WL 5179916, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. July 12,
2024) (“As Plaintiff does not clearly allege what personalized information of hers was
actually collected, she does not identify any harm to her privacy.”): see also Mikulsky v.
Noom, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 3d 855, 864 (S._D. Cal. 2023) (granting motion to dismiss for
lack of standing because “the Court is unable to determine whether the ‘personal
information’ Plaintiff inputted is protected or whether it was merely information akin to
basic contact information that would not trigger a protectable privacy interest’).
Accordingly, plaintiff Harris fails to allege an injury sufficient to confer Article III
standing for her two CIPA claims. Because plaintiff Harris’ UCL claim alleges the same
injury and no independent injury, she also lacks Article III standing for that claim.
By contrast, plaintiff Cheung, in addition to making similar vague allegations that
defendant collected his browsing activity and page interactions, specifically alleges that
he “purchased several video games through the Website,” and that this video purchase
information was transmitted to the Tracking Entities, including Facebook, along with his
personally identifying information. Compl. 417. Plaintiff further alleges that he “began
receiving targeted or unsolicited advertisements related to the content and products
viewed on the Website.” Id. The Court finds that plaintiff Cheung adequately alleges an
injury analogous to a common law invasion of privacy tort, specifically the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion, because plaintiff Cheung has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his “video-viewing history.” See Eichenberger, 876 F.3d at 983 (holding that
an adequately alleged VPPA violation confers Article III standing because the VPPA
codifies a “consumer’s substantive privacy interest in his or her video-viewing history’’):
see also Plotsker v. Envato Pty Ltd., No. 2:24-CV-04412-MEMF-RAO, 2025 WL
2481422, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2025) (same); Balestrieri v. SportsEdTV, Inc., No.
25-CV-04046-SK, 2025 WL 2776356, at *8 (N_D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025) (same); Edwards
v. MUBL Inc., 773 F. Supp. 3d 868, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (same). Thus, plaintiff
Cheung’s VPPA and ECPA claims are not “bare procedural violation[s], divorced from
any concrete harm.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341.
To the extent that defendant disputes plaintiffs’ factual allegations relating to
whether plaintiff Cheung’s alleged privacy harm is traceable to defendant’s conduct and
contends that plaintiff Cheung’s alleged injury may instead be traceable to independent,
third-party conduct, such a factual dispute is “intertwined with the merits of the plaintiffs
claim,” and the Court must “leave the resolution of material factual disputes to the trier of
fact.”” Bowen v. Energizer Holdings, Inc., 118 F.4th 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. = 2:26-cv-00519-CAS-MBKx Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1122 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014)). Accordingly, the Court
concludes that plaintiff Cheung adequately alleges Article III standing for his VPPA and
ECPA claims.
Finally, the Court finds that plaintiffs Harris and Cheung have adequately alleged
Article III standing for their unjust enrichment claim. Plaintiffs allege that “[d|efendant
obtained a benefit by collecting, processing, and enabling third-party monetization of”
plaintiffs’ information that was collected and transmitted without plaintiffs’ valid
consent. Compl. 4] 226, 227. Plaintiffs argue that they conferred these benefits on
defendant and that defendant has thus been unjustly enriched at their expense. Id. § 228.
Thus, plaintiffs allege an actionable monetary injury—the use of their personal
information without compensation. “For standing purposes, a loss of even a small
amount of money is ordinarily an “injury.”” Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S.
451, 464 (2017). Furthermore, the complaint shows that the alleged injury was likely
caused by defendant’s conduct, and such a monetary injury is redressable by the federal
courts.
In conclusion, the Court grants in part and denies in part defendant’s motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court
DISMISSES plaintiff Harris’ two CIPA claims (Claims III and IV) and her UCL claim
(Claim V) for lack of Article III standing, with leave to amend.
