Opinion

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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9 SIMRANJEET SINGH, Case No. 1:26-cv-01936-JLT-SAB-HC

10 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF

11 v. HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECT

RESPONDENTS TO PROVIDE

12 WARDEN OF CALIFORNIA CITY PETITIONER WITH BOND HEARING

CORRECTIONS CENTER FACILITY, et al.,

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Respondents.

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15 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition

16 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

17 I.

18 BACKGROUND

19 Petitioner is a citizen of India who entered the United States on or about April 21, 2023.

20 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner

21 under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and issued a notice to appear charging Petitioner as inadmissible. (ECF

22 No. 1 at 10.1) On September 16, 2025, Petitioner was arrested for vehicle theft, a violation of

23 California Vehicle Code section 10851(a). (ECF No. 6-1 at 4–5.) Petitioner has been in DHS

24 custody since October 29, 2025, and is currently detained at the California City Corrections

25 Center. (ECF No. 1 at 5.)

26 On March 10, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for

27 temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On March 11, 2026, the assigned district

1 judge denied the motion for TRO as untimely. (ECF No. 5.) On April 1, 2026, Respondents filed

2 an answer. (ECF No. 6.) To date, no traverse has been filed, and the time for doing so has

3 passed.

4 II.

5 DISCUSSION

6 A. Statutory Framework and Applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)

7 An intricate statutory scheme governs the detention of noncitizens during removal

8 proceedings and after a final removal order is issued. “Where an alien falls within this statutory

9 scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of

10 review process available to him if he wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.” Prieto-

11 Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).

12 “Four statutes grant the Government authority to detain noncitizens who have been

13 placed in removal proceedings: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) (‘Section 1225(b)’), 1226(a) (‘Subsection

14 A’), 1226(c) (‘Subsection C’), and 1231(a) (‘Section 1231(a)’).” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th

15 525, 529 (9th Cir. 2023). “Subsection A is the default detention statute for noncitizens in

16 removal proceedings and applies to noncitizens ‘[e]xcept as provided in [Subsection C].’”

17 Avilez, 69 F.4th at 529 (alterations in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). “[D]etention under

18 Subsection A is discretionary” and “provides for release on bond or conditional parole.” Avilez,

19 69 F.4th at 529. “When a person is apprehended under § 1226(a), an ICE officer makes the initial

20 custody determination,” and the noncitizen “will be released if he ‘demonstrate[s] to the

21 satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and

22 that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.’” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th

23 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)).

24 Although section 1226(a) sets out a discretionary detention scheme, section

1226(c) provides an exception which mandates detention for certain criminal

25 noncitizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Section 1226(c)(1)(E), which was

added to the statute in 2025 by the Laken Riley Act, mandates detention for any

26 noncitizen (i) who is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an “alien

present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,” and (ii) who “is

27 charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or admits” to committing certain crimes.

1 § 1226(c)(1)(E)). Accord J.S.H.M v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL

2 2938808, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025).

3 To avoid “serious due process concerns,” “courts have construed the Laken Riley Act to

4 apply only where an individual is currently charged with or arrested for the enumerated

5 crimes[.]” Singh v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-CV-00546-DJC-AC, 2026 WL 266021, at *2 (E.D. Cal.

6 Feb. 2, 2026). Thus, “mandatory detention is not required when charges are never filed, Helbrum

7 v. Williams Olson, No. 4:25-cv-00349-SHL-SBJ, 2025 WL 2840273, at *6 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 30,

8 2025), or where an individual has been acquitted, E.C. v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-01789-RFB-BNW,

9 2025 WL 2916264, at *10 (D. Nev. Oct. 14, 2025).” Singh, 2026 WL 266021, at *2. Courts have

10 found serious questions going to the merits as to the application of the Laken Riley Act where

11 noncitizens were arrested but prosecutors ultimately declined to file charges and closed the case.

12 Singh, 2026 WL 266021, at *2; S.E. v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-00356-DAD-SCR, 2026 WL 206085

13 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2026).

14 In Count Two of the petition, Petitioner asserts that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

15 § 1226(a) and his detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act. (ECF No. 1 at 12–13.)

16 Respondents argue that “Petitioner’s detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)”

17 because Petitioner’s arrest for vehicle theft “falls within section 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii).” (ECF No.

18 6 at 2, 3.) Section 1226(c)(1) provides that the “Attorney General shall take into custody any

19 alien who—”

20 (E)(i) is inadmissible under paragraph (6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) of section 1182(a) of

this title; and

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(ii) is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or

22 admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary,

theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any

23 crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person,

24 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). And “[f]or purposes of paragraph (1)(E), the terms ‘burglary’,

25 ‘theft’, ‘larceny’, ‘shoplifting’, ‘assault of a law enforcement officer’, and ‘serious bodily injury’

26 have the meanings given such terms in the jurisdiction in which the acts occurred.” 8 U.S.C.

27 § 1226(c)(2).

1 On its face, the Laken Riley Act appears to apply to Petitioner, given that he has been

2 charged with being inadmissible, (ECF No. 1 at 10), and was arrested for one of the enumerated

3 crimes in section 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii), (ECF No. 6-1). As Petitioner did not file a reply to

4 Respondents’ response and has not addressed the applicability of the Laken Riley Act

5 whatsoever, the Court recommends finding that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention

6 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) and thus is not entitled to habeas relief on Count Two.

7 B. Overview of Caselaw Regarding Immigration Detention Statutes

8 “[I]n a series of decisions since 2001, ‘the Supreme Court and [the Ninth Circuit] have

9 grappled in piece-meal fashion with whether the various detention statutes may authorize

10 indefinite or prolonged detention of detainees and, if so, may do so without providing a bond

11 hearing.’” Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting

12 Rodriguez v. Hayes (Rodriguez I), 591 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010)). In Zadvydas v. Davis,

13 533 U.S. 678 (2001), two noncitizens, who had been ordered removed but whose removal could

14 not be effectuated due to lack of a repatriation treaty or because their designated countries

15 refused to accept them, challenged their prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which

16 governs detention beyond the ninety-day removal period. Applying the canon of constitutional

17 avoidance because a “statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious

18 constitutional problem,” the Supreme Court “read an implicit limitation into” § 1231(a)(6) and

19 held that the statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably

20 necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

21 689. Thus, “after a presumptively reasonable six-month period of post-removal period detention,

22 the alien was entitled to release if he successfully demonstrated that there was ‘good reason to

23 believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’”

24 Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).

25 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to

26 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Demore distinguished Zadvydas by emphasizing

27 detention under § 1226(c) has a “definite termination point” and “in the majority of the cases it

1 that “in 85% of the cases in which aliens are detained pursuant to § 1226(c), removal

2 proceedings are completed in an average time of 47 days and a median of 30 days” and “[i]n the

3 remaining 15% of cases, in which the alien appeals the decision of the Immigration Judge to the

4 Board of Immigration Appeals, appeal takes an average of four months, with a median time that

5 is slightly shorter”).2 However, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which created the

6 majority rejecting the facial challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), specifically noted

7 that “a lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized

8 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became

9 unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

10 In the Rodriguez class action, noncitizens “challenge[d] their prolonged detention

11 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a) without individualized bond

12 hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention.” Rodriguez v. Robbins

13 (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). In Rodriguez II, to avoid constitutional

14 concerns, the Ninth Circuit held that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) and § 1225(b) is

15 implicitly time-limited and expires after six months. Thereafter, the government’s authority to

16 detain shifts to § 1226(a), which requires a bond hearing governed by the procedural

17 requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011).3 Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d

18 at 1138–44. In Rodriguez III, the Ninth Circuit held that for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C.

19 §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c), “the government must provide periodic bond hearings every

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2 “Thirteen years after the decision in Demore, the government admitted that the figures it provided to the Court, and

which the Court relied on, contained ‘several significant errors.’” Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-04187-TSH,

21 2019 WL 7491555, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (citations omitted). Although the “Supreme Court had inferred

from the government’s brief in Demore that in cases in which the alien appeals, the time of detention was ‘about five

22 months,’” the government’s 2016 letter clarified that for years 1999–2001, the “length of detention in cases where

the alien appealed [was] 382 days, or a little more than a year.” Id. (citations omitted).

23 [I]n cases in which an appeal was filed, in most years the average length of detention was more

than 300 days, or more than double the five-month estimate the Court relied on in Demore. The

24 data from the Jennings case show that 460 members of the respondent section 1226(c) subclass

were detained for an average of 427 days (over fourteen months) with some individual detention

25 periods exceeding four years. Indeed, when the GAO conducted a study, it found that as of 2015,

the median length of time it takes the BIA to complete an appeal of a removal order exceeds 450

days.

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Rodriguez, 2019 WL 7491555, at *5 (citations omitted).

27 3 In Singh, the Ninth Circuit provided guidance as to the procedural requirements for the bond hearings.

Specifically, “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger

to the community to justify denial of bond.” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208. Due process also requires a contemporaneous

1 six months so that noncitizens may challenge their continued detention as ‘the period of . . .

2 confinement grows.’” Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Diouf v. Napolitano (Diouf II),

3 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011)).

4 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth

5 Circuit’s interpretation that §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c) included “an implicit 6–month time limit on

6 the length of mandatory detention” and reversed Rodriguez III, holding that the Ninth Circuit

7 misapplied the constitutional avoidance canon to find a statutory right under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

8 to “periodic bond hearings every six months in which the Attorney General must prove by clear

9 and convincing evidence that the alien’s continued detention is necessary.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at

10 296, 304, 306. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit “to consider [the]

11 constitutional arguments on their merits.” Id. at 312. The Ninth Circuit, in turn, remanded the

12 case to the district court to consider the constitutional arguments in the first instance, but noted

13 that it had “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without

14 any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect

15 against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d

16 252, 255, 256 (9th Cir. 2018).

17 Following Jennings, the Ninth Circuit upheld the “construction of § 1231(a)(6) to require

18 a bond hearing before an IJ after six months of detention for an alien whose release or removal is

19 not imminent” with the government “bear[ing] a clear and convincing burden of proof at such a

20 bond hearing to justify an alien’s continued detention.” Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762,

21 766 (9th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, Garland v. Aleman

22 Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543, 546 (2022), and “[i]n a companion case decided that same day arising

23 from the Third Circuit, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, [596] U.S. [573], 142 S. Ct. 1827, 213

24 L.Ed.2d 125 (2022), the Supreme Court separately rejected [the Ninth Circuit’s] statutory

25 interpretation in Aleman Gonzalez,” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1201 (9th Cir.

26 2022), holding that “there is no plausible construction of the text of § 1231(a)(6) that requires the

27 Government to provide bond hearings before immigration judges after six months of detention,

1 detained noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community,” Arteaga-Martinez, 596

2 U.S. at 581. Arteaga-Martinez declined to reach the constitutional claims. Id. at 583.

3 “[A]fter the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jennings and Arteaga-Martinez, it remain[ed]

4 undetermined whether the Due Process Clause requires additional bond procedures under any

5 immigration detention statute” until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez Diaz, which

6 concerned a petitioner detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) who sought a second bond

7 hearing before an IJ at which the government would bear the burden of proof by clear and

8 convincing evidence. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1201, 1193. The Ninth Circuit held that “due

9 process does not require the procedures Rodriguez Diaz would have us impose” because

10 “Section 1226(a) offers substantial procedural protections to detained persons, and Rodriguez

11 Diaz has not shown that these procedures violate due process, either facially or as applied.” Id.

12 C. Procedural Due Process

13 In Count One of the petition, Petitioner asserts a prolonged detention due process claim.

14 (ECF No. 1 at 11–12.) As set forth in section II(A), supra, Petitioner is subject to mandatory

15 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position

16 on whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C.

17 § 1226(c), the First, Second, and Third Circuits have found that “the Due Process Clause

18 imposes some form of ‘reasonableness’ limitation upon the duration of detention . . . under

19 [section 1226(c)].” Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021) (alterations in original)

20 (citation omitted). Accord Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (“conclud[ing] that a noncitizen’s

21 constitutional right to due process precludes his unreasonably prolonged detention under section

22 1226(c) without a bond hearing”); German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d

23 203, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that after Demore and Jennings, petitioners detained

24 pursuant to § 1226(c) can still bring as-applied challenges to their detention and that due process

25 affords them a bond hearing once detention becomes unreasonable). Contra Banyee v. Garland,

26 115 F.4th 928 (8th Cir. 2024). Additionally, “essentially all district courts that have considered

27 the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a

1 C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019) (citation omitted),

2 report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5962685 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019).

3 Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends finding that unreasonably prolonged

4 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) without an individualized bond hearing violates

5 due process. The Court now turns to whether Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably

6 prolonged such that due process requires a bond hearing.

7 Courts in this circuit have taken various approaches to determining whether procedural

8 due process requires a bond hearing in a particular case. See Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-

9 04187-TSH, 2019 WL 7491555, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (six-month bright-line rule in

10 § 1226(c) context); Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (six-

11 factor test that considers “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future

12 detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the

13 detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood

14 that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal” in § 1225(b) context); Juarez

15 v. Wolf, No. C20-1660-RJB-MLP, 2021 WL 2323436, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2021) (eight-

16 factor test that considers “whether the detention will exceed the time the petitioner spent in

17 prison for the crime that made him [or her] removable” and “the nature of the crimes the

18 petitioner committed” in addition to the six factors set forth above in § 1226(c) context

19 (alteration in original)), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2322823 (W.D. Wash.

20 June 7, 2021); Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5–6 (N.D.

21 Cal. June 14, 2022) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge test to petitioner’s due process claim

22 requesting initial bond hearing in § 1226(c) context).

23 This Court previously found that “[t]o determine whether § 1226(c) detention has become

24 unreasonable, the Court will look to the total length of detention to date, the likely duration of

25 future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the

26 government.” Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022). Here, there is no

27 information before this Court regarding the likely duration of future detention and the delays in

1 apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1193,

2 1206 (“assum[ing] without deciding,” in context of petitioner detained under to 8 U.S.C.

3 § 1226(a) seeking a second bond hearing, that Mathews test applied, noting the Ninth Circuit has

4 “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal proceedings,” and finding

5 “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must account for the heightened governmental

6 interest in the immigration detention context”); id. at 1219 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (“agree[ing]

7 that the test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18

8 (1976), is the appropriate legal framework to determine whether there was a due process

9 violation”).

10 [I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires

consideration of three distinct factors. First, the private interest that will be

11 affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such

interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional

12 or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,

including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

13 additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.

14 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.

15 1. Private Interest

16 “As a general matter, detention is prolonged when it has lasted six months and is

17 expected to continue more than minimally beyond six months.” Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d

18 1081, 1092 n.13 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, Petitioner has been detained for six and a half months. It

19 “is beyond dispute” that Petitioner’s interest here is “fundamental.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872

20 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). “Freedom

21 from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—

22 lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. See

23 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (“We have also held, more generally, that an individual’s

24 private interest in ‘freedom from prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably substantial.’” (quoting

25 Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208)). Petitioner “has a legitimate and reasonably strong private liberty

26 interest under Mathews.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207. Accordingly, the Court finds the first

27 Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.

1 2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

2 “Turning to the second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty is

3 high where, as here, ‘[the petitioner] has not received [and will not receive] any bond or custody

4 redetermination hearing.’” Kakkar v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-1627 JLT SAB, 2025 WL

5 3638298, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2025) (alterations in original) (quoting A.E. v. Andrews, No.

6 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025)).

7 3. Government Interest

8 “[T]he government clearly has a strong interest in preventing aliens from ‘remain[ing] in

9 the United States in violation of our law.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore,

10 538 U.S. at 518, 515). “These are interests of the highest order that only increase with the

11 passage of time.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208. “The government interest in immigration

12 enforcement in general is surely substantial. But the question here is not the government’s

13 interest in immigration enforcement [in general] but its interest in” detaining Petitioner without

14 providing him with a bond hearing. Zerezghi v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 955

15 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2020). See Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Off., No. 3:19-cv-01358-SB, 2020

16 WL 1862254, at *7 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2020) (The “government interest at stake here is not the

17 continued detention of Petitioner, but the government’s ability to detain him without a bond

18 hearing.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1855189 (D. Or. Apr. 13, 2020);

19 Henriquez, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (“Although the Government has a strong interest in

20 enforcing the immigration laws and in ensuring that lawfully issued removal orders are promptly

21 executed, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without providing an individualized

22 bond hearing is low.”). Accordingly, the Court finds the third Mathews factor weighs in favor of

23 Petitioner.

24 Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends finding that Petitioner’s continued

25 detention has become unreasonable, due process requires that Petitioner be provided a bond

26 hearing, and Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief on Count One.4

27

4 In light of this conclusion, the Court declines to address Count Three of the petition raising an Administrative

1 D. Remedy

2 “The Court finds, consistent with other post-Jennings cases, that the appropriate remedy

3 is a bond hearing before an immigration judge[.]” Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 882. See Doe v.

4 Becerra, 697 F. Supp. 3d 937, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (“[C]ourts in this Circuit have regularly

5 found that the IJ is the proper authority to conduct bond hearings and determine a detainee’s risk

6 of flight or dangerousness to the community.” (citing Martinez, 36 F.4th at 1223 (“district courts

7 throughout this circuit have ordered immigration courts to conduct bond hearings for noncitizens

8 held for prolonged periods”))); Mansoor v. Figueroa, No. 3:17-cv-01695-GPC (NLS), 2018 WL

9 840253, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2018) (“The Court finds the IJ is uniquely qualified and

10 situated to make neutral administrative determinations about Petitioner’s eligibility for release on

11 bond and/or placement in a supervised release program[.]”).

12 The Court further finds that “the government must prove by clear and convincing

13 evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond” and

14 that the bond hearing must comport with the other requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d

15 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). See Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2024) (stating

16 that “the BIA properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and

17 convincing evidence that Martinez is a danger to the community” with respect to a bond hearing

18 ordered pursuant to the Due Process Clause). In the event Petitioner is “determined not to be a

19 danger to the community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without

20 bond,” the immigration judge should consider Petitioner’s financial circumstances and

21 alternative conditions of release. Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 1000. See Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (The

22 district court “correctly directed the immigration judge (“IJ”), in setting his bond and

23 establishing appropriate terms for his potential release, to consider his ability to pay and

24 alternative means of assuring appearance.”).

25 III.

26 RECOMMENDATION

27 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

] 2. Respondents be ordered to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before

2 an immigration judge that complies with the requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder,

3 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), and where “the government must prove by clear and

4 convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to

5 justify denial of bond,” id. at 1203. In the event Petitioner is “determined not to be a

6 danger to the community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention

7 without bond,” the immigration judge should consider Petitioner’s financial

8 circumstances and alternative conditions of release. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976,

9 1000 (9th Cir. 2017).

10 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

11 | Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local

12 | Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

13 | FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file

14 | written objections with the Court, limited to fifteen (15) pages in length, including any

15 | exhibits. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

16 | Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days

17 | after service of the objections. The assigned District Judge will then review the Magistrate

18 | Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

19 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order.

20 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d

21 | 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

22

73 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAA Le

24 | Dated: _May 15, 2026 _ eee

STANLEY A. BOONE

25 United States Magistrate Judge

26

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28