Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 ERIK PYLE, Case No. 2:24-cv-02940-TLN-CSK (PS)

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

GRANTING DEFENDANTS SHERIFF

13 v. JUSTIN GIBBS AND GLENN COUNTY

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT’S MOTION TO

14 CHEIF JUSTIN GIBBS GLENN DISMISS

COUNTY SHERIFF OFFICER DOE,1

15 (ECF No. 42)

Defendants.

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18 Plaintiff Erik Pyle is proceeding in this action pro se. Pending before the Court is

19 Defendants Sheriff Justin Gibbs (sued as “Cheif [sic] Justin Gibbs”) and Glenn County

20 Sheriff’s Department’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”)

21 (ECF No. 30) pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6).2 (ECF

22 No. 42.) The motion is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 42, 43, 44, 45.) Pursuant to Local Rule

23 230(g), the Court submitted the motion without argument and vacated the April 7, 2026

24 hearing. 3/30/2026 Minute Order (ECF No. 46). For the reasons that follow, the Court

25 recommends GRANTING Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC without leave to

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1 Defendants are named as they appear on the caption page of Plaintiff’s Second

27 Amended Complaint (ECF No. 30). Spelling errors are in the original.

2 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R.

28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c).

1 amend.

2 I. BACKGROUND

3 A. Factual Allegations3

4 Plaintiff alleges that on an unspecified date, while Plaintiff was driving in Glenn

5 County, “multiple marked vehicles belonging to the Glenn County Sheriff’s Office” pulled

6 over Plaintiff. SAC at 2 ¶ 1 (ECF No. 30).4 After Plaintiff pulled over, “[s]everal deputies

7 exited their patrol vehicles with firearms drawn and aimed directly at Plaintiff, shouting

8 conflicting commands and treating him as if he were a violent fugitive.” Id. at 2 ¶ 2.

9 Plaintiff alleges he was ordered out of his vehicle and then almost immediately ordered

10 back in. Id. at 2 ¶ 3. Plaintiff alleges that “Chief Gibbs, who appeared to be supervising

11 the encounter, shouted at Plaintiff: ‘When are you going to get enough of this woman?

12 Thirty years you’ve been putting up with this woman!’” Id. at 3 ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges that

13 “Deputies then conducted a full search of Plaintiff’s vehicle without warrant, consent, or

14 exigent circumstances.” Id. at 3 ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges he was arrested “on suspicion of

15 domestic violence, an accusation entirely unsupported by witness statements or

16 probable cause.” Id. at 3 ¶ 6. Plaintiff was then allegedly transported and detained “in a

17 small filthy isolation cell with no toilet, sink, or running water” and “a strong,

18 overwhelming odor of urine.” Id. at 3 ¶ 8. Plaintiff was allegedly “denied access to a

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20 3 These facts primarily derive from the Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 30),

which are construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party.

21 Faulkner v. ADT Sec. Servs., 706 F.3d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013). However, the Court

does not assume the truth of any conclusory factual allegations or legal conclusions.

22

Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court notes that Plaintiff’s

23 SAC appears to have been drafted with the help of generative artificial intelligence

(“GenAI”) or similar tools because it contains apparent GenAI responses to prompts. See

24 SAC at 2:19-21, 3:26-28, 4:25-28, 6:22-24, 7:11-13. Of particular concern is an apparent

reference to “Sheriff Owens” in one of the responses, who is not named elsewhere in the

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SAC. See SAC at 3:26-27. This raises concerns that the SAC may contain facts that the

26 generative AI “hallucinated,” that is, made up. The Court previously warned Plaintiff that

a misuse of generative AI that includes hallucinations of facts or legal authority can

27 violate Rule 11. See 10/14/2025 Order and Findings and Recommendations at 6.

4 Citations to the SAC refer to page and paragraph numbers where available;

28 otherwise, citations are by page and line numbers.

1 phone, legal counsel, and contact with family.” Id. at 3 ¶ 9. Plaintiff was released after

2 about twenty-four hours, and Plaintiff alleges that subsequent arrest reports were altered

3 to indicate he was arrested for “harassment” rather than domestic violence. Id. at 3

4 ¶¶ 10, 11.

