Opinion

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 JUAN BACILIO GASPAR, Case No. 1:25-cv-02026-JLT-SAB-HC

11 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF

12 v. HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECT

RESPONDENTS TO PROVIDE

13 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE PETITIONER WITH BOND HEARING

ANNEX ICE DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,

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Respondents.

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16 Petitioner is an immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas

17 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

18 I.

19 BACKGROUND

20 Petitioner is a citizen of Guatemala whose status was adjusted to lawful permanent

21 resident on April 21, 2009. (ECF No. 13-2 at 2.1) On September 10, 2019, Petitioner was

22 convicted of kidnapping, with an enhancement for use of a deadly or dangerous weapon

23 pursuant, and of inflicting corporal injury to a spouse or roommate. Petitioner was sentenced to

24 an imprisonment term of seven years. (Id. at 5.) On September 24, 2025, Enforcement and

25 Removal Operations (“ERO”) took Petitioner into custody. (Id. at 24.) A notice to appear was

26 filed that charged Petitioner within being removable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the

27 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (Id. at 25.)

1 On December 29, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging

2 his prolonged immigration detention without a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.

3 (ECF No. 1.) On February 27, 2026, Respondents filed an answer. (ECF No. 13.) On March 27,

4 2026, Petitioner filed a traverse. (ECF No. 15.) On April 17, 2026, Petitioner’s motion for

5 temporary restraining order was denied. (ECF No. 17.)

6 II.

7 DISCUSSION

8 A. Overview of Caselaw Regarding Immigration Detention Statutes

9 An intricate statutory scheme governs the detention of noncitizens during removal

10 proceedings and after a final removal order is issued. “Where an alien falls within this statutory

11 scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of

12 review process available to him if he wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.” Prieto-

13 Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).

14 “Four statutes grant the Government authority to detain noncitizens who have been

15 placed in removal proceedings: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) (‘Section 1225(b)’), 1226(a) (‘Subsection

16 A’), 1226(c) (‘Subsection C’), and 1231(a) (‘Section 1231(a)’).” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th

17 525, 529 (9th Cir. 2023). “Subsection A is the default detention statute for noncitizens in

18 removal proceedings and applies to noncitizens ‘[e]xcept as provided in [Subsection C].’”

19 Avilez, 69 F.4th at 529 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). “[D]etention under

20 Subsection A is discretionary” and “provides for release on bond or conditional parole.” Id.

21 “Subsection C provides for the detention of ‘criminal aliens’ and states that ‘[t]he Attorney

22 General shall take into custody any alien who’ is deportable or inadmissible based on a

23 qualifying, enumerated offense.” Id. at 530 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)).

24 “[D]etention under Subsection C is mandatory,” and “[r]elease under Subsection C is limited to

25 certain witness protection purposes.” Id. “Section 1231(a) applies to detention after the entry of a

26 final order of removal” and “governs detention during a ninety-day ‘removal period’ after the

27 conclusion of removal proceedings.” Id. at 530–31.

1 “[I]n a series of decisions since 2001, ‘the Supreme Court and [the Ninth Circuit] have

2 grappled in piece-meal fashion with whether the various detention statutes may authorize

3 indefinite or prolonged detention of detainees and, if so, may do so without providing a bond

4 hearing.’” Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting

5 Rodriguez v. Hayes (Rodriguez I), 591 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010)). In Zadvydas v. Davis,

6 533 U.S. 678 (2001), two noncitizens, who had been ordered removed but whose removal could

7 not be effectuated due to lack of a repatriation treaty or because their designated countries

8 refused to accept them, challenged their prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which

9 governs detention beyond the ninety-day removal period. Applying the canon of constitutional

10 avoidance because a “statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious

11 constitutional problem,” the Supreme Court “read an implicit limitation into” § 1231(a)(6) and

12 held that the statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably

13 necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

14 689. Thus, “after a presumptively reasonable six-month period of post-removal period detention,

15 the alien was entitled to release if he successfully demonstrated that there was ‘good reason to

16 believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’”

17 Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).

18 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to

19 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Demore distinguished Zadvydas by emphasizing

20 detention under § 1226(c) has a “definite termination point” and “in the majority of the cases it

21 lasts for less than the 90 days we considered presumptively valid in Zadvydas.” Id. at 529 (noting

22 that “in 85% of the cases in which aliens are detained pursuant to § 1226(c), removal

23 proceedings are completed in an average time of 47 days and a median of 30 days” and “[i]n the

24 remaining 15% of cases, in which the alien appeals the decision of the Immigration Judge to the

25 Board of Immigration Appeals, appeal takes an average of four months, with a median time that

26 is slightly shorter”).2 However, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which created the

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2 “Thirteen years after the decision in Demore, the government admitted that the figures it provided to the Court, and

which the Court relied on, contained ‘several significant errors.’” Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-04187-TSH,

1 majority rejecting the facial challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), specifically noted

2 that “a lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized

3 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became

4 unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

5 In the Rodriguez class action, noncitizens “challenge[d] their prolonged detention

6 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a) without individualized bond

7 hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention.” Rodriguez v. Robbins

8 (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). In Rodriguez II, to avoid constitutional

9 concerns, the Ninth Circuit held that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) and § 1225(b) is

10 implicitly time-limited and expires after six months. Thereafter, the government’s authority to

11 detain shifts to § 1226(a), which requires a bond hearing governed by the procedural

12 requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011).3 Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d

13 at 1138–44. In Rodriguez III, the Ninth Circuit held that for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C.

14 §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c), “the government must provide periodic bond hearings every

15 six months so that noncitizens may challenge their continued detention as ‘the period of . . .

16 confinement grows.’” Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Diouf v. Napolitano (Diouf II),

17 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011)).

18 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth

19 Circuit’s interpretation that §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c) included “an implicit 6–month time limit on

20 the length of mandatory detention” and reversed Rodriguez III, holding that the Ninth Circuit

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from the government’s brief in Demore that in cases in which the alien appeals, the time of detention was ‘about five

22 months,’” the government’s 2016 letter clarified that for years 1999–2001, the “length of detention in cases where

the alien appealed [was] 382 days, or a little more than a year.” Id. (citations omitted).

23 [I]n cases in which an appeal was filed, in most years the average length of detention was more

than 300 days, or more than double the five-month estimate the Court relied on in Demore. The

24 data from the Jennings case show that 460 members of the respondent section 1226(c) subclass

were detained for an average of 427 days (over fourteen months) with some individual detention

25 periods exceeding four years. Indeed, when the GAO conducted a study, it found that as of 2015,

the median length of time it takes the BIA to complete an appeal of a removal order exceeds 450

days.

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Rodriguez, 2019 WL 7491555, at *5 (citations omitted).

27 3 In Singh, the Ninth Circuit provided guidance as to the procedural requirements for the bond hearings.

Specifically, “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger

to the community to justify denial of bond.” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208. Due process also requires a contemporaneous

1 misapplied the constitutional avoidance canon to find a statutory right under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)

2 to “periodic bond hearings every six months in which the Attorney General must prove by clear

3 and convincing evidence that the alien’s continued detention is necessary.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at

4 296, 304, 306. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit “to consider [the]

5 constitutional arguments on their merits.” Id. at 312. The Ninth Circuit, in turn, remanded the

6 case to the district court to consider the constitutional arguments in the first instance, but noted

7 that it had “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without

8 any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect

9 against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d

10 252, 255, 256 (9th Cir. 2018).

11 Following Jennings, the Ninth Circuit upheld the “construction of § 1231(a)(6) to require

12 a bond hearing before an IJ after six months of detention for an alien whose release or removal is

13 not imminent” with the government “bear[ing] a clear and convincing burden of proof at such a

14 bond hearing to justify an alien’s continued detention.” Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762,

15 766 (9th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, Garland v. Aleman

16 Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543, 546 (2022), and “[i]n a companion case decided that same day arising

17 from the Third Circuit, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, [596] U.S. [573], 142 S. Ct. 1827, 213

18 L.Ed.2d 125 (2022), the Supreme Court separately rejected [the Ninth Circuit’s] statutory

19 interpretation in Aleman Gonzalez,” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1201 (9th Cir.