B. Failure to State a Claim
Because the Court has determined that Claims III, IV, and V of the complaint are
dismissed due to inadequate allegations as to the basis for plaintiff Harris’ Article III
standing, whether the complaint has failed to state those claims is MOOT. Defendant’s
arguments may be renewed in a motion to dismiss any First Amended Complaint. The
Court proceeds to consider defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) arguments for the remaining
claims.
1. Plaintiff Cheung’s VPPA Claim (Claim I)
Without making any determination of the merits of defendant’s arguments on these
claims, it is recommended that plaintiffs consider them in connection with the preparation
of any First Amended Complaint in order to promote a more efficient resolution of this
matter.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
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Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
“Although Plaintiff has Article III standing to pursue this action, whether he can
state a claim for relief under the VPPA is a different issue.” Cantu v. Tractor Supply Co.,
No. 2:23-CV-3027-HDV-JC, 2024 WL 1601257, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2024).
Defendant argues three reasons why plaintiff Cheung’s VPPA claim should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim for relief. Mot. at 6-10.
a. Video Tape Service Provider
First, defendant argues that it is not a “video tape service provider” under the
VPPA because it does not sell, rent, or deliver audio-visual materials to its users, but
rather the Website directs its users to external retailers’ websites to complete their
purchases. Id. at 7. Defendant argues that the term “video tape service provider” does
not include every business with some tangential relationship to video content, and that its
business is only peripherally or passively involved in the conveyance of video content,
which defendant argues is not enough to be held liable under the VPPA. Id. Defendant
argues that it does not publish video content on its website, nor does it sell video content.
Id. Defendant argues that it merely lists the “deals” its users find across the internet,
which sometimes happen to be for video content. Id. Defendant argues that those deals
lead users to external retailers where they can then complete purchases for video content.
Id. Defendant argues that its business does not revolve around video content, and it could
conduct its business without hosting any “deals” for video content. Id. at 7-8. Defendant
concludes that because it is not substantially involved in delivering video content, nor
does it tailor its business to delivering video content, it is not a “video tape service
provider” under the VPPA. Id. at 8.
In opposition, plaintiffs argue that the plain meaning of “business” allows multiple
defendants to be engaged in the business of selling the same video content and that
nothing in the VPPA requires that video-related activity be a defendant’s primary
business. Opp. at 6. Plaintiffs argue that defendant qualifies as a video tape service
provider because it involved itself and took part in the commercial activity of selling
video products for profit. Id. (citing Compl. 130-31). Plaintiffs argue that defendant
concedes in its motion that the Website features video products. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs
further argue that defendant’s revenue is tied to funneling consumer purchases to partner
retailers, including purchases of video products. Id. (citing Compl. {| 127-28, 163).
Plaintiffs argue that defendant’s active participation in the user purchase journey and its
receipt of commission-based compensation upon the completion of those sales place
defendant squarely within the meaning of “engaged in the business” of selling audio-
visual materials. Id. (citing Compl. J 126-130, 162-63). Plaintiffs argue that
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. = 2:26-cv-00519-CAS-MBKx Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
defendant’s contention that it could still conduct its business without hosting any deals
for video content misses the point because defendant’s choice to participate in the process
of selling video products is dispositive. Id,
In reply, defendant argues that plaintiffs concede that defendant is not a direct
retailer of audio-visual materials, but rather defendant guides users to an external
retailer’s website to complete a purchase. Reply at 4-5. Defendant argues that its receipt
of monetary compensation is not enough to confer it the status of a video tape service
provider. Id. at 5. Defendant argues that the cases that plaintiffs cite are distinguishable
and that defendant’s involvement in the sale of video products here is far too attenuated
to be considered engaged in the business of selling video products. Id. at 5.
The Court finds that the complaint adequately alleges that defendant is a “video
tape service provider” under the VPPA. The VPPA defines “video tape service provider”
as “any person, engaged in the business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of
rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual
materials...” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4). “Congress’s use of the phrase ‘similar audio
visual materials’ indicates that the definition is medium-neutral; the defendant must be in
the business of delivering video content, but that content need not be in a particular
format.” In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Priv. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1221 (C.D. Cal.
