Davis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JAMIR ANREE DAVIS I, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 1:25-cv-393

v.

JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE

WALSH KOKOSING JOINT Magistrate Judge Litkovitz

VENTURE, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

On March 30, 2026, the Court issued an Opinion and Order (Doc. 32) granting

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 20, 21, 23). In that Opinion,1 the Court held

that: (1) Plaintiff Jamir Davis, proceeding pro se, cannot represent his law firm,

Plaintiff J. Davis Law Firm, PLLC (JDLF), (Doc. 32, #735–37), in this action; (2) res

judicata arising from a previous arbitration between JDLF and WEB Ventures bars

the claims against Defendant Icy Williams, who is an employee of WEB Ventures,

(id. at #737–44); (3) Defendants Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) and

Deborah Green enjoy immunity for Counts 5, 9, and 12, (id. at #744–51);2 (4) the

federal claims against Defendants Walsh Kokosing Joint Venture, Arik Quam,

ODOT, and Green (Counts 6, 7, 8, 10) fail as a matter of law, (id. at #752–62); and

1 There, the Court summarized the factual background giving rise to this lawsuit. (Doc. 32,

#722–32). The Court declines to repeat it here.

2 Two other ODOT employees named in those counts were not served as of the time of the

previous Opinion, (Doc. 32, #732), and so far as the Court can tell have not been served since.

(5) the state-law claims should be held in abeyance given the dismissal of the federal

claims, (id. at #762–64).

The Court dismissed some claims with prejudice: counts 1–5 against Williams,

counts 5 and 12 against Green in her official capacity, and counts 9 and 12 against

ODOT. (Id. at #764). And it dismissed others without prejudice: counts 5, 6, 7, 8, 10,

and 12. (Id.). The Court held the remaining state claims against Walsh Kokosing (and

its employee Arik Quam) (counts 1–5 and 11 as asserted against those Defendants)

in abeyance. (Id. at #762). The Court noted that Plaintiffs could move for leave to

amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies for the claims dismissed without

prejudice. (Id. at #764). Since then, Davis has filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc.

39) relating solely to one issue—the Court’s res judicata analysis involving Williams.3

For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Davis’s motion. (Doc. 39).

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for a motion for

reconsideration, at least one directed at an order like the one Davis challenges here.

Davis requests reconsideration under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b), 59(e),

or Rule 60(b) “depending on the posture of the case.” (Doc. 39, #780). Rules 59 and 60

do not appear to be the relevant rules. Rule 59 allows a party to move the court to

alter or amend a judgment, specifically a final judgment. See Russell v. GTE Gov’t

3 As the Court noted in its previous Opinion and Order, Davis is a practicing attorney, but he

is not barred to practice in the Southern District of Ohio. (Doc. 32, #735–37). So Davis may

represent himself and proceed pro se, but he cannot represent the law firm. (Id.). JDLF must

secure counsel, which it seems to have done. (Not. of Appearance, Doc. 35). Despite that, only

Davis has signed the reconsideration motion, (Doc. 39, #784), so the Court will only review

its res judicata analysis with respect to Davis individually.

Sys. Corp., 141 F. App’x 429, 436 (6th Cir. 2005). True, here the Court dismissed some

claims with prejudice, and so the Order is in some sense “final” as to those claims.

But the judgment to which Rule 59(e) refers is the final judgment disposing of all

claims, not merely some of them. See Blair v. Bd. of Trs. of Sugarcreek Twp., No. 3:07-

cv-56, 2008 WL 4372665, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 22, 2008) (holding Rule 59(e) did not

apply to the court’s order because it had “adjudicate[d] fewer than all of the claims,

entail[ed] a partial grant of summary judgment, and [was] not immediately

appealable”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (“[A]ny order or other decision, however

designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of

fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties

and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the

claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.”). Likewise, Rule 60 allows for relief

from a “final judgment, order, or proceeding.” That does not include interlocutory

orders, which is what the order here is absent certification of “no just reason for delay”

under Rule 54(b). Whatever It Takes Transmission & Parts, Inc. v. Cap. Core, Inc.,

No. 2:10-cv-72, 2014 WL 12653727, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2014) (citation omitted).

Because the Court’s previous Opinion and Order was not final on all claims and

parties, Rule 60(b) does not apply.

“However, ‘district courts have authority both under common law and Rule

54(b) to reconsider interlocutory orders and to reopen any part of a case before entry

of final judgment.’” Id. (bracket omitted) (quoting Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health

& Welfare Fund, 89 F. App’x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004)). As for the merits, the Court

has significant discretion and can “afford such relief from [interlocutory orders] as

justice requires.” Rodriguez, 89 F. App’x at 959 (first citing Citibank N.A. v. Fed.

Deposit Ins. Corp., 857 F. Supp. 976, 981 (D.D.C. 1994); and then citing Melancon v.

Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 1981)).

That is not to say there are no limits. For example, in deciding what “justice

requires,” courts often look to Rule 59 for guidance. See, e.g., id. at 959 n.8. So, in

deciding whether to reconsider interlocutory orders, courts still generally ask

whether there is “(1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence

available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Id. at

959 (citation omitted). And motions for reconsideration “may not be used to relitigate

old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised

prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5

(2008) (quoting 11 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed.

1995)).

What these principles recognize is that such motions should be granted

“sparingly because of the interests in finality and conservation of scarce judicial

resources,” United States ex rel. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 179

F.R.D. 541, 547 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (citation omitted), which are interests that apply

even with regard to interlocutory orders, Hagy v. Demers & Adams, LLC, No. 2:11-

cv-530, 2013 WL 5334106, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 23, 2013). “A movant has no right to

reconsideration of an interlocutory order simply because the movant makes the

motion in good faith.” Rodriguez, 89 F. App’x at 959 n.7. Our judicial system is built

on the notions that litigants put their best arguments forward on the first go-around

and that judges do their best to decide the issues that the litigants have put before

them. Requests to reconsider rulings once rendered undermine both notions and thus

do little to advance the efficient handling of matters.

Davis also includes in his motion a request for leave to amend his complaint.

(Doc. 39, #783–84). Generally, Rule 15 applies and states that the “court should freely

give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But when deciding

whether to grant leave to amend, courts may consider “undue delay in filing, lack of

notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and

futility of amendment.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Sargent & Lundy, 916 F.2d 1119, 1130 (6th

Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The Court previously dismissed with prejudice all claims that Davis had

asserted against Williams here on the grounds that the preclusive effect of an earlier

arbitration decision barred them. Davis requests reconsideration, primarily arguing

that the previous arbitration only addressed JDLF’s claims against WEB Ventures

(Williams’ employer), and that the arbitrator prevented Davis from asserting any

individual claims there. (See generally Doc. 39). So Davis argues he did not receive a

“full and fair opportunity” to litigate his individual claims—a necessary prerequisite

for claim preclusion to apply. (Id. at #783). Indeed, Davis says, if he cannot proceed

on his claims here, that means he is left without any forum in which to vindicate his

rights. (Id. at #781–82). Beyond that, if the Court agrees with Davis that his

individual claims can proceed, he requests an opportunity to amend his complaint “to

reassert claims against Williams in her individual capacity, to add WEB Ventures as

a Defendant, and to clarify that these claims were not and could not have been

litigated in arbitration.” (Id. at #783). As discussed below, though, the Court again

concludes that claim preclusion bars the claims Davis seeks to assert against

Williams in this action (at least those he has sought to assert to date), and that even

if that were not the case, issue preclusion would bar almost all of them anyway. So

the Court ends up at the same spot, but expands its reasoning somewhat. As for

Davis’s request to add other new claims, the Court will address that in connection

with the recently filed Motion to Amend (Doc. 51).

A. Davis Does Not Present Newly Discovered Evidence.

Davis first argues for reconsideration on the basis of newly discovered evidence

that supposedly demonstrates that “he was expressly barred from” asserting his

individual claims in the arbitration. (Doc. 39, #781 (emphasis omitted)). That “newly

discovered evidence” consists of a series of emails between his former arbitration

counsel and WEB Ventures’ arbitration counsel. (Id.). In those emails, WEB

Ventures’ counsel argued it is not required to arbitrate Davis’s individual claims

because Davis was not a party to the Teaming Agreement. (Id.; Doc. 41-1 (emails)).

Thus, WEB Ventures contended the arbitration provision contained in that

Agreement did not extend to Davis personally. (Doc. 39, #781). Willliams does not

dispute the existence of those emails, but instead argues that they do not constitute

newly discovered evidence because Davis had access to them since 2024. (Resp., Doc.

