Guzman

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 CORTEZ WASHINGTON, Case No.: 25cv2007-DMS-JAC

CDCR #AI-3100,

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ORDER:

Plaintiff,

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vs. (1) DISMISSING ALL CLAIMS

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AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS

WARDEN GUZMAN,

15 EXCEPT DEFENDANT GUZMAN,

Defendant. and

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17 (2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO

EFFECT SERVICE OF SUMMONS

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AND SECOND AMENDED

19 COMPLAINT ON DEFENDANT

GUZMAN PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(d) & Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)

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22 Plaintiff Cortez Washington is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

23 pauperis (“IFP”) in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On November

24 17, 2025, the Court screened his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) &

25 1915A(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Court found the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which

26 relief could be granted, notified Plaintiff of its pleading deficiencies, and dismissed it with

27 leave to amend. (Id. at 5-11.) On February 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First Amended

28 Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 7.)

1 On April 13, 2026, the Court screened the FAC, found that it plausibly alleged claims

2 against Defendant Guzman but not against any other Defendant, and provided Plaintiff

3 with the option of amending or proceeding only against Guzman. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff

4 has now filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (ECF No. 10.)

5 I. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

6 A. Standard of Review

7 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP, his SAC requires a pre-Answer

8 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). The Court must sua sponte

9 dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails

10 to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. Lopez v. Smith, 203

11 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.

12 Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

13 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon

14 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of

15 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d

16 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir.

17 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the

18 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”) Rule

19 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state

20 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009),

21 quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

22 B. Allegations in the FAC

23 Plaintiff identifies himself as “an Ordained Christian Clergyman with sincerely held

24 religious beliefs prohibiting: exposure of his naked body to members of the opposite sex;

25 public nudity outside marital context; sexualized viewing or recording of his unclothed

26 body,” all of which he identifies as central tenants of his faith. (ECF No. 10 at 3.) Plaintiff

27 states that his work assignment requires daily movement through the prison work exchange

28 area, during which he is subjected to daily routine strip searches before and after work,

1 without individualized suspicion or privacy screens, under video surveillance, and in open

2 areas in view of inmates and prison personnel, including female personnel. (Id. at 3-4.)

3 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Correctional Officers Leon, Martinez, Sousa, Avila and

4 Rubio have routinely ordered him to fully disrobe in front of persons of the opposite gender

5 over his objections, made “inappropriate remarks about Plaintiff’s penis and religion,” and

6 “used verbal, sexual and racially degrading remarks.” (Id. at 4-5.) He was forced to “swipe

7 his genitals with his hands and then place his hands in his mouth for mouth checks,” and

8 spread his buttocks, all of which resulted in trauma for which he is seeking mental health

9 treatment. (Id. at 5.) “Plaintiff asked Defendants why he was being singled out which

10 Defendants Martinez, Sousa, Rubio, Leon stated: because people like you write 602’s and

11 tell our supervisors.” (Id. at 6.)

12 Plaintiff claims the Defendants’ actions violated his right to the free exercise of his

13 religion under the First Amendment (claim one), that their failure to use the least restrictive

14 means to effect the purpose of the searches violated the Religious Land Use and

15 Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) (claim two), the searches were unreasonable in

16 violation of the Fourth Amendment (claim three), the sexual humiliation and abuse

17 constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment (claim

18 four), the searches were retaliatory in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments

19 (claim five), Warden Guzman acting in his supervisory capacity failed to prevent the

20 violations (claim six), and his rights were violated under state law. (Id. at 7-8.)

21 C. Discussion

22 1. Claim One – First Amendment Free Exercise

23 To state a First Amendment claim for interference with religious activities, a

24 prisoner must plausibly allege that an official took an action which: (a) “substantially

25 burdens the person’s practice of [his] religion” and (b) was not “reasonably related to

26 legitimate penological interests.” Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031-33 (9th Cir.

27 2015), quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 432, 248 (1987). “A substantial

28 burden exists where the governmental authority puts substantial pressure on an adherent to

1 modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Int’l Church of Foursquare Gospel v. City

2 of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

3 Plaintiff has alleged that he has a sincerely held belief, rooted in religion, not to have

4 his naked body viewed by members of the opposite sex. He further alleges that Warden

5 Guzman, in his supervisory capacity, failed to grant his request to modify the strip search

6 policy to provide for modesty, and in so doing put substantial pressure on Plaintiff to

7 modify his behavior to violate his beliefs by forcing him to submit to a strip search viewed

8 by female officers if he wished to continue with his prison employment. These allegations

9 are sufficient to survive the low threshold of passing screening for a First Amendment free

10 exercise claim against Warden Guzman. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at

11 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Lewis v. Soto, 2017 WL 11469999, at *6 (C.D. Cal.

12 2017) (strip search of male inmate intentionally conducted by a female officer and in the

13 presence of other inmates including male and female officers in violation of sincerely held

14 religious objection to appearing naked in front of the opposite sex plausibly alleged a free

15 exercise claim), citing Dean v. Hazewood, 2011 WL 4543080, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (same

16 as to routine strip searches at the end of each work shift). Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled

17 to have the U.S. Marshal effect service of the summons and SAC against Defendant

18 Warden Guzman. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve

19 all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court

20 may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal . . . if the

21 plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”)

22 Plaintiff once again fails to identify what action each remaining Defendant took to

23 violate his free exercise right. Defendants Correctional Officers Leon, Martinez, Sousa,

24 Avila and Rubio are alleged to have routinely ordered him to fully disrobe in front of

25 persons of the opposite gender over his objections, made “inappropriate remarks about

26 Plaintiff’s penis and religion,” and “used verbal, sexual and racially degrading remarks.”

27 (ECF No. 10 at 4-5.) Plaintiff groups these Defendants together as engaging in that alleged

28 conduct, but does not identify who made each remark or when they were made. Plaintiff

1 was instructed in the prior dismissal order (see ECF No. 8 at 6), that “[a]s a general rule,

2 when a pleading fails ‘to allege what role each Defendant played in the alleged harm,’ this

3 ‘makes it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for individual Defendants to respond to

4 Plaintiffs’ allegations.’” Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Blue Source Grp. Inc., 125 F.Supp.3d 945, 964

5 (N.D. Cal. 2015), quoting In re iPhone Application Litig., 2011 WL 4403963, at *8 (N.D.

6 Cal. 2011). “Accordingly, a complaint which ‘lump(s) together . . . multiple defendants in

7 one broad allegation fails to satisfy (the) notice requirement of Rule 8(a)(2).’” Id., quoting

8 Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Amoco Corp., 926 F. Supp. 948, 961 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (“[C]onfusion of

9 which claims apply to which defendants would require that the complaint be dismissed

10 with leave to file an amended complaint.”) Plaintiff has failed to cure that defect of

11 pleading. Even if he could, he was also informed that he failed to allege that any Defendant,

12 other than Warden Guzman, had the authority to alter the privacy aspects of the strip search

13 policy which allegedly burdens the exercise of his beliefs, and was instructed that he must

14 set forth facts which plausibly allege these Defendants knew of, and could have but

15 deliberately refused to accommodate, his request for privacy. (ECF No. 8 at 6.) Plaintiff

16 has not cured that defect of pleading in the SAC. Although he alleges he informed these

17 Defendants of his privacy requests (ECF No. 10 at 4), there are once again no allegations

18 they were in a position to accommodate them. Because it is now clear he is unable to cure

19 this pleading defect, the First Amendment claims against all Defendants other than Guzman

20 are dismissed without further leave to amend. See Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for

21 the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing futility of amendment as

22 a proper basis for dismissal without leave to amend).

23 Accordingly, the First Amendment free exercise claim in the SAC is dismissed sua

24 sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim without

25 further leave to amend as to all Defendants except Warden Guzman. Watison, 668 F.3d at

26 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Schmier, 279 F.3d at 824.

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1 2. Claim Two – RULIPA

2 Plaintiff alleges the policy of female officers monitoring strip searches of inmates

3 coming and going from the work area to the general population violates RULIPA because

4 performing them without a privacy option is not the least restrictive means of achieving

5 the penological objective of the searches. (ECF No. 10 at 6.) RLUIPA provides that “[n]o

6 government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing

7 in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general

8 applicability,” unless the government demonstrates the burden is “in furtherance of a

9 compelling government interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that

10 compelling governmental interest.” Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2015),

11 quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a). “To state a claim under RLUIPA, a prisoner must show

12 that: (1) he takes part in a ‘religious exercise,’ and (2) the State’s actions have substantially

13 burdened that exercise.” Id., quoting Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 888-89 (9th Cir.

14 2008). To constitute a substantial burden, the alleged limitation on religious practice must

15 impose “a ‘significantly great’ restriction or onus upon such exercise.” San Jose Christian

16 Coll., 360 F.3d at 1034. “RLUIPA requires the government to meet the much stricter

17 burden of showing that the burden it imposes on religious exercise is in furtherance of a

18 compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that

19 compelling governmental interest.” Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 986 (9th

20 Cir. 2008) (internal quote marks omitted).

21 RLUIPA does not allow a plaintiff to recover damages, only injunctive relief. Jones

22 v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). A RLUIPA claim may not be maintained

23 against prison officials in their individual capacities; the proper defendant is an official

24 sued in their official capacity. Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public

25 Safety, 600 U.S. ___, ___, 2026 WL 1791277, at *6 (2006); Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899,

26 904 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Warden Guzman, in his official

27 capacity, has placed a substantial burden on the practice of his religion by refusing to

28 provide less restrictive means to conduct the strip searches so that his naked body is not

1 viewed by female personnel, and seeks to enjoin that practice. (ECF No. 10 at 8.) These

2 allegations are sufficient to survive the low threshold of passing screening for a RLUIPA

3 claim against Warden Guzman in his official capacity. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112;

4 Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff has not, and it is now clear

5 that he cannot, state a RLUIPA claim against any other Defendant.

6 Accordingly, the RLUIPA claim in the SAC is dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28

7 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim without further leave to amend

8 as to all Defendants except Warden Guzman in his official capacity. Watison, 668 F.3d at

9 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Schmier, 279 F.3d at 824.

10 3. Claim Three – Fourth Amendment Unreasonable Search

11 Plaintiff claims the searches were unreasonable in violation of the Fourth

12 Amendment. (ECF No. 10 at 7.) The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable

13 searches, and “its protections are not extinguished upon incarceration.” Jordan v. Gardner,

14 986 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993), citing Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333

15 (9th Cir. 1988) (prisoners retain a limited right to bodily privacy which is not violated by

16 routine body cavity searches when leaving or returning to their housing unit). The analysis

17 for a Fourteenth Amendment bodily privacy claim “largely mirrors” a Fourth Amendment

18 analysis. Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2017).

19 Strip searches of prisoners are constitutional if they are reasonable. See Nunez v.

20 Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 2010). Strip-search procedures are not reasonable

21 if they are abusive, vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any legitimate penological

22 interest. Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332, citing Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559. The Court must

23 consider the following factors in assessing the reasonableness of the strip search policy:

24 (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the

25 legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it”; (2) “whether there are

26 alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates”; (3) “the

27 impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other

28 inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) the “absence of ready

1 alternatives,” or whether the rule at issue is an “exaggerated response to prison concerns.”

2 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1987). Whether a search is reasonable under the

3 Fourth Amendment requires a case-by-case balancing of the need for the particular search

4 against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails, and courts are required to

5 consider such factors as (1) the scope of the particular intrusion, (2) the manner in which

6 it is conducted, (3) the justification for initiating it, and (4) the place in which it is

7 conducted. Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Dep., 629 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2011)

8 (en banc). The Byrd court recognized there are special concerns associated with cross-

9 gender searches in applying the Turner balancing test, considering such things as intimate

10 contact and touching of genitals, the lack of an emergency, how many inmates and officers

11 viewed the searches, if they were videotaped, the lack of justification for the cross-gender

12 search as opposed to the routine justification for any search. Id. at 1142-43.

13 Plaintiff has plausibly alleged his routine strip searches, during which he was viewed

14 by inmates and prison officers, some of whom are female, and monitored or recorded on

15 video, all without any effort to accommodate even the most modest privacy concerns, and

16 during which he was subjected to unnecessary humiliation and abuse, were unreasonable

17 within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. These allegations are sufficient to survive

18 the low threshold of passing screening for a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim

19 against Warden Guzman in his individual capacity, as he is alleged to have known of and

20 refused to alter the manner in which the searches were conducted despite having the

21 authority to do so. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S.

22 at 678. Plaintiff has not identified in the SAC any other Defendant who took actions which

23 rendered the searches unreasonable. Rather, as noted above and in the Court’s prior

24 dismissal order, he lumps the remaining Defendants together as having made the harassing

25 comments without specific allegations, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the

26 individual Defendants to respond to the allegations in the SAC. Adobe Sys. Inc., 125

27 F.Supp.3d at 964; Gen-Probe, Inc., 926 F. Supp. at 961 (“[C]onfusion of which claims

28 apply to which defendants would require that the complaint be dismissed with leave to file

1 an amended complaint.”) In addition, as noted, the SAC, like the prior versions of the

2 complaint, fails to include any allegations that any Defendant other than Warden Guzman

3 had the authority to alter the manner in which the searches were conducted, merely that the

4 other Defendants made degrading and humiliating comments during the searches which

5 Plaintiff primarily contends were humiliating due to the lack of privacy. Plaintiff alleges

6 he complained to Defendants John Does 1-2 (ECF No. 10 at 5), but there are no allegations

7 these Defendants had authority over the manner in which the searches were conducted.

8 Because Plaintiff has been repeatedly instructed on these same pleading defects and has

9 failed to cure them in the SAC, the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim is

10 dismissed without further leave to amend as to all Defendants except Guzman. Schmier,

11 279 F.3d at 824.

12 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim is dismissed sua sponte pursuant

13 to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) without further leave to amend for failure to state

14 a claim as to all Defendants except Warden Guzman. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm,

15 680 F.3d at 1121; Schmier, 279 F.3d at 824.

16 4. Claim Four – Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment

17 Plaintiff claims the Defendants caused him to suffer cruel and unusual punishment

18 in violation of the Eighth Amendment with embarrassing and degrading verbal harassment

19 which caused him fear and anxiety. (ECF No. 10 at 7.) “[A] prison official violates the

20 Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must

21 be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994),

22 quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Second, Plaintiff must allege the prison

23 official he seeks to hold liable had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” that is, “one of

24 ‘deliberate indifference’ to” his constitutional rights. Id., quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-

25 03. “An objectively serious deprivation is a denial of ‘the minimal civilized measures of

26 life’s necessities.’” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996), quoting Rhodes

27 v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).

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1 “[T]he Eighth Amendment’s protections do not necessarily extend to mere verbal

2 sexual harassment.” Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004). “Although

3 the Ninth Circuit has recognized that sexual harassment may constitute a cognizable claim

4 for an Eighth Amendment violation, the court has specifically differentiated between

5 sexual harassment that involves verbal abuse and that which involves allegations of

6 physical assault, finding [only] the latter to be in violation of the constitution.” Minifield

7 v. Butikofer, 298 F. Supp. 2d 900, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2004), citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204

8 F.3d 1187, 1198 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, to state a claim for sexual harassment, Plaintiff

9 must allege “that a prison staff member, acting under color of law and without legitimate

10 penological justification, touched the prisoner in a sexual manner or otherwise engaged in

11 sexual conduct for the staff member’s own sexual gratification, or for the purpose of

12 humiliating, degrading, or demeaning the prisoner.” Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130,

13 1144 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2012) (an

14 allegation that a correctional officer sexually touched and harassed prisoner during a strip

15 search “in a manner designed to demean and humiliate” can state a claim).

16 As Plaintiff has twice been instructed (see ECF No. 4 at 11; ECF No. 8 at 13), the

17 allegations that Defendants made sexual and degrading remarks but never touched him fail

18 to plausibly allege an Eighth Amendment violation. Bearchild, 947 F.3d at 1144; Somers

19 v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (“To hold that gawking, pointing, and joking

20 violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment would trivialize the objective

21 component of the Eighth Amendment test and render it absurd.”); id. at 622-24 (Eighth

22 Amendment did not prohibit female guards from performing visual body cavity searches

23 on male inmates or watching male inmates shower, even where guards allegedly pointed,

24 joked, and “gawked” at inmate); Wilson v. Soto, 2016 WL 825194, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan.

25 21, 2016) (allegations of strip search in the presence of other inmates and female officers

26 insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim), report and recommendation adopted,

27 2016 WL 827747 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2016); Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171 (“Although prisoners

28 have a right to be free from sexual abuse, whether at the hands of fellow inmates or prison

1 guards, the Eighth Amendment’s protections do not necessarily extend to mere verbal

2 sexual harassment.”) (citations omitted); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th

3 Cir. 1987) (“Verbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional

4 deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”)

5 Even assuming the degrading comments could possibly rise to the level of an Eighth

6 Amendment violation, see e.g. Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1092 (a claim based on verbal

7 harassment can succeed if the offending comments were “gross even for a prison setting

8 and were calculated to and did cause [plaintiff] psychological damage.”), Plaintiff was

9 previously informed that he was required to identify which Defendant made which

10 comment (ECF No. 8 at 6), but continues to fail to do so in the SAC. Plaintiff has been

11 informed of these pleading defects and has failed to cure them in the SAC, and it is now

12 clear he is unable to state an Eighth Amendment claim.

13 Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim in the

14 SAC is dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) for failure

15 to state a claim without further leave to amend. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680

16 F.3d at 1121; Schmier, 279 F.3d at 824.

17 5. Claim Five – Retaliation

18 Plaintiff claims Defendants Martinez, Sousa, Rubio, Leon and Avila “retaliated

19 against Plaintiff as described in this complaint for protected conduct.” (ECF No. 10 at 7.)

20 “Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials,”

21 Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114, and retaliation against a prisoner for filing grievances is an

22 independent constitutional violation. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir.

23 2009). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails

24 five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

25 inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

26 the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably

27 advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th

28 Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted).

1 Plaintiff must allege a retaliatory motive, that is, a causal connection between the

2 adverse action and his protected conduct. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1114; Soranno’s Gasco,

3 Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff must show that the protected

4 conduct was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor in the defendant’s decision to act). To

5 do so, an inmate must allege a specific causal link between a defendant’s retaliatory

6 conduct and the exercise of a constitutional right. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807-08

7 (9th Cir. 1995). Because direct evidence of retaliatory intent is “rarely” available, Watison,

8 668 F.3d at 1114, a plaintiff may do so either with direct evidence of a defendant’s

9 retaliatory motive, or with circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s knowledge of the

10 protected conduct plus some other evidence of retaliatory intent, such as “(1) proximity in

11 time between protected speech and the alleged retaliation; (2) (that) the (defendant)

12 expressed opposition to the speech; (or) (3) other evidence that the reasons proffered by

13 the (defendant) for the adverse . . . action were false and pretextual.” McCollum v. Cal.

14 Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 647 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2011).

15 The only allegations in the FAC that any defendant took any adverse action because

16 of Plaintiff’s complaints or prison grievances, or that they were a substantial or motivating

17 factor in the decision to abuse and humiliate him during the searches, include that when

18 Plaintiff questioned why he was being singled out, “Defendants Martinez, Sousa, Rubio,

19 Leon stated: because people like you write 602’s and tell our supervisors.” (ECF No. 10

20 at 6.) Prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for filing grievances. Bruce v.

21 Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 2003). However, Plaintiff fails to identify which

22 Defendant told him he was being singled out for humiliating treatment due to filing which

23 grievance. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry into

24 causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each

25 individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional

26 deprivation.”) Plaintiff has twice been informed of this same pleading deficiency, and was

27 informed that if he wished to proceed with a retaliation claim he must set forth factual

28 allegations identifying what action each Defendant took which he contends was retaliatory

1 and the protected activity which triggered the retaliation. (ECF No. 4 at 6-7; ECF No. 8 at

2 11.) Assuming Plaintiff refers to the grievance he filed with the Warden complaining of

3 the searches as the motivation for the other Defendants’ harassing and vulgar comments,

4 the SAC again fails to include specific factual allegations as which Defendant made which

5 comments. Plaintiff also once again fails to allege the searches themselves were conducted

6 out of retaliation for that grievance, as he has consistently referred to the searches as

7 routine. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that a complaint is subject to dismissal for

8 failure to state a claim if it does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

9 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and the “mere possibility of misconduct”

10 falls short of meeting this plausibility standard.)

11 The First Amendment retaliation claim in the FAC is dismissed sua sponte pursuant

12 to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) without further leave to amend for failure to state

13 a claim. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121; Schmier, 279 F.3d at 824.

14 6. Claim Six – Supervisor Liability

15 Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Warden Guzman liable as a supervisor, claiming

16 that: “Warden Guzman knowingly failed to correct ongoing constitutional violations.”

17 (ECF No. 10 at 8.) “A supervisory official is liable under § 1983 so long as there exists

18 either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a

19 sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

20 constitutional violation.” Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir.

21 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). A supervisor may “be liable in his individual

22 capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of

23 his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that

24 showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d

25 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018).

26 The SAC plausibly alleges Warden Guzman was aware of the manner in which the

27 strip searches were conducted and is responsible for the implementation of the strip search

28 policy but failed to correct the alleged constitutional violations as set forth above. The

1 SAC survives the low threshold of screening for supervisory liability against Guzman.

2 Keates, 883 F.3d at 1243; Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123.

3 7. Claim Seven – State Law Violations

4 Plaintiff once again invites the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state

5 law claims for violations of the Bane Act (California Civil Code § 52.1), and California

6 Code of Regulations, Title 15 §§ 3007, 3267, 3287. (ECF No. 10 at 7.)

7 To state a claim under California’s Bane Act, Plaintiff must plausibly allege

8 “intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or

9 legal right,” and that “the interference or attempted interference was by threats,

10 intimidation or coercion.” Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 67 (2015);

11 see Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that the

12 Bane Act “provides a cause of action for violations of a plaintiff’s state or federal civil

13 rights committed by ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion.’”), quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1.

14 For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has plausibly a First Amendment claim, and has

15 therefore alleged a Bane Act claim. See e.g. Guillen v. Carrillo, 2022 WL 902883, at *9

16 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022) (facts supporting a First Amendment claim also support a Bane

17 Act Claim); Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A state law claim

18 is part of the same case or controversy when it shares a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’

19 with the federal claims and the state and federal claims would normally be tried together.”);

20 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original

21 jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims

22 that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form

23 part of the same case or controversy.”)

24 However, a pleading requirement of a Bane Act claim is presentation of the claim to

25 the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, and the Board must

26 have acted on the claim, or a showing of circumstances excusing compliance. See Gleason

27 v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 2020 WL 3411390, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (“Compliance

28 with this ‘claim presentation requirement’ or, circumstances excusing compliance,

1 constitutes an element of a cause of action for damages against a public entity or official.”),

2 citing State of California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1244 (2004) and Karim-

3 Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988) (state tort

4 claims included in a federal civil rights action may not proceed if they were not first

5 presented to the state in compliance with the claim presentation requirement.) The Court

6 indicated it would accept supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim if he

7 amended to allege compliance with the claim presentation requirement. (ECF No. 8 at 15.)

8 However, there is no indication in the SAC that Plaintiff has complied with the presentation

9 requirement. Rather, he merely alleges he has exhausted administrative remedies through

10 the prison grievance procedures. (ECF No. 10 at 6.) The Court will therefore not at this

11 time accept supplemental jurisdiction over a Bane Act claim.

12 The Court will not accept supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under

13 California Code of Regulations, Title 15, §§ 3007, 3267, 3287, because there is no private

14 cause of action available under those provisions. See Davis v. Powell, 901 F.Supp.2d 1196,

15 1211 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (“There is no implied private right of action under title fifteen of the

16 California Code of Regulations.”)

17 II. Conclusion and Orders

18 Based on the foregoing, the Court:

19 1. DISMISSES all claims against all Defendants in the Second Amended

20 Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28

21 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) without further leave to amend with the exception of the

22 First Amendment free exercise claim, the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim,

23 and the RLUIPA claim against Defendant Warden Guzman.

24 2. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Second Amended

25 Complaint (Doc. No. 10) for Defendant Guzman and forward it to Plaintiff along with a

26 blank U.S. Marshal Form 285 for this Defendant. The Clerk will provide Plaintiff with

27 certified copies of his Second Amended Complaint and the summons so that he may serve

28 the Defendant. Upon receipt of this “In Forma Pauperis Package,” Plaintiff must complete

1 ||the USM Form 285 as completely and accurately as possible, include an address where

2 || Defendant may be found and/or subject to service pursuant to S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.1(c), and

3 ||return the form to the United States Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk

4 || provides in the letter accompanying the In Forma Pauperis Package.

5 3. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Second Amended

6 || Complaint and summons upon Defendant Guzman as directed by Plaintiff on the USM

7 Form 285 provided to him. All costs of that service will be advanced by the United States.

8 || See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).

9 4. ORDERS Defendant, once served, to reply to Plaintiff's Second Amended

10 ||Complaint and any subsequent pleading Plaintiff files in this matter in which Defendant is

11 ||named as a party within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rules of

12 ||Civil Procedure 12(a) and 15(a)(3). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while Defendant may

13 || occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner

14 || confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the

15 || Court has conducted its sua sponte screening Defendant is required to respond).

16 5. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service of the summons and Second Amended

17 Complaint, to serve upon Defendant, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon

18 ||Defendant’s counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document

19 ||submitted for the Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must

20 include with every original document he seeks to file with the Clerk, a certificate stating

21 manner in which a true and correct copy of that document has been served on Defendant

22 ||or Defendant’s counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2.

23 IT IS SO ORDERED.

24 || Dated: July 6, 2026 » Yim yw.

25 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw

%6 United States District Judge

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