2017).
Here, the complaint factually alleges: “The Website provides offers to buy videos
and video games to Subscribers, including to Plaintiffs and the other Class Members, by
advertising discounted videos and video games on the Website and directing users to
purchase video materials through partnered retailers.” Compl. □□ 130. Defendant admits
that it “directs [users] to an external retailer’s website to complete the purchase.” Mot. at
7. The complaint further alleges that defendant “earns a commission from every sale
resulting from consumers clicking on links on the Website to purchase items, including
video content.” Id. { 127. Thus, under the plain meaning of “engaged in the business”
and “sale,” the complaint sufficiently alleges that defendant 1s “engaged in the business”
of the “sale” of video content, even if consumers ultimately complete the purchase with a
“partner retailer.” See In re Vizio, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 1221 (“Under [the dictionary]
definition [of “business”], a defendant can be ‘engaged in the business’ of delivering
video content even if other actors a/so take part in the delivery of the same video
content.”) (emphasis in original). Defendant argues that while multiple persons can be
“engaged in the business” of delivering the same video content, multiple persons cannot
be “engaged in the business” of selling the same video content. Reply at 5. The Court
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CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
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Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
disagrees. For example, an independent salesperson who only earns a commission on a
sales transaction between a buyer and seller is nonetheless “engaged in the business” of
that sale. The statutory definition of a video tape service provider does not limit liability
only to “direct” sellers.
Defendant’s argument that it is “only peripherally or passively involved in the
conveyance of video content,” Mot. at 7, is a factual contention not supported by the
factual allegations in the complaint, which the Court must accept as true. Pareto, 139
F.3d at 699. Even assuming the truth of defendant’s contention, that would not preclude
defendant from qualifying as a video tape service provider under the VPPA. See Turner
v. Nat’] Notary Ass’n, No. CV 25-0334 FMO (PDX), 2026 WL 947171, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 27, 2026) (“[D]efendant’s suggestion that under the VPPA a defendant must be
‘primarily’ engaged in the business of selling covered video material, and that ‘delivering
covered video materials [must be] the defining feature’ of its business, is misplaced as it
relies on inapposite cases. Those cases involved contentions that defendants were VTSPs
because they were in the business of ‘delivering’ audio visuals materials, which may
involve greater line-drawing issues.”) (citations omitted). Here, as in Turner, the
complaint alleges that defendant is engaged in the business of selling, not delivering,
video content. See Compl. §] 130. Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiffs
adequately allege that defendant is a “video tape service provider” under the VPPA.
b. Consumer
Next, defendant argues that plaintiffs do not fit into the definition of “consumers”
under the VPPA. Mot. at 8. Defendant argues that plaintiffs are not renters or purchasers
because they did not rent or purchase anything directly from defendant. Id. Defendant
argues that plaintiffs are also not “subscribers” under the VPPA, despite the fact that
plaintiffs can create an account with defendant, because users need not have an account
to browse the “deals” or to click links to complete purchases on any third-party retailers’
websites. Id.
In opposition, plaintiffs argue that plaintiff Cheung qualifies as a consumer under
the VPPA because he made purchases for which defendant received compensation, and
alternatively he is a subscriber because he provided his information to create an account
on Slickdeals. Opp. at 7-8. Plaintiffs argue that plaintiff Cheung is a purchaser even
though he did not purchase video content directly from defendant because defendant
nonetheless participated in the sales process. Id. at 8. Plaintiffs argue that it is not
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
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Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
necessary that plaintiff Cheung’s account with Slickdeals provide access to audio-visual
material to qualify plaintiff Cheung as a subscriber under the VPPA. Id. (citing cases).
In reply, defendant argues that the VPPA’s definition of “consumer” does not
include those who make a purchase from a third party connected to a video tape service
provider. Reply at 6. And defendant argues that California courts have rejected
plaintiffs’ argument that providing information to create a user account “for some
undisclosed purpose or benefit” is sufficient to qualify as a VPPA subscriber. Id. (citing
Jefferson v. Healthline Media, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 3d 760, 764 (N._D. Cal. 2023).