5 B. Procedural Posture

6 Plaintiff filed the initial complaint on October 25, 2024, naming as defendants

7 Glenn County Sheriff’s Department, Glenn County Board of Supervisors, and Orland

8 Police Department. (ECF No. 1.) On May 28, 2025, Defendants Glenn County Sheriff’s

9 Department, Glenn County Board of Supervisors, and Orland Police Department filed a

10 motion to dismiss the complaint. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff did not file an opposition or

11 statement of non-opposition to the motion. See Docket. On June 17, 2025, the Court

12 issued a minute order directing Plaintiff to show cause why the Court should not

13 construe Plaintiff’s failure to file a timely opposition as a non-opposition to Defendants’

14 motion and why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 6/17/2025

15 Minute Order (ECF No. 14). On June 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a response to the Court’s

16 June 17, 2025 Order, requesting leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to Federal

17 Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). (ECF No. 15.) On June 27, 2025, the Court issued a

18 minute order granting Plaintiff’s request to file an amended complaint for good cause

19 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. 6/27/2025 Minute Order (ECF No. 16).

20 On July 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), naming as

21 defendants Glenn County Sheriff’s Department, Orland Police Department, and Does 1-

22 10. (ECF No. 17.) On July 31, 2025, Defendant Glenn County Sheriff’s Department filed

23 a motion to dismiss the FAC. (ECF No. 18.) After briefing, the Court took the motion

24 under submission. 8/19/2025 Minute Order (ECF No. 20). On October 14, 2025, the

25 undersigned issued Findings and Recommendations recommending that the motion to

26 dismiss be granted with leave for Plaintiff to amend. 10/14/2025 Order and Findings and

27 Recommendations (ECF No. 25). Plaintiff filed objections to these Findings and

28 Recommendations on October 24, 2025. (ECF No. 27.) The district judge adopted the

1 Findings and Recommendations on November 26, 2025. 11/26/2025 Order (ECF No.

2 34).

3 On November 12, 2025, while the October 14, 2025 Findings and

4 Recommendations were still pending before the district judge, Plaintiff filed a notice of

5 voluntary dismissal as to Defendant Orland Police Department and filed the SAC, which

6 names “Cheif [sic] Justin Gibbs Glenn County Sheriff Officer Doe” as Defendants. (ECF

7 Nos. 29, 30.) The SAC appears to allege one cause of action for violation of civil rights

8 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on Monell liability. SAC at 4 ¶¶ 1-8. Plaintiff seeks

9 monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 6:16-21, 7:14-28, 8.

10 Because the October 14, 2025 Findings and Recommendations were still pending

11 before the assigned district judge, the Court struck the SAC as premature. 11/25/2025

12 Minute Order (ECF No. 33). After the district judge adopted the October 14, 2025

13 Findings and Recommendations, the Court withdrew its November 25, 2025 Order

14 striking Plaintiff’s SAC and ordered Defendants to respond to the now-operative SAC

15 within twenty-one days. 2/5/2026 Minute Order (ECF No. 38).

16 On February 26, 2026, Defendants Sheriff Justin Gibbs and Glenn County

17 Sheriff’s Department filed the instant motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint

18 and set it for hearing on April 7, 2026 before the undersigned. (ECF No. 42.) On March

19 17, 2026, Defendants filed a notice that Plaintiff had failed to timely file an opposition to

20 the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 43.) That same day, Plaintiff filed a late opposition. Pl.

21 Opp’n (ECF No. 44). Defendants replied to the opposition on March 27, 2026. Def. Reply

22 (ECF No. 45). The Court then took the motion to dismiss under submission and vacated

23 the April 7, 2026 hearing. 3/30/2026 Minute Order (ECF No. 46).

24 II. LEGAL STANDARDS

25 A. Rule 8, Pro Se Pleadings, Construction and Amendment

26 Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed and afforded the benefit of any

27 doubt. Chambers v. Herrera, 78 F.4th 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2023). However, the court

28 need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or

1 unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th

2 Cir. 1981). To give fair notice of the claims and the grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff

3 must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants

4 which support the claims. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). A

5 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice to state a claim.

6 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

7 662, 678 (2009). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must

8 allege enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550

9 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

10 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

11 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

12 Upon dismissal of any claims, the court must tell a pro se plaintiff of a pleading’s

13 deficiencies and provide an opportunity to cure such defects. Garity v. APWU Nat'l Lab.

14 Org., 828 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2016). However, if amendment would be futile, leave to

15 amend does not need to be provided. Lathus v. City of Huntington Beach, 56 F.4th 1238,

16 1243 (9th Cir. 2023).

17 To determine the propriety of a dismissal motion, the court may not consider facts

18 raised outside the complaint (such as in an opposition brief), but it may consider such

19 facts when deciding whether to grant leave to amend. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023,

20 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).

21 B. Failure to State a Claim under Rule 12(b)(6)

22 A claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s “failure to state a claim upon

23 which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint fails to state a claim if

24 it either lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal

25 theory. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). When considering

26 whether a claim has been stated, the court must accept the well-pleaded factual

27 allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-

28 moving party. Id. However, the court is not required to accept as true conclusory factual

1 allegations contradicted by documents referenced in the complaint, or legal conclusions

2 merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559

3 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009).

4 III. DISCUSSION

5 Defendants Sheriff Justin Gibbs and Glenn County Sheriff’s Department move to

6 dismiss the entire SAC for failure to satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of

7 Civil Procedure Rule 8 and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

8 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Def. Mot. (ECF No. 42-1.) Prior to

9 addressing Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court first addresses Plaintiff’s late

10 opposition.

11 A. Plaintiff’s Late Opposition

12 Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC was filed on February 26, 2026. See Def.

13 Mot. Thus, pursuant to the Local Rules, Plaintiff’s opposition was due on March 12,

14 2026. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(c). Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion on

15 March 17, 2026. See Pl. Opp’n. Defendants argue on reply that because Plaintiff’s

16 opposition is untimely, the opposition should be struck. Def. Reply at 2. The Court notes

17 that this is not the first time this has occurred. 10/14/2025 Order and Findings and

18 Recommendations at 5. In addition, the Court granted Plaintiff e-service of filings such

19 that Plaintiff receives filings electronically through CM/ECF simultaneous with their filing.

20 (ECF No. 25.) Despite this, the Court declines Defendants’ request to strike Plaintiff’s

21 opposition given Plaintiff’s pro se status and where Defendants were able to respond to

22 Plaintiff’s late opposition and are therefore not prejudiced.

23 B. Motion to Dismiss

24 Defendants move to dismiss the SAC for (1) failure to present a short and plain

25 statement of Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), and (2) failure to allege sufficient

26 facts to support a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Def. Mot. at 4-5, 5-8. Defendants

27 argue that the SAC does not comply with Rule 8 because it fails to identify who are the

28 defendant parties and does not clearly indicate what, if any other, causes of action

1 Plaintiff asserts apart from a Section 1983 claim based solely on a Monell theory. Id. at

2 1, 5. Defendants argue that, even if the SAC satisfies Rule 8, it should be dismissed

3 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because: (1) any claims against Defendant Gibbs in his official

4 capacity must be dismissed as duplicative of Plaintiff’s Monell claim; (2) any claims

5 against Defendant Gibbs in his individual capacity are based on conclusory, speculative

6 allegations; and (3) the claim based on Monell liability fails to allege facts to identify or

7 support an unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice by Defendants. Id. at 5-8.

8 1. Rule 8 Pleading Requirements

9 Plaintiff's SAC does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as required

10 by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because the SAC fails to allege, with at least some

11 degree of particularity, overt acts by specific defendants which support Plaintiff’s claims.

