Webb

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

WENDY WEBB * CIVIL ACTION

* NO. 25-2337

VERSUS *

* MAGISTRATE JUDGE

OCEANS BEHAVIORAL HOSPITAL OF * JANIS VAN MEERVELD

KENTWOOD, LLC *

*********************************** *

ORDER AND REASONS

This is an employment discrimination lawsuit. Before the Court is the defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 14), which plaintiff has not opposed. The Court finds that plaintiff has failed

to timely file her lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Further, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for

hostile work environment or retaliation. Accordingly, defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc.

14) is GRANTED and plaintiff’s claims for race discrimination and hostile work environment

under Title VII, age discrimination under the ADEA, hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. §

1981, and retaliation under § 1981 are dismissed with prejudice. Only plaintiff’s claim for race

discrimination under § 1981 and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law remain.

Background

Plaintiff Wendy Webb worked as a full-time nurse for Oceans Behavioral Hospital of

Kentwood, LLC (“Oceans Behavioral”) from January 9, 2024, through August 22, 2024. Ms. Webb

is African-American. She alleges her employment was terminated following an incident on August

14, 2024, when Ms. Webb left her assigned shift early because she was suffering from a sudden

and acute illness that impaired her ability to safely continue providing patient care. Before

departing, she provided Kayla Kelly, the Director of Nursing, a written report summarizing the

condition and orders of all assigned patients. She alleges that the submission of a written report

was fully consistent with facility custom and did not constitute patient abandonment or

insubordination. Nonetheless, on August 22, 2024, she was terminated for “shift abandonment”

and “failure to provide a verbal hand-off.” The termination was recommended by Kayla Kelley

(white, age 29) and Michelle Gaudet (white, age 50). Ms. Webb alleges that immediately thereafter

she emailed Jane Fuller, the Regional Director of Human Resources requesting review and noting

that white and younger nurses routinely left written reports and that her termination for identical

conduct was inequitable.1 Ms. Fuller and Ms. Webb scheduled a meeting to talk, but Ms. Webb

was not reinstated.

Ms. Webb filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission on April 29, 2025, alleging age and race discrimination and describing her

termination. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on August 19, 2025.

She filed this lawsuit on November 18, 2025, alleging that younger, white nurses were

treated more leniently for comparable or worse conduct. She asserts claims for hostile work

environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; race discrimination and disparate treatment under § 1981;

retaliation under § 1981; hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000; race discrimination under Title VII; age discrimination under the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621; and race discrimination

under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law (“LEDL”), La. Stat. Ann. § 23:332(A)(1).

Oceans Behavioral has filed a Motion to Dismiss. It argues that Ms. Webb’s Title VII and

ADEA claims must be dismissed as untimely because she filed suit 91 days after receiving the

Notice of Right to Sue. Further, it argues that Ms. Webb did not raise a claim for hostile work

1 Defendant attaches what purports to be the referenced email, wherein Ms. Webb describes the termination as

“inequitable” and describes the use of written reports as customary for “many nurses” and states that “other nurses

have routinely been allowed this privilege and/or convenience under less compelling circumstances.” Rec. Doc. 14-5,

at 1. But the email does not reference age or race in any way. Id.

environment in her EEOC charge and, therefore, she has failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies as to that claim. Oceans Behavioral adds that Ms. Webb has failed to allege any facts that

could support a claim for hostile work environment and argues that her hostile work environment

claim under § 1981 and the LEDL2 should also be dismissed. Finally, Oceans Behavioral argues

that Ms. Webb has failed to state a claim for retaliation because she has not adequately alleged that

she engaged in a protected activity.

The time period to file a memorandum in opposition has passed, and Ms. Webb has not

filed an opposition. The Court considers the Motion to Dismiss unopposed.

Law and Analysis

1. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move for dismissal when a plaintiff fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on such a motion, “[t]he court accepts all well-

pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal

Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). However, “[t]o

survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true

(even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citation, footnote, and quotation marks omitted). On that point, the

United States Supreme Court has explained:

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability

requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a

2 Ms. Webb’s complaint appears to assert only a race discrimination under the LEDL, but it is possible she is attempting

to assert a claim for hostile work environment as well.

defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court must limit

itself to the contents of the pleadings, including attachments thereto.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley

Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit has recognized that the court may

also consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss by the defendant if they are referred to in

the plaintiff's complaint and central to her claim. Id. at 498-99. For example, in Carter v. Target

Corp., the court held that the district court was permitted to consider the EEOC charges attached

to the defendant’s motion to dismiss because they were referenced in the plaintiff's complaint and

were central to plaintiff's claim. 541 F. App’x 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2013).

1. Timeliness of Title VII and ADEA Claims

Before bringing a suit in court, an employment discrimination plaintiff must exhaust

administrative remedies, which occurs when the plaintiff files a timely charge with the EEOC and

receives a statutory notice of right to sue. Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th

Cir. 2002). Title VII requires that a plaintiff file suit within ninety days of receipt of an EEOC

right-to-sue letter. Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Miss., 674 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). This same 90-day limitations period applies to claims filed under the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 29 U.S.C. §626(e); St. Louis v. Texas Worker's Comp.

