Payne

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

HENRY PIERCE PAYNE, )

)

Movant, )

v. ) Case No. 4:24-CV-00483-SEP

)

UNITED STATES, )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Respondent. )

Before the Court is Movant Henry Pierce Payne’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or

Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. [1]. The issues are fully briefed. For the

reasons set forth below, the Motion is deniFeAdC. T S

In January 2023, Movant pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to three

counts of a six-count indictment: conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to

distribute actual methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846

(Count II); possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of actual

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) (Count III); and

SeeUnited States v. Payne

felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(a)(2) (Count V). , No. 4:22-CR-00073-SEP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 27,

2023) (Crim. Doc.), Doc. [210] at 4.

The parties jointly agreed that Movant may be subject to a mandatory minimum

sentence of 15 years pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), otherwise known as the Armed Career

Criminal Act (ACCA). Crim. Doc. [185] at 5. Movant pled guilty with full knowledge of this

possibility, stated that he had discussed this possibility with his counsel, and acknowledged

Id.

that he would not be able to withdraw his guilty plea if the Court applied the ACCA

enhancement to his sentence. at 6. Movant agreed to waive his rights to appeal all

non-jurisdictional, nonsentencing issues, including “issues relating to pretrial motions,

Id.

discovery and the guilty plea, [and] the constitutionality of the statute(s) to which [Movant

pled guilty].” at 8. Movant waived “all rights to contest the conviction or sentence in

any post-conviction proceeding, including one pursuant to Title 28, United States Code,

Id.

Section 2255, except for claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of

counsel.” Finally, Movant agreed that he was satisfied with the performance of counsel

Id.

and that he had knowingly and voluntarily entered into both the plea agreement and the

guilty plea. at 11-12.

During the plea hearing, Movant stated under oath that he was satisfied with

counsel’s representation and that he had discussed the plea agreement with counsel. Crim.

Doc. [266] at 6, 8. The Court explained that the maximum penalty for Count V was up to ten

Id.

years’ imprisonment, a fine of no more than $250,000, or both, and that the Court may

impose a period of supervised release up to three years. at 14. The Court asked

whether Movant understood that, in certain situations under ACCA, he “may be subject to a

Id.

mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum sentence greater than described

above,” andMovant confirmed that he understood. Movant also acknowledged that by

pleading guilty, he was waiving his rights to appeal his sentence and post-conviction

Id.

matters, except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.

at 17. At the sentencing hearing, the Court applied the ACCA enhancement to Movant’s

charges given Movant’s criminal history and sentenced Movant to 180 months’

imprisonment. Crim. Doc. [268] at 4. Movant did not directly appeal his sentence. In

March of 2024, Movant filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under

28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. [1]. LEGAL STANDARD

Jones v. Hendrix

Section 2255 of Title 28 provides a “postconviction remedy for federal prisoners.”

, 599 U.S. 465, 469 (2023), and states as follows:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress

claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was

imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that

the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the

sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise

subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence

to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255. To obtain relief under § 2255, the movant must establish a constitutional

or federal statutory violation constituting “a fundamental defect which inherently results in

United States v. Gomez

United States v. Boone

a complete miscarriage of justice.” , 326 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir.

2003) (quoting , 869 F.2d 1089, 1091 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989)).

Claims, including those concerning constitutional and jurisdictional issues, that a

defendant does not raise on direct appeal cannot subsequently be raised in a § 2255

United States v. Moss

motion unless the movant establishes: “(1) cause for the default and actual prejudice or

Bousley v. United States

(2) actual innocence.” , 252 F.3d 993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing

, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998)). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims

Massaro v. United States

may be raised for the first time in a § 2255 motion even if they could have been raised on

direct appeal. , 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). This exception exists to

Id.

prevent movants from being forced “to raise the issue before there has been an opportunity

fully to develop the factual predicate for the claim.”

