The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION
EDDA D., Case No. 2:25-cv-06976-DFM
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
v.
FRANK J. BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Plaintiff Edda D. appeals the decision of the administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) denying her claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income. For the reasons set forth below, the ALJ’s denial of benefits is
affirmed, and this action is dismissed with prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income on April 25, 2020, alleging disability beginning October 3,
2017.1 See Administrative Record (“AR”) 274-83. Her claim was denied at the
initial level and on reconsideration. See AR 116-17, 168-69, 191-97. She
requested a hearing before an ALJ, who conducted a hearing on March 23,
1 Citations to the AR are to the record pagination. All other docket
citations are to the CM/ECF pagination.
2023. See AR 42-70. Plaintiff testified at the hearing, as did a vocational expert
(“VE”). See id. Following the hearing, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim on
March 30, 2023. See AR 14-35.
The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a),
416.920(a). At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since her alleged disability onset date. See AR 19.
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments:
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with impingement;
degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine with impingement;
status post left humerus fracture, left tibial fracture; left shoulder
traumatic arthropathy, tendinosis and capsulitis; left elbow
epicondylitis; left hand tenosynovitis; degenerative joint disease of
the bilateral hips; PTSD; generalized anxiety disorder; and major
depressive disorder/dysthymic disorder.
AR 20. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of
one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
See AR 21.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined by 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)2 with the following exertional and non-
2 Sections 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) defines “light” work as “work
involv[ing] lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or
carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds” and requiring “a good deal of
walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some
pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls.”
exertional limitations:
[S]he can lift, carry, push and pull up to 20 pounds occasionally
and 10 pounds frequently. She can sit for 6 hours, stand for 6
hours, and walk for 6 hours in an 8- hour workday, for 5 days a
week. She also has the following limitations: no more than
frequent pushing and pulling, reaching, and handling with left
upper extremity; no crawling, exposure to hazards, or climbing
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and no more than occasional
balancing, crouching, kneeling, stooping, or climbing ramps or
stairs, as those are defined in the DOT/SCO; and no exposure to
extreme temperatures of cold. She can understand, remember, and
carry out simple instructions. She can have occasional interactions
with supervisors and coworkers but no interactions with the
public, and can deal with frequent changes in a routine work
setting.
AR 22. The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant
work. See AR 26. At step five, based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff could perform the following jobs that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy: marker, router, and collator. See AR 26-27. Thus, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. See AR 28. The Appeals Council
denied review of the ALJ’s decision. See AR 1-4.
On February 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed an appeal in this Court, alleging
that the ALJ erred by not finding that her complex regional pain syndrome
(“CRPS”) was medically determinable and by rejecting her subjective-
symptom testimony. See Edda D. v. O’Malley, No. 24-01213, 2024 WL
6969023 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2024). On September 13, 2024, the Court found
that the ALJ erred in evaluating Plaintiff’s CRPS, noting that it was well-
documented in the medical evidence of record and that the error was not
harmless. See id. The Court remanded for the ALJ to evaluate the medical
evidence concerning Plaintiff’s CRPS and determine whether and how it
affected her RFC. See id.
On remand, the ALJ conducted a second hearing, at which Plaintiff and
a VE testified. See AR 32-61. Thereafter, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim. See
AR 1318-33.
The ALJ again followed the five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a),
416.920(a). The ALJ reached the same findings at steps one, two, and three as
in his original decision, with one exception. See AR 1321. At step two, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff’s CRPS constituted a severe impairment. See id. At
step four, the ALJ reached the same RFC finding as in the first decision with
respect to Plaintiff’s ability to perform light work with exertional limitations.
See AR 1324. The ALJ modified Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations. See id.
In his original decision, he found that Plaintiff could have only occasional
interactions with supervisors and coworkers and no interactions with the
public. See AR 22. On remand, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could “have
frequent interactions with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.” AR 1324.
Relying on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform the
following jobs, which exist in significant numbers in the national economy:
cleaner, collator operator, and router. See AR 1332. Accordingly, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff was not disabled. See AR 1333.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A district court will set aside a denial of benefits only if “it is either not
supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Luther v.
Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Under the
substantial-evidence standard, the district court looks to the existing
administrative record and determines “whether it contains sufficient evidence
to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S.
97, 102 (2019) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). “Substantial” means “more than
a mere scintilla” but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 103 (citation omitted). This
threshold “is not high” and “defers to the presiding ALJ, who has seen the
hearing up close.” Id. at 103, 108. “Where evidence is susceptible to more than
one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”
Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).
III. DISCUSSION
The parties dispute: (1) whether the ALJ complied with the Court’s
order to properly consider the medical evidence concerning Plaintiff’s CRPS;
(2) whether the ALJ’s decision to alter Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations in
his RFC finding was justified; (3) whether the ALJ properly considered
medical opinions concerning the effects of Plaintiff’s severe mental-health
impairments; and (4) whether the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective-
symptom testimony. See Dkt. 11 at 7-25.
