The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 PHONG TRANG TRAN NGUYEN (A- Case No. 1:26-cv-3106-DAD-JDP
Number: 079-868-912),
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Petitioner,
13 ORDER; FINDINGS AND
v. RECOMMENDATIONS
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WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY
15 DETENTION FACILITY,
16 Respondent.
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18 Petitioner Phong Trang Tran Nguyen is subject to a final order of removal dated March
19 20, 2026. ECF No. 7-1. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28
20 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that her detention violates the constitution. For the reasons outlined
21 below, I recommend that the petition be denied.
22 Background
23 Petitioner entered the United States at an unknown time. See ECF No. 2 at 2 (petitioner
24 alleging that she entered when she “was little”). Neither petitioner nor respondent has provided
25 information regarding when petitioner was detained by ICE, the reason for that detention, and
26 whether petitioner sought release from immigration custody. On March 20, 2026, an immigration
27 judge ordered petitioner removed. ECF No. 7-1. Petitioner reserved her right to appeal that
28 order. Id. Any appeal was due on April 20, 2026. Id. Respondent represents that, as of April 27,
1 2026, no appeal had been filed. ECF 7 at 1. The EOIR’s Automated Case Information tracker
2 also indicates that the Board of Immigration Appeals has not received an appeal of the
3 immigration judge’s order. See EOIR Automated Case Information,
4 https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited May 20, 2026). Accordingly, the
5 order of removal became final when it was issued. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(b).
6 Procedural History
7 On April 23, 2026, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 2.
8 Petitioner concurrently filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion to appoint
9 counsel.1 ECF Nos. 3, 4. On April 27, 2026, the District Judge issued a minute order construing
10 the request for relief in the petition as a motion for temporary restraining order and ordering that a
11 response be filed. ECF No. 6. That same day, respondent filed an opposition and attached the
12 March 20, 2026 removal order. ECF No. 7. On April 29, 2026, the District Judge denied the
13 temporary restraining order and referred the matter to me. ECF No. 8. On May 1, 2026, I gave
14 petitioner seven days to submit a traverse and stated that the matter would be deemed submitted
15 when the allotted time for filing a traverse has expired. ECF No. 9. Since petitioner has not filed
16 a traverse, the matter is submitted. See id.
17 Legal Standard
18 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates
19 federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75
20 (2000). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
21 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
22 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a
23 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.
24 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of
25 1 Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted, and her motion for the
appointment of counsel will be denied. There currently exists no absolute right to appointment of
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counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). Under
27 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, the court can appoint counsel at any stage of the case “if the interests of
justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases. I do not find that the
28 interests of justice require appointment of counsel at the present time.
1 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have
2 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction
3 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
4 Analysis
5 Petitioner claims that her detention violates the Fifth Amendment. ECF No. 2.
6 Respondent counters that the petition should be dismissed because petitioner is subject to
7 mandatory detention following a final order of removal. ECF No. 7.
8 The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that when a noncitizen “is ordered
9 removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of
10 90 days (in this section referred to as the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Relevant
11 here, the removal period begins on the “date the order of removal becomes administratively
12 final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Moreover, detention during the removal period is mandatory. See id.
13 § 1231(a)(2)(A) (“During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”). The
14 Court of Appeals has held that this period of detention “passes constitutional scrutiny” because
15 there is no danger of indefinite detention; on the contrary, the provision authorizes “detention for
16 90 days only.” Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 2004).
17 Here, petitioner was ordered removed on March 20, 2026. ECF No. 7-1. Because
18 petitioner did not appeal, the order became final on that day. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(b).
19 Consequently, petitioner is subject to mandatory detention during her removal period, which runs
20 through June 20, 2026. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), (2)(A). Moreover, this mandatory
21 detention does not violate petitioner’s due process rights. See Khotesouvan, 386 F.3d at 1301.
22 Accordingly, petitioner’s detention does not violate the Fifth Amendment.
23 It also bears mention that after the removal period expires in June 2026, petitioner will
24 still be subject to discretionary detention. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). In Zadvydas, the Supreme
25 Court addressed a challenge to prolonged detention under this section and held that:
26 We do have reason to believe, however, that Congress previously
doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months.
27 Consequently, for the sake of uniform administration in the federal
courts, we recognize that period. After this 6-month period, once
28 the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant
] likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
5 Government must respond with evidence sufficient.
3 | 533 US. at 701 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
4 Accordingly, petitioner’s detention is “presumptively reasonable” until six months
5 | following the issuance of the removal order. See id.
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7 Conclusion
8 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
9 1. Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 3, is GRANTED.
10 2. Petitioner’s motion for the appointment of counsel, ECF No. 4, is DENIED.
11 Further, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:
12 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 2, be DENIED.
13 2. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
14 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
15 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days of
16 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the
17 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to
18 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed
19 | within seven days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file
20 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
21 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.
22 | 1991).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ May 25, 2026 aw——
26 JEREMY D. PETERSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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