44, #1537–39).

The Court finds that Williams has the better of the argument. “To constitute

‘newly discovered evidence,’ the evidence must have been previously unavailable.”

GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations

omitted). But “[e]vidence is considered unavailable only if it could not, in the exercise

of reasonable diligence, have been submitted earlier.” Whatever It Takes

Transmission & Parts, 2014 WL 12653727, at *5 (citation omitted).

Here, Davis claims that he “was not a participant in the original email chain,

was not copied on the underlying communications, and did not maintain independent

possession of the correspondence.” (Reply, Doc. 47, #1622). Looking at the emails that

Davis submitted, though, Davis’s counsel forwarded him the email exchange on April

9, 2024, and specifically asked him “Do you want to evaluate this or should I?”. (Doc.

41-1, #1151). So Davis cannot reasonably claim that he discovered the emails since

the Court’s Opinion and Order on March 30, 2026. Even if he had not maintained

possession of them, he could have acquired the emails from his former counsel with

reasonable diligence. Indeed, Davis himself admits that the emails were “previously

overlooked.” (Doc. 39, #781). Furthermore, as Williams argues, the underlying fact is

not new to this case either. (Doc. 44, #1539). Williams stated in her original Motion

to Dismiss that “the arbitrator dismissed Davis’s claims in his personal capacity.”

(Doc. 21, #433). Davis, then, cannot rely on this evidence to support his motion for

reconsideration.

B. Res Judicata of One Form or Another Bars Davis’s Individual Claims.

That said, newly discovered evidence is not a prerequisite to the Court

revisiting an interlocutory order. As such orders are necessarily not final, the Court

can grant reconsideration whenever “justice requires.” Rodriguez, 89 F. App’x at 959

(citations omitted). Beyond the emails, Davis argues that he “did not have a full and

fair opportunity to litigate” his individual claims in the arbitration, which is one of

the four elements that is a prerequisite to applying claim preclusion. (Doc. 39, #781–

82). Specifically, Davis notes that the arbitrator found Davis was not personally a

party to the Teaming Agreement, so the arbitration provision in the Agreement did

not extend to his individual claims. (Id.). Williams largely agrees on the factual

predicate for Davis’s argument—she does not contest that the arbitrator dismissed

Davis’s individual claims because Davis personally was not a party to the contract.

In fact, Williams herself said that to the Court. (Doc. 21, #433). Instead, Williams

argues that the alleged distinction between Davis’s individual claims and JDLF’s

claims does not change the outcome. The Court concludes that she is correct. The five

claims that Davis assets here are advanced under the same labels (with one minor

exception) and based on the same alleged conduct; the only difference is that it is

Davis (who is in privity with JDLF) who advances them, and he directs them against

Williams (who is in privity with WEB Ventures). But as discussed below, that is a

distinction without a difference. So, as the Court previously found, claim preclusion

bars all five claims. And, even if that were not so, a different aspect of res judicata

under Ohio law, issue preclusion, leads to largely the same result.

1. Claim Preclusion Bars the Five Claims on Which Davis Seeks

Reconsideration.

Generally, Ohio’s res judicata doctrine covers two forms of preclusion: claim

preclusion (which Ohio law calls estoppel by judgment) and issue preclusion

(otherwise known as collateral estoppel). Grava v. Parkman Twp., 653 N.E.2d 226,

228 (Ohio 1995). In its previous Opinion and Order, the Court broadly referred to res

judicata under Ohio law, but did not expressly identify on which of those two

subcategories it relied. That said, the Court applied the elements of claim preclusion.

(See Doc. 32, #737–39). Specifically, the Court stated “a party invoking res judicata

must establish four elements: (1) a final decision on the merits; (2) the prior action

involved the same parties (or their privies) as the parties currently before the Court;

(3) the current action raises ‘claims that were or could have been litigated in the first

action’; and (4) both actions ‘arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.’” (Id. at

#737 (citing William Powell Co. v. Nat’l Indem. Co., 18 F.4th 856, 869–70 (6th Cir.

2021))). And, as William Powell makes clear, those are the elements of claim

preclusion under Ohio law. 18 F.4th at 869–70 (citing Hapgood v. City of Warren, 127

F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 1997)).