12 See Kimes, 84 F.3d at 1129.

13 As an initial problem, Plaintiff has not adequately identified the defendants to the

14 SAC. The caption page provides “Cheif [sic] Justin Gibbs [line break] Glenn County

15 Sheriff Officer Doe” as the Defendants, but nowhere in the SAC does Plaintiff clarify

16 whether he is suing one defendant (Defendant Gibbs), two (Defendants Gibbs and

17 Glenn County Sheriff’s Department), or three or more defendants, including Doe

18 defendants. See SAC at 1. Under the “Cause of Action” heading, the SAC appears to

19 allege a Section 1983 claim based on Monell liability, but there it names “[t]he County of

20 Glenn” rather than the Glenn County Sheriff’s Department, which was named in the

21 FAC. Id. at 4 ¶ 7. Under the “Prayer for Relief” heading, the SAC refers to “Defendants,”

22 “the Glenn County Sheriff’s Office,” and “County of Glenn.” Id. at 7:15-28, 8. Thus,

23 because the defendants to the SAC are not clearly identified, the SAC fails to satisfy the

24 requirements of Rule 8.

25 Further, nowhere in the SAC does Plaintiff clearly identify (apart from the Monell

26 claim) what other claim(s), if any, Plaintiff brings, what defendants against whom Plaintiff

27 seeks to bring such claim(s), and on what theory of liability. “[C]ourts have routinely

28 granted motions to dismiss” where defendants “lack notice as to which theory of liability

1 Plaintiffs are advancing against which of them and cannot make informed responses as

2 to Plaintiffs' allegations.” Taylor v. City of Torrance, 2025 WL 4059416, at *3 (C.D. Cal.

3 Oct. 8, 2025). Plaintiff’s opposition fails to address these omissions. See Pl. Opp’n at 3-

4 4. As the Court earlier cautioned Plaintiff, the SAC must not require the Court and

5 defendants to guess at what is being alleged against whom. See 10/14/2025 Order and

6 Findings and Recommendations at 10; McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir.

7 1996) (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally guessing

8 as to what facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain defendants”).

9 Accordingly, because the SAC fails to comply with Rule 8 in providing notice to

10 Defendants of what claims are being brought against them, the Court recommends the

11 SAC be dismissed.

12 2. Monell Claim

13 Defendants argue that any claim against the Glenn County Sheriff’s Department

14 based on Monell liability fails because the SAC does not allege facts to identify or

15 support an unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice by Defendants. Def. Mot. at 5-8.

16 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights,

17 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

18 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (internal quotation marks

19 omitted). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely provides a

20 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.

21 266, 271 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To state a cognizable

22 Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right protected by the

23 Constitution and laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was

24 committed by a person who acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also

25 Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2011). An

26 individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts establish the

27 defendant's personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal connection

28 between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

1 See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d

2 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978).

3 “In order to establish municipal liability [under Monell], a plaintiff must show that a

4 ‘policy or custom’ led to the plaintiff's injury.” Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d

5 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of

6 New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege that

7 (1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality has a policy; (3) the

8 policy amounts to deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) the

9 policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Anderson v. Warner,

10 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th

11 Cir. 1994)). The complaint must identify the particular policy that the plaintiff alleges

12 caused his constitutional injury. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681 (9th

13 Cir. 2002); see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (under § 1983, local

14 governments are responsible only for “their own illegal acts,” and therefore to impose

15 liability on a local government, plaintiffs must prove that an “action pursuant to official

16 municipal policy” caused their injury) (citations omitted). Further, the policy at issue must

17 be the result of a decision of a person employed by the entity who has final decision or

18 policymaking authority. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. There must be a direct causal link

19 between the policy or custom and the injury, and a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate

20 that his injury resulted from a permanent and well-settled practice. Anderson, 451 F.3d

21 at 1070.

22 Here, the SAC fails to state a Section 1983 claim under a Monell theory of liability.

23 Plaintiff alleges his constitutional deprivations were “part of an established custom,

24 policy, and failure of training and supervision within the Glenn County Sheriff’s Office to

25 engage in unlawful detentions, use intimidation tactics, and disregard constitutional

26 rights.” SAC at 3 ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that “Chief Gibbs and other supervisory officials

27 within the Glenn County Sheriff’s Office acted . . . within the scope of their employment

28 as policymakers and decision-makers for the County.” Id. at 4 ¶ 2. Plaintiff also alleges

1 that “Chief Gibbs, acting in a supervisory and decision-making capacity, personally

2 directed and oversaw deputies who conducted the unlawful stop, the search, and the

3 confinement.” Id. at 6:11-12. Plaintiff further alleges “the policies, customs, and decisions

4 made and carried out during [Plaintiff’s] arrest and detention were the direct and moving

5 force behind the violations of his constitutional rights.” Id. at 4 ¶ 3. Plaintiff pleads

6 minimal allegations and fails to sufficiently state a Monell claim. As they relate to the

7 “execution of a government’s policy or custom” to deprive constitutional rights, the

8 allegations are conclusory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. In his opposition, Plaintiff asserts

9 that “[a]t the pleading stage, a plaintiff is not required to prove the existence of a policy

10 or custom.” To the extent Plaintiff means he does not have to allege non-conclusory

11 facts about a municipal entity’s policy to succeed on a Monell claim, Plaintiff is wrong.

12 See A. E. ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012)

13 (clarifying that Monell claims may not be pleaded with conclusory allegations reciting

14 elements of cause of action). Thus, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's Monell claims

15 against Defendant Glenn County Sheriff’s Department be dismissed.

16 3. Claims Against Defendant Gibbs

17 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Gibbs was present when Plaintiff was pulled over and

18 that Defendant Gibbs shouted, “When are you going to get enough of this woman?

19 Thirty years you’ve been putting up with this woman!” SAC at 3 ¶ 4. Plaintiff also alleges

20 that Defendant Gibbs supervised the actions depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional

21 rights; that Plaintiff’s arrest records were modified, “indicating possible coordination

22 among supervisory personnel—including Chief Gibbs”; and that Defendant Gibbs’s

23 “verbal remarks during the encounter show active participation and bias.” Id. at 4 ¶ 7,

24 5:3-6, 6:11-15. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiff

25 brings claims against Defendant Gibbs, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to state a

26 claim because (1) claims against Defendant Gibbs in his official capacity must be

27 dismissed as duplicative of Plaintiff’s Monell claim; and (2) any Section 1983 claims

28 against Defendant Gibbs in his individual capacity are conclusorily alleged. Def. Mot. at

1 5-7. The Court agrees.

2 As a threshold matter, the SAC does not indicate whether Plaintiff seeks to bring

3 Section 1983 claims against Gibbs in his individual or official capacity, or whether those

4 allegations are intended to support only Plaintiff’s Monell claim. The Court considers

5 both possibilities. “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit

6 against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no

7 different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.

8 58, 71 (1989) (citation omitted); see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). If

9 an individual is sued in his official capacity as a municipal official and the municipal entity

10 is also sued, the claims against the individuals are duplicative and should be dismissed.

11 Coronado v. City of Fresno, 2025 WL 3004080, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025)

12 (dismissing official-capacity claims as duplicative of municipal-liability claims); Myrtle St.

13 Flats LLC v. City of Vallejo, 2017 WL 5754891, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2017) (same).

14 Here, a Section 1983 claim against Defendant Gibbs in his official capacity is

15 effectively a Section 1983 claim against Defendant Glenn County Sheriff’s Department.

16 See Coronado, 2025 WL 3004080, at *4. Because Plaintiff also brings claims against the

17 municipal entity (the Glenn County Sheriff’s Department), Plaintiff's claims against

18 Defendant Gibbs should be dismissed as duplicative to the extent they are brought

19 against Defendant Gibbs in his official capacity. See id.; Myrtle St. Flats LLC, 2017 WL

20 5754891, at *5.

21 Even assuming that Plaintiff seeks to bring claims against Defendant Gibbs in his

22 individual capacity, the SAC fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim. Individual

23 defendants may be held independently liable as supervisors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if

24 there exists either “(1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,

25 or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the

26 constitutional violation.” Hanson v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989). “[A]n officer

27 ‘must be more than a mere bystander’ to be liable under § 1983.” Taylor, 2025 WL

28 4059416, at *3 (quoting Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner, 969 F.3d 930, 941 (9th Cir.

1 2020)). Courts in the Ninth Circuit have dismissed supervisory liability claims against

2 police department chiefs where the pleadings were conclusory and there were no factual

3 allegations to support a causal connection between the chief's conduct and the

4 unconstitutional actions allegedly committed by subordinate officers. See Sterling, 2023

5 WL 2600454, at *6; Mitchell v. County of Contra Costa, 2022 WL 526161, at *7 (N.D.

6 Cal. Feb. 22, 2022) (finding that pleadings that only state that the supervisor “directed

7 his or her subordinates in conduct that violated Plaintiff's rights,” “set in motion a series

8 of acts and omissions by his or her subordinates,” “failed to act to prevent his or her

9 subordinate from engaging in conduct,” and “disregarded the consequence of a known

10 or obvious training deficiency” were conclusory and contained no factual allegations to

11 support supervisory liability); Arteaga v. City of Oakley, 2020 WL 511876, at *7 (N.D.

12 Cal. Jan. 31, 2020) (dismissing a claim for supervisory liability on similarly pleaded

13 allegations).

14 Here, Plaintiff’s SAC falls short in similar ways. The SAC’s allegations do not

15 sufficiently allege that Defendant Gibbs personally participated in constitutional violations

16 against Plaintiff or that Defendant Gibbs’s conduct had a causal connection to

17 unconstitutional actions allegedly committed by subordinate officers. However, Plaintiff’s

18 opposition alleges for the first time that when Plaintiff was stopped, Defendant Gibbs

19 “announced that Plaintiff was under arrest for domestic violence.” Pl. Opp’n at 5. This

20 allegation is unavailing. On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a court may not

21 look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff's moving papers, such as a memorandum in

22 opposition to a defendant's motion to dismiss.” Schneider v. California Dep't of Corr., 151

23 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). The Court disregards

24 Plaintiff’s allegations raised for the first time in his opposition. However, even if the Court

25 were to consider this allegation, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded Defendant Gibbs’s

26 personal participation in an unlawful arrest with factual allegations that would indicate a

27 lack of probable cause. See Graves v. Fresno Cnty. Mental Health, 2019 WL 2125457

28 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2019) (holding that general allegations of lack of probable cause for

1 arrest are insufficient to state claim under Section 1983).

2 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plead liability against Defendant Gibbs in his

3 individual capacity. The Court therefore recommends dismissal of any claims Plaintiff

4 brings against Defendant Gibbs.

5 C. Leave to Amend

6 Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se

7 litigant's complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and

8 succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). If the

9 court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, it has

10 discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-30. Leave

11 to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint could

12 be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see also Cato, 70 F.3d at

13 1106 (“A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some

14 notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the

15 complaint could not be cured by amendment.”) (citation omitted). However, if, after

16 careful consideration, it is clear that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the

17 court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06.

18 Here, Plaintiff has amended his complaint twice. (See ECF Nos. 17, 30.) The

19 Court also provided Plaintiff a detailed explanation of the deficiencies in his First

20 Amended Complaint. See 10/14/2025 Order and Findings and Recommendations.

21 Despite this, Plaintiff has been unable to cure the deficiencies and allege sufficient facts

22 to state a claim against any defendant. Accordingly, the Court finds that further

23 amendment would be futile. The SAC should therefore be dismissed without leave to

24 amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06.

25 IV. CONCLUSION

26 Based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED:

27 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 42) be GRANTED;

28 2. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 30) be DISMISSED

1 without leave to amend; and

2 3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case.

3 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

4 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

5 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

6 || written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should

7 || be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any

8 || reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14

9 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time

10 || may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,

11 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

12

13 | Dated: May 12, 2026 C iy $

14 CHI SOO KIM

45 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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