Chestnut

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 SIMON JOSE MANUEL OSORIO Case No. 1:26-cv-1085 DC CSK

ORTEGA (A-214-330-668),

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Petitioner,

13 ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

v. RECOMMENDATIONS

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CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al.,

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Respondents.

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18 Petitioner Simon Jose Manuel Osorio Ortega (A-214-330-668), a Venezuelan national,

19 filed a verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his

20 ongoing detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).1 (ECF No. 1.)

21 Petitioner argues that detention on the basis of his immigration status violates 8 U.S.C. § 1254a

22 and violates his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. (Id. (claims one and two).) For

23 the following reasons, this Court recommends that the petition be granted.

24 I. LEGAL STANDARD

25 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every

26 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)

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1 Petitioner is proceeding through counsel. This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant

28 to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c)(17).

1 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in

2 custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure

3 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas

4 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the

5 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has

6 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

7 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s

8 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

9 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

10 II. DISCUSSION2

11 On February 8, 2026, petitioner filed his habeas petition, and on February 11, 2026, filed a

12 motion for a temporary restraining order.3 (ECF Nos. 1, 8.) On February 11, 2026, the district

13 court ordered respondents to file an opposition or statement of non-opposition to the motion for a

14 temporary restraining order and to substantively address whether any provision of law or fact in

15 this case would distinguish it from the district court’s decisions in Selis Tinoco v. Noem, et al.,

16 2025 WL 3567862 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2025), Labrador-Prato v. Noem, et al., 2025 WL 3458802

17 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025), and D.L.C. v. Wofford, 2026 WL 25511 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026), or

18 indicate that the matter is not substantively distinguishable. (ECF No. 9.) In addition, as to count

19 one of the petition, respondents were directed to address why petitioner’s detention is not

20 unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4) in light of the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Nat’l TPS

21 All. v. Noem, 2026 WL 226573, at *16-18 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026), which affirmed a district

22 court’s finding that Secretary Noem exceeded her statutory authority by revoking Temporary

23 Protected Status (“TPS”) protections for Venezuelans. (Id.) On February 13, 2026, respondents

24 filed a motion to dismiss the motion for a temporary restraining order and the petition. (ECF No.

25 11.) In the opposition, respondents argued that petitioner was admitted into the United States “as

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2 The factual and procedural background previously presented in the district judge’s February 26,

27 2026 order is incorporated herein. (See ECF No. 13.)

3 On February 10, 2026, this Court granted the application by petitioner’s counsel to proceed pro

28 hac vice. (ECF No. 6.)

1 a non-immigrant B2 tourist visa on or about June 7, 2016,” and thus petitioner is subject to

2 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and would be entitled to a bond hearing. (Id. at 1.) Because petitioner had

3 not requested a bond hearing before an immigration judge, respondents argued that petitioner

4 failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and his petition is premature. (Id. at 1-2.)

5 Respondents also noted that because petitioner is eligible for a bond hearing under § 1226(a),

6 respondents did not believe it was necessary to address petitioner’s temporary protected status.

7 (Id. at 1 n.1.) On February 17, 2026, petitioner filed a traverse and opposition to respondents’

8 motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 12.) Petitioner objected to respondents’ refusal to address the cases

9 cited by the district court, and argued the district court should deny respondents’ motion because

10 they failed to distinguish petitioner’s case from Selis Tinoco, 2025 WL 3567862, and other cited

11 cases, and did not establish why petitioner’s detention is not unlawful under 8 U.S.C.

12 § 1254a(d)(4). (Id. at 4.) Petitioner also argued that prudential exhaustion should not be

13 required. (Id.)

14 On February 26, 2026, the district court granted petitioner’s motion for a temporary

15 restraining order. (ECF No. 13.) The district court first set forth the TPS statutory and regulatory

16 framework, and then determined the status of the legal challenge to Secretary Noem’s actions,

17 finding that Secretary Noem’s vacatur and termination of Venezuela’s TPS has been set aside by

18 the declaratory judgment in National TPS Alliance v. Noem, 2025 WL 3539156 (N.D. Cal. Dec.

19 10, 2025).4 (ECF No. 13 at 4-7.) In light of the grant of declaratory relief and petitioner’s timely

20 re-registration for extension of his TPS pursuant to the 2025 TPS Extension, the district court

21 found that petitioner likely retains his TPS until October 2, 2026, so long as he remains eligible

22 for TPS. (Id. at 7-8.) The district court also found that petitioner was likely to succeed on the

23 merits of his claim that he was arrested and detained in violation of Section 1254a of the TPS

24 statute because “[t]he statute is clear—an individual provided TPS must not be detained based on

25 their immigration status.” (Id. at 8 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4)).) Further, the district court

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4 On April 14, 2026, the government’s motion to stay appellate proceedings was granted.

27 National TPS Alliance v. Noem, No. 26-187 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2026). The parties were directed

to file status reports following decisions in Mullin v. Dahlia Doe, No. 25-1083, and Trump v.

28 Miot, No. 25-1084, both pending before the Supreme Court. (Id.)

1 noted that respondents provided no other basis or justification for detaining petitioner, and found

2 petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that his detention is unlawful. (Id. (citing

3 Gonzalez v. Noem, 2026 WL 332223, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2026); J.G.M.F. v. Wofford, 2026

4 WL 88985, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2026)).) After weighing the remaining Winter factors, the

5 district court granted petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order and ordered his

6 immediate release. (Id. at 9-10.) The district court referred this action to the assigned Magistrate

7 Judge for further proceedings. (Id.)

8 Where the record before the district court has not changed since the district court’s ruling

9 on the motion for a temporary restraining order, this Court recommends that the petition for writ

10 of habeas corpus be granted based on finding that petitioner holds TPS status until at least

11 October 2, 2026, so long as he remains eligible for TPS, and as a result, he is protected under

12 8 U.S.C.§ 1254a(d)(4), which precludes his detention based on his immigration status. See

13 J.G.M.F., 2026 WL 88985, at *1 (“by statute, noncitizens granted TPS shall not be detained by

14 the Attorney General on the basis of the alien’s immigration status in the United States.”)

15 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Because of such protection, petitioner was unlawfully

16 detained, and his petition should be granted on petitioner’s first claim.

17 As to petitioner’s second claim alleging a violation of due process, petitioner contends

18 that because the “TPS statute unequivocally prohibits the detention of persons with valid TPS,”

19 this Court need not address constitutional questions. (ECF No. 1 at 11-12 (citing 8 U.S.C.

20 § 1254a(a)(1)(A), (d)(4).) Respondents did not address petitioner’s due process claim. (ECF No.

21 11.) Because petitioner’s first claim provides the relief requested, the Court need not address

22 petitioner’s constitutional claim (claim two).

23 III. RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

24 In their motion to dismiss, respondents content that because petitioner was admitted to the

25 United States, he is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and would be entitled to a bond hearing. (ECF

26 No. 11 at 1.) Respondents argue that petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

27 before bringing this action because petitioner did not ask for a bond hearing, which he would be

28 entitled to under § 1226(a). (Id.) Petitioner contends that prudential exhaustion should not be

1 required when respondents are statutorily barred from detaining petitioner due to his immigration

2 status. (ECF No. 12 at 4.)

3 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals

4 before filing petitions for habeas corpus.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004).

5 However, “[a]s a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all available

6 judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v. Chavez, 678

7 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Because exhaustion is not required by statute, it is not

8 jurisdictional. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by

9 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995) (citing Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. CHG Int’l, Inc.,

10 811 F.2d 1209, 1223 (9th Cir. 1987)). If a petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the

11 district court, in its discretion, may “determine whether to excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach

12 the merits or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in

13 court.” Id. “Courts may require prudential exhaustion if (1) agency expertise makes agency

14 consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of

15 the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and

16 (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude

17 the need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal

18 citation and quotation marks omitted). However, the court may waive the exhaustion requirement

19 when administrative remedies are inadequate, irreparable injury may occur without immediate

20 judicial relief, or exhaustion otherwise would be futile. Laing, 370 F.3d at 1000-01 (“[D]istrict

21 court’s habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is ordinarily reserved for instances in which

22 no other judicial remedy is available.”).

23 This Court concludes that the prudential exhaustion requirement should be waived.

24 Because respondents were statutorily barred from detaining petitioner due to his immigration

25 status under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1)(A), (d)(4), the prudential exhaustion requirement should be

26 waived.

27 ///

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1 IV. REMEDY

2 As relief, petitioner seeks an order granting the habeas petition, an order enjoining

3 respondents from further detaining petitioner so long as the December 10, 2025 order in Nat’l

4 TPS All., 2025 WL 3539156, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025) remains in effect, a declaratory

5 judgment, and an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. (ECF No. 1 at 15.) Petitioner

6 was released from detention in response to the district court’s order granting the motion for

7 temporary restraining order, and this Court recommends that the habeas petition be granted. This

8 Court finds it appropriate to enjoin respondents from re-detaining petitioner so long as he

9 qualifies for TPS.

10 Because the Court recommends granting habeas relief, the Court declines to recommend

11 that a declaratory judgment be issued.

12 Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs is denied without prejudice to the

13 bringing of a properly noticed and supported motion.

14 V. CONCLUSION

15 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and

16 costs is denied without prejudice.

17 Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

18 1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) be DENIED.

19 2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED.

20 3. Respondents be ENJOINED and RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner so long

21 as petitioner qualifies for Temporary Protected Status under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a. This

22 injunction does not address other circumstances where detention authority is

23 established under different authority than what is presented in this case (e.g., 8 U.S.C.

24 § 1226(c) or 8 U.S.C. § 1231).

25 4. Petitioner’s request for a declaratory judgment be DENIED.

26 5. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment for petitioner and close this case.

27 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

28 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within seven days after

1 | being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with

2 || the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

3 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be

4 || filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that

5 || failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

6 || Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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g Dated: May 1, 2026 7 _-

Spo

9 CHI SOO KIM

10 |] //osor1085.157.2241.imm.gr UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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