Opinion

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 SILVESTRE PEREZ-PAREDES (A- Case No. 1:26-cv-3356-DC-JDP

Number: 094-811-315),

12

Petitioner,

13 ORDER; FINDINGS AND

v. RECOMMENDATIONS

14

WARDEN, et al.,

15

Respondents.

16

17 Petitioner Silvestre Perez-Paredes entered the United States at an unknown time and was

18 detained by ICE in 2025. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28

19 U.S.C. § 2241. For the following reasons, I recommend that the petition be granted and that

20 petitioner be afforded a bond hearing.

21 Background

22 Petitioner entered the United States at unknown time.1 ECF No. 7-1 at 1. There is no

23 allegation or evidence that, since his most recent entry into the country and prior to his current

24 detention, petitioner had been detained by immigration officers. In 2016, petitioner was denied a

25 U nonimmigrant visa. Id. at 4. Petitioner has suffered the following convictions: a DUI in 2001;

26 a DUI in 2018; and attempting to prevent a victim from testifying in 2025. ECF No. 7-2 at 7, 10,

27

1 Petitioner has previously been removed to Mexico on four occasions, most recently in

28 2010. ECF No. 7-1 at 4.

1 12. Additionally, petitioner’s criminal history includes the following arrests: disorderly conduct

2 relating to prostitution in 2005; possession of a controlled substance in 2006; possession of

3 marijuana for sale in 2009; willful cruelty to a child in 2017; battery against a spouse/ex-spouse

4 in 2024; and rape by means of force or fear in 2024. Id. at 8-9, 11-13.

5 In October 2025, petitioner was arrested and charged in California with unlawful

6 possession of tear gas, unlawful possession of paraphernalia, and appropriation of lost property.

7 ECF No. 7-1 at 2. The record does not establish the disposition of these charges. Upon his

8 release from local custody, petitioner was detained by ICE. Id. at 3. Since his detention,

9 petitioner has been denied a bond hearing. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 23; ECF No. 7 at 2.

10 Procedural History

11 On May 1, 2026, petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.2

12 ECF No. 1. On May 14, 2026, respondents filed an answer. ECF No. 7. Petitioner was

13 permitted to file a traverse by May 21, 2026. See ECF No. 6 at 2. Because petitioner did not file

14 a traverse by that deadline, the matter is deemed submitted. See id.

15 Legal Standard

16 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates

17 federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75

18 (2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of

19 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”

20 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a

21 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.

22 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of

23 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have

24 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction

25 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

26

27

2 Petitioner concurrently filed a motion for the appointment of counsel. ECF No. 2. In

28 light of my recommendation of that the case be closed, I will deny this motion.

1 Analysis

2 Respondents argue that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.

3 § 1225(b)(2)(A), as opposed to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).3 ECF No. 7 at

4 2. Under section 1225(b)(2)(A), applicants “seeking admission” to the United States are subject

5 to mandatory detention: “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the

6 examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and

7 beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained . . . .” 8 U.S.C.

8 § 1225(b)(2)(A). Critically, no bond hearing is provided for a noncitizen detained under this

9 section. Id. By contrast, “[u]nder § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, a detainee may

10 request a bond hearing before an [immigration judge] at any time before a removal order becomes

11 final.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022).

12 For decades, the government applied section 1226(a)—and not section 1225(b)(2)(A)—to

13 noncitizens apprehended in the interior of the United States. See id. at 1196 (“The provision at

14 issue in this case, 8 U.S.C. § 1226, provides the general process for arresting and detaining aliens

15 who are present in the United States and eligible for removal.”). In July 2025, however, the

16 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) revisited its legal position and now maintains that all

17 applicants for admission within the meaning of section 1225(a) are subject to mandatory

18 detention under section 1225(b). ECF No. 7 at 2 n.2. Respondents urge the court to follow suit

19 and find that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 1225(b)(2). Id. at 2.

20 This issue is one of statutory interpretation, and so I begin with the plain text of the

21 Immigration and Nationality Act. See United States v. Lillard, 935 F.3d 827, 833-34 (9th Cir.

22 2019). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for

23 admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not

24

3 As an initial matter, respondents request that the court hold this action “in abeyance

25

pending the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of” Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239 (W.D.

Wash. 2025). ECF No. 7 at 3. While the Court of Appeals’ decision may be instructive, a

26

somewhat unsettled legal landscape does not justify an indefinite stay. Moreover, because

27 respondents have filed an answer to the petition, it does not appear that they would suffer any

prejudice from the court presently ruling on the petition. Accordingly, respondents’ request is

28 denied.

1 clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained.” 8 U.S.C.

2 § 1225(b)(2)(A). There is only one exception to mandatory detention: a noncitizen may be

3 paroled into the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit”

4 under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018).

5 While the text of section 1225(b)(2)(A) limits its reach to applicants “seeking admission,”

6 section 1226(a) does not include the same qualifying language. Section 1226(a) provides that, for

7 a noncitizen who is arrested and detained “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General,” the

8 Attorney General (1) “may continue to detain” the arrested noncitizen, (2) “may release” the

9 noncitizen on “bond,” or (3) “may release” the noncitizen on “conditional parole.”4 8 U.S.C.

10 §§ 1226(a)(1)-(2).

11 The government urges the court to read section 1225(b)(2)(A) as using the terms

12 “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” interchangeably. ECF No. 7 at 2. According

13 to the government, all noncitizens who have not been admitted to the United States—i.e.,

14 “applicants for admission”—are necessarily “seeking admission” for purposes of section

15 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. Thus, the government contends, section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens

16 who are “applicants for admission.” Id.

17 I find that the government’s interpretation violates the rule against surplusage in three

18 ways. First, for section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention to apply, “a noncitizen must (1) be

19 an applicant for admission, (2) be ‘seeking admission’, and (3) be ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt

20 entitled to be admitted.’” J.S.H.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01309-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 2938808,

21 *11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025). If, as the government argues, all “applicants for admissions” were

22 also individuals “seeking admission,” the phrase “seeking admission” would be unnecessary. The

23 government’s reading, therefore, runs contrary to the rule against surplusage. See United States,

24 ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023) (“[E]very clause and word

25 of a statute should have meaning.”); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“[N]o clause,

26

4 Section 1226(c) mandates detention of noncitizens falling into “one of several

27 enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and terrorist activities.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at

289. Because respondents do not argue that this section governs petitioner’s detention, I do not

28 consider the applicability of this section.

1 sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”).

2 Second, the government’s reading cannot be squared with the text of section 1226. Were

3 it possible to interpret section 1225(b)(2)(A) in the manner favored by the government, section

4 1226(a)’s requirement that noncitizens be afforded bond hearings—arguably the section’s

5 centerpiece—would serve no purpose because the government would be allowed to detain all

6 “applicants for admission” under section 1225(b)(2)(A). Further, as noted, under section 1226(c),

7 Congress mandated the detention of certain categories of noncitizens. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). If, as

8 the government now contends, section 1225(b)(2)(A) can be applied to all noncitizens who are

9 inadmissible, section 1226(c) would also be superfluous.

10 Third, the Laken Riley Act (“LRA”)—passed in January 2025—would also be rendered

11 superfluous. The LRA amended section 1226(c) to add new categories of mandatory detention.

12 See Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3,

13 2025). Under the government’s theory of section 1225(b)(2)(A), the LRA would be unnecessary;

14 if mandatory detention for all unauthorized noncitizens were already permitted—and, in fact,

15 required—by section 1225(b)(2)(A), the amendment would be surplusage. “When Congress acts

16 to amend a statute, [courts] presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”

17 Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995).

18 Respondents’ theory, essentially, is that both sections 1226(a) and 1226(c) have been

19 taken out of commission, not by any new law or act of Congress, but by a shift in executive

20 branch policy. This interpretation collides squarely with the rule against surplusage. See Marx v.

21 Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013) (“[T]he canon against surplusage is strongest

22 when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.”).

23 I also find that the government’s interpretation runs contrary to the DHS’s longstanding

24 practice prior to July 2025. As noted, the government previously interpreted these provisions in

25 the manner argued by petitioner. Prior agency practice, though not dispositive, may inform this

26 court’s determination of law. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024)

27 (“[T]he longstanding practice of the government—like any other interpretive aid—can inform a

28 court’s determination of what the law is.”). Other courts have emphasized the persuasive value of

1 the DHS’s “longstanding agency practice.” See Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1259 (“Congress

2 enacted the LRA against the backdrop of longstanding agency practice applying Section 1226(a)

3 to inadmissible noncitizens already residing in the country.”).

4 Finally, I note that arguments substantially similar to those made by the government here

5 have been rejected by a large majority of district courts nationwide. See Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F.

6 Supp. 3d 1104, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (collecting cases). The government’s argument also runs

7 contrary to Jennings, which held that section 1225(b) “applies primarily to aliens seeking entry

8 into the United States,” whereas sections 1226(a) and (c) “authorize[] the Government to detain

9 certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings . . . .” 583 U.S.

10 at 289, 297. While the government’s interpretation was endorsed by the Board of Immigration

11 Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the persuasive power of an

12 agency ruling is limited. See Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 400.

13 Accordingly, because petitioner was detained in the interior of the United States, I find

14 that his detention is governed by section 1226(a) and not, as respondents argue, by section

15 1225(b). Given this finding, I must determine whether the appropriate relief is release or a bond

16 hearing. Petitioner requests release or, alternatively, a bond hearing. ECF No. 1 at 17.

17 Respondents do not address this issue. See ECF No. 7.

18 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[h]abeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful

19 executive detention,” and the “typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” Munaf v.

20 Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The Court has also observed, however, that “release need not

21 be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case in which the writ is granted.”

22 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008). “Indeed, common-law habeas corpus was, above

23 all, an adaptable remedy. Its precise application and scope changed depending upon the

24 circumstances.” Id.; see also Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968) (The federal habeas

25 statute “does not limit the relief that may be granted to discharge of the applicant from physical

26 custody”).

27 In analogous circumstances, courts in this Circuit have ordered both forms of relief. Some

28 courts have found that a bond hearing is the proper remedy. See Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at

1 1263 (“The Court finds that the specific harm Rodriguez alleges—that he is unlawfully barred

2 from receiving a bond hearing on the merits—is remedied by granting his request for a bond

3 hearing under Section 1226(a) and enjoining Defendants from denying bond on the basis that he

4 is detained under Section 1225(b)(2).”). Other courts have held that release is the proper remedy.

5 See Feng v. Lyons, No. 1:26-cv-0235-DJC-SCR, 2026 WL 472635, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19,

6 2026) (“Provision of a bond hearing after months of detention without the opportunity to seek

7 release on bond cannot be said to satisfy due process where that bond hearing is a matter of

8 statutory right.”).

9 Under the circumstances presented, I find that a bond hearing is proper. The harm

10 suffered by petitioner—not receiving the bond hearing to which he is statutorily entitled—is

11 remedied by providing that hearing. See Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1263. Moreover, Feng is

12 distinguishable from the instant action. There, the court found “no indication . . . of prima facie

13 evidence that Petitioner could be found to be a risk of flight or a danger to the community.”

14 Feng, 2026 WL 472635, at *1. The same cannot be said here. As noted, petitioner has been

15 convicted for attempting to prevent a victim from testifying and for two DUIs. ECF No. 7-2 at 7,

16 10, 12. He also has been arrested for disorderly conduct regarding prostitution, possession of a

17 controlled substance, possession of marijuana for sale, willful cruelty to a child, battery against a

18 spouse/ ex-spouse, rape by means of force or fear, unlawful possession of tear gas, unlawful

19 possession of paraphernalia, and appropriation of lost property. Id. at 8-9, 11-13.

20 While this evidence might prove insufficient for the immigration judge to deny bond, it is

21 sufficient to support the finding that “due process is satisfied if [p]etitioner is provided with a

22 post-deprivation bond hearing.” See Archundia v. Wofford, No. 1:26-cv-1452-DJC-CSK, 2026

23 WL 607977, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2026) (finding a bond hearing to be the proper remedy

24 where petitioner was previously arrested for “allegedly engaging in prostitution”) (citing

25 J.S.H.M., 2025 WL 2938808, at *15-16).

26

27

28

1 Conclusion

2 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that petitioner’s motion for the appointment of

3 | counsel, ECF No. 2, is DENIED.

4 Further, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

5 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be GRANTED.

6 2. Within seven days of this order, petitioner (A-Number: 094-811-315) be afforded a

7 | bond hearing before a neutral arbiter pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing

8 | regulations, at which petitioner’s eligibility for bond must be considered.

9 3. Respondents be ordered to file a status report, within five days of the bond hearing,

10 | confirming that the hearing occurred.

11 4. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.

12 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

13 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days of

14 || service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the

15 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to

16 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed

17 | within seven days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

18 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See

19 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

20 | 1991).

21

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ May 25, 2026 _————

24 JEREMY D. PETERSON

95 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

26

27

28