If the movant’s claims are not procedurally barred, “[a] prisoner is entitled to an

Engelen v. United States

evidentiary hearing on a section 2255 motion unless the motion, files and records of the

case conclusively show that the prisoner is not entitled to relief.” ,

68 F.3d 238, 240 (8th Cir. 1995). The Eighth Circuit has explained that a § 2255 motion

“can be dismissed without a hearing if (1) the petitioner’s allegations, accepted as true,

would not entitle the petitioner to relief, or (2) the allegations cannot be accepted as true

Id.

because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather

than statements of fact.” DISCUSSION

Movant raises three grounds in his § 2255 Motion to Vacate: (1) counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to inform Movant of a possible sentence enhancement

under ACCA; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the statutory basis for Movant’s conviction in

Count V, is unconstitutional; and (3) it is unconstitutional to consider a defendant’s past

criminal history in determining whether to apply the ACCA enhancement if the defendant

1

has completed his sentence for those charges. Doc. [1] at 4-5, 7.

1

In Ground 4, Movant claims that his sentence was illegal and unconstitutionally vague based on

I. Movant has not shown that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing

to inform him of a possible sentencing enhancement under ACCA.

In Ground 1, Movant asserts that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing

to advise him of the possibility that he could be subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum

sentence pursuant to ACCA. Doc. [1] at 4. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

Meza-Lopez v. United

require a movant to show “both that his attorney’s performance ‘fell below an objective

States Strickland v. Washington

standard of reasonableness’ and that he was prejudiced as a result.”

, 929 F.3d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting , 466 U.S. 668,

687-88 (1984)). To show that counsel’s performance was deficient, a movant must show

“counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’

Anderson v. United States

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment [to the United States Constitution].”

Strickland

, 393 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting

, 466 U.S. at 687). To demonstrate prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, a

Watson v. United States

movant “must establish a reasonable probability that he would have exercised his right to a

trial but for counsel’s ineffectiveness.” , 682 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir.

2012) (citation omitted). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

Meza-Lopez

confidence in the outcome or a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different

result.” , 929 F.3d at 1044-45 (citation modified).

Because of the difficulties inherent in evaluating an attorney’s performance, “a court

Strickland

must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

post hoc

reasonable professional assistance.” , 466 U.S. at 689. “Courts should not upset a

Meza-Lopez Lee v.

plea solely because of assertions from a defendant about how he would have

United States

pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies.” , 929 F.3d at 1045 (quoting

Id.

, 582 U.S. 357, 369 (2017)). Instead, courts should “look to contemporaneous

evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences.” In particular, a

Adams v. United

“defendant’s representations during the plea-taking carry a strong presumption of verity

States see also United States v. Brown

and pose a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.”

, 869 F.3d 633, 635 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted); ,

331 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 2003) (“We have held that facts gathered from the prosecutor’s

summarization of the plea agreement and the language of the plea agreement itself, a

colloquy between the defendant and the district court, and the stipulated facts before the

district court, are sufficient to find a factual basis for a guilty plea.” (citation modified)).

“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the

Strickland

inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the

defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” , 466 U.S. at 697.

The record establishes that Movant had notice of the possibility of a 15-year

mandatory minimum sentence under ACCA. Not only did Movant acknowledge that

possibility in his plea agreement, Crim. Doc. [185] at 5-6, but the Court also informed him

of it during his plea colloquy, Crim. Doc. [266] at 14. Thus, even if counsel failed to inform

Movant that his sentence may be enhanced under ACCA, the record establishes that Movant

wII.a s notMifoievda onft tkhnaot wpoisnsgilbyil aitnyd. Bveoclauunstea rMiloyv wanati vcaendn hoits s rhiogwht p troe cjuodnitcees, th hisi sG rcoounnvdic 1ti foanil s.

or sentence in a § 2255 proceeding, except for claims of prosecutorial

misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel.

United States v.

Andis

“As a general rule, a defendant is allowed to waive appellate rights.”