The VPPA prohibits a “video tape service provider” from “knowingly disclosing]
... personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider.” 18
§ 2710(b)(1). The VPPA defines “consumer” as “any renter, purchaser, or
subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider.” 18 U.S.C. §
2710(a)(1). The Court recognizes that defendant maintains that it is not a “video tape
service provider” because consumers ultimately complete their purchases of any video
content linked on the Website through third-party retailers. However, this argument is
unavailing because the VPPA allows liability against any “video tape service provider”
who is “engaged in the business . . . of rental, sale, or delivery” of video conduct. 18
U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4). The VPPA does not limit liability to parties from which a
“consumer” directly rents or purchases video conduct but rather any party “engaged in
the business” of such a sale. Id. Here, defendants do not appear to dispute that plaintiff
Cheung alleges purchases of video content from the third-party retailers. See generally
Opp. Therefore, plaintiff Cheung is sufficiently alleged to be a “consumer” under the
VPPA. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1). Accordingly, the Court need not determine whether
plaintiff Cheung’s user account on the Website qualifies him as a subscriber under the
VPPA.
c. Personally Identifiable Information
Finally, defendant argues that plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient facts to allege
defendant knowingly disclosed plaintiffs’ personally identifiable information (“PIT”).
Mot. at 9. Defendant argues that the complaint merely alleges that plaintiff Cheung
purchased some video games using a deal link he located on defendant’s website, but
defendants argue that he did not purchase those video games from defendant. Id. at 10.
Defendant argues that plaintiff Cheung thus did not provide defendant with his PII but
rather provided a third-party website his PII in connection with purchasing the video
games. Id. Defendant further argues that plaintiffs’ allegations regarding defendant’s
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
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Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
collection of users’ searches or browsing history does not constitute PIT under the VPPA.
Id.
In opposition, plaintiffs argue that plaintiff Cheung alleges that when he purchased
video products, his personal identifiers, including his Facebook ID, were linked to the
titles of his purchases and were in turn disclosed to the Tracking Entities via the Tracking
Tools installed on the Website. Opp. at 8-9. Plaintiffs argue that this 1s sufficient to
plead disclosure of PII under the VPPA. Id. at 9.
In reply, defendant maintains that plaintiff Cheung did not and could not provide
his PII regarding his purchases to defendant because those purchases were completed
with third parties. Reply at 7. Defendant argues that plaintiffs conflate browsing activity
with purchase activity. Id. at 8.
The Court finds that plaintiffs sufficiently allege that defendant disclosed plaintiff
Cheung’s PII. The VPPA defines PII as “information which identifies a person as having
requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service
provider.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3); see also In re Hulu Priv. Litig., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1090,
1095 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“For there to be an actionable VPPA violation, the video provider
must have knowingly disclosed: 1) a consumer’s identity; 2) the identity of ‘specific
video materials’; and 3) the fact that the person identified “requested or obtained’ that
material.”). Here, the complaint satisfies these pleading requirements. Plaintiffs allege
that defendant disclosed plaintiff Cheung’s four video game purchases along with
plaintiff's identity by transmitting his purchase activity and personally identifiable device
identifiers to the Tracking Entities. Compl. 131-133. Defendant’s factual dispute as
to whether defendant actually possessed or disclosed any of plaintiff Cheung’s purchase
activity 1s better resolved on a more complete factual record rather than on a motion to
dismiss. To the extent that defendant contends that it is factually impossible for
defendant to possess purchase information when a purchase is completed with a third
party, the Court disagrees. The complaint’s factual allegations are sufficient to permit the
inference that defendant possessed information as to plaintiff Cheung’s video game
purchases completed with partner retailers. See Compl. § 127 (alleging that defendant
earns a commission from every sale resulting from consumers clicking on links on the
Website to purchase items). Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendant’s motion to
dismiss plaintiff Cheung’s VPPA claim (Claim I).
2. Plaintiff Cheung’s ECPA Claim (Claim II)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘Oo’
Case No. = 2:26-cv-00519-CAS-MBKx Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ ECPA claim must be dismissed because of the
statute’s one-party consent rule. Mot. at 10-11. Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot
establish any communication has been unlawfully intercepted because the ECPA is a one-
party consent statute that does not make it unlawful for someone to intercept an electronic
communication where such person is a party to the communication. Id. Therefore,
defendant argues that it cannot be held liable for “eavesdropping” upon alleged
communications between plaintiffs and defendant. Id. Defendant argues that the
criminal or tortious purpose exception to the one-party consent rule does not apply where
the alleged crime or tort is incidental to the interception. Id. at 11. Rather, defendants
argue, the interception must be alleged to have been performed for the purpose of
committing a tort or crime for the exception to apply. Id. Defendant argues that, here, it
did not intercept plaintiffs’ information, much less, transmit plaintiffs’ sensitive
information to commit a crime or tortious act. Id. at 11-12. Defendant argues that
plaintiffs merely claim that their data was used to target ads to themselves, and an alleged
invasion of privacy and violation of state privacy law is not enough to establish an ECPA
claim. Id. at 12.
In opposition, plaintiffs argue that the complaint satisfies all the statutory
requirements for pleading an ECPA claim. Opp. at 13. Plaintiffs argue that defendant
does not challenge whether plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded the elements but instead
rests its hat on the “party defense.” Id. First, plaintiffs argue that the party defense
shields only direct interceptors, not procurers of an interception, and plaintiffs argue the
allegations show defendant’s role as a procurer. Id. Second, plaintiffs argue that the
ECPA’s crime-tort exception to the party defense applies. Id. Plaintiffs argue that
defendant procured and installed the Tracking Tools for the purpose of disclosing users’
data to the Tracking Entities, violating the VPPA and plaintiffs’ privacy. Id. Plaintiffs
argue that defendant’s profit motivation does not disqualify the crime-tort exception. Id.
at 14 (citing cases). Plaintiffs additionally argue that defendant’s subsequent use of the
intercepted contents of plaintiffs’ communications for marketing and analytics purposes
constitutes a violation of CIPA § 631(a). Id.
In reply, defendant argues that plaintiffs’ ECPA claim must be dismissed because
the one-party consent rule applies and plaintiff has failed to allege a tortious or criminal
purpose. Reply at 8. Defendant argues that plaintiffs incorrectly argue that the one-party
consent rule does not apply to defendant as an alleged procurer rather than interceptor.
Id. Defendant argues that plaintiffs also incorrectly argue that the crime-tort exception
applies because of an alleged VPPA violation or non-specific “privacy” violation. Id. at
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
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Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
9. Defendant argues that plaintiffs have not alleged “any act “independent of the
interception itself’ that “was done for a criminal or tortious purpose.’” Id. (quoting Sisti
v. Bosley Inc., No. 2:25-CV-10669-JFW-DFM, 2026 WL 1223927, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
27, 2026)). Defendant argues that by claiming that defendant had a tortious purpose in
disclosing plaintiffs’ website interactions to third parties, plaintiffs are merely claiming
that the purported interception itself was committed for a tortious purpose. Id.
The ECPA makes it unlawful to intentionally intercept an electronic
communication. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). To state a claim, plaintiff must allege that
defendant “(1) intentionally (2) intercepted [or procured another to intercept] (3) the
contents of (4) plaintiff's electronic communications (5) using a device. There is an
exception to liability for a person who is a party to the communication or ‘where one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.’ This
exception applies unless the interception occurred ‘for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act.”” Doe I v. Google LLC, 741 F. Supp. 3d 828, 842 (N_D. Cal.
2024) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)) (internal citations omitted). The “criminal or
tortious purpose must be separate and independent from the act of the recording.”
