The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
ROLANDO RICARDO RODNEY,
Petitioner,
v. Case No: 5:24-cv-555-WFJ-PRL
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
_______________________________________/
ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Rolando R. Rodney’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1). Respondent has filed a Response (Doc. 8)
and an Appendix (Doc. 9). Mr. Rodney filed a Reply. (Doc. 12). Upon careful
consideration, the Court denies the Petition.
BACKGROUND
On December 28, 2018, Mr. Rodney was charged by information with robbery
with a firearm and possession of a firearm with altered or removed serial number.
(Doc. 9-1 at 33–34). On April 26, 2021, Mr. Rodney was charged by amended
information with robbery with a firearm while masked and possession of a firearm
with altered or removed serial number. (Doc. 9-1 a 98–99). A jury trial was held on
April 30, 2021. The jury found Mr. Rodney guilty as charged on both counts and made
specific findings that during the commission of the robbery he possessed a firearm and
actually wore a hood, mask, or other device that concealed his identity. (Doc. 9-1 at
149–51). On June 14, 2021, he was sentenced to 30 years in state prison with a 10-year
minimum mandatory. (Doc. 9-1 at 191–98). Mr. Rodney appealed, and the Fifth
District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida (“5th DCA”) per curiam affirmed the
judgment and sentence. (Doc. 9-1 at 968); Rodney v. State, 342 So. 3d 1713 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2022). Mandate issued on July 14, 2022. Id. at 970.
On August 23, 2022, Mr. Rodney filed a motion for reduction or modification
of sentence under Rule 3.800(c), Fla. R. Crim. P. (Doc. 9-1 at 1553–56). On September
9, 2022, the trial court denied the motion. Id. at 1558.
On March 17, 2023, Mr. Rodney filed a motion for postconviction relief under
Rule 3.850, Fla. R. Crim. P, (Doc. 9-1 at 984–1009), and a memorandum of law (Id.
at 1012–20). On July 6, 2023, the trial court denied, in part Mr. Rodney’s motion, and
set an evidentiary hearing on one of the claims, and reserved ruling on the final claim.
(Doc. 9-1 at 1062–1208). On September 21, 2023, the evidentiary hearing was held.
(Doc. 9-1 at 1220–76). On January 2, 2024, the remaining claims of the Rule 3.850
motion were denied. (Doc. 9-1 at 1277–1397). Mr. Rodney appealed, and the Fifth
DCA per curiam affirmed the trial court’s order. (Doc. 9-1 at 1548–49); Rodney v. State,
392 So. 3d 832 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024). Mandate issued on September 24, 2024. Id. at
1551.
On October 3, 2024, Mr. Rodney filed his petition in this Court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. (Doc. 1).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs
a state prisoner's federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic
& Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016), abrogation recognized on other
grounds by Smith v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 67 F.4th 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2023).
“‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard
against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means
of error correction.’” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)). As such,
federal habeas review of final state court decisions is “greatly circumscribed and highly
deferential.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d
1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court
decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't
of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue a written
opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court's decision to qualify as an
adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where
the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the
United States Supreme Court has instructed:
[T]he federal court should “look through” the unexplained decision to
the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale.
It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same
reasoning.
Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). The presumption may be rebutted by
showing that the higher state court's adjudication most likely relied on different
grounds than the lower state court's reasoned decision, such as persuasive alternative
grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher court or obvious in the record it
reviewed. Id. at 125–26.
If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d) bars
relitigation of the claim unless the state court's decision (1) “was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97–98. The Eleventh
Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:
First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for claims of state courts’
erroneous legal conclusions. As explained by the Supreme Court in
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two
distinct clauses: a “contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable
application” clause. The “contrary to” clause allows for relief only “if the
state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the
Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case
differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413 (plurality opinion). The “unreasonable
application” clause allows for relief only “if the state court identifies the
correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions
but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.”
Id.
Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for claims of state courts’
erroneous factual determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal
courts to grant relief only if the state court's denial of the petitioner's claim
“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined § 2254(d)(2)’s
“precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1), which imposes a burden on the
petitioner to rebut the state court's factual findings “by clear and
convincing evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 18 (2013); accord
Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 322 n.8 (2015). Whatever that “precise
relationship” may be, “‘a state-court factual determination is not
unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have
reached a different conclusion in the first instance.’” Titlow, 571 U.S. at
18 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)).
Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal citations modified).
Also, deferential review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an
examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”).
Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners
whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Titlow, 571 U.S. at 19. “Federal
courts may grant habeas relief only when a state court blundered in a manner so ‘well
understood and comprehended in existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’
that ‘there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree.’” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at
1338 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102–03). This standard is “meant to be” a “difficult”
one to meet. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner's claims
were adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they must be evaluated under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective assistance
of counsel. That right is denied when a defense attorney's performance falls below an
objective standard of reasonableness and thereby prejudices the defense.” Yarborough
v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521
(2003), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction
must show that “counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness.” [Strickland,] 466 U.S. at 688. A court considering a
claim of ineffective assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that
counsel's representation was within the “wide range” of reasonable
professional assistance. Id. at 689. The challenger's burden is to show
“that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at
687.
With respect to prejudice, a challenger must demonstrate “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at
694. It is not enough “to show that the errors had some conceivable effect
on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693. Counsel's errors must be
“so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable.” Id. at 687.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 104 (internal citations modified). The Eleventh Circuit has
recognized “the absence of any iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of
the Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir. 2010).
Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth
Amendment violation, “a court need not address the performance prong if the
petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v.
Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which
we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
A state court's adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great
deference.
“[T]he standard for judging counsel's representation is a most deferential
one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. But “[e]stablishing that a state court's
application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more
difficult. The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both
highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly
so.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). “The question is not
whether a federal court believes the state court's determination under the
Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that determination was
unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” Knowles v. Mirzayance,
556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). If there is “any
reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential
standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state-court decision
denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105.
Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal citations
modified). In other words, “[i]n addition to the deference to counsel's performance
mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds another layer of deference—this one to a
state court's decision—when we are considering whether to grant federal habeas relief
from a state court's decision.” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir.
2004). As such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Ground One
Mr. Rodney states that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate,
compare, and present his shoe and pants sizes. (Doc. 1 at 3–4). The individual that
robbed the Dollar General was described as wearing black pants, black jacket, black
shoes and a blue hat. Id. at 3. Law enforcement tracked the stolen money to the
residence of Keith Jackson. Pants and shoes matching the description were found in
Keith Jackson Jr.’s (“KJ”) closet. Id. Mr. Rodney denies that those were his pants and
shoes and claims that they belonged to KJ. Id. Mr. Rodney claims that if trial counsel
had investigated his sizes, they could establish that those items were not his sizes. Id.
at 3–4.
Mr. Rodney raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion. (Doc. 9-1 at 997–99).
The trial court rejected this claim following the evidentiary hearing:
Defendant asserts Mr. Ward provided ineffective assistance
because he failed to investigate, compare, and present articles of clothing
found at Mr. Jackson's residence. Defendant claims Mr. Ward failed to
ask about Defendant's pants and shoe size for a comparison against the
articles of clothing collected at Mr. Jackson's residence. On direct
examination by the State, witness Jordyn Holzer, forensic crimes scene
technician with the Marion County Sheriff's Office, testified that she
collected a black Nike backpack containing currency, black tennis shoes,
a pair of black pants with the belt still buckled, a Nissan key, two black
gloves, one white glove, and one blue glove from Mr. Jackson's residence.
See, Exhibit E, Tr. of Jury Trial, Day One at 110–132. Ms. Holzer
testified that the black shoes in evidence are a men's size 11-1/2. Id.
Along with the pants and black shoes is a white shoe which is a men's
size 11. Id. The State inquired, "[s]o the black shoes located and the shoe
in the closet are different sizes" and Ms. Holzer answered in the
affirmative. Id. at 131. Defendant was located by law enforcement at Mr.
Jackson's residence. During deliberations, the jury asked about
Defendant's shoe and pant size. See, Exhibit F, Tr. of Jury Trial, Day
Two, at 404–405.
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Ward testified that he deposed Ms.
Holzer and she stated that a black pair of Dickies pants had a 34" waist
and a 34" inseam. See, Exhibit G, Tr. of Evidentiary Hearing at 19. Mr.
Ward's strategy was to say Mr. Jackson was the individual involved and
not Defendant. Id. at 19-20. Mr. Jackson predeceased the trial and so
evidence of Mr. Jackson's height and weight was discovered from a
nonrelated booking photo and his driver's license. Id. Defendant's height
was found on the Information and Mr. Ward stated that when he stood
next to Defendant, he believed Defendant to be 6"3'. Id.
Mr. Ward explained there is a five-inch height difference between
Mr. Jackson and Defendant. Id. at 21. An inseam of 34" concerned Mr.
Ward because he is 6 feet tall with an inseam of 32 inches. Id. "So a 34-
inch inseam would imply that the person that was wearing the pants was
over 6 feet tall. So it wasn't my interest to try and introduce that
information." Id. Defendant testified at trial and Mr. Ward inquired if the
black pants and shoes belonged to Defendant to which Defendant
answered in the negative. Id. at 22. Mr. Ward stated, "I didn't want to go
into the sizes." Id.
The Court finds Mr. Ward's representation was reasonable as set
forth under Strickland. Also under Strickland, Defendant has failed to
establish how he was prejudiced. Ground two of Defendant's Motion
lacks merit and is denied.
(Doc. 9-1 at 1278–80). Mr. Rodney appealed and the Fifth DCA affirmed the denial
of this ground. (Doc. 9-1 at 1548–49).
The trial court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application
of, clearly established law. First, the court identified Strickland as the ineffective
assistance of counsel standard. (Doc. 9-1 at 1278). Next, the state court analyzed Mr.
Rodney’s claim to determine whether he suffered any prejudice due to his counsel’s
actions. Id. at 1279–80. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
made the following findings:
Okay. All right. Based upon everything that I have reviewed and
hearing Mr. Ward’s testimony today, I do not find him to be ineffective.
I do not think, Mr. Rodney, that you have presented sufficient evidence
to support Mr. Ward being ineffective.
Had he investigated the shoe size and the pant size more
thoroughly, it would likely have been harmful to you, and that is what he
testified to. I was the judge who presided over the trial and I agree that
that would have been nothing but harmful to you under the
circumstances.
I think Mr. Ward’s trial strategy was more than reasonable,
especially considering the facts of this case, and all of the other evidence
that the jury had to consider against you. His trial strategy specifically
related to not investigating the shoe and the pant size further was very
reasonable to protect you under the circumstances.
I think based upon my memory of the trial, that Mr. Ward did
everything he possibly could have to argue that Keith Jackson, Jr. was
the person who committed the robbery. I don't know of anything more
he could have done. And, like I said, had he investigated the shoe size
and the pant size any more in depth, I do believe it would have probably
convinced the jury even more of your guilt.
There was a lot of other evidence that was relied upon. This
particular part of the evidence was a smart decision on Mr. Ward's part
not to focus on it and to put the blame back on the state for not
investigating more thoroughly. And that is exactly his job. I think
pointing out that the phone was in the pocket and that the state didn't do
any other further investigation into anything to identify who the pants
belonged to was a very smart choice on his part.
So I'm gonna deny your motion. I do not find that you have
established prejudice. In addition, to not showing that Mr. Ward was
ineffective, you've not established any prejudice as a result of it, especially
in light of the circumstances of the case.
(Doc. 9-1 at 1272–74). Thus, the state court correctly identified Strickland as the
controlling law and properly applied it to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. See Robinson v. Moore, 300 F.3d 1320, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that, “[i]t
is well established that the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland is the controlling
legal authority to be applied to ineffective assistance of counsel claims”) (quotation
omitted). Finally, because Mr. Rodney offers no evidence that the state court’s
decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented,” he has not met his burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the state court’s factual findings were incorrect. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2), (e)(1). Accordingly, Ground One is denied.
B. Ground Two
Mr. Rodney claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and
present the nexus of the evidence during the State’s motion in limine to exclude
relevant evidence that supported his defense theory. (Doc. 1 at 4–6). Mr. Rodney
claims that the robbery was committed by KJ. Id. at 4–5. In this case, the Dollar
General robbery, a nine-millimeter Sig Sauer handgun with a scratched off serial
number was found in the van used in the robbery. Id. Months after the Dollar General
robbery, KJ was killed during the course of a home invasion robbery that he was
committing. Id. at 5. KJ was using a “forty five sig sauer with a scratched off serial
number.” Id. The trial court denied trial counsel’s attempt to introduce the home
invasion and firearm introduced at trial to show that KJ committed the Dollar General
robbery. Id. Mr. Rodney claims that trial counsel failed to investigate and present
evidence that the guns used in the crimes were both simultaneously stolen from a
detective’s vehicle. Id.
Mr. Rodney raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion. (Doc. 9-1 at 991–96).
The trial court summarily denied it:
Defendant argues that his trial attorney, Jacques Ward ("Mr.
Ward"), provided ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to
"investigate and present the nexus of the evidence during the State's
Motion in Limine to exclude exculpatory evidence .... " See, Exhibit D,
Motion for Postconviction Relief. According to Defendant, salient
evidence was prohibited that showed Keith Jackson, Jr. had committed
a similar crime and possessed a similar firearm. More specifically,
Defendant asserts (1) the firearms used here, and in Mr. Jackson's home
invasion case were Sig Sauers with altered serial numbers; (2) both
firearms were used in crimes where Mr. Jackson was a suspect; and (3)
both firearms "were stolen arising from the same car burglary of a law
enforcement officer." Id.
On April 16, 2021, the State filed a Motion in Limine asking the
Court to prohibit any references to Mr. Jackson's character and prohibit
the introduction of evidence of Mr. Jackson's possession of drugs and/or
firearms. See, Exhibit E, State's Motion in Limine. Mr. Ward filed a
Response in which he argued reverse Williams Rule evidence is
appropriate and compared the current case to a case in which Mr.
Jackson committed a home invasion and was killed by the victim in self-
defense. See, Exhibit F, Defendant's Response to State's Motion for Order
in Limine. At the hearing on the State's Motion in Limine, a discussion
ensued pertaining to the evidence collected at Mr. Jackson's residence.
Mr. Ward stated that Defendant was at Mr. Jackson's residence when
law enforcement arrived after following a GPS-tracker located in the
stolen money from Dollar General. Id. at 12.
[MR. WARD:] They [Law Enforcement Officers] -- they --
they go into the [Mr. Jackson's] bedroom where the two
black males have been located. They see the - I believe, the
handle of a shotgun sticking out from under the bed. There's
a rifle in the corner. There's a -- a handgun on the dresser.
And what I'm getting at, Judge, is it's not just that --
I think what the State is suggesting is that it's two separate
crimes. So if Keith Jackson, Jr. is running a -- a drug
operation from his bedroom, and I believe the State is
suggesting that's completely separate.
…
We're saying that the evidence is that he [Mr.
Jackson] was a person of interest in the investigation. They
decided, in light of all this information, to only go after
Rolando Rodney. And, Judge, what happens is, is Mr.
Camuccio had the case before Madam Prosecutor, and
when he was aware of the defense, he specifically had the
DNA from Mr. Keith Jackson, Jr. tested, because he said,
okay, you're going to say this other guy did it and I'm going
to exclude him. I'm going to do everything -- and to get
evidence to show that he's not the person, that we got the
right person.
And so what happens is, in my client's vehicle, they
see clothing, but also in Keith Jackson, Jr. 's closet, there is
clothing. So there's a pair of pants they believe that was
worn in the robbery in Keith Jackson, Jr. 's bedroom. But in
the back of Rolando Rodney's vehicle, there is like, you
know, a jacket, a -- a hat, and they find a gun also. They test
-- they believe that the hat and the gun that were found,
supposedly, in Rolando Rodney's vehicle was used in the
crime. They test it for DNA and it comes back. They say
Rolando Rodney's DNA is on the hat and the gun. And
then when they compare Keith Jackson, Jr.'s DNA to the
hat and the gun, they say that we cannot necessarily include
him or exclude him from this mixture.
…
The next part of the defense is, I think the State is
trying to get us to not be able to present, is six months later
there is a home invasion robbery [by Mr. Jackson] wherein
Keith Jackson, Jr. is - is killed.
Now, Judge, there are similarities. There is the
robber wore gloves. The robber had a mask. And, better yet,
Judge, in the - in our case, they say inside this Nissan Quest
that Rolando Rodney [Defendant] was driving, I believe
they said to the left of the center console, they find a Sig
Sauer handgun with the serial number that was scraped off
that had been reported stolen in a Marion County case. Six
months later, when Keith Jackson, Jr. is killed while
committing a home invasion robbery. He is found deceased.
Next to his hand is a Sig Sauer handgun with the serial
number scraped off that had also been reported stolen in a
Marion County case.
THE COURT: Not the same gun?
MR. WARD: Not the same gun –
THE COURT: Just –
MR. WARD: -- but the same circumstances.
THE COURT: -- same make and model and the same
scratched off serial number?
MR. WARD: It was a Sig Sauer black handgun with the
serial number scraped off. Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WARD: And it's -- it -- I'm arguing, Judge, that -- my
motion, I -- I -- I had put arguments into it. I didn't know
that the Court wanted us to repeat our arguments. That's
why it's just -- at this point, it's -- I have where it says, where
evidence tends in any way, even indirectly, to establish a
reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, it is error to deny its
admission.
See, Exhibit G, Tr. of Hr'ing at 7-12.
The State argued, "[t]hese two crimes are not so similar that you
could argue it's the same modus operandi, which I think is pretty much
what they're [Defense] alluding to." Id. at 22. The State explains
[t]hey're seven months apart. They're completely unrelated
people involved. One is a very quick robbery with a firearm
of a Dollar General, a single person takes -- we're assuming
he took a van. The other is four people park both of their
vehicles outside of a residence hidden in the woods. They
all are masked up. They all have gloves on. They barge into
this person's residence. There's a shootout. That's much
different than a quick convenience store robbery.
Id. The Court agreed with the State and explained "[t]he marijuana and
the guns and other evidence at Mr. Jackson's house, those are not coming
in. That has no bearing on this case and the robbery of the Dollar
General, except just to cast bad character evidence against Mr. Jackson."
Id. at 27.
This Court finds Mr. Ward did sufficiently argue for the
admittance of the evidence from Mr. Jackson's home invasion case. Mr.
Ward explained that Mr. Jackson's gun was the same model, had the
same scratched off serial number, and was reportedly stolen in a Marion
County case. Under Strickland, Mr. Ward was not ineffective in his
representation. Even if Mr. Ward had been allowed to present that both
firearms were stolen out of a law enforcement officer's vehicle, and any
evidence from Mr. Jackson's home invasion case, the outcome is unlikely
to have been different. Defendant has failed to establish how he was
prejudiced. Claim one of Defendant's Motion lacks merit and is denied.
(Doc. 9-1 at 1063–67). Mr. Rodney appealed and the Fifth DCA affirmed the denial
of this ground. (Doc. 9-1 at 1548–49).
The state court’s denial of this ground is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable
application of, Strickland. The state court found the trial counsel did sufficiently argue
for the admittance of the evidence from KJ’s home invasion case and determined that
even if it was presented, the outcome was unlikely to have been different. Accordingly,
Ground Two is denied under § 2254(d).
C. Ground Three
Mr. Rodney claims that the trial court denied his constitutional right to due
process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by erroneously granting the
State’s motion in limine regarding the evidence of a home invasion robbery that KJ
was involved in. (Doc. 1 at 6). On direct appeal, Mr. Rodney raised a version of this
claim, arguing “[t]he proof the court excluded would have illustrated the validity of
Appellant’s theory of defense, and the ruling on the pretrial motion in limine
amounted to an abuse of discretion and to reversible error.” (Doc. 9-1 at 927–28).
Specifically, Mr. Rodney claimed that the trial court erred by excluding “reverse
Williams Rule” evidence.1 Id. at 927–33. However, the appellate briefs exclusively cited
Florida law, all his substantive arguments addressed state law, and did not raise or
otherwise indicate that he intended to raise federal constitutional issues. See Baldwin v.
1 Evidence of collateral crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by a suspect other than the accused
may be admissible as reverse Williams Rule evidence to show the defendant's innocence by
proof of the guilt of another. McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 2002).
Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004); see also McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302–03 (11th
Cir. 2005) (holding that “‘[t]he exhaustion doctrine requires a habeas applicant to do
more than scatter some makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court record’”)
(citations omitted)). The requirement of exhaustion mandates that the precise issues
set forth in the federal petition must have been presented to the state courts. Heath v.
Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 818 (11th Cir. 1989); Nothing in Mr. Rodney’s appellate
arguments would have alerted the state court to the presence of a federal claim about
due process. Accordingly, this claim is unexhausted.
Alternately, Mr. Rodney predicated this claim on the assertion that the trial
court misinterpreted and/or misapplied Florida law. As such, “it is not the province
of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law
questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S 62, 67–68 (1991). It is “a fundamental principle
that state courts are the final arbiters of state law, and federal habeas courts should not
second-guess them on such matters.” Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338,
1355 (11th Cir. 2005). In reviewing the evidentiary determination of a state trial judge,
the federal court does not sit as a “‘super’ state Supreme Court.” Shaw v. Boney, 695
F.2d 528, 530 (11th Cir. 1983). So, for the purpose of this case, even if the trial court
and the appellate court got it wrong, it is not for a federal habeas court to review that
determination. And that is true even though the petition is “couched in terms of …
due process.” Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
Thus, this claim is not cognizable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED. The Clerk will enter judgment
for Respondents and against Mr. Rodney and close this case. The Court denies a
certificate of appealability, as Mr. Rodney has not made a substantial showing of a
denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Because Mr. Rodney is not
entitled to such a certificate, the Court will not grant in forma pauperis status for an
appeal.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on July 6, 2026.
lite,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Pro Se Party
Counsel of Record
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