Comm'n, 65 F.3d 43, 47 (5th Cir. 1995).

The “requirement to file a lawsuit within the ninety-day limitation period is strictly

construed.” Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379. Courts within the Fifth Circuit have found that a claimant’s

receipt of the EEOC’s notice via email begins the 90-day limitation period. See, e.g., Harrison v.

Mayorkas, No. CV 21-161, 2022 WL 2237135, at *2-3 (E.D. La. June 21, 2022) (holding that 90-

day limitation period began to run from receipt of EEOC email, even when the email was not read

on that date); Boyd v. Monroe City Hall, No. 20-1473, 2021 WL 1305385, at *4 (W.D. La. Mar. 8,

2021) (holding that EEOC email of determination notice triggered 90 day period, even when email

was deposited in plaintiff’s spam folder). “Courts within this Circuit have repeatedly dismissed

cases in which the plaintiff did not file a complaint until after the ninety-day limitation period had

expired.” Taylor, 296 F.3d at 376 (citing Butler v. Orleans Parish School Board, No. CV 00-0845,

2001 WL 1135616 (E.D. La. Sept. 25, 2001) (dismissing Title VII claims where pro se plaintiff

filed her complaint one day beyond the ninety-day period because she and her husband were

prevented from filing on the 90th day, as planned, by family illnesses).

Here, Ms. Webb alleges that the Notice of Right to Sue was issued on August 19, 2025.

Rec. Doc. 1, at 4. Oceans Behavioral has attached a copy of the Notice of Right to Sue and the

email by which it received the notice from the EEOC, and both are dated August 19, 2025. Rec.

Docs. 14-2, 14-3.

Ninety days after August 19, 2025, was November 17, 2025, which was neither a weekend

nor a holiday. Ms. Webb filed the present Complaint a day later on November 18, 2025. Ms.

Webb’s Complaint is untimely. Her Title VII and ADEA claims must be dismissed.

2. Hostile Work Environment - Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies under Title VII

As noted above, Title VII requires that a plaintiff file a charge with the EEOC prior to filing

suit. Ernst v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 1 F.4th 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2021). “To satisfy exhaustion, a

claim generally must arise out of the plaintiff's EEOC charge.” Id. The Court interprets “what is

properly embraced in review of a Title–VII claim somewhat broadly,” by considering not only “the

scope of the administrative charge itself” but also “the scope of the EEOC investigation which

‘can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’” Pacheco v. Mineta, 448

F.3d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th

Cir. 1970)).

Here, Ms. Webb’s EEOC charge describes only the incident leading up to her termination

and her claim that she was discriminated against because of her race. Nothing in the charge

suggests she experienced any type of harassment or hostile work environment. A hostile work

environment claim could not reasonably be expected to grow out of her EEOC charge. Ms. Webb

has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to any hostile work environment claim under

Title VII. This claim must be dismissed.

3. Hostile Work Environment – LEDL Requirement that Notice be Given

Although the LEDL does not require a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies, see

Walton-Lentz v. Innophos, Inc., 476 F. App'x 566, 570 (5th Cir. 2012), the statute does require that:

A plaintiff who believes he or she has been discriminated against, and who intends

to pursue court action shall give the person who has allegedly discriminated written

notice of this fact at least thirty days before initiating court action, shall detail the

alleged discrimination, and both parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve the

dispute prior to initiating court action.

La. Stat. Ann. § 23:303(C). “[A] plaintiff's failure to provide timely notice of intent to sue warrants

dismissal of an LEDL claim . . . .” Stubberfield v. Offshore, No. CV 15-2339, 2016 WL 2855480,

at *2 (E.D. La. May 16, 2016). The notice requirement may be satisfied by filing an EEOC charge.

Lafargue v. Comprehensive Health Mgmt., Inc., No. CV 19-11111, 2020 WL 3832663, at *4 (E.D.

La. July 8, 2020).

Oceans Behavioral argues that Ms. Webb’s hostile work environment claim under the

LEDL must be dismissed because she failed to provide notice. Indeed, as discussed above, Ms.

Webb’s EEOC charge did not provide notice of a hostile work environment claim. She has offered

no other basis to find that the notice requirement has been met. For this reason, Ms. Webb’s LEDL

hostile work environment claim must be dismissed.

4. Failure to State a Hostile Work Environment Claim under § 1981.

To establish a hostile-work-environment claim under § 1981 or Title VII, an employee must

prove that she

(1) belongs to a protected group; (2) [she] was subjected to unwelcome harassment;

(3) the harassment complained of was based on race; (4) the harassment complained

of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; (5) the employer knew

or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt

remedial action.

Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ramsey v.

Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002)); see Mendoza v. Helicopter, 548 F. App'x 127, 128

(5th Cir. 2013). Harassment affects a “term, condition, or privilege” of employment when it is so

severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions of employment and “create[s] an abusive working

environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City

of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). In determining “whether a hostile work

environment existed, a court must consider ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its

severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Moore v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 150 F. App'x 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d

264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002)).

Here, Oceans Behavioral argues that plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that could

support a hostile work environment claim. Indeed, the alleged instances of harassment do not

appear to concern Ms. Webb’s employment with Oceans Behavioral at all. Ms. Webb alleges that

she was “subjected to unwelcome conduct in [defendant’s] refusal to report the harassment was

based on race in regards to the March 22, 2023, Incident [and] the November 8, 2023, Incident.”

Rec. Doc. 1, at 15-16. But Ms. Webb alleges that she did not begin employment with Oceans

Behavioral until after that, in January 2024. She alleges also that defendant’s actions and/or

omissions “created a hostile work environment for Plaintiff because of her race – she was the sole

African American woman Sales Team Manager.” But she alleges she was a nurse with Oceans

Behavioral, not a Sales Team Manager. As Oceans Behavioral suggests, it appears that Ms. Webb’s

counsel erroneously included allegations from a wholly different complaint.3 See Rec. Doc. 1, at

9-10. As to Ms. Webb’s employment with Oceans Behavioral as a nurse in 2024, there are no

allegations at all that could be construed as creating a hostile work environment. Ms. Webb has

failed to state a plausible claim for hostile work environment under § 1981, and such claims must

be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

5. Retaliation under § 1981.

Section 1981 claims for retaliation are analyzed under the same rubric as Title VII. Scott v.

U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021), as revised (Nov. 26, 2021). To establish

a retaliation claim under § 1981, the plaintiff must allege that she “engaged in a protected activity,”

that “an adverse employment action occurred,” and that “a causal link exists between the protected

activity and the adverse employment action. Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, L.L.C., 23 F.4th

422, 436–37 (5th Cir. 2022). “An employee engages in a protected activity under Section 1981

3 This error, while it may have been inadvertent, is indefensible. Even a cursory review of the Complaint prior to

filing would have revealed references to “Mr. Jonathan Laskie” serving as a “Market Sales Director” tasked with

“supporting funeral homes and cemeteries in sales, retirement, training, and marketing,” “Mr. Albert Delaney Jr.,

“the General Manager Area Cemeteries of the SCI Funeral Services and S.E. Cemeteries of Louisiana,” and several

other individuals and titles that are clearly unrelated to Ms. Webb’s claims. The inclusion of pages of extraneous

information has resulted in additional work for the defendant and the Court in order to determine which allegations

of the Complaint actually apply to Ms. Webb. The Court cautions Ms. Webb’s counsel that “Any attorney or other

person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the

proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess

costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

when ‘he has opposed any practice made unlawful by [Title VII].’” Scott, 16 F.4th at 1209 (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). Under Title VII, protected activity “can consist of either: (1) ‘oppos[ing]

any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter’ or (2) ‘ma[king] a charge,

testif[ying], assist [ing], or participat[ing] in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing

under this subchapter.’” E.E.O.C. v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2016)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a)) (alteration in original). The Fifth Circuit has “consistently held

that a vague complaint, without any reference to an unlawful employment practice under Title VII,

does not constitute protected activity.” Davis v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 448 F. App'x 485, 493

(5th Cir. 2011).

Here, Oceans Behavior argues that Ms. Webb failed to allege that she engaged in any

protected activity. First, it points out that she alleges making reports after the March 2023 and

November 2023 incidents and within days she was subjected to a retaliatory lateral transfer and

disciplinary action. As noted above, these purported incidents occurred before she allegedly began

work at Oceans Behavior and appear to be related to a different lawsuit. And no facts alleged

support any lateral transfer or disciplinary action other than the August 2024 termination.

As to Ms. Webb’s allegation that she emailed Ms. Fuller immediately after her termination

and claimed her termination was inequitable, Oceans Behavior argues that this complaint cannot

be a protected activity because she did not make any reference to racial discrimination. Indeed,

although Ms. Webb alleges that she told Ms. Fuller white and younger nurses received different

treatment, the copy of the email attached by Oceans Behavior shows that she did not do so.4

The Court finds Ms. Webb has failed to plausibly allege that she engaged in a protected

activity. Accordingly, she has failed to state a claim for retaliation and this claim must be dismissed.

4 Because the email is referenced in Ms. Webb’s complaint, the Court finds it appropriate to consider the email as

incorporated into her Complaint.

Conclusion

Because Ms. Webb has failed to exhaust administrative remedies under Title VII and the

ADEA, her claims under these claims are dismissed. Furthermore, Ms. Webb has failed to exhaust

her administrative remedies as to any hostile work environment claim under Title VII and as to

any hostile work environment claim under the LEDL, she has failed to provide adequate pre-suit

notice. These claims are dismissed. Further, Ms. Webb has failed to state a claim for hostile work

environment or retaliation under § 1981. These claims are also dismissed. Accordingly, Oceans

Behavior’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Only Ms. Webb’s claims for race discrimination

under § 1981 and the LEDL remain.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 6th day of July, 2026.

Quin van Mogaweldl

Janis van Meerveld

United States Magistrate Judge

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