Opinion

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 EDITH KARINA ESPIRITU COMPARAN, Case No. 1:26-cv-01639-KES-SAB-HC

11 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF

12 v. HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECT

RESPONDENTS TO PROVIDE

13 WARDEN OF THE CALIFORNIA CITY PETITIONER WITH BOND HEARING

DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,

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Respondents.

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16 Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

17 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

18 I.

19 BACKGROUND

20 Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who was granted lawful permanent resident status on

21 August 6, 2018. (ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 13-2 at 2.1) Petitioner pleaded guilty in the United

22 States District Court for the Southern District of California to possession of methamphetamine

23 and fentanyl, and on June 6, 2024, Petitioner was sentenced to one year of supervised probation.

24 (ECF No. 13-3 at 4–5.) On April 22, 2025, Petitioner’s probation was revoked and Petitioner was

25 sentenced to an imprisonment term of nine months. (Id. at 8–9.) On October 2, 2025, Petitioner

26 was released from the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service and turned over to Enforcement and

27 Removal Operations (“ERO”) San Diego pursuant to an active immigration detainer hold. (ECF

1 No. 13-6 at 5.) Petitioner is currently in custody at the California City Detention Facility. (ECF

2 No. 1 at 2.)

3 On February 4, 2026, an immigration judge (“IJ”) ordered Petitioner removed to Mexico.

4 (ECF No. 13-4.) Petitioner subsequently appealed her removal order to the Board of Immigration

5 Appeals (“BIA”). (ECF No. 13-5.) That appeal is still pending. See Executive Office for

6 Immigration Review, Automated Case Information System, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (last

7 visited May 19, 2026).

8 On February 24, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United

9 States District Court for the Central District of California. (ECF No. 1.) On February 27, 2026,

10 the petition was transferred to this Court. (ECF Nos. 4, 5.) On March 23, 2026, Respondents

11 filed an answer. (ECF No. 13.) To date, no traverse has been filed, and the time for doing so has

12 passed.

13 II.

14 DISCUSSION

15 A. Overview of Caselaw Regarding Immigration Detention Statutes

16 An intricate statutory scheme governs the detention of noncitizens during removal

17 proceedings and after a final removal order is issued. “Where an alien falls within this statutory

18 scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of

19 review process available to him if he wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.” Prieto-

20 Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).

21 “Four statutes grant the Government authority to detain noncitizens who have been

22 placed in removal proceedings: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) (‘Section 1225(b)’), 1226(a) (‘Subsection

23 A’), 1226(c) (‘Subsection C’), and 1231(a) (‘Section 1231(a)’).” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th

24 525, 529 (9th Cir. 2023). “Subsection A is the default detention statute for noncitizens in

25 removal proceedings and applies to noncitizens ‘[e]xcept as provided in [Subsection C].’”

26 Avilez, 69 F.4th at 529 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). “[D]etention under

27 Subsection A is discretionary” and “provides for release on bond or conditional parole.” Id.

1 General shall take into custody any alien who’ is deportable or inadmissible based on a

2 qualifying, enumerated offense.” Id. at 530 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)).

3 “[D]etention under Subsection C is mandatory,” and “[r]elease under Subsection C is limited to

4 certain witness protection purposes.” Id. “Section 1231(a) applies to detention after the entry of a

5 final order of removal” and “governs detention during a ninety-day ‘removal period’ after the

6 conclusion of removal proceedings.” Id. at 530–31.

7 “[I]n a series of decisions since 2001, ‘the Supreme Court and [the Ninth Circuit] have

8 grappled in piece-meal fashion with whether the various detention statutes may authorize

9 indefinite or prolonged detention of detainees and, if so, may do so without providing a bond

10 hearing.’” Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting

11 Rodriguez v. Hayes (Rodriguez I), 591 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010)). In Zadvydas v. Davis,

12 533 U.S. 678 (2001), two noncitizens, who had been ordered removed but whose removal could

13 not be effectuated due to lack of a repatriation treaty or because their designated countries

14 refused to accept them, challenged their prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which

15 governs detention beyond the ninety-day removal period. Applying the canon of constitutional

16 avoidance because a “statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious

17 constitutional problem,” the Supreme Court “read an implicit limitation into” § 1231(a)(6) and

18 held that the statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably

19 necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

20 689. Thus, “after a presumptively reasonable six-month period of post-removal period detention,

21 the alien was entitled to release if he successfully demonstrated that there was ‘good reason to

22 believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’”

23 Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).

24 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to

25 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Demore distinguished Zadvydas by emphasizing

26 detention under § 1226(c) has a “definite termination point” and “in the majority of the cases it

27 lasts for less than the 90 days we considered presumptively valid in Zadvydas.” Id. at 529 (noting

1 proceedings are completed in an average time of 47 days and a median of 30 days” and “[i]n the

2 remaining 15% of cases, in which the alien appeals the decision of the Immigration Judge to the

3 Board of Immigration Appeals, appeal takes an average of four months, with a median time that

4 is slightly shorter”).2 However, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which created the

5 majority rejecting the facial challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), specifically noted

6 that “a lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized

7 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became

8 unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

9 In the Rodriguez class action, noncitizens “challenge[d] their prolonged detention

10 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a) without individualized bond

11 hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention.” Rodriguez v. Robbins

12 (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). In Rodriguez II, to avoid constitutional

13 concerns, the Ninth Circuit held that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) and § 1225(b) is

14 implicitly time-limited and expires after six months. Thereafter, the government’s authority to

15 detain shifts to § 1226(a), which requires a bond hearing governed by the procedural

16 requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011).3 Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d

17 at 1138–44. In Rodriguez III, the Ninth Circuit held that for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C.

18 §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c), “the government must provide periodic bond hearings every

19 six months so that noncitizens may challenge their continued detention as ‘the period of . . .

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2 “Thirteen years after the decision in Demore, the government admitted that the figures it provided to the Court, and

which the Court relied on, contained ‘several significant errors.’” Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-04187-TSH,

21 2019 WL 7491555, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (citations omitted). Although the “Supreme Court had inferred

from the government’s brief in Demore that in cases in which the alien appeals, the time of detention was ‘about five

22 months,’” the government’s 2016 letter clarified that for years 1999–2001, the “length of detention in cases where

the alien appealed [was] 382 days, or a little more than a year.” Id. (citations omitted).

23 [I]n cases in which an appeal was filed, in most years the average length of detention was more

than 300 days, or more than double the five-month estimate the Court relied on in Demore. The

24 data from the Jennings case show that 460 members of the respondent section 1226(c) subclass

were detained for an average of 427 days (over fourteen months) with some individual detention

25 periods exceeding four years. Indeed, when the GAO conducted a study, it found that as of 2015,

the median length of time it takes the BIA to complete an appeal of a removal order exceeds 450

days.

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Rodriguez, 2019 WL 7491555, at *5 (citations omitted).

27 3 In Singh, the Ninth Circuit provided guidance as to the procedural requirements for the bond hearings.

Specifically, “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger

to the community to justify denial of bond.” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208. Due process also requires a contemporaneous

1 confinement grows.’” Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Diouf v. Napolitano (Diouf II),

2 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011)).

3 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth

4 Circuit’s interpretation that §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c) included “an implicit 6–month time limit on

5 the length of mandatory detention” and reversed Rodriguez III, holding that the Ninth Circuit

6 misapplied the constitutional avoidance canon to find a statutory right under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

7 to “periodic bond hearings every six months in which the Attorney General must prove by clear

8 and convincing evidence that the alien’s continued detention is necessary.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at

9 296, 304, 306. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit “to consider [the]

10 constitutional arguments on their merits.” Id. at 312. The Ninth Circuit, in turn, remanded the

11 case to the district court to consider the constitutional arguments in the first instance, but noted

12 that it had “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without

13 any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect

14 against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d

15 252, 255, 256 (9th Cir. 2018).

16 Following Jennings, the Ninth Circuit upheld the “construction of § 1231(a)(6) to require

17 a bond hearing before an IJ after six months of detention for an alien whose release or removal is

18 not imminent” with the government “bear[ing] a clear and convincing burden of proof at such a

19 bond hearing to justify an alien’s continued detention.” Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762,

20 766 (9th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, Garland v. Aleman

21 Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543, 546 (2022), and “[i]n a companion case decided that same day arising

22 from the Third Circuit, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, [596] U.S. [573], 142 S. Ct. 1827, 213

23 L.Ed.2d 125 (2022), the Supreme Court separately rejected [the Ninth Circuit’s] statutory

24 interpretation in Aleman Gonzalez,” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1201 (9th Cir.

25 2022), holding that “there is no plausible construction of the text of § 1231(a)(6) that requires the

26 Government to provide bond hearings before immigration judges after six months of detention,

27 with the Government bearing the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a

1 U.S. at 581. Arteaga-Martinez declined to reach the constitutional claims. Id. at 583.

2 “[A]fter the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jennings and Arteaga-Martinez, it remain[ed]

3 undetermined whether the Due Process Clause requires additional bond procedures under any

4 immigration detention statute” until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez Diaz, which

5 concerned a petitioner detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) who sought a second bond

6 hearing before an IJ at which the government would bear the burden of proof by clear and

7 convincing evidence. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1201, 1193. The Ninth Circuit held that “due

8 process does not require the procedures Rodriguez Diaz would have us impose” because

9 “Section 1226(a) offers substantial procedural protections to detained persons, and Rodriguez

10 Diaz has not shown that these procedures violate due process, either facially or as applied.” Id.

11 B. Zadvydas and Third Country Removal

12 In Ground One, Petitioner raises a claim pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678

13 (2001), asserting that her continued detention violates due process because there is no significant

14 likelihood that she will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. (ECF No. 1 at 13.) As

15 set forth above, “Zadvydas dealt with a noncitizen who had been detained and never released

16 following a final order of removal.” Yan-Ling X. v. Lyons, 813 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1162–63 (E.D.

17 Cal. 2025). Here, as Petitioner has a pending BIA appeal, Petitioner’s order of removal is not

18 final and the removal period has not yet begun. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i) (“The removal

19 period begins on the latest of the following: (i) The date the order of removal becomes

20 administratively final.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a) (“An order of removal made by the immigration

21 judge at the conclusion of proceedings under section 240 of the Act shall become final . . . Upon

22 dismissal of an appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals[.]”). Accordingly, Petitioner is not

23 entitled to release pursuant to Zadvydas, and the Court recommends finding that Petitioner is not

24 entitled to habeas relief on Ground One.

25 In Grounds Two and Three, Petitioner challenges Respondents’ third country removal

26 policy. As Petitioner was ordered removed to her home country of Mexico, (ECF No. 13-4), the

27 Court recommends finding that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on Grounds Two and

1 Cal. 2026) (finding “Petitioner’s third-country removal claim is not constitutionally ripe”

2 because officer “attests that ICE intends to remove him to Armenia and that no request for

3 removal to a third country has been made,” and “there is no evidence . . . that suggests ICE

4 intends to remove him to a country other than Armenia”); Uzzhina v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-

5 01594-DAD-SCR, 2025 WL 3458787, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (“The court will deny

6 without prejudice this request for temporary injunctive relief because the evidence before the

7 court at this time is that respondents intend to remove petitioner to either Russia or Kazakhstan,

8 not a third country.”).

9 C. Procedural Due Process

10 The Court construes the petition as also raising a prolonged detention due process claim.

11 See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2020) (“It is an entrenched principle

12 that pro se filings however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than formal

13 pleadings drafted by lawyers. We are specifically directed to construe pro se pleadings liberally.

14 This duty applies equally to pro se motions and with special force to filings from pro se

15 inmates.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Here, Petitioner is subject to

16 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A). Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to take

17 a position on whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8

18 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the First, Second, and Third Circuits have found that “the Due Process Clause

19 imposes some form of ‘reasonableness’ limitation upon the duration of detention . . . under

20 [section 1226(c)].” Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021) (alterations in original)

21 (citation omitted). Accord Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (“conclud[ing] that a noncitizen’s

22 constitutional right to due process precludes his unreasonably prolonged detention under section

23 1226(c) without a bond hearing”); German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d

24 203, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that after Demore and Jennings, petitioners detained

25 pursuant to § 1226(c) can still bring as-applied challenges to their detention and that due process

26 affords them a bond hearing once detention becomes unreasonable). Contra Banyee v. Garland,

27 115 F.4th 928 (8th Cir. 2024). Additionally, “essentially all district courts that have considered

1 bond hearing, ‘will—at some point—violate the right to due process.’” Martinez v. Clark, No.

2 C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019) (citation omitted),

3 report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5962685 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019).

4 Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends finding that unreasonably prolonged

5 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) without an individualized bond hearing violates

6 due process. The Court now turns to whether Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably

7 prolonged such that due process requires a bond hearing.

8 Courts in this circuit have taken various approaches to determining whether procedural

9 due process requires a bond hearing in a particular case. See Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-

10 04187-TSH, 2019 WL 7491555, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (six-month bright-line rule in

11 § 1226(c) context); Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (six-

12 factor test that considers “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future

13 detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the

14 detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood

15 that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal” in § 1225(b) context); Juarez

16 v. Wolf, No. C20-1660-RJB-MLP, 2021 WL 2323436, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2021) (eight-

17 factor test that considers “whether the detention will exceed the time the petitioner spent in

18 prison for the crime that made him [or her] removable” and “the nature of the crimes the

19 petitioner committed” in addition to the six factors set forth above in § 1226(c) context

20 (alteration in original)), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2322823 (W.D. Wash.

21 June 7, 2021); Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5–6 (N.D.

22 Cal. June 14, 2022) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge test to petitioner’s due process claim

23 requesting initial bond hearing in § 1226(c) context).

24 This Court previously found that “[t]o determine whether § 1226(c) detention has become

25 unreasonable, the Court will look to the total length of detention to date, the likely duration of

26 future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the

27 government.” Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022). Here, there is no

1 the removal proceedings caused by Petitioner and the government. Accordingly, the Court will

2 apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1193,

3 1206 (“assum[ing] without deciding,” in context of petitioner detained under to 8 U.S.C.

4 § 1226(a) seeking a second bond hearing, that Mathews test applied, noting the Ninth Circuit has

5 “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal proceedings,” and finding

6 “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must account for the heightened governmental

7 interest in the immigration detention context”); id. at 1219 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (“agree[ing]

8 that the test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18

9 (1976), is the appropriate legal framework to determine whether there was a due process

10 violation”).

11 [I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires

consideration of three distinct factors. First, the private interest that will be

12 affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such

interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional

13 or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,

including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

14 additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.

15 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.

16 1. Private Interest

17 “As a general matter, detention is prolonged when it has lasted six months and is

18 expected to continue more than minimally beyond six months.” Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d

19 1081, 1092 n.13 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, Petitioner has been detained for seven months. It “is

20 beyond dispute” that Petitioner’s interest here is “fundamental.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d

21 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). “Freedom from

22 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at

23 the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. See

24 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (“We have also held, more generally, that an individual’s

25 private interest in ‘freedom from prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably substantial.’” (quoting

26 Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208)). Petitioner “has a legitimate and reasonably strong private liberty

27 interest under Mathews.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207. Accordingly, the Court finds the first

1 2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

2 “Turning to the second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty is

3 high where, as here, ‘[the petitioner] has not received [and will not receive] any bond or custody

4 redetermination hearing.’” Kakkar v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-1627 JLT SAB, 2025 WL

5 3638298, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2025) (alterations in original) (quoting A.E. v. Andrews, No.

6 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025)).

7 3. Government Interest

8 “[T]he government clearly has a strong interest in preventing aliens from ‘remain[ing] in

9 the United States in violation of our law.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore,

10 538 U.S. at 518, 515). “These are interests of the highest order that only increase with the

11 passage of time.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208. “The government interest in immigration

12 enforcement in general is surely substantial. But the question here is not the government’s

13 interest in immigration enforcement [in general] but its interest in” detaining Petitioner without

14 providing her with a bond hearing. Zerezghi v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 955

15 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2020). See Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Off., No. 3:19-cv-01358-SB, 2020

16 WL 1862254, at *7 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2020) (The “government interest at stake here is not the

17 continued detention of Petitioner, but the government’s ability to detain him without a bond

18 hearing.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1855189 (D. Or. Apr. 13, 2020);

19 Henriquez, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (“Although the Government has a strong interest in

20 enforcing the immigration laws and in ensuring that lawfully issued removal orders are promptly

21 executed, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without providing an individualized

22 bond hearing is low.”). The Court finds the third Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.

23 Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends finding that Petitioner’s continued

24 detention has become unreasonable and due process requires that Petitioner be provided a bond

25 hearing.

26 D. Remedy

27 “The Court finds, consistent with other post-Jennings cases, that the appropriate remedy

1 Becerra, 697 F. Supp. 3d 937, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (“[C]ourts in this Circuit have regularly

2 found that the IJ is the proper authority to conduct bond hearings and determine a detainee’s risk

3 of flight or dangerousness to the community.” (citing Martinez, 36 F.4th at 1223 (“district courts

4 throughout this circuit have ordered immigration courts to conduct bond hearings for noncitizens

5 held for prolonged periods”))); Mansoor v. Figueroa, No. 3:17-cv-01695-GPC (NLS), 2018 WL

6 840253, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2018) (“The Court finds the IJ is uniquely qualified and

7 situated to make neutral administrative determinations about Petitioner’s eligibility for release on

8 bond and/or placement in a supervised release program[.]”).

9 The Court further finds that “the government must prove by clear and convincing

10 evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond” and

11 that the bond hearing must comport with the other requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d

12 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). See Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2024) (stating

13 that “the BIA properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and

14 convincing evidence that Martinez is a danger to the community” with respect to a bond hearing

15 ordered pursuant to the Due Process Clause). In the event Petitioner is “determined not to be a

16 danger to the community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without

17 bond,” the immigration judge should consider Petitioner’s financial circumstances and

18 alternative conditions of release. Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 1000. See Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (The

19 district court “correctly directed the immigration judge (“IJ”), in setting his bond and

20 establishing appropriate terms for his potential release, to consider his ability to pay and

21 alternative means of assuring appearance.”).

22 III.

23 RECOMMENDATION

24 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

25 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be GRANTED on the construed prolonged

26 detention due process claim.

27 2. Respondents be ordered to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before

] 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), and where “the government must prove by clear and

2 convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to

3 justify denial of bond,” id. at 1203. In the event Petitioner is “determined not to be a

4 danger to the community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention

5 without bond,” the immigration judge should consider Petitioner’s financial

6 circumstances and alternative conditions of release. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976,

7 1000 (9th Cir. 2017).

8 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

9 | Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local

10 | Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

11 | FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file

12 | written objections with the Court, limited to fifteen (15) pages in length, including any

13 | exhibits. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

14 | Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days

15 | after service of the objections. The assigned District Judge will then review the Magistrate

16 | Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

17 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order.

18 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d

19 | 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

20

>] IT IS SO ORDERED. DAA Le

22 | Dated: __May 20, 2026 _ Oe

STANLEY A. BOONE

23 United States Magistrate Judge

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