Midile

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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 KENNETH J. MIDILE, an No. 2:25-cv-03480-JAM-CKD

individual,

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Plaintiff,

12 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

v. MOTION TO REMAND

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GENERAL MOTORS LLC, a

14 Delaware limited liability

company, and DOES 1-10,

15 inclusive,

16 Defendants.

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18 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Kenneth

19 Midile’s motion to remand. ECF No. 12, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of

20 Points and Authorities (“Mot.”). Defendant Ford Motor Company

21 filed an opposition (ECF No. 13 (“Opp’n”)); Plaintiff filed an

22 untimely reply, which also failed to comply with this Court’s

23 previous order regarding filing requirements and page limits.

24 See ECF Nos. 3-2 and 15, Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of Motion

25 to Remand (“Reply”). For the reasons detailed below, Plaintiff’s

26 motion is denied.1

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1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without

28 oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g); see also ECF No. 16.

1 I. BACKGROUND

2 In 2025, Plaintiff initiated a lawsuit in Solano County

3 Superior Court, arising out of his 2019 purchase of a Chevrolet

4 Silverado 2500 (the “Subject Vehicle”), which he claims is

5 defective. See generally Mot. at 1-2; Opp’n at 2. Defendant

6 then removed the matter to this Court, based on 28 U.S.C.

7 §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446, alleging the parties were diverse and

8 the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. ECF 1.

9 Specifically, Defendant alleged the Plaintiff is a California

10 citizen and Defendant is incorporated in Delaware, with its

11 principal place of business in Michigan. Id. Defendant also

12 averred the removal was timely, because it was made within 30

13 days of a determination that the amount in controversy exceeded

14 $75,000. Id.

15 At the outset of this case, the Court issued an Order

16 regarding filing requirements. See ECF No. 3-2 (filed Dec. 2,

17 2025). Reply briefs are limited to 5 pages, and the parties were

18 cautioned a violation “will result in monetary sanctions being

19 imposed against counsel in the amount of $50.00 per page and the

20 Court will not consider any arguments made past the page limit.”

21 Id. Local Rule 230 governs the timing requirements for civil

22 motions, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78.

23 See E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(b)–(d). Defendant’s opposition was filed

24 on February 12, 2026, and under Local Rule 230(d), Plaintiff’s

25 reply was due no later than February 24, 2026. Plaintiff’s reply

26 brief, however, was filed March 10, 14 days past the deadline and

27 was 8 pages long. See Dkt. While the Court has not disregarded

28 the extra pages of the reply, it will issue sanctions for the

1 late filing and the excessive length, in the amount of $850: $50

2 per page over the page limit ($150) plus $50 per day the filing

3 was late ($700). Plaintiff’s counsel shall pay $850 to the Clerk

4 of the Court no later than June 12, 2026.

5 II. OPINION

6 A. Legal Standard

7 Federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction

8 over civil actions between parties with diverse citizenship

9 where “the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of or value of

10 $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C.

11 § 1332(a). Such an action may be removed to federal court under

12 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). It is well-established that “[r]emoval

13 statutes are strictly construed, and any doubt about the right

14 of removal requires resolution in favor of remand. This rule of

15 narrow construction both recognizes the limited jurisdiction of

16 federal courts and protect[s] the jurisdiction of state courts.”

17 Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2024)

18 (citing and quoting Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553

19 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) and Harris v. Bankers Life &

20 Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal citations

21 and quotations removed).

22 “The presumption against removal means that the defendant

23 always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”

24 Casola, 98 F.3d at 954 (quoting Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244)

25 (quotations removed). Indeed, when removal is challenged based

26 on whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, “‘the

27 removing defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a

28 preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy

1 exceeds’ the jurisdictional threshold,” unless it is clear from

2 the face of the state court complaint. Urbino v. Orkin Services

3 of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2013)

4 (quoting Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404

5 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Ninth Circuit defines the “amount in

6 controversy as the amount at stake in the underlying litigation,

7 [that is,] any result of the litigation, excluding interests and

8 costs, that entails a payment by the defendant. This amount

9 includes, inter alia, damages (compensatory, punitive, or

10 otherwise) and the cost of complying with an injunction, as well

11 as attorneys’ fees awarded under fee shifting statutes.”

12 Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648-49

13 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing and quoting Theis Research, Inc. v.

14 Brown & Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005) and Guglielmino

15 v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007)

16 (internal quotations, citations, and brackets removed)).

17 In assessing whether the defendant has met its burden, a

18 court “may consider allegations in the complaint and in the

19 notice of removal, as well as summary-judgment-type evidence

20 relevant to the amount in controversy.” Chavez v. JPMorgan

21 Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Kroske v.

22 U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005)).

23 B. Analysis

24 Plaintiff only contests jurisdiction by claiming Defendant

25 did not establish the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

26 See generally Mot. Plaintiff does not dispute this matter was

27 timely removed, nor does he dispute complete diversity. See

28 Opp’n at 2; Reply.

1 The parties agree it is not apparent from face of complaint

2 that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (see Mot. at 5

3 and Opp’n at 1-2); accordingly, Defendant bears the burden of

4 establishing by a preponderance that the amount in controversy

5 exceeds $75,000. See Urbino, 726 F.3d 1118. Only Defendant has

6 presented evidence for the Court to consider in determining the

7 amount in controversy here. See Mot.; Opp’n; Reply.

8 1. Actual Damages

9 In his complaint, Plaintiff seeks “all damages permitted by

10 law,” including “actual damages,” restitution, “a civil penalty

11 in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s actual damages,”

12 “consequential and incidental damages,” costs, expenses, and

13 attorneys’ fees, plus “prejudgment interest at the legal rate,”

14 and any “other equitable or legal relief [] the Court may deem

15 proper.” ECF No. 1-1, Exh. A (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 44 and pg. 8.

16 Defendant provided the Retail Installment Sales Contract

17 (“RISC”) for the Subject Vehicle. See Opp’n, Exh. A. Defendant

18 also provided a declaration; this evidence demonstrates the

19 purchase price of the subject vehicle was $72,328.64. Id.; see

20 also Opp’n at 3. In conjunction with this evidence, Defendant

21 offers a detailed analysis of a proposed mileage offset, plus a

22 rebate offset, resulting in a more favorable calculation of

23 actual damages for the Plaintiff. See Opp’n at 2-3. Since the

24 first repair identified as potentially relevant in this case

25 occurred at approximately 3,057 miles, according to the

26 Defendant’s calculated Song-Beverly offset, this mileage,

27 divided by 120,000 and multiplied by the purchase price,

28 subtracted from the Subject Vehicle cost, results in a total of

1 $66,125.55 in actual damages. Id.

2 Plaintiff claims these numbers are “unreliable,” “fatally

3 speculative,” and “not supported by facts or evidence . . . .”

4 Reply at 1-2. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff has not provided

5 any evidence for the Court to consider, no alternative proposal

6 for actual damages, nor any reason to question the evidence or

7 calculation provided by Defendant. Indeed, the evidence and

8 calculations before the Court are uncontroverted. Accord

9 Carrington Stonemasons, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company, No. 24-cv-

10 00080, 2024 WL 1745038 at *3 (N.D. Cal Apr. 22, 2024) (“Because

11 [Plaintiff] has not filed a reply, [Defendant]’s calculation of

12 the use offset and actual damages is undisputed.”).

13 Although Plaintiff relies on a number of cases to support

14 his argument that Defendant failed to meet its evidentiary

15 burden here, they are distinguishable. See Mot. at 5-12. For

16 example, in Steeg, the defendant simply relied on the

17 allegations in the complaint and the vehicle’s MSRP

18 (manufacturer’s suggested retail price). Steeg v. Ford Motor

19 Company, No. 19-cv-05833, 2020 WL 2121508 (N.D. Cal. May 5,

20 2020). The defendant did not present other evidence, including

21 the actual sales price, and the court found defendant failed to

22 demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.

23 Id. Similarly, defendants in Schneider relied on the claimed

24 damages in the plaintiffs’ complaints of at least $25,000,

25 argued this number would be doubled if civil penalties were

26 included, and made general claims about attorneys’ fees. See

27 Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d 909 (N.D. Cal. Mar.

28 2, 2020). There, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion to remand

1 because defendants failed to meet their burden. Id. Unlike

2 these cases, and the many others cited by Plaintiff, Defendant

3 presented evidence of the actual damages at issue here,

4 supported by the RISC and repair history; Defendant did not

5 simply rely on the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint and make

6 vague claims about possible damages like Plaintiff claims. Cf.

7 Echemendia v. Subaru of America, Inc., No. 20-cv-09243, 2020 WL

8 7311348 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2020) (defendant provided sales

9 contract, but no other evidence or analysis to “allow the Court

10 to reliably estimate actual damages”); Chajon v. Ford Motor

11 Company, No. 2:18-cv-10533, 2019 WL 994019 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 8,

12 2019) (defendant failed to meet its burden establishing

13 requisite amount in controversy because it relied on MSRP, did

14 not provide other evidence or an offset calculation, and

15 speculated about penalties and attorneys’ fees). Defendant has

16 demonstrated by a preponderance that the actual damages are at

17 least $66,125.55. Accordingly, the Court turns to the parties’

18 arguments regarding penalties.

19 2. Civil Penalties

20 Plaintiffs seek a statutory civil penalty of twice

21 Plaintiff’s actual damages under the Song-Beverly Act,

22 prejudgment interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees. See Compl. at

23 ¶¶ 44 and pg. 8. The parties disagree about the appropriate way

24 to include and calculate civil penalties here, citing a number

25 of cases supporting their respective positions. See Mot. at 9-

26 12; Opp’n at 6-7. Plaintiff argues Defendant’s assumption that

27 Plaintiff will recover the penalty authorized by the Song-

28 Beverly act is unsupported; since Defendant has failed to meet

1 its burden, which Plaintiff claims requires proof a willful

2 violation of the Song-Beverly Act, civil penalties should not be

3 included in the amount in controversy calculation. Mot. at 9-

4 12. Plaintiffs rely on a number of cases that include

5 underlying complaints requesting civil penalties “up to twice

6 the amount of [] actual damages,” which are unlike Plaintiff’s

7 complaint that seeks “a civil penalty in the amount of two times

8 Plaintiff’s actual damages . . . .” Compare, e.g., Echemendia,

9 2020 WL 7311348 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2020) (“Plaintiff’s sole

10 allegation remotely inferring willfulness is that Subaru

11 misrepresented it would cure the Vehicle’s defects”) with Compl.

12 ¶¶ 17 and 24 (containing descriptions of Defendant’s “willful”

13 failure to comply with the Song-Beverly Act). The Court is

14 persuaded by the Carrington and Verastegui cases, which support

15 the inclusion of a civil penalty doubling the actual damages in

16 the amount in controversy calculation; these cases are more

17 analogous to the claims in Plaintiff’s complaint and the

18 evidence before this Court than any cited by the Plaintiffs.

19 See Carrington, 2024 WL 1745038 at *3-4 (relying on Sanchez v.

20 Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 1996) and

21 Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 2018) to

22 support the application of the civil penalty in determining the

23 amount in controversy); Verastegui v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-cv-

24 04806, 2020 WL 598516, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2020)

25 (recognizing “courts in this district have varying views as to

26 whether the maximum civil penalties should be considered when

27 deciding the amount in controversy,” but finding the penalty

28 doubling the actual damages applied because “it is what

ee NE EE EE IED

1 Plaintiff put in controversy.”). Using the underlying actual

2 damages calculation most favorable to Plaintiffs, $66,125.55,

3 the inclusion of the civil penalty Plaintiff claims he is

4 entitled to brings the amount in controversy to more than

5 $132,000. This number well exceeds the requisite jurisdictional

6 threshold, without considering attorneys’ fees or other damages

7 requested by Plaintiff. Based on the evidence before the Court,

8 Defendant has met its burden establishing by a preponderance the

9 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

10 Til. ORDER

11 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES

12 Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. Plaintiff’s counsel shall pay

13 sanctions in the amount of $850 to the Clerk of the Court no

14 later than June 12, 2026.

15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

16 Dated: May 22, 2025

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HN A. MENDEZ.

1s Fee UNITED pe acl JUDGE

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