A. Plaintiff’s RFC
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed three errors in determining
her RFC. First, she faults the ALJ for failing to find that her CRPS caused any
RFC limitations other than those that the ALJ identified in his initial hearing
decision. See Dkt. 11 at 7. Second, Plaintiff maintains that no medical
evidence supported the ALJ’s decision on remand to downgrade his prior RFC
finding concerning Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations. See id. at 11-14.
Third, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for ignoring medical evidence in the record that
supported greater non-exertional restrictions than those reflected in the ALJ’s
RFC finding. See id. at 14-19. The Court will address each argument in turn.
1. Legal Standard
At step four of the five-step process, the ALJ must determine the
claimant’s RFC, which measures the claimant’s capacity to engage in basic
work activities. See Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 471 (1986); Burch, 400
F.3d at 683. The RFC is a determination of “the most [the claimant] can still
do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1);
416.945(a)(1). Although the RFC assessment is ultimately the ALJ’s
responsibility, it must be supported by substantial evidence. See Rounds v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing
Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008)). The ALJ
must “set out in the record his reasoning and the evidentiary support for his
interpretation of the medical evidence.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1102
(9th Cir. 1999).
2. Plaintiff’s CRPS
a. Background
On February 1, 2021, Dr. Seung Ha Lim personally examined Plaintiff
in connection with her alleged physical impairments. See AR 788-92. He noted
that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with CRPS in her left arm but observed that,
among other things, Plaintiff was able to generate 40 pounds of force using her
right hand and 30 pounds of force using her left. See AR 789. According to Dr.
Lim, Plaintiff’s range of motion in both arms was “within normal limits,”
although she displayed “hypersensitivity [in] the left upper extremity.” AR
790-91. Dr. Lim found that Plaintiff could perform medium work requiring her
to frequently use her left arm for “pushing, pulling, and overhead reaching.”
AR 791.
Three weeks later, on February 22, 2021, Dr. Gideon Lowell, a state
agency consultant, reviewed Dr. Lim’s findings and found that Plaintiff was
limited to light work with some restrictions. See AR 82-85. Although Dr.
Lowell disagreed with Dr. Lim’s finding that Plaintiff could perform medium
work, he concurred with Dr. Lim’s finding that Plaintiff could frequently use
her left arm for pushing, pulling, and overhead reaching. See AR 83-84. Dr.
Lowell also found that Plaintiff had no restrictions on her ability to use her
hands for gross and fine manipulation. See AR 84. Approximately one year
later, Dr. F. Greene, another state agency consultant, reached the same
conclusions. See AR 132-36.
About six months after this case was remanded, Dr. Lim examined
Plaintiff a second time. See AR 1878-87. This time, Plaintiff was able to
generate 45 pounds of force using her right hand and five pounds of force using
her left. See AR 1885. Dr. Lim noted that Plaintiff’s range of motion in both
upper extremities was “within normal limits,” although she claimed to
experience “hypersensitivity to touch in the left elbow area.” AR 1886. Dr.
Lim again found that Plaintiff could, among other things, perform medium
work requiring her to frequently use her left hand for pushing and pulling. See
AR 1878-80.
b. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work that,
among other things, required her to “frequently push, pull, reach, handle, and
finger with left upper extremity.” AR 1324. In doing so, the ALJ rejected some
of Dr. Lim’s findings—including his finding that Plaintiff could perform
medium work—but credited his finding regarding Plaintiff’s ability to
frequently use her left arm. See id. The ALJ largely credited Dr. Lowell’s and
Dr. Greene’s opinions, although the ALJ limited Plaintiff’s exertional abilities
more than either Dr. Lowell or Dr. Greene had opined. See AR 1329.
c. Analysis
Plaintiff’s CRPS argument presents a challenge to the evidence
supporting the ALJ’s RFC finding that Plaintiff could frequently push, pull,
reach, handle, and finger with her left arm. In particular, Plaintiff contends
that the ALJ’s RFC finding failed to account for her CRPS in the left arm, see
Dkt. 11 at 7-11, which, according to the ALJ, was a severe impairment, see
AR 1321. That argument fails because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
RFC finding. The ALJ based his RFC assessment on the opinions of Dr. Lim,
who personally examined Plaintiff twice, and the non-testifying state agency
physicians, all of whom opined that Plaintiff could, at a minimum, perform
light work that required her to frequently push, pull, reach, handle, and finger
with her left arm. See AR 82-85, 132-36, 791. Indeed, Dr. Lim twice found
Plaintiff capable of such work—once in February 2021 and again in April
2025—despite his awareness that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with CRPS in
her left arm. See AR 788-92, 1878-80. Those opinions constitute substantial
evidence supporting the ALJ’s RFC assessment. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278
F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The opinions of non-treating or non-examining
physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are
consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record.”);
Dyke v. Berryhill, No. 17-08967, 2019 WL 13043633, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24,
2019) (concluding that ALJ’s RFC assessment was supported by substantial
evidence when it was based on opinions of consultative examiner and state
agency physicians).
To the extent Plaintiff believes that the Court’s remand order required
the ALJ to alter his RFC finding concerning Plaintiff’s exertional limitations to
account for her CRPS, she is mistaken. To be sure, the Court noted that a
proper consideration of Plaintiff’s CRPS “could have resulted” in a different
RFC finding. See Edda D., 2024 WL 6969023, at *3. But the Court never
suggested that it required as much. And, as discussed above, medical evidence
adduced before and after the remand order supported the conclusion that,
despite her CRPS, Plaintiff could frequently push, pull, reach, handle, and
finger with her left arm. Accordingly, the Court cannot disturb the ALJ’s RFC
finding.
Plaintiff’s suggestion that the ALJ failed to adequately address the
medical evidence in the record concerning her CRPS is unpersuasive. See Dkt.
11 at 10. As related above, the ALJ relied on the medical evidence in the
record to find that Plaintiff’s CRPS constituted a severe impairment. See AR
1321. Indeed, in finding that Plaintiff’s CRPS “show[ed] persisting, limiting
pain in [her] left upper extremity,” AR 1327, the ALJ cited all but one of the
medical records that Plaintiff contends he failed to sufficiently address.3
Although Plaintiff faults the ALJ for failing to sufficiently discuss how the
medical records described her CRPS symptoms, see Dkt. 11 at 10, the ALJ’s
citation to and reliance on those records shows that he was aware of their
content. And despite his failure to provide a detailed discussion of the records,
the ALJ necessarily relied on them in finding that Plaintiff’s CRPS was a
severe impairment that caused her persistent, limiting pain in her left arm.
Moreover, considering that the medical records concerning Plaintiff’s
CRPS were central to the Court’s remand order—of which the ALJ was well
aware—there is every reason to believe that the ALJ understood what the
medical records showed concerning Plaintiff’s CRPS and its resulting
symptoms. Indeed, the only evidence concerning Plaintiff’s CRPS that the ALJ
mischaracterized was the treatment Plaintiff received. Specifically, the ALJ
mistakenly stated that Plaintiff had been treated with a stellate ganglion block
and a spinal cord stimulator for her back pain, see AR 1326-76, when, in fact,
she had received those treatments for the pain in her left arm due to her CRPS,
see AR 645, 647-49, 652, 657-59. But the treatment Plaintiff received for her
CRPS had no bearing on how the condition affected her ability to perform
work-related tasks.
3 The only record identified by Plaintiff that the ALJ did not cite consists
of a handwritten notation that provides no details about Plaintiff’s CRPS that
had not already appeared in the records that the ALJ cited. See AR 1169.
Evidence of conservative treatment is relevant to an ALJ’s assessment of
a claimant’s subjective-symptom testimony. See Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,
751 (9th Cir. 2007)) (“[E]vidence of ‘conservative treatment’ is sufficient to
discount a claimant's testimony regarding severity of an impairment.” (citing
Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995))). Such evidence,
therefore, could impact an RFC finding. But here, the ALJ did not cite
Plaintiff’s conservative treatment for her CRPS in discounting her subjective-
symptom testimony. As a result, any error on the ALJ’s part in identifying the
treatment Plaintiff received for her CRPS was harmless. See Marsh v. Colvin,
792 F.3d 1170, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that ALJ’s failure to
address medical evidence is harmless when the evidence is “inconsequential to
the ultimate nondisability determination” and, if considered, would not have
caused a reasonable ALJ to reach a different disability determination (citation
omitted)).
Accordingly, remand is not warranted on this claim of error.
3. The ALJ’s Modification of Plaintiff’s Non-Exertional
Limitations
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in downgrading the prior RFC
finding concerning her non-exertional limitations. See Dkt. 11 at 11-14. As
related above, the ALJ’s RFC finding on remand was the same as his original
RFC finding, with one exception: he originally found that Plaintiff could have
only occasional interactions with supervisors and coworkers and no
interactions with the public, see AR 22, but on remand, he found that she
could “have frequent interactions with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.”
AR 1324. According to Plaintiff, no medical evidence supported this alteration
to the RFC, and the ALJ failed to explain why he altered the original RFC
finding. See Dkt. 11 at 11-14. As such, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s RFC
finding on remand is not supported by substantial evidence. See id.
In Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth
Circuit rejected an argument nearly identical to the one Plaintiff makes here.
See id. There, the claimant argued that the ALJ was not free on remand to
change the claimant’s RFC and that the ALJ’s new finding was erroneous. See
id. Rejecting that argument, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that, because the
Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s original decision and specifically instructed
the ALJ to reassess the claimant’s residual functional capacity, “the ALJ’s
original finding no longer existed.” Id. Here, under Massachi, the ALJ was not
bound by his prior RFC finding because it no longer existed on remand. As
such, the ALJ was free to reach a different RFC finding, provided that it was
supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff relies on Gageby v. Dudek, No. 24-2595, 2025 WL 1352401
(9th Cir. May 9, 2025). There, the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ erred on
remand by reducing the claimant’s limitations in concentration, persistence,
and pace from “moderate” to “mild” without adequately explaining the
change. Id. at *1. According to the Ninth Circuit, the ALJ relied on nearly
identical reasoning to reach different conclusions before and after remand, yet
failed to explain why his prior rationale was no longer persuasive or how any
evidence justified his revised finding. See id. Citing Treichler v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014), and Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42
(1983), the Ninth Circuit stated that an ALJ must provide a reasoned
explanation when changing prior RFC findings. See Gageby, 2025 WL
1352401, at *1.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Gageby is unpersuasive. As an initial matter,
Gageby is an unpublished memorandum disposition. As the Ninth Circuit has
made clear, its unpublished memorandum dispositions are not binding
precedent. See Grimm v. City of Portland, 971 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir.
2020). Although they “can be cited, and may prove useful, as examples of the
applications of settled legal principles,” they should not be used—as Plaintiff
would have the Court use Gageby—“as the pivotal basis for a legal ruling by a
district court.” Grimm, 971 F.3d at 1067; see Brown v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 116 F.4th 861, 887 (9th Cir. 2024) (Lee, J., dissenting) (“Over and
over, seemingly at every judicial conference or bench-and-bar meeting, judges
of the Ninth Circuit warn litigants and district courts against relying on our
unpublished memorandum dispositions.”).
Indeed, Gageby does not mention—let alone discuss—the Ninth
Circuit’s published opinion in Massachi, which, as noted above, held that prior
RFC findings cease to exist once the Appeals Council vacates the ALJ’s
underlying decision. Furthermore, the cases that Gageby cites for the
proposition that, on remand, an ALJ must explain any changes to a prior RFC
finding do not support that proposition. The first case, Treichler, did not
concern an ALJ’s decision after his first one was vacated. Rather, it addressed
whether the ALJ had provided sufficient reasons for rejecting the claimant’s
subjective-symptom testimony. Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1102-03. The second
case on which Gageby relies, State Farm, is inapposite. It does not involve a
claim for disability benefits or a judicial review of an ALJ’s RFC finding after
his original decision was vacated. Rather, State Farm concerns what a
government agency must do when it changes course by rescinding a generally
applicable agency rule, see 463 U.S. at 42. Specifically, it explained that when
a government agency changes or rescinds an existing rule or policy, it must
provide a reasoned explanation for the change. See id. Put simply, neither case
on which Gageby relies supports the proposition that an ALJ on remand must
explain why his RFC finding is different from that in a prior, vacated decision.
In any event, even if Gageby were controlling, Plaintiff still could not
show that the ALJ erred. Unlike the ALJ in Gageby, who used “nearly
identical explanations to reach two different decisions” concerning the
claimant’s RFC, 2025 WL 1352401, at *1, the ALJ here explained the basis for
his finding on remand that Plaintiff could “have frequent interactions with
supervisors, coworkers, and the public,” AR 1324. Specifically, the ALJ cited
the opinions of two state-agency medical consultants who found that Plaintiff
had no social-interaction limitations. See AR 88 (opinion of Dr. Pamela
Hawkins), 138 (opinion of Dr. L. Closky); see also AR 1330 (ALJ crediting
both opinions but nevertheless limiting Plaintiff to only “frequent interactions
with supervisors, coworkers, and the public”). The ALJ did not address those
specific findings in his original decision, and his reliance on them on remand
differentiates his explanation for his original RFC finding from his explanation
for the one on remand.4 Moreover, as the ALJ noted, see AR 1328, Plaintiff
reported to her treating physician in January 2025—that is, after the case had
been remanded—that her medications were “working fine,” that she felt
“balanced,” and that her “anxiety and mood” were “under control,” AR 1670.
She also reported that her energy levels were “stable” and that she had been
4 The opinions of two state-agency medical consultants were available to
the ALJ when he initially found that Plaintiff could have only occasional
interactions with supervisors and coworkers and no interactions with the
public. Indeed, the ALJ cited both opinions in his original decision and found
portions of them unpersuasive. See AR 25. But the ALJ neither credited nor
rejected either consultant’s finding that Plaintiff had no social-interaction
limitations. See id. Considering that the ALJ assessed non-exertional
limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to interact with others in the original hearing
decision, he arguably should have discussed those specific findings in
formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. But any error in failing to do so in the original
decision did not prevent the ALJ from rectifying that error on remand.
Moreover, because the ALJ did not previously address the state-agency
medical consultants’ findings concerning Plaintiff’s social limitations, his
decision on remand to rely on those findings was not inconsistent with his
prior evaluation of the medical evidence.
“engaged in social activities.” Id. That evidence, coupled with the state-agency
medical consultants’ findings that Plaintiff had no social-interaction
limitations, constituted substantial evidence supporting the challenged aspect
of the ALJ’s RFC finding on remand. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957; Dyke,
2019 WL 13043633, at *1.
Accordingly, remand is not warranted on this claim of error.
4. The ALJ’s Consideration of the Medical Evidence
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ ignored medical evidence in the record
that supported greater non-exertional restrictions than those reflected in the
ALJ’s RFC finding. See Dkt. 11 at 14-19. First, she asserts that the ALJ
omitted key limitations identified by two state-agency medical consultants
whose opinions the ALJ found persuasive. See id. at 14-15. Specifically,
Plaintiff notes that the ALJ’s RFC finding did not include the consultants’
findings that she required a low-demand work setting, where any changes
should be introduced gradually. See id. at 15.5 Second, she contends that the
ALJ failed to evaluate a 2018 medical opinion describing the extent of her
psychological and emotional debilitation. See id. at 17-18.
a. Background
On April 6, 2021, Dr. Pamela Hawkins, a non-examining state agency
medical consultant, reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and found, among
other things, that she was unlimited in her ability to carry out short and simple
instructions and to “maintain concentration, pace and persistence for simple
and some detailed routine tasks.” AR 86-89. By contrast, Dr. Hawkins found
that Plaintiff was moderately limited in her ability to carry out detailed
5 The two state-agency consultants whose findings Plaintiff faults the
ALJ for ignoring are the same consultants the ALJ relied on in finding that
Plaintiff could have frequent interactions with supervisors, coworkers, and the
public. See AR 1324.
instructions and routine tasks. See id. In explaining Plaintiff’s adaptation
capacities and limitations, Dr. Hawkins stated that Plaintiff could “adapt to a
low demand work setting consistent with simple and some detailed work” and
noted that, “[f]or greatest success, changes should be introduced gradually.”
AR 87. On February 10, 2022, Dr. L. Closky, another non-examining state
agency medical consultant, reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and reached
the same findings. See AR 137-39.
On February 23, 2022, Plaintiff underwent a mental status examination
by Ana L. Nogales, Ph.D., a qualified medical examiner. See AR 627-43. Dr.
Nogales opined that Plaintiff suffered from post-traumatic-stress disorder and
major depression. See AR 642. Dr. Nogales found that Plaintiff’s
symptomatology included “extreme sadness, fear, anxiousness, agitation, a
lack of interest in pleasurable activities and feelings of hopelessness which are
compounded by the pain in her left shoulder.” Id. According to Dr. Nogales,
Plaintiff’s conditions were the “direct result of [a] debilitating accident she
sustained in October 2017.” Id. Dr. Nogales recommended that Plaintiff
undergo cognitive behavioral therapy and suggested that she take
antidepressant medication. See AR 642-43.
b. Analysis
The ALJ did not err in his assessment of the medical evidence. First, the
ALJ’s RFC finding limiting Plaintiff to “understand[ing], remember[ing], and
carry[ing] out simple instructions,” AR 1324, adequately accounted for the
state-agency medical consultants’ opinions that she could “adapt to a low
demand work setting consistent with simple and some detailed work,” AR 88,
139.6 Although Plaintiff construes the consultants’ references to “low demand
6 Notably, the ALJ’s RFC finding regarding Plaintiff’s ability to carry out
instructions was more restrictive than the limitations assessed by the non-
examining state agency medical consultants. Indeed, they found that Plaintiff
work” as imposing a limitation separate and apart from a restriction to
“simple” work, she ignores that those references are qualified by the phrase
“consistent with.” Read plainly, the consultants’ use of “consistent with”
indicates that a low-demand work setting corresponds to or aligns with simple
work, rather than constituting an additional limitation. See, e.g., Davis v. Saul,
No. 18-01968, 2019 WL 6838912, at *2-3 (D. Nev. Dec. 13, 2019) (limiting
plaintiff to simple tasks accounted for medical opinions that he “could adapt to
a low-demand work setting consistent with simple and some detailed work”),
aff’d, 846 F. App’x 464 (9th Cir. 2021); Fox v. Berryhill, No. 16-4738, 2017
WL 3197215, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2017) (concluding that ALJ
accommodated state agency medical consultant’s suggestion that plaintiff work
in “[a] more flexible and low demand work environment” by limiting plaintiff
to simple, routine work).
Second, the ALJ did not err in opting not to include the state agency
medical consultants’ recommendations about which work environment would
give Plaintiff the best chance of success. Both consultants certainly suggested
that Plaintiff would have the “greatest” chance to succeed in a work
environment where changes were “introduced gradually.” AR 87, 139. But to
the extent Plaintiff believes that the ALJ was required to either incorporate that
suggestion into his RFC finding or provide reasons for rejecting it, she is
mistaken. A finding about a claimant’s RFC is not intended to identify the best
possible scenario in which the claimant can perform work; rather, it is intended
to identify “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [her] limitations.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). Here, the state agency medical consultants’
recommendation had no bearing on the most Plaintiff could do despite her
could carry out some detailed routine tasks, see AR 89, 139, whereas the ALJ
found that she could carry out only simple instructions, see AR 1324.
limitations; accordingly, the ALJ was under no obligation to address it. See
Mendoza v. Berryhill, No. 17-01210, 2019 WL 1259434, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 19, 2019) (finding that ALJ did not err in omitting state agency
physician’s recommendation that claimant “would fare best in a low-stress”
work setting because recommendation was “not [a] concrete” functional
limitation); Carmela S. v. Saul, No. 19-6044, 2020 WL 3542839, at *3 (W.D.
Wash. June 30, 2020) (finding that ALJ did not err by omitting aspect of
consultants’ opinion that plaintiff would “do best” with few coworkers because
it expressed preference rather than required functional limitation addressing
“the most” plaintiff could do).
Finally, the ALJ did not err in failing to address Dr. Nogales’s opinion
in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC. As an initial matter, the ALJ repeatedly cited
Dr. Nogales’s opinion and, thus, necessarily considered it. See AR 1327, 1328.
But the ALJ was not required to consider Dr. Nogales’s opinion in
determining Plaintiff’s RFC because the opinion contained no statements
about what Plaintiff could do despite her impairments. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1513(a)(2) (“A medical opinion is a statement from a medical source
about what you can still do despite your impairment(s) and whether you have
one or more impairment-related limitations or restrictions in . . . your abilities
to [perform physical and mental demands of work and] adapt to environmental
conditions.”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a)(2) (same). Instead, Dr. Nogales
diagnosed Plaintiff with post-traumatic-stress disorder and major depression,
described the symptoms Plaintiff had reported, and recommended appropriate
treatment. See AR 627-43; see also Skinner v. Astrue, No. 09-00971, 2010 WL
546363, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (“[T]he mere diagnosis of a psychiatric
disorder does not substitute for a finding of functional limitations.”); Riley v.
Kijakazi, No. 22-00366, 2023 WL 3896269, at *9 n.9 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2023)
(“Plaintiff points to the fact that he was ‘diagnosed with paranoid
schizophrenia and psychosis,’ but mere diagnosis alone does not establish a
limitation in the ability to work.” (citations omitted)). Thus, at most, Dr.
Nogales’s opinion was relevant to whether Plaintiff’s diagnosed post-
traumatic-stress disorder and major depression were severe impairments. But
assuming that the ALJ did not consider Dr. Nogales’s opinion for that
purpose, the resulting error was harmless because the ALJ found that
Plaintiff’s post-traumatic-stress disorder and major depression were severe
impairments. See AR 1321.
Accordingly, remand is not warranted on this claim of error.
B. Subjective-Symptom Testimony
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in rejecting her testimony regarding
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her mental and physical
impairments. See Dkt. 11 at 19-25.
1. Plaintiff’s Testimony
At the March 23, 2023 hearing, Plaintiff testified that she was unable to
work due to having been hit by a car in October 2017. See AR 50. She
fractured her face, left shoulder, wrists, and left hand. See id. As a result, she
could not make a fist, experienced cramps, and suffered from “systematic
reflex dystrophy syndrome.” AR 50-51. She testified that her back, neck, and
elbow were in constant pain. See id. As a general matter, her pain was a
“seven” on a scale of 0 to 10, but on a “bad day,” she claimed it was a 10. See
AR 53, 58-59. She was prescribed Tramadol for her pain but reported that it
was not helpful. See AR 52-53. When asked if she could tolerate the handling
and fingering requirements of her previous work as a medical biller, she
answered, “No.” AR 60.
Additionally, Plaintiff suffered from “severe migraines” at least twice a
month that lasted up to a week at a time. See AR 50-51. In order to combat the
migraines, she had to stay in a dark room with “no noise.” AR 51. She also
experienced difficulty remembering things. See id.. For example, she testified
that she would put something away but, within minutes, forget where she had
put it. See AR 57. Her forgetfulness frustrated her. See id.
Plaintiff testified that she lived in an apartment and handled her own
finances, although she claimed that she was “not good at it.” AR 53, 60. She
did not leave her home unless she had a doctor’s appointment or “want[ed]
something from the store.” AR 55. She required friends or family to drive her
to appointments, but if they were unavailable, she took public transportation.
See AR 54. When taking public transportation, she sometimes would get
“confused” and, as a result, would miss her bus stop. Id. She did not socialize,
watch television, or “surf[] the internet” because she had “lost interest in
everything” and did not “feel comfortable being around people.” AR 53-55.
She could walk “no more than 10 to 15 minutes” and stand “about 15
minutes” before needing to rest. AR 56. She could not lift a gallon of milk or
turn a door knob with her left hand but could do so with her right. See AR 57,
59-60. She could not type or use a pencil, nor could she raise her elbow. See
AR 61. Nevertheless, she could cook for herself. See AR 60.
At the April 29, 2025 hearing, Plaintiff testified that, as a result of the
2017 accident, she was in daily pain that worsened with every passing day. See
AR 1353. According to Plaintiff, her hand and elbow were in constant pain.
See AR 1354. She described the pain as “bad,” noting that it felt like it was
“burning.” Id. She stated that she could occasionally grip small objects with
her left hand, although she often dropped them, and claimed that she could
carry no more than one pound in her left arm. See AR 1354-55. She likewise
claimed that her right arm was “pretty bad,” stating that she could not lift
“more than five or six pounds.” AR 1356. She could reach for things at chest
level, in front of her, or over her head. See id. The most she could do with her
left arm was reach the front part of her hair. See AR 1357. She could not be on
her feet or stay in a seated position for more than five minutes, and her ability
to do both had deteriorated since 2017. See id. In addition, she testified that
she had nerve damage in her neck and lower back that caused her to suffer
from “bad migraines.” AR 1356.
Plaintiff also testified about the impacts of her mental-health
impairments. See AR 1358-62. She testified that she had trouble remembering
things and that she had “withdraw[n] a lot from people.” AR 1358. She lived
with a friend in an RV, in which she spent most days fixing “little things” and
folding clothes. AR 1359-61. She sometimes left the RV to run errands but was
not able to do so alone. See AR 1362. Although she played games on her
phone, she abandoned them before finishing because she could not
concentrate. See AR 1362-63. She did not sleep during the day and, at night,
slept no more than “three to four hours.” AR 1362. She took medication for
her mental-health problems and experienced no side effects. See AR 1361.
2. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s subjective complaints concerning the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her physical and mental
impairments. See AR 1326-29. In doing so, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s
testimony, as well as the relevant medical evidence in the record. See id. The
ALJ found that Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were “not fully consistent with
the objective medical evidence during the period at issue.” AR 1326.
Specifically, the ALJ noted that “the reviewing and examining opinions find
[Plaintiff] to be much more capable than she claims” and that her medical
records reflected that she had responded well to medications for her mental-
health symptoms. See AR 1327-28. Additionally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s
ability to engage in daily activities, such as riding a bicycle and walking her
dog, undercut her testimony. See AR 1326-28.
3. Legal Standard
An ALJ’s assessment of a claimant’s allegations concerning the severity
of her symptoms is entitled to “great weight.” Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d
20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (as amended) (citation omitted); Nyman v. Heckler, 779
F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985) (as amended Feb. 24, 1986). “[T]he ALJ is not
‘required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits
would be available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(5)(A).’” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)), superseded on
other grounds by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502(a), 416.902(a).
In evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ must
engage in a two-step analysis. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-
36 (9th Cir. 2007); see also SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *3 (Mar. 16,
2016). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented
objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment ‘[that] could
reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’”
Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344
(9th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). If such objective medical evidence exists, the ALJ
may not reject a claimant’s testimony “simply because there is no showing that
the impairment can reasonably produce the degree of symptom alleged.” Id.
(emphasis in original) (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir.
1996)).
If the claimant meets the first test, the ALJ may discount the claimant’s
subjective symptom testimony only if the ALJ makes specific findings that
support the conclusion. See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir.
2010). But the ALJ is not required to “perform a line-by-line exegesis of the
claimant’s testimony.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020).
Rather, absent a finding or affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ must
provide a “clear and convincing” reason for rejecting the claimant’s testimony.
Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (as amended)
(citing Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036); Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1102. If the
ALJ’s evaluation of a plaintiff’s alleged symptoms is supported by substantial
evidence in the record, the reviewing court “may not engage in second-
guessing.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959.
4. Analysis
The ALJ offered specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting
Plaintiff’s subjective-symptom testimony. First, the medical evidence in the
record supported the ALJ’s credibility finding. “When objective medical
evidence in the record is inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony,
the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such testimony.” Smartt v.
Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) (emphasis in original); Carmickle v.
Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Contradiction with the
medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective
testimony” (citing Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995))).
Here, the ALJ properly rejected Plaintiff’s subjective-symptom testimony
based on the objective medical evidence contradicting it. Plaintiff’s treatment
records undercut her testimony regarding her physical abilities. For example,
although she testified that she could not make a fist, turn a doorknob, or grip
small objects with her left hand, see AR 1354-55, she was able to generate 30
pounds of force using her left hand during a 2021 examination, see AR 789.