Davis says that claim preclusion does not apply here, though, because the third

element in that list is lacking—Davis did not and could not have litigated his personal

claims in the earlier arbitration. (Doc. 39, #782). At first glance, he seems to be on to

something. As both sides admit, the arbitrator held that Davis was not personally a

party to the Agreement, so his individual claims were outside the scope of the

arbitration provision. (Id.; Doc. 44, #1536; see also Doc. 21-3 (arbitrator’s opinion)).

In other words, the arbitrator determined that Davis could not litigate those claims

in that forum. So, if Davis was seeking to advance in the arbitration, and is seeking

to advance here, a distinct set of personal claims, claims that were separate and apart

from those claims Davis asserted on behalf of JDLF in the arbitration, he would be

correct that claim preclusion would not bar those claims, as he did not have an

opportunity to litigate them in the earlier proceeding.

But that is a big if. Deciding whether that premise is met requires the Court

to compare the claims actually asserted and decided in the arbitration against those

Davis seeks to advance here, to see if they are in fact different. If instead they are the

same claims, merely advanced through a person in privity with JDLF, rather that

JDLF itself, and directed at a person in privity with WEB Ventures, rather than WEB

Ventures itself, then claim preclusion—which extends to actions between those in

privity with the original litigants—bars them.

So how does the comparison shake out? In the current action, Davis asserts

five claims against Williams: (1) tortious interference with a prospective business

advantage, (2) intentional misrepresentation, (3) unjust enrichment, (4) fraudulent

concealment, and (5) negligence. (Doc. 1-25, #357–61). The earlier arbitration, by

contrast, involved ten counts against WEB Ventures, Williams’ employer. JDLF alone

brought seven of the ten: (1) breach of contract, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) tortious

interference with a prospective business advantage, (4) fraudulent concealment,

(5) constructive fraud, (6) implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and

(7) negligent misrepresentation. (Doc. 21-4, #502–08). Davis and JDLF were both

named as plaintiffs on one of the remaining claims—negligence. (Id. at #508–09). And

then Davis raised two counts solely on behalf of himself: negligent infliction of

emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at #509–12).

Then, in response to WEB Ventures’ motion to dismiss, the arbitrator dismissed

Davis individually as a party because he was not party to the Teaming Agreement

and thus the arbitration provision did not extend to him. (Doc. 21-2, #468–70). So

that resulted in dismissal of both the negligent and intentional infliction claims in

their entirety, as well as the portion of the negligence claim that Davis advanced on

his own behalf. (See id. at #471). That left JDLF and WEB Ventures to arbitrate to

judgment the remaining eight claims (the JDLF portion of the negligence claim and

the seven JDLF-only claims).4

The claims Davis seeks to assert here match the causes of action that JDLF

previously advanced in the arbitration. In particular, four of the five claims he asserts

here bear the identical label to claims JDLF advanced there—tortious interference,

unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment, and negligence. (Compare Doc. 1-25,

#357–61, with Doc. 21-4, #503–06, 508–08). And while it is admittedly Davis (rather

than JDLF) who advances them, and he does so against Williams (rather than against

WEB Ventures, Williams’ employer), a comparison of the factual allegations shows

4 It is not entirely clear to the Court why the arbitrator would have jurisdiction over the

negligence claim. Negligence claims, after all, arise under common law, while an arbitrator’s

jurisdiction under a contractual arbitration provision typically is limited to claims that arise

under that contract. That said, parties can agree to arbitrate non-contract claims. And here,

it appears that both parties (WEB Ventures and JDLF) sought an arbitral ruling on the

negligence claim. In the Court’s view, that suffices to provide the arbitrator authority to

decide that claim.

that Davis seeks to hold Williams personally liable to him here based on the exact

same conduct, and the exact same alleged harm, for which JDLF sought to hold WEB

Ventures liable in the arbitration.

As to the remaining claim, misrepresentation, there is admittedly at least a

small difference. In the arbitration, JDLF advanced a negligent misrepresentation

claim, whereas here, Davis advances an intentional misrepresentation claim. (Doc. 1-

25, #358–59; Doc. 21-4, #508). But again, the alleged conduct, and the alleged harm,

underlying both claims is identical. And there was nothing preventing JDLF from

advancing an intentional misrepresentation claim in the arbitral forum to go along

with its negligent misrepresentation claim.

At bottom then, Davis seeks to litigate here the same claims, based on the same

factual allegations, that JDLF arbitrated (or could have arbitrated in the case of the

intentional misrepresentation claim) previously. See William Powell, 18 F.4th at 870

(citation omitted). And Davis does not dispute that the arbitrator rendered a final

decision on the merits with regard to those claims. Moreover, as the Court determined

previously, and reviews below, Davis is clearly in privity with JDLF as his solo law

firm, and Williams is in privity with WEB Ventures. Taken together, that means

Davis cannot escape the claim preclusive effect of the previous arbitral award.

True, if his individual claims against Williams were somehow distinct from

JDLF’s claims against WEB Ventures, perhaps a different result would follow. Then,

the arbitrator’s refusal to hear any of his individual claims (either those that he

actually asserted, like his negligence claim, or those he may have wanted to assert,

like the tortious interference claim here) would mean that he did not have a “full and

fair opportunity” to litigate them. And that in turn would rob the arbitral award of

its claim-preclusive effect as to those claims. See W.J. O’Neil Co. v. Shepley, Bulfinch,

Richardson & Abbott, Inc., 765 F.3d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that, under

similar Michigan preclusion law, claim preclusion does not bar the litigation of claims

that were not subject to the previous arbitration). But Davis has failed to show how

his claims here are in fact different in any meaningful sense from JDLF’s claims in

the arbitration. To the contrary, as noted above, he relies on the same alleged facts,

the same alleged duties, the same alleged harms, and the same alleged labels (e.g.,

tortious interference) in support of his claims here as those that JDLF previously

advanced there. So the claims are the same, even though it is Davis who now seeks

to advance them, rather than JDLF. But claim preclusion applies not only to the

parties who participated in the previous litigation, but also their privies. Williams v.

Ohio Dep’t of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., No. 2:25-cv-70, 2026 WL 1615269, at

*4, 6 (S.D. Ohio June 5, 2026) (applying claim preclusion to privies). So the distinction

between JDLF and Davis does not matter, rather, only the similarity in claims does,

at least so long as the parties here are in privity with the parties there.

And, as the Court already found, privity in fact exists, both between Davis and

JDLF and between Williams and WEB Ventures. (Doc. 32, #740–41). To briefly recap,

“[w]hat constitutes privity in the context of res judicata is somewhat amorphous.”

Brown v. Dayton, 730 N.E.2d 958, 962 (Ohio 2000). But, “[a]s a general matter, privity

is merely a word used to say that the relationship between the one who is a party on

the record and another is close enough to include that other within the res judicata.”

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As particularly relevant here,

privity exists when a party “had the right to control the [earlier] proceedings.” O’Nesti

v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 862 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ohio 2007) (citation omitted).

Similarly, “[a]n interest in the result of and active participation in the original

lawsuit may also establish privity.” Id.

Here, as the Court found previously, “[w]hile they are distinct legal entities,

Davis is the president of JDLF and, so far as the Court can tell, the only lawyer at

the firm.” (Doc. 32, #741). So while JDLF technically was the party that invoked the

arbitration provision previously and litigated in that forum, Davis was the man

pulling the strings. Davis attempts to disclaim responsibility for the prior litigation

decisions by alleging that he “was not making the arguments and was not responsible

for responding” to opposing counsel. (Doc. 47, #1623). But in the emails Davis

submitted to the Court, his counsel specifically inquired, “Do you want to evaluate

this or should I?” (Doc. 41-1, #1151). That does not suggest that Davis was uninvolved

in JDLF’s litigation strategy. And, in any event, whether he actually exercised control

over the litigation or not, he clearly had the right to control it. As Williams argues,

“[i]t is hard to conceive a relationship more deserving of the moniker ‘privity’ than

that of Jamir Davis and his solo law practice.” (Doc. 44, #1541). So the Court

concludes, again, that there is privity between Davis and JDLF. “To find otherwise

would be to allow the [defendants] to come under constant attack simply by

replenishing the ranks of plaintiffs.” Brown, 730 N.E.2d at 962.

