Albarran

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 SHIV VIG (A-Number: 246-359-586), Case No. 1:26-cv-1252-DAD-JDP

12 Petitioner,

13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14 SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al.,

15 Respondents.

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17 Petitioner Shiv Vig entered the United States in 2022 and was detained by ICE in 2026.

18 Petitioner, proceeding with counsel, has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

19 § 2241, claiming that his detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court

20 issued injunctive relief, ordering petitioner to be afforded a bond hearing. Petitioner was

21 provided that hearing, at which he was denied bond. Petitioner now moves to amend his petition.

22 Respondents oppose, arguing that petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

23 For the following reasons, I recommend that petitioner’s motion to amend be denied and that the

24 petition be dismissed without prejudice.

25 Background

26 Petitioner entered the United States in 2022 without inspection, admission, or parole.

27 ECF No. 15-2 at 10. There is no allegation or evidence that, prior to his present detention,

28 petitioner had any contact with immigration officials. In January 2026, petitioner was detained

1 by ICE in California. Id. at 9.

2 Procedural History

3 On February 12, 2026, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion

4 for temporary restraining order. ECF Nos. 1 & 6. On February 17, 2026, respondents filed a

5 combined response to those two filings. ECF No. 9. Three days later, the court granted

6 petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order and ordered respondent to “provide petitioner

7 with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

8 § 1226(a).” ECF No. 10.

9 On March 2, 2026, petitioner was provided a bond hearing, at which the immigration

10 judge denied bond based on the finding that petitioner is both a danger to the community and a

11 flight risk. ECF No. 15-2 at 33. On April 20, 2026, petitioner filed a motion to amend the

12 petition. ECF No. 15. On April 28, 2026, respondents filed an opposition. ECF No. 17. On the

13 following day, petitioner filed a reply. ECF No. 18.

14 Legal Standard

15 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates

16 federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75

17 (2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of

18 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”

19 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a

20 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.

21 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of

22 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have

23 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction

24 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

25 Analysis

26 Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, his motion to

27 amend should be denied because amendment would be futile, and the petition should be

28 dismissed without prejudice.

1 “The exhaustion requirement is prudential, rather than jurisdictional, for habeas claims.”

2 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). To decide whether exhaustion is

3 required, courts consider the Puga factors to determine if:

4 (1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to

generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation

5 of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the

administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to

6 allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the

need for judicial review.

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8 Id. (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)).

9 Where a court finds that the petitioner has failed to exhaust prudentially required

10 administrative remedies, it “ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay

11 the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies.” Id. (quoting Leonardo v. Crawford,

12 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)). However, even if a consideration of the Puga factors

13 favors prudential exhaustion, a court may nonetheless waive exhaustion if “administrative

14 remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile

15 gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Id.

16 (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). I begin by considering the Puga

17 factors in turn.

18 First, it does not appear that “agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to

19 generate a proper record and reach a proper decision.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. On the

20 contrary, courts have found that where, as here, the petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing under

21 section 1226, the first Puga factor weighs against prudential exhaustion. See Okoth v. Kaiser,

22 No. 1:25-cv-1936-KES-SAB, 2026 WL 45199, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2026); Hernandez Burruel

23 v. Murray, No. 1:25-cv-1569-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3240356, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025). The

24 immigration judge (“IJ”) provided a written decision, and respondents have lodged an audio

25 recording of the bond hearing; it therefore appears that consideration by the Board of Immigration

26 Appeals (“BIA”) is unnecessary to generate a record or for this court to reach a proper decision.

27 See ECF No. 15-2 at 33; ECF No. 19. For these reasons, the first Puga factor does not weigh in

28 favor of finding exhaustion prudential.

1 Second, “relaxation of the [exhaustion] requirement would encourage the deliberate

2 bypass of the administrative scheme.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. “Granting petitioner’s

3 requested relief would ‘bypass’ the administrative scheme under § 1226(a) and its implementing

4 regulations.” See Okoth, 2026 WL 45199, at *3 (finding that the second Puga factor weighs in

5 favor of prudential exhaustion). Notably, the Court of Appeals has held that section 1226’s

6 procedures facially satisfy due process. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1213 (9th Cir.

7 2022). While the Court of Appeals did not foreclose as-applied challenges, petitioner does not

8 argue that section 1226’s procedures violate his due process rights. I find that “relaxing the

9 exhaustion requirements in this case would encourage others to immediately seek habeas review

10 if they deem the federal courts to be a more sympathetic forum.” See Martinez v. Scott, No. 2:25-

11 cv-1538-TSZ-GJL, 2025 WL 2689844, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2025), report and

12 recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2689066 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 19, 2025).

13 Third, “administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and

14 to preclude the need for judicial review.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988. Indeed, the BIA “has

15 the authority to correct the erroneous factual determinations and evidentiary errors alleged” by

16 petitioner. See Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *5 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii)). The

17 BIA’s review of the IJ’s order would “allow the agency to correct its own mistakes” and

18 potentially “preclude the need for judicial review.” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988.

19 Accordingly, while the first factor weighs against prudential exhaustion, the second and

20 third factors support the finding that petitioner has failed to exhaust prudentially required

21 administrative remedies.

22 As noted, a court may waive exhaustion if “administrative remedies are inadequate or not

23 efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will

24 result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.” Id. Petitioner argues that exhausting

25 administrative remedies “would unduly delay relief from ongoing unlawful detention.” ECF No.

26 18 at 3. However, as the court in Martinez held when considering a similar argument:

27 Even assuming arguendo Petitioner had shown that immediate

federal judicial review of his claims would be more efficient, this is

28 not the same as demonstrating that the available administrative

1 processes are inadequate and inefficient. Indeed, a version of

Petitioner’s argument could be made by virtually every litigant

2 attempting to bypass the administrative process by proceeding

directly to the federal courts. Permitting Petitioner to avoid the

3 administrative scheme based solely on the additional time required

to pursue administrative remedies would create an exception to

4 exhaustion that would swallow the rule.

5 Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *6 (emphasis in original).

6 I agree with the analysis in Martinez and find that petitioner has not demonstrated that the

7 court should waive the exhaustion requirement on the basis that exhausting would delay relief.

8 Petitioner also argues that “a genuine and material change in circumstances” supports waiving the

9 exhaustion requirement. ECF No. 18 at 2. Since his bond hearing, petitioner’s criminal charges

10 have been dismissed due to his completion of a judicial diversion program. Id. at 5. Petitioner

11 argues that this development “directly undermines the prior findings of dangerousness and

12 materially alters the basis upon which bond was denied.” See id. at 2. Petitioner, however,

13 provides no authority showing that this change in circumstances excuses the prudential

14 requirement to exhaust. Moreover, at petitioner’s bond hearing, the IJ considered the nature of

15 petitioner’s criminal charges after petitioner’s counsel represented that petitioner was completing

16 a judicial diversion program. See ECF No. 19. That petitioner has now completed such a

17 program does not excuse his requirement to exhaust.

18 It also bears mention that, even after criminal charges are dismissed, an IJ may still

19 consider such charges in determining danger and flight risk. The regulations provide that “[t]he

20 determination of the Immigration Judge as to custody status or bond may be based upon any

21 information that is available to the Immigration Judge or that is presented to him or her by the

22 alien or the Service.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals rejected the

23 “argument that [the petitioner’s] due process rights were violated when the IJ admitted his

24 unauthenticated RAP sheet into evidence” because the “Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply

25 strictly in immigration removal proceedings” and “regulations delineating the rules of procedure

26 for bond determinations in immigration court specify that an immigration judge may rely upon

27 any information that is available to the Immigration Judge or that is presented to him or her by the

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1 alien or the Service.”1 Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 8 C.F.R.

2 § 1003.19(d)), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Rodriguez, 53 F.4th 1189.

3 The Board of Immigration Appeals similarly has held that “[w]hen an alien’s conduct

4 results in his having had contact with the criminal justice system or being placed in criminal

5 proceedings, the nature of those contacts and the stage to which those proceedings have

6 progressed should be taken into account and weighed accordingly.” Matter of Thomas, 21 I. & N.

7 Dec. 20, 24 (BIA 1995). District courts have found that dismissed charges “are deemed relevant

8 evidence regarding a determination of the potential danger [the petitioner] poses to the

9 community.” See Flores-Delgado v. Lynch, No. 15-cv-1273-PHX-JAT, 2016 WL 2865872, at *7

10 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2016) (citing Alarcon-Serrano v. I.N.S., 220 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000)).

11 Accordingly, because petitioner does not demonstrate that the exhaustion requirement

12 should be waived, the petition for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed without prejudice.

13 See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 (holding that a petition may be dismissed without prejudice

14 where the petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies); Okoth, 2026 WL 45199, at *4

15 (dismissing the petition because the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies);

16 Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *7 (same). Similarly, petitioner’s motion to amend should be

17 denied because amendment would be futile in light of petitioner’s failure to exhaust. See Bonin v.

18 Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).

19 Lastly, the Court of Appeals’ decision in Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.

20 2011), is persuasive. In that case, after the petitioner filed a habeas petition, the court ordered that

21 petitioner be afforded a Casas-Castrillon hearing.2 Id. at 1159. The petitioner was provided a

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1 Elsewhere, the Court of Appeals has held that “[t]he fact of arrest, insofar as it bears

23 upon whether an alien might have engaged in underlying conduct” is relevant in determining

whether a noncitizen is entitled to discretionary relief from deportation. Paredes-Urrestarazu v.

24 I.N.S., 36 F.3d 801, 810 (9th Cir. 1994). Additionally, the Court of Appeals cited with approval

another circuit’s holding that “[e]vidence of an alien’s conduct, without a conviction, may be

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considered in denying the discretionary relief of voluntary departure.” See Villanueva-Franco v.

I.N.S., 802 F.2d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Parcham v. I.N.S., 769 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir.

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1985)).

27 2 A Casas-Castrillon hearing was afforded to a noncitizen detained under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c) and whose “immigration case reaches judicial review” such that their detention is then

28 governed under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for a bond hearing. Avilez v. Garland, 69

1 hearing, at which the IJ denied bond based on the finding that the petitioner “posed a danger to

2 the community.” Id. “Rather than appealing the IJ’s adverse bond determination to the BIA, [the

3 petitioner] filed a motion for review of the IJ’s decision in his pending habeas case, arguing that

4 the hearing failed to satisfy due process or conform to the district court’s previous order.” Id.

5 The Court of Appeals held that “[t]his short cut was improper” and that the petitioner “should

6 have exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district

7 court to review the IJ’s decision.” Id. at 1160. The court further held that “[o]nce the BIA

8 rendered its decision, [the petitioner] could have properly pursued habeas relief in the district

9 court.” Id. Accordingly, the court remanded the case with instructions for the district court to

10 dismiss the petition without prejudice. Id. at 1161.

11 Here, as in Leonardo, the court ordered a bond hearing, petitioner was denied bond at that

12 hearing, and petitioner has sought judicial review before exhausting administrative remedies.

13 Given these core similarities, the Court of Appeals’ reasoning from Leonardo is persuasive;

14 petitioner’s “short cut was improper” and he must exhaust administrative remedies—i.e., wait

15 until the BIA issues its decision on his appeal—before seeking habeas relief. See id. at 1160.

16 Accordingly, as in Leonardo, the petition should be dismissed without prejudice. See id. at 1161.

17 Conclusion

18 Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

19 1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be dismissed without

20 prejudice.

21 2. Petitioner’s motion to amend, ECF No. 15, be DENIED.

22 3. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.

23 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

24 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days of

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F.4th 525, 528 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Casas-Castrillon v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942

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(9th Cir. 2008)). The Court of Appeals has since overturned Casas-Castrillon, holding that

27 section 1226(c) “authorizes detention during the judicial review phase of removal proceedings.”

Id. at 537. While Casas-Castrillon is no longer good law, and the hearing in the present action is

28 distinct, Leonardo is nonetheless instructive.

1 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the

2 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to

3 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed

4 | within seven days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

5 || objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See

6 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (th Cir.

7 | 1991).

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9 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ May 14, 2026 Q———

1] JEREMY D. PETERSON

1 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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