Moreover, the examiner’s finding that she had a “normal range of motion of
the joints of the upper extremities,” AR 790, contradicted Plaintiff’s testimony
that she had nearly no range of motion in her left arm, see AR 1356-57. The
medical evidence likewise undermined Plaintiff’s testimony that she could lift
only one pound with her left arm and five pounds with her right arm, and
could not use her left arm for lifting, fingering, or other manipulative tasks. See
AR 60, 1354-56. Indeed, a consultative examiner and two state-agency
physicians found that she was capable of performing light work that required
her to frequently push, pull, reach, handle, and finger with her left arm. See
AR 82-85, 132-36, 788-92, 1878-87. The ALJ did not err in relying on the
foregoing evidence to reject Plaintiff’s subjective-symptom testimony
concerning the effects of her physical impairments. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at
1161-62 (finding that ALJ permissibly discounted claimant’s testimony
concerning the severity of his physical limitations based in part on medical
opinions indicating that he retained the capacity for light work).
Plaintiff’s medical records, likewise, undermined her testimony about
the severity of her mental-health symptoms. Although she testified that her
mental-health impairments prevented her from concentrating, caused her
severe memory problems, and led to social isolation, see AR 51, 1358-62, her
treatment records showed otherwise. For example, in March 2021, a
consultative examiner found that Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning fell “within
the low average range” and that she could “understand, remember and carry
out short, simplistic instructions without difficulty.” AR 795-97. Similarly, two
state-agency medical consultants found that she was capable of understanding
and remembering simple instructions. See AR 86-89, 137-39. The state-agency
medical consultants also found that Plaintiff had no social-interaction
limitations. See AR 88, 138.
Moreover, the contemporaneous treatment records also contradicted
Plaintiff’s testimony. Although she testified at the April 2025 hearing that she
continued to experience severe mental-health symptoms, see AR 1358-62, her
treatment notes from January 2025 reflect that she was “stable” on her
medications, which were “working fine,” and that her “anxiety and mood
[were] under control,” AR 1670. Indeed, she reported that she had “observed
improvements in attention span, mood, and anxiety, and expressed satisfaction
with the treatment plan.” Id. What’s more, contrary to her April 2025 hearing
testimony that she lacked any social interaction, see AR 53-55, 1358, 1362, her
treatment notes reflect that she was “engaged in social activities,” AR 1670.
Those same treatment notes state that her memory was “intact,” her thought
process was “[l]inear, logical and coherent,” and that her cognition was “alert
and oriented.” Id. Given that evidence, the ALJ reasonably relied on the
treatment records and medical opinions in discounting Plaintiff’s testimony
regarding the severity of her mental-health symptoms. See Mead v. Astrue, 330
F. App’x 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The ALJ gave specific, clear, and
convincing reasons for the credibility finding, including treatment notes
indicating that Mead’s depression had improved and that she was responding
well to treatment.”).
Second, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff’s ability to engage in daily
activities contradicted her testimony concerning the symptoms of her physical
and mental impairments. “Engaging in daily activities that are incompatible
with the severity of symptoms alleged can support an adverse credibility
determination.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014).
“Even if the claimant experiences some difficulty or pain, her daily activities
‘may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that
they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.’” Smartt, 53 F.4th
at 499 (citation omitted). Here, the record contains several examples of
activities that were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claimed limitations. Although
she testified that she could not stand or stay in a seated position for more than
five minutes, medical records indicate that she rode a bicycle in October 2020.
See AR 771. Standing alone, riding a bicycle on one occasion does not show
that Plaintiff was capable of full-time work. It does, however, undermine
Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the extent of her physical limitations. Indeed, it
would have required her to reach for and grip the bicycle’s handlebars with
both hands, which is at odds with her testimony that she could not use her left
hand to grip or even turn a doorknob, as well as her testimony that she could
use her arm only to reach the front part of her hair.’ See AR 57-60, 1357;
Valentine v. Comm’r, 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009) (claimant’s daily
activities undermined his allegations regarding the severity of his limitations,
even though they did not establish ability to return to past work). Moreover,
although she testified in March 2023 that she was incapable of walking her
dog, see AR 54, she affirmed in November 2024 that walking her dog was her
“routine workout,” AR 1665.°
In short, the ALJ’s stated reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's subjective-
symptom testimony were supported by the evidence in the record. See
Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ’s rejection of claimant’s
credibility is proper provided he cites a valid reason that it is adequately
supported by the record). Accordingly, remand is not warranted on this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ALJ’s denial of benefits is affirmed and this case is dismissed with
prejudice.
Date: June 24, 2026 Lt, + é
DOUGLAS F. McCORMI
United States Magistrate Judge
’ Riding a bicycle was also inconsistent with Plaintiffs claims that she
never left her home other than to go shopping on foot and attend medical
appointments. See AR 55.
8 As with Plaintiff's act of riding a bicycle, her “routine workout” of
walking her dog contradicted her testimony that she never left her home other
than to go shopping and attend medical appointments. See AR 55.
Ae