20 2022), holding that “there is no plausible construction of the text of § 1231(a)(6) that requires the

21 Government to provide bond hearings before immigration judges after six months of detention,

22 with the Government bearing the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a

23 detained noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community,” Arteaga-Martinez, 596

24 U.S. at 581. Arteaga-Martinez declined to reach the constitutional claims. Id. at 583.

25 “[A]fter the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jennings and Arteaga-Martinez, it remain[ed]

26 undetermined whether the Due Process Clause requires additional bond procedures under any

27 immigration detention statute” until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez Diaz, which

1 hearing before an IJ at which the government would bear the burden of proof by clear and

2 convincing evidence. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1201, 1193. The Ninth Circuit held that “due

3 process does not require the procedures Rodriguez Diaz would have us impose” because

4 “Section 1226(a) offers substantial procedural protections to detained persons, and Rodriguez

5 Diaz has not shown that these procedures violate due process, either facially or as applied.” Id.

6 B. Procedural Due Process

7 The petition asserts a prolonged detention due process claim. (ECF No. 1 at 6–17.) Here,

8 Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B). Although the Ninth

9 Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens

10 detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the First, Second, and Third Circuits have found that “the

11 Due Process Clause imposes some form of ‘reasonableness’ limitation upon the duration of

12 detention . . . under [section 1226(c)].” Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021) (alterations

13 in original) (citation omitted). Accord Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (“conclud[ing] that a noncitizen’s

14 constitutional right to due process precludes his unreasonably prolonged detention under section

15 1226(c) without a bond hearing”); German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d

16 203, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that after Demore and Jennings, petitioners detained

17 pursuant to § 1226(c) can still bring as-applied challenges to their detention and that due process

18 affords them a bond hearing once detention becomes unreasonable). Contra Banyee v. Garland,

19 115 F.4th 928 (8th Cir. 2024). Additionally, “essentially all district courts that have considered

20 the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a

21 bond hearing, ‘will—at some point—violate the right to due process.’” Martinez v. Clark, No.

22 C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019) (citation omitted),

23 report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5962685 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019).

24 Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends finding that unreasonably prolonged

25 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) without an individualized bond hearing violates

26 due process. The Court now turns to whether Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably

27 prolonged such that due process requires a bond hearing.

1 Courts in this circuit have taken various approaches to determining whether procedural

2 due process requires a bond hearing in a particular case. See Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-

3 04187-TSH, 2019 WL 7491555, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (six-month bright-line rule in

4 § 1226(c) context); Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (six-

5 factor test that considers “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future

6 detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the

7 detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood

8 that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal” in § 1225(b) context); Juarez

9 v. Wolf, No. C20-1660-RJB-MLP, 2021 WL 2323436, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2021) (eight-

10 factor test that considers “whether the detention will exceed the time the petitioner spent in

11 prison for the crime that made him [or her] removable” and “the nature of the crimes the

12 petitioner committed” in addition to the six factors set forth above in § 1226(c) context

13 (alteration in original)), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2322823 (W.D. Wash.

14 June 7, 2021); Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5–6 (N.D.

15 Cal. June 14, 2022) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge test to petitioner’s due process claim

16 requesting initial bond hearing in § 1226(c) context).

17 In the petition, Petitioner applies the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), test, or

18 alternatively “the multi-factor reasonableness test the Third Circuit adopted in German Santos v.

19 Warden Pike Correctional Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2020).” (ECF No. 1 at 9.) This

20 Court previously found that “[t]o determine whether § 1226(c) detention has become

21 unreasonable, the Court will look to the total length of detention to date, the likely duration of

22 future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the

23 government.” Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022). Here, there is no

24 information before this Court regarding the likely duration of future detention and the delays in

25 the removal proceedings caused by Petitioner and the government. Accordingly, the Court will

26 apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1193,

27 1206 (“assum[ing] without deciding,” in context of petitioner detained under to 8 U.S.C.

1 “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal proceedings,” and finding

2 “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must account for the heightened governmental

3 interest in the immigration detention context”); id. at 1219 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting) (“agree[ing]

4 that the test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18

5 (1976), is the appropriate legal framework to determine whether there was a due process

6 violation”).

7 [I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires

consideration of three distinct factors. First, the private interest that will be

8 affected by the official action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such

interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional

9 or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,

including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

10 additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.

11 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.

12 1. Private Interest

13 “As a general matter, detention is prolonged when it has lasted six months and is

14 expected to continue more than minimally beyond six months.” Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d

15 1081, 1092 n.13 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, Petitioner has been detained for seven months. It “is

16 beyond dispute” that Petitioner’s interest here is “fundamental.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d

17 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). “Freedom from

18 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at

19 the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. See

20 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (“We have also held, more generally, that an individual’s

21 private interest in ‘freedom from prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably substantial.’” (quoting

22 Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208)). Petitioner “has a legitimate and reasonably strong private liberty

23 interest under Mathews.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207. Accordingly, the Court finds the first

24 Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.

25 2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

26 “Turning to the second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty is

27 high where, as here, ‘[the petitioner] has not received [and will not receive] any bond or custody

1 3638298, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2025) (alterations in original) (quoting A.E. v. Andrews, No.

2 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025)).

3 3. Government Interest

4 “[T]he government clearly has a strong interest in preventing aliens from ‘remain[ing] in

5 the United States in violation of our law.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore,

6 538 U.S. at 518, 515). “These are interests of the highest order that only increase with the

7 passage of time.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208. “The government interest in immigration

8 enforcement in general is surely substantial. But the question here is not the government’s

9 interest in immigration enforcement [in general] but its interest in” detaining Petitioner without

10 providing him with a bond hearing. Zerezghi v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 955

11 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2020). See Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Off., No. 3:19-cv-01358-SB, 2020

12 WL 1862254, at *7 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2020) (The “government interest at stake here is not the

13 continued detention of Petitioner, but the government’s ability to detain him without a bond

14 hearing.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1855189 (D. Or. Apr. 13, 2020);

15 Henriquez, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (“Although the Government has a strong interest in

16 enforcing the immigration laws and in ensuring that lawfully issued removal orders are promptly

17 executed, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without providing an individualized

18 bond hearing is low.”). Accordingly, the Court finds the third Mathews factor weighs in favor of

19 Petitioner.

20 Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends finding that Petitioner’s continued

21 detention has become unreasonable and due process requires that Petitioner be provided a bond

22 hearing.

23 C. Remedy

24 “The Court finds, consistent with other post-Jennings cases, that the appropriate remedy

25 is a bond hearing before an immigration judge[.]” Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 882. See Doe v.

26 Becerra, 697 F. Supp. 3d 937, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (“[C]ourts in this Circuit have regularly

27 found that the IJ is the proper authority to conduct bond hearings and determine a detainee’s risk

1 throughout this circuit have ordered immigration courts to conduct bond hearings for noncitizens

2 held for prolonged periods”))); Mansoor v. Figueroa, No. 3:17-cv-01695-GPC (NLS), 2018 WL

3 840253, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2018) (“The Court finds the IJ is uniquely qualified and

4 situated to make neutral administrative determinations about Petitioner’s eligibility for release on

5 bond and/or placement in a supervised release program[.]”).

6 The Court further finds that “the government must prove by clear and convincing

7 evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond” and

8 that the bond hearing must comport with the other requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d

9 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). See Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2024) (stating

10 that “the BIA properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and

11 convincing evidence that Martinez is a danger to the community” with respect to a bond hearing

12 ordered pursuant to the Due Process Clause). In the event Petitioner is “determined not to be a

13 danger to the community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without

14 bond,” the immigration judge should consider Petitioner’s financial circumstances and

15 alternative conditions of release. Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 1000. See Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (The

16 district court “correctly directed the immigration judge (“IJ”), in setting his bond and

17 establishing appropriate terms for his potential release, to consider his ability to pay and

18 alternative means of assuring appearance.”).

19 III.

20 RECOMMENDATION

21 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

22 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be GRANTED.

23 2. Respondents be ordered to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before

24 an immigration judge that complies with the requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder,

25 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), and where “the government must prove by clear and

26 convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to

27 justify denial of bond,” id. at 1203. In the event Petitioner is “determined not to be a

] without bond,” the immigration judge should consider Petitioner’s financial

2 circumstances and alternative conditions of release. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976,

3 1000 (9th Cir. 2017).

4 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

5 | Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local

6 | Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

7 | FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file

8 | written objections with the Court, limited to fifteen (15) pages in length, including any

9 | exhibits. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

10 | Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days

11 | after service of the objections. The assigned District Judge will then review the Magistrate

12 | Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

13 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order.

14 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d

15 | 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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7 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAA Le

18 | Dated: _May 8, 2026 _ ef

STANLEY A. BOONE

19 United States Magistrate Judge

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