So, at bottom, Davis, as a privity of JDLF, is seeking to advance claims against

Williams, who is in privity with WEB Venture, that are identical to claims already

asserted in the arbitration. Claim preclusion bars such efforts. Indeed, if all a party

needed to do to escape such preclusion is change the nominal identity of the person

advancing the claim, or the defendant named in it, claim preclusion would have no

meaningful scope of application at all. That is precisely why the doctrine extends to

those in privity. So claim preclusion bars Davis efforts to (re)assert those claims here.

2. Issue Preclusion Also Bars Four of the Five Claims.

But that is not all. Even if the Court were to find Davis correct as to claim

preclusion, a related route leads Davis to basically the same dead end, at least as to

four of the five claims. As noted, res judicata under Ohio law includes not only claim

preclusion, but also issue preclusion. Issue preclusion “serves to prevent relitigation

of any fact or point that was determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a

previous action between the same parties or their privies.” O’Nesti, 862 N.E.2d at

806. As that description suggests, it applies when three elements are present: (1) the

issue “was actually and directly litigated in the prior action,” (2) “‘a court of competent

jurisdiction’ decided the issue,” and (3) “the party against whom collateral estoppel

[i.e., issue preclusion] is asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior

action.” In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. C-8 Pers. Inj. Litig., 54 F.4th 912, 921

(6th Cir. 2022) (quoting State ex rel. Jefferson v. Russo, 150 N.E.3d 873, 875 (Ohio

2020)). Importantly, unlike claim preclusion, “[i]ssue preclusion applies even if the

causes of action differ.” O’Nesti, 862 N.E.2d at 806 (citation omitted). That is because

issue preclusion goes to the “fact or point that was determined,” as opposed to the

specific claim at issue in the earlier matter. Id. (emphasis added). The elements of

issue preclusion are present here. The Court takes them in reverse order.

Start with privity. The test for privity in issue preclusion is the same as the

test for privity in claim preclusion. State ex rel. Schachter v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret.

Bd., 2008-Ohio-3624, ¶19 (10th Dist.) (stating privity standard for res judicata

generally and citing both claim and issue preclusion cases). So Davis is in privity with

JDLF, and Williams is in privity with WEB Ventures, for the reasons the Court

articulated in its first opinion, (Doc. 32, #740–41), and above.

Next, turn to whether the arbitral forum constituted a “court of competent

jurisdiction” for issue preclusion purposes. True, arbitration does not involve a “court”

per se. But neither party disputes that the arbitrator had authority to decide the

issues before him—i.e., that the arbitrator had jurisdiction.5 And as the Court found

previously (in deciding the similar issue of whether arbitral awards constitute final

decisions on the merits), “federal courts ordinarily give preclusive effect to

arbitrations.” (Doc. 32, #739 (first quoting Cent. Transp., Inc. v. Four Phase Sys., Inc.,

936 F.2d 256, 259 (6th Cir. 1991); and then citing In re Robinson, 256 B.R. 482, 488

(Bankr. S. D. Ohio 2000))). So the Court concludes this element is met.

Last, turning to whether the same issues were litigated and decided on the

merits, Williams’ original Motion to Dismiss expressly listed all five counts asserted

5 As noted above, see supra note 4, questions perhaps could be raised regarding the

arbitrator’s jurisdiction to hear JDLF’s freestanding negligence claim. But no one raised

them during the arbitration, or indeed even here. And parties are free to commit noncontract

claims to arbitration if they wish.

against her here and pointed to how the arbitrator ruled on the factual predicate for

each. (Doc. 21, #448). For example, Count One here raises a claim for tortious

interference with a prospective business advantage, (Doc. 1-25, #357–58), and the

arbitrator had ruled that, on the facts presented, WEB Ventures did not intentionally

interfere with JDLF’s prospective business advantage, (Doc. 21, #448). But Davis now

asks this Court to decide that same issue based on the same facts, but to reach a

different result. That is also true as to at least three of the other four claims Davis

presses in this suit:

• Unjust Enrichment—the arbitrator ruled in favor of JDLF and held it

entitled to damages of $8,212.50 because, while JDLF did not establish

WEB Ventures would not have received the subcontract from Walsh

Kokosing but for its involvement, it did establish that WEB Ventures

was unjustly enriched by JDLF’s work preparing the bid, (Doc. 21-1,

#462), which are the same theories for the unjust enrichment claim here,

(Doc. 1-25, #359). And Davis provides no explanation for why he would

be entitled to recover twice for the same harm, or as to how Williams

was somehow unjustly enriched apart from WEB Ventures.

• Fraudulent Concealment—the arbitrator specifically credited the

testimony of WEB Ventures’ owners over Davis’s to find that WEB

Ventures did not commit fraud but rather “truly misunderstood” how its

budget from Walsh Kokosing worked, (Doc. 21-1, #462–64), and that is

the same alleged “fraud” for which Davis seeks to hold Williams liable

here, (Doc. 1-25, #360).

• Negligence—the arbitrator determined that there is no duty arising out

of 49 C.F.R. Part 26 because the regulations do not create a private right

of action, (Doc. 21-3, #481), but that same alleged basis for Defendants’

duty is what underlies Davis’s negligence claim here, (Doc. 1-25, #361).

As to each of these claims then, he asks the Court to revisit factual or legal

determinations that the arbitrator directly and necessarily addressed in resolving the

claims before him. So the Court concludes, for at least these four counts, that

Williams has established the relevant issues were actually litigated and decided in

the previous arbitration such that issue preclusion applies.

In his reply, Davis seeks to avoid this by claiming that the Teaming

Agreement, the principal subject of the arbitration, was not the only source of

Williams’ (and really WEB Ventures’) duties to him. (Doc. 47, #1617). Instead, Davis

argues his claims “arise from duties voluntarily undertaken by WEB Ventures and

its employees through their participation in a federally funded DBE compliance,

outreach, inclusion, and utilization program governed by 49 C.F.R. Part 26.” (Id.).

Critically, though, Davis omits that the arbitrator addressed this question of law

already, too, and did so without any objection from Davis as to the arbitrator’s

jurisdiction to consider it. Specifically, in deciding whether JDLF could pursue a

negligence claim based on that alleged duty, the arbitrator found “there is no

indication that … Congress intended to create a private right of action for individuals

seeking to enforce [these] provisions of the law.” (Doc. 21-3, #481 (quoting Richmond

Transp., Inc. v. Departmental Off. of C.R. of the U.S. Dep’t of Transp., No. 11-13771,

2013 WL 425357, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 2013))). And that no-private-right-of-action

finding demonstrates that the issue was actually litigated and decided previously,

such that issue preclusion applies.

True, all of that leaves the intentional misrepresentation claim untouched.

Issue preclusion does not come to bear as to that claim because, in ruling against

JDLF in the arbitration, the arbitrator determined that, as a matter of law, a

negligent representation claim cannot be based on “a party’s intent to perform a

promise.” (See Doc. 21-3, #481–82 (citing GPH Louisville Hill Creek LLC v. Redwood

Holdings, LLC, No. 3:21-cv-63, 2022 WL 855292, at *11 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 22, 2022))).

That legal proposition does not necessarily apply to intentional misrepresentation

claims. See PCR Contractors, Inc. v. Danial, 354 S.W.3d 613–17 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011).

So the factual or legal basis for the intentional misrepresentation claim was not

actually litigated in the earlier arbitration such that issue preclusion would apply.

But as to that claim, as already discussed above, claim preclusion applies as it arose

out of the same facts and JDLF could have advanced it in arbitration—it just chose

not to do so.

In sum, claim preclusion bars all five of Davis’s claims, and issue preclusion

separately ends up dooming four of them. So, even after reviewing the matter anew,

the Court finds that Davis’s claims against Williams here must be dismissed with

prejudice on res judicata grounds.

C. The Court Denies the Motion to Amend.

Davis concludes his reconsideration motion by also requesting leave to amend.

(Doc. 39, #783). As noted above, the claims that Davis has advanced against Williams

to date are still precluded, so he cannot replead those. Davis also states that he wishes

to add WEB Ventures as a party here. The Court’s preclusion analysis, however,

applies just as much, if not more so, to WEB Ventures directly. So the Court finds

that any attempt to add WEB Ventures is likely futile. That said, the Court extended

Davis and JDLF an opportunity to file a new motion to amend, (see 6/22/26 Min. Entry

& Order), which they have done, (Doc. 51). So to the extent Davis wishes to remedy

any other deficiencies identified in the Court’s previous Opinion & Order, or advance

claims based on theories not already litigated in the arbitration, the Court will review

such attempts in connection with that motion.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Davis’s Motion for

Reconsideration (Doc. 39).

SO ORDERED.

July 6, 2026

DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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