Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 BEE SWEET CITRUS GROWERS No. 1:26-cv-02814-KES-SKO

COOPERATIVE, INC.,

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Plaintiff,

13 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

v. DENYING IN PART TEMPORARY

14 RESTRAINING ORDER

VILLA PRODUCE, INC., et.al.,

15 Doc. 5

Defendants.

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18 Plaintiff Bee Sweet Citrus Growers Cooperative, Inc. (“Bee Sweet”) moves ex parte for a

19 temporary restraining order seeking injunctive relief to enjoin defendants Villa Produce, Inc.

20 (“Villa Produce”) and Jesus Villarreal from dissipating, transferring, encumbering, selling,

21 assigning, or otherwise disposing of assets Bee Sweet contends are subject to a statutory trust

22 imposed by Section 5(c) of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930, as amended,

23 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c) (“PACA”).

24 On April 13, 2026, Bee Sweet filed a complaint in this Court, alleging causes of action for

25 (1) Enforcement of United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Reparation Order,

26 pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b), against Villa Produce; and (2) Breach of PACA Statutory Trust,

27 pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c), against Villa Produce and Jesus Villarreal. Doc. 2. On April 20,

28 2026, Bee Sweet filed an ex parte application for temporary restraining order seeking injunctive

1 relief to prevent the dissipation of trust assets in connection with the sale and delivery of

2 perishable agricultural commodities pursuant to PACA, based on defendants’ alleged efforts to

3 close Villa Produce’s business and dissipate PACA trust assets. Doc. 5.

4 The Court finds that the requirements for issuing a temporary restraining order without

5 notice are met. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Plaintiff attempted to contact defendants by telephone

6 on April 17, 2026, and notified defendants on April 20, 2026, by email and first-class mail to

7 defendants’ last known addresses, that they would seek ex parte relief. See Doc. 5-3 at 3. While

8 defendants have not appeared or filed a response, plaintiff has set out specific facts demonstrating

9 that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage may result before defendants can be heard

10 in opposition.

11 I. BACKGROUND

12 Between approximately August 25, 2025, and September 20, 2025, Bee Sweet sold and

13 delivered to defendant Villa Produce, lemons, oranges, and grapefruit. Doc. 5-2 at ¶ 2. The

14 commodities were shipped from the State of California to the State of Texas. Id. Bee Sweet

15 represents that the total amount due and owing for these transactions is $46,393.90, exclusive of

16 interest. Id.; see also Doc. 2 at 10. At the time of the sales, both Bee Sweet and Villa Produce

17 held active PACA licenses. Doc. 5-2 at ¶ 3. Bee Sweet’s invoices to Villa Produce contained the

18 statutory PACA trust language set forth in 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(4). Id. at ¶ 4; Doc. 2 at 12–18. Bee

19 Sweet contends that despite numerous requests and exchanges, defendants failed to make any

20 payment to Bee Sweet for the perishable agricultural commodities as required by PACA. Doc. 5-

21 2 at ¶ 4.

22 On or about January 7, 2026, Bee Sweet filed a complaint with the USDA’s PACA

23 Division. Id. at ¶ 5. On March 10, 2026, the Secretary for the USDA issued a reparation order

24 finding that Villa Produce had violated Section 2 of PACA, 7 U.S.C. § 499b, by failing to make

25 full payment for perishable agricultural commodities and awarded Bee Sweet $46,393.90, plus

26 interest. Id.; see also Doc. 2 at 8–10. The thirty-day period for Villa Produce to appeal the

27 reparation order pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 499g(c) has passed. Doc. 5-2 at ¶ 5. Bee Sweet contends

28 that defendants have not made any payment to Bee Sweet pursuant to the reparation order. Id. at

1 ¶ 6. Bee Sweet represents that it has made multiple attempts to contact defendants by telephone,

2 text, and e-mail, and that defendants have not responded to Bee Sweet’s communications since

3 December 23, 2025. Id. at ¶ 7.

4 Bee Sweet believes that defendants have closed or are in the process of closing the Villa

5 Produce business and that defendants are dissipating, concealing, or transferring assets subject to

6 the PACA statutory trust—or that such dissipation is imminent—without making provision for

7 payment of Bee Sweet’s PACA trust claim. Doc. 5-3 at ¶ 8. On April 15, 2026, counsel for Bee

8 Sweet conducted online searches on three websites for “Villa Produce, Inc.”1 Id. at ¶¶ 5–7. A

9 search performed on the online business directory “chamberofcommerce.com” revealed that Villa

10 Produce’s status was listed as “permanently closed.” Id. at ¶ 5. A license search performed on

11 the USDA’s website through the “ePACA Portal” revealed that Villa Produce’s status was listed

12 as “Terminated–OOB.” Id. at ¶ 6. Bee Sweet asserts that USDA’s definition for that status is

13 “license terminated because customer is out of business.” Id. A business entity search performed

14 on the California Secretary of State’s website revealed that Villa Produce’s status was listed as

15 “FTB Suspended,” which according to Bee Sweet, means that defendant was in poor standing

16 with the California Franchise Tax Board. Id. at ¶ 7. The business entity search also revealed that

17 there was no “Statement of Information” filed for 2026. Id.

18 Bee Sweet contends that the foregoing strongly suggests that defendants are closing Villa

19 Produce and dissipating its assets. Id. at ¶ 10.

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1 In connection with its ex parte application for temporary restraining order, Bee Sweet requests

21 that the Court take judicial notice of the second and third of these search results, from the

USDA’s website and the California Secretary of State’s website, respectively. Doc. 5-4. Under

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Federal Rule of Evidence 201, “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to

23 reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial

jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

24 reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). “Public records maintained on government

websites are generally subject to judicial notice.” Johnson v. DTBA, LLC, 424 F. Supp. 3d 657,

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662 (N.D. Cal. 2019). Here, the Court finds that the accuracy of the results of the searches

performed can be determined by readily accessible resources whose accuracy cannot reasonably

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be questioned. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice of the search results (Doc. 5-4 at 4, 6–

27 9), see L'Garde, Inc. v. Raytheon Space & Airborne Sys., 805 F. Supp. 2d 932, 938 (C.D. Cal.

2011) (taking judicial notice of “the results of records searches from the Secretary of State for the

28 State of California corporate search website.”).

1 II. LEGAL STANDARD

2 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are

3 “substantially identical.” See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Bush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839

4 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of

5 right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553

6 U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008)). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is

7 likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

8 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the

9 public interest.” Id. at 20 (citing Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689–90; Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of

10 Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12

11 (1982)). “Likelihood of success on the merits is a threshold inquiry and is the most important

12 factor.” Simon v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 135 F.4th 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting

13 Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Carlson, 968 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2020)). “[I]f a plaintiff can only

14 show that there are serious questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of

15 success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships

16 tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Friends of the

17 Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations

18 omitted).

19 III. ANALYSIS

20 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

21 1. Reparation Order Enforcement Claim

22 Bee Sweet’s first claim is for the enforcement of a reparation award issued by the USDA

23 against Villa Produce. Under PACA, an individual may file suit in federal court for the

24 enforcement of a reparation award issued by the USDA. 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b). Any findings or

25 orders of the Secretary of Agriculture in a reparation award are “prima-facie evidence of the facts

26 therein stated.” Id.

27 On March 10, 2026, Bee Sweet obtained a favorable default order from the Secretary of

28 Agriculture. Doc. 2 at 8–10. The Secretary adopted the facts alleged in Bee Sweet’s formal

1 complaint and found that Villa Produce violated 7 U.S.C. § 499b.2 Id. The default order provides

2 the following disposition:

3 Within 30 days from the date of this Order, [Villa Produce] shall pay

[Bee Sweet] as reparation $46,393.90 with interest at the rate of 18%

4 per annum from October 1, 2025, until the date of this Order, plus

interest at the rate of 3.56 % per annum on the amount of $46,393.90

5 from the date of this Order, until paid, plus the amount of $500.00.

6 Id. at 10. Bee Sweet alleges that Villa Produce has failed to pay any portion of the reparation

7 award or to appeal the default order within the time permitted. Doc. 2 at ¶ 9.

8 On this record, Bee Sweet is likely to succeed on its reparation order enforcement claim.

9 2. Breach of PACA Statutory Trust Claim

10 Bee Sweet’s second claim is brought against Villa Produce and Jesus Villarreal to enforce

11 payment under PACA’s trust provisions, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c).

12 Under PACA’s trust provisions, “perishable commodities or proceeds from the sale of

13 those commodities are held in trust by the dealer for the benefit of the unpaid seller until full

14 payment is made.” Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Fisher, 104 F.3d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 7

15 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(2)). “If [an] unpaid person has a PACA license, the licensee [] can preserve its

16 status as a beneficiary of the trust by including specific language in the bill or invoice

17 statement.”3 Rodriguez v. Old W. Exp., Inc., 711 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1186 (E.D. Cal. 2024) (citing

18 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(4)). District courts have jurisdiction to entertain actions by trust beneficiaries

19 to enforce payment from the trust. 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(5).

20 To recover the proceeds from a PACA trust, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) the

21 commodities sold were perishable agricultural commodities; (2) the purchaser of the perishable

22 agricultural commodities was a commission merchant, dealer or broker; (3) the transaction

23 occurred in interstate or foreign commerce; (4) the seller has not received full payment on the

24 transaction; and (5) the seller preserved its trust rights” in compliance with 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c).

25 2 The administrative complaint before the Secretary is not attached to the pleadings in this action,

and it is not clear which specific factual findings would be entitled to 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b)’s prima

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facia evidentiary benefit.

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3 “The bill or invoice statement must [also] include the information required by the last sentence

28 of [7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)](3)”: that is, the terms of payment. 7 U.S.C. §§ 499e(c)(3), (4).

1 Corona Fruits & Veggies, Inc. v. MLC Berries, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-02525-SB-JPR, 2020 WL

2 9422353, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2020); see also Produce Pay, Inc. v. Izguerra Produce, Inc.,

3 39 F.4th 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2022) (elements of a PACA claim).

4 Bee Sweet—whose principal place of business is in California—has attached to its

5 complaint, and describes in sworn declarations submitted with its ex parte application, invoices

6 documenting its sale of lemons, oranges, and grapefruit to Villa Produce.4 Docs. 2 at 12–18; 5-3

7 at ¶¶ 2, 4. All invoices other than No. 25D37568-A (which lists a shipping address in California)

8 list shipping addresses in Texas. Doc. 2 at 12–18. Each invoice contains the language specified

9 in 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(4).5 Id. Bee Sweet alleges that “Villa Produce, Inc. was a ‘commission

10 merchant,’ ‘dealer,’ or ‘broker’ as those terms are defined in 7 U.S.C. § 499a(b) and was subject

11 to and licensed under the provisions of” PACA. Doc. 2 at ¶ 11. Bee Sweet also alleges that it has

12 not received any payment from defendants despite the Secretary of Agriculture’s finding that

13 Villa Produce violated 7 U.S.C. § 499b.6 Doc. 5-2 at ¶¶ 5, 6.

14 On this record, Bee Sweet is likely to succeed on its breach of PACA statutory trust claim

15 against Villa Produce. But, on the present record, Bee Sweet has not shown a likelihood of

16 success with respect to its claim that defendant Jesus Villarreal is liable in his personal capacity.

17 The Ninth Circuit has held that “individual shareholders, officers, or directors of a corporation

18 who are in a position to control PACA trust assets, and who breach their fiduciary duty to

19 preserve those assets, may be held personally liable under” PACA. Sunkist, 104 F.3d 280, 283

20 (9th Cir. 1997). Bee Sweet, relying on Grimmway Enters., Inc. v. PIC Fresh Glob., Inc., 548 F.

21 Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Cal. 2008), contends that Villarreal is personally liable based on his ability to

22 control the trust assets as the sole owner, principal, and shareholder of Villa Produce. But the

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24 4 “Fresh fruits” are a “perishable agricultural commodity.” 7 U.S.C. § 499a(b)(4).

25 5 Each invoice also appears to provide as terms of payment “NET 10 DAYS.” Doc. 2 at 12–18.

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6 7 U.S.C. § 499b(4) prevents any commission merchant, dealer, or broker “from failing to pay in

27 full promptly for any produce they receive in interstate commerce.” Produce Pay, Inc. v.

Izguerra Produce, Inc., 39 F.4th 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2022); see also 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b)(findings

28 and orders of Secretary are prima-facie evidence).

1 decision in Grimmway was based on a summary judgment record, with declarations detailing the

2 individual defendant’s “active involvement” in the operation of the business, and where the

3 individual defendant admitted that the purchasing entity “failed to maintain sufficient trust assets

4 to fully satisfy all qualified PACA trust claims.” Grimmway Enters., Inc. v. PIC Fresh Glob.,

5 Inc., 548 F. Supp. 2d 840, 848–50. (E.D. Cal. 2008). The declarations Bee Sweet provides in

6 connection with its ex parte application do not clearly identify a breach of fiduciary duty by

7 Villarreal. Bee Sweet’s other allegations are made on information and belief or do not have the

8 type of evidentiary support found in Grimmway.

9 For these reasons, Bee Sweet has not established a likelihood of success on its PACA

10 statutory trust claim to the extent it seeks to hold Villarreal liable in his personal capacity.

11 B. Irreparable Harm

12 The prospect of Bee Sweet’s statutory trust assets being depleted by Villa Produce

13 constitutes irreparable harm. Laury v. LoBue, No. 120CV01463DADSKO, 2021 WL 168317, at

14 *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2021) (“District courts in the Ninth Circuit have regularly found TROs

15 warranted in the PACA context, and routinely conclude that the prospect of statutory trust assets

16 being depleted constitutes irreparable injury.”).

17 C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest

18 As to the request for relief against Villa Produce, the balance of equities favors Bee Sweet

19 and the requested injunctive relief is in the public interest. Enjoining Villa Produce from

20 dissipating trust assets merely requires it to comply with the statutory duties PACA imposes.

21 Chula Brand CA, Corp. v. Martinez, No. 17CV37-JLS (KSC), 2017 WL 107672, at *3 (S.D. Cal.

22 Jan. 11, 2017); Tanimura & