Hodoba

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 ASHANI HODOBA, No. 2:26-cv-1681 DC AC PS

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER and

14 NATHANIEL HODOBA, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMISSIONER ALEXANDER J. PAL,

15 and the SACRAMENTO COUNTY

SUPERIOR COURT,

16

Defendants.

17

18 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was accordingly referred to the

19 undersigned by E.D. Cal. 302(c)(21). Plaintiff filed a request for leave to proceed in forma

20 pauperis (“IFP”), and has submitted the affidavit required by that statute. See 28 U.S.C.

21 § 1915(a)(1). The motion to proceed IFP (ECF No. 3) will therefore be granted.

22 Upon screening the complaint, however, the undersigned finds that this court may not

23 exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims. As leave to amend would be futile, the undersigned

24 recommends dismissal of this action and denial of plaintiff’s pending motion for a temporary

25 restraining order (“TRO”) (ECF No. 2).

26 I. Screening

27 A. Standards

28 The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally

1 “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks

2 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A

3 claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v.

4 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court will

5 (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly

6 baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and

7 (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton

8 Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S.

9 1037 (2011).

10 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint

11 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court

12 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must

13 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a

14 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

15 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable

16 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618,

17 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice

18 to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

19 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

20 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to

21 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has

22 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

23 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

24 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity

25 to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v.

26 Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in

27 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2000)) (en banc).

28 ////

1 B. The Complaint

2 Plaintiff Ashani Hodoba was formerly married to defendant Nathaniel Hodoba

3 (“Nathaniel”), and the two have a seven-year-old son named Lucas. ECF No. 1 at 2. The

4 couple’s divorce is the subject of Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 25FL2038, which

5 is currently pending. Id.

6 The complaint alleges that plaintiff purchased the property at 409 San Miguel Way,

7 Sacramento, CA 95819 (“Property”) with her own funds prior to the marriage, and that the

8 Property is therefore her separate property. Id. Nathaniel has allegedly perjured himself by

9 claiming in the divorce case that he pays the mortgage on the Property, despite mortgage

10 payments being 92 days delinquent as of the filing of this action. Id. at 3. Nathaniel has also

11 refused to consent to a medically necessary surgery for Lucas, thereby delaying it for a year. Id.

12 He also violated every provision of California's Automatic Temporary Restraining Orders

13 (“ATRO”), including by canceling plaintiff’s car insurance the week before plaintiff filed this

14 complaint. Id.

15 The complaint alleges that by refusing to allow plaintiff to submit evidence of Nathaniel’s

16 perjury, “denying meaningful hearings,” and failing to enforce its own orders, defendants have

17 effectively deprived her of the right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.

18 Plaintiff therefore asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks TROs both staying all

19 foreclosure proceedings on the Property and compelling enforcement of the ATROs, for this court

20 to “[r]etain federal jurisdiction” over the divorce case, declaratory relief affirming that defendants

21 violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 3-4.

22 C. Analysis

23 Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971), federal courts must abstain from

24 interfering in most ongoing state court cases. Younger abstention is a narrow exception to the

25 general rule obligating federal courts to decide federal questions that have been presented to

26 them. Cook v. Harding, 879 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2018). “Abstention is not in order simply

27 because a pending state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter.” Sprint

28 Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013). However, certain “exceptional” classes

1 of cases do support—and may even compel—abstention. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v.

2 Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367 (1998). Where abstention is required under

3 Younger, the district court may not exercise its jurisdiction over a case. Beltran v. State of

4 California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1988).

5 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “Younger principles apply in an action for damages

6 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the federal plaintiff brings a constitutional challenge to a

7 state proceeding when that proceeding is ongoing; the state proceeding is of a judicial nature,

8 implicating important state interests; and the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating his

9 federal constitutional issues in that proceeding.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 984 (9th

10 Cir. 2004). In sum, Younger abstention is appropriate if four requirements are met: (1) a state-

11 initiated proceeding remains ongoing at the time the federal case is commenced; (2) the

12 proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state

13 proceedings to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the requested relief either seeks to enjoin or

14 has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial proceeding. See Arevalo v.

15 Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018); Beltran v. State of California, 871 F.2d 777, 782

16 (9th Cir. 1988). All four elements must be satisfied to warrant abstention. See

17 AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007).

18 All four elements are met here. First, it is clear that the relevant state proceedings were

19 pending when this action was initiated. See Kitchens v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir.

20 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988) (critical question is whether state proceedings were

21 ongoing at initiation of the federal proceeding). The complaint asks that this court enforce

22 temporary restraining orders and retain jurisdiction over the family law proceedings as they

23 progress, ECF No. 1 at 4, which demonstrates that those proceedings are ongoing.

24 Second, the state has a powerful interest in family relations. In our federal system of dual

25 sovereigns, domestic and family relations are exclusively governed by state law. See In re

26 Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-594 (1890) (domestic and family relations are governed by state, not

27 federal, law); Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1983) (same). Indeed, “there is

28 perhaps no state administrative scheme in which federal court intrusions are less appropriate than

1 domestic relations law.” Evans v. Hepworth, 433 F.Supp.3d 1171, 1180 (D. Idaho 2020)

2 (quoting DuBroff v. DuBroff, 833 F.2d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 1987)).

3 Third, federal courts must assume that state procedures will afford an adequate

4 opportunity for the consideration of constitutional claims “in the absence of unambiguous

5 authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). The complaint

6 does not establish that plaintiff is without a state forum for presentation of her concerns, including

7 her arguments involving her due process rights. That plaintiff is dissatisfied with particular state

8 court rulings does not mean that the state legal system precludes consideration of her claims.

9 Finally, it is indisputable that the requested relief would interfere with the pending state

10 court proceedings. Indeed, plaintiff expressly seeks such interference. See ECF No. 1 at 4

11 (requesting that the district court enforce ATRO and “retain jurisdiction” over the family law

12 case). This court has no authority to enforce the orders of a state court, or to usurp a state court’s

13 jurisdiction over a state law matter. In sum, the gravamen of the complaint plainly demonstrates

14 the applicability of Younger.

15 Because all four elements are satisfied, Younger abstention applies and the case must be

16 dismissed. See Beltran, 871 F.2d at 782 (“Where Younger abstention is appropriate, a district

17 court cannot refuse to abstain, retain jurisdiction over the action, and render a decision on the

18 merits after the state proceedings have ended. To the contrary, Younger abstention requires

19 dismissal of the federal action.”) (emphasis in original) (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,

20 577 (1973)).

21 II. Leave to Amend is Not Appropriate

22 Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint

23 could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31

24 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, the court may dismiss without leave to amend if it is clear

25 that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06

26 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, because the requirements for Younger abstention are satisfied, dismissal is

27 mandatory. Beltran, 871 F.2d at 782. Because no amendment could avoid that result, leave to

28 amend should not be granted.

1 III. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

2 Plaintiff seeks to stay any foreclosure proceedings by Axos Bank for the Property; enforce

3 California ATROs; compel Nathaniel to pay $17,000 in monthly spousal and child support based

4 on an annual income of $422,362, rather than his purportedly false claim of an annual income of

5 $310,000; award plaintiff temporary sole legal medical custody of their son Lucas; and to have

6 this court assert jurisdiction over the superior court proceedings in the divorce case. ECF No. 2-2

7 at 1-3. Axos Bank is not named as a defendant, and neither the complaint nor the motion

8 indicates that foreclosure proceedings are imminent, both of which preclude a TRO directed to

9 Axos. In any event, the status of the Property is at issue in the divorce case and Younger

10 principles therefore require this court to abstain from involving itself. All other requested forms

11 of injunctive relief are unavailable for the reasons previously explained. Because the undersigned

12 concludes that the case as a whole must be dismissed pursuant to Younger, supra, it is

13 recommended in the interests of judicial economy that this motion be denied as moot.

14 IV. Pro Se Plaintiff’s Summary

15 You are being granted in forma pauperis status and do not have to pay the filing fee.

16 However, the Magistrate Judge is also recommending that the District Judge dismiss this case. A

17 federal lawsuit cannot be used to challenge ongoing state proceedings. A rule known as Younger

18 abstention prevents this court from considering your lawsuit at this time. The Magistrate Judge is

19 therefore also recommending that your request for a temporary restraining order be denied.

20 You have 21 days to object to this recommendation if you wish to do so. The District

21 Judge will make the final decision.

22 V. Conclusion

23 For the reasons explained above, it is HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s request to

24 proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED.

25 It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that:

26 1. The complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED without prejudice;

27 2. Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 2) be DENIED AS

28 MOOT; and

1 3. This case be closed.

2 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

3 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days

4 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections

5 || with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a document

6 || should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure

7 || to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s

8 || order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153,

9 || 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

10 || DATED: May 6, 2026 ~

ththienr—Chnp—e_

ALLISON CLAIRE

12 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28