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am.., Inc. v. Newman, 51] F.4th 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2022):
see also Deteresa v. American Broad. Cos., 121 F.3d 460, 467 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1997)
(emphasizing the distinction between a taping that is itself tortious or criminal, and one
carried out for the purpose of committing some other crime or tort).
The Court finds that plaintiffs sufficiently allege that defendant intercepted
plaintiff Cheung’s communications for the purpose of committing a separate and
independent tortious act such that the party consent defense 1s inapplicable at the
pleading stage. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendant intercepted plaintiff
Cheung’s “order-related interactions,” Compl. 182, which allegedly included video
purchase information that defendants allegedly disclosed to the Tracking Entities, in
violation of the VPPA. Compl. § 131. This alleged disclosure of plaintiff Cheung’s
video purchase information to advertisers is therefore allegedly tortious conduct that is
“independent of the interception itself.” Doe I, 741 F. Supp. 3d at 842: see also In re
Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Priv. Litig., 806 F.3d 125, 145 (3d Cir. 2015)
authority of which we are aware indicates that the criminal or tortious acts
contemplated by § 2511(2)(d) are acts secondary to the acquisition of the communication
involving tortious or criminal use of the interception’s fruits.”). Furthermore, to the
extent that defendant may argue that the allegations demonstrate that defendant’s purpose
in intercepting plaintiffs’ communications was financial rather than tortious and that the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
alleged tort was only “incidental,” the Court finds that such a determination 1s better
made on a more complete factual record. Moreover, allegations of financial motivation
do not preclude a tortious purpose. See Sussman v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 186
F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1999) (“But the existence of a lawful purpose does not mean
that the interception is not also for a tortious or unlawful purpose.”); Riganian v.
LiveRamp Holdings, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (denying motion
to dismiss ECPA claim); R.S. v. Prime Healthcare Servs.. Inc., No. 5:24-CV-00330-
ODW (SPX), 2025 WL 103488, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2025) (same). Defendant does
not otherwise challenge the sufficiency of Cheung’s ECPA pleading. Accordingly, the
Court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff Cheung’s ECPA claim (Claim II).
3. Plaintiffs Harris and Cheung’s Unjust Enrichment Claim (Claim VI)
Defendant argues that the complaint’s allegations that defendant was unjustly
enriched when it collected and enabled “third party monetization” of plaintiffs’ sensitive
information is not enough to state a claim for unjust enrichment under California law.
Mot. at 18. Defendant argues that plaintiffs do not sufficiently plead that defendant
retained a benefit at plaintiff's expense. Id. Defendant argues that the claim fails
because plaintiffs were never in privity with defendant nor do plaintiffs allege to have
such a relationship through some corresponding contractual causes of action. Id. at 18-
19. Defendants also argue that plaintiffs do not plead that they have either expended their
own resources or shown their sensitive information has become less valuable. Id. at 19.
Defendant argues that plaintiffs do not and cannot plead that they conferred a benefit onto
defendant in exchange for data security because plaintiff Cheung paid for video games,
not for data security, and plaintiff Harris did not pay for anything. Id. at 19.
In opposition, plaintiffs argue that California courts have permitted unjust
enrichment claims where a plaintiff alleges entitlement to defendant’s profits derived
from users’ personal data, and here is no different. Opp. at 18 (citing cases). Plaintiffs
argue that they may bring an unjust enrichment claim because they allege that defendant
benefited from using their private information, without their consent, to enhance revenue
through advertising, and that otherwise their remedies at law are inadequate. Id. at 19.
Plaintiffs argue that the cases cited by defendant are inapposite because in those cases,
defendants derived no monetary benefit from the plaintiff's data beyond the initial
payment for their service. Id. Here, by contrast, plaintiffs argue that defendant did not
merely profit from plaintiffs’ purchases through affiliate commissions but also exploited
plaintiffs’ private information to enhance targeted advertising revenue for itself,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. = 2:26-cv-00519-CAS-MBKx Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
generating an additional layer of financial benefit that plaintiffs never contemplated or
consented to. Id.
In reply, defendant argues that plaintiffs’ cited authorities do not warrant going
against well-established California law and do not stand for the proposition that receipt of
personal data itself satisfies the elements of unjust enrichment. Reply at 16 (citing cases).
Defendant argues that courts reject the proposition that personally identifiable
information is valuable per se. Id. at 17. Additionally, defendant argues that plaintiffs’
arguments regarding defendant’s receipt of “affiliate commissions” should be rejected as
plaintiffs do not allege that the commissions are tied to the alleged disclosure of
information. Id.
“{I}]n California, there is not a standalone cause of action for “unjust enrichment,’
which is synonymous with ‘restitution.”” Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp.. Inc., 783 F.3d
753, 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit “has construed the
common law to allow an unjust enrichment cause of action through quasi-contract.” ESG
Cap. Partners, LP v. Stratos, 828 F.3d 1023, 1038 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Astiana, 783
F.3d at 762 (“When a plaintiff alleges unjust enrichment, a court may ‘construe the cause
of action as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution.””’). To state a claim for unjust
enrichment, a plaintiff must adequately allege “that the defendant received and unjustly
retained a benefit at the plaintiff's expense.” Id. “It must ordinarily appear that the
benefits were conferred by mistake, fraud, coercion or request; otherwise, though there is
enrichment, it is not unjust.” Nibbi Bros., Inc. v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 205 Cal.
App. 3d 1415, 1422 (Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis in original) (quoting 1 Witkin, Summary
of Cal. Law § 97 (9th ed. 1987)).
Here, plaintiffs allege that they conferred the benefit of the value of their data upon
defendant by mistake. See Compl. §§ 16, 17, 226, 227 (alleging that plaintiffs’ data has
advertising, marketing, and sales value to defendant; that defendant collected and
transmitted plaintiffs’ data without their consent; and that plaintiffs Harris and Cheung
would not have accessed or used the Website had they known that their personal
information would be intercepted and disclosed). Furthermore, plaintiffs allege that
defendant’s privacy policy misrepresents that the cookies on the Website “contain no
personally identifiable information.” Compl. § 124. These allegations are sufficient at
this stage to plead an unjust enrichment claim. See A.J. v. LMND Med. Grp., No. 24-cv-
03288-RFL, 2024 WL 4579143, at *4 (N_D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2024) (finding that plaintiffs’
allegation that defendant benefitted from their information by exchanging it without their
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES —- GENERAL ‘O’
Case No. = 2:26-cv-00519-CAS-MBKx Date June 29, 2026
Title Andrew Cheung et al v. Slickdeals, LLC
consent and that plaintiffs failed to receive the benefit of their bargain was sufficient to
preclude dismissal).
That plaintiffs and defendants are not alleged to be in privity does not foreclose an
unjust enrichment claim. See 55 Cal. Jur. 3d Restitution § 2 (“Unjust enrichment is a
common-law obligation implied by law based on the equities of a particular case and not
on any contractual obligation, and thus, a claim for unjust enrichment is said to be
inappropriate, and must fail, where express binding agreements define the parties’
rights.”’) (citations omitted). To the extent that defendant argues that plaintiffs fail to
allege any expenditure of resources or diminution in value of their personal information,
“even if plaintiffs have suffered no economic loss from the disclosure of their plausibly
private information, they are allowed to proceed through the pleadings stage with a claim
for unjust enrichment to recover the gains that a defendant realized from its allegedly
improper conduct.” Gabrielli v. Haleon US Inc., 815 F. Supp. 3d 852, 875 (N.D. Cal.
2025) (citing Hadley v. Kellogg Sales Co., 324 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1113 (N_D. Cal. 2018);
In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d 767, 803 (N.D.
Cal. 2019)).
Accordingly, the Court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ unjust
enrichment claim (Claim VI).
V. CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
PART defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint.
The Court DISMISSES Claims III, [V, and V, with leave to amend. Plaintiffs
shall file any first amended complaint on or before July 13, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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