, 333 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The Eighth Circuit has found “no reason

DeRoo v. United States

to distinguish the enforceability of a waiver of direct-appeal rights from a waiver of

collateral-attack rights in the plea agreement context.” , 223 F.3d

919, 923 (8th Cir. 2000). When reviewing a waiver of appellate rights, the Eighth Circuit

United States v. Griffin

looks to whether the “appeal falls within the scope of the waiver and that both the waiver

Andis

and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily.” ,

668 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing , 333 F.3d at 889-90). A knowing and

Id.

voluntary waiver will not be enforced “where to do so would result in a miscarriage of

United States v. Sisco Andis

justice.” “[T]he ‘miscarriage of justice’ exception is a narrow one that may arise in only

limited contexts.” , 576 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing , 333

F.3d at 891-92). Although the Eighth Circuit has not provided an exhaustive list of what

falls under the miscarriage of justice exception, it has “recognized it for challenges to an

illegal sentence, to a sentence that violates the terms of an agreement, and where

United States v. Williams Andis

ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the appeal waiver itself unknowing and

involuntary.” , 81 F.4th 835, 840 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing , 333

In Grounds 2 and 3, Movant challenges the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and

ACCA. These claims fall within the scope of Movant’s waiver of appellate rights. In the plea

agreement, Movant agreed to waive his rights to appeal all non-jurisdictional,

constitutionality

nonsentencing issues, including “issues relating to pretrial motions, discovery and the

guilty plea, [and] the of the statute(s) to which [Movant pled guilty].”

Id.

Crim. Doc. [185] at 8 (emphasis added). And Movant knowingly and voluntarily entered

into both the waiver and the plea agreement. at 12. During the plea hearing, Movant

stated under oath that he had not been pressured or threatened to enter the plea

.

agreement and that he had discussed the plea agreement with his counsel before signing.

Crim Doc. [266] at 8. Movant also affirmed his understanding that by pleading guilty, he

Id.

was waiving his right to appeal matters in his sentence and post-conviction proceedings,

except for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. at 17.

Finally, enforcing Movant’s waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice. None

of the previously recognized exceptions in the Eighth Circuit applies, as Movant questions

the constitutionality of the two statutory provisions underlying his guilty plea and

sentence. Nor does Movant provide any basis for extending the exception. Movant does

not provide any citations to legal authority or other reasoning as to why § 922(g)(1) and

See United States v. Shelledy Chay-

ACCA are unconstitutional. When there is no meaningful argument presented in a brief, the

Velasquez v. Ashcroft

claim is waived. , 961 F.3d 1014, 1023 (8th Cir. 2020);

, 367 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2004).

Even if Movant offered more legal authority in support of his claim, Eighth Circuit

precedent does not suggest that these statutory provisions are unconstitutional facially or

UnitedStates v. Cunningham

as applied to Movant. The Eighth Circuit has held that “[t]he longstanding prohibition on

United States v. Jackson

possession of firearms by felons is constitutional.” , 114 F.4th

671, 675 (8th Cir. 2024); , 110 F.4th 1120, 1125-26 (8th Cir. 2024).

And the Court has found no authority suggesting that ACCA is unconstitutional as applied

2

to Movant. Thus, enforcing Movant’s waiver of his right to contest constitutional issues in

this § 2255 proceeding will n ot result in a miscarriage of justice.

Johnson v. United States

2

In , 576 U.S. 591 (2015), the SupreSmeee Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii),

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Movant's § 2255 Motion to

Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence must be denied in all respects. Because the Court

finds that the motion and the record conclusively show that Movant is not entitled to relief,

no evidentiary hearing will be necessary. See Engelen, 68 F.3d at 240. Further, no

certificate of appealability shall issue because the Court finds that Movant has not made a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (“A

certificate of appealability may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Doc. [1], is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Movant's Motion to Compel for 2255 Relief, Doc.

[14], is DENIED.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that no certificate of appealability shall issue.

Dated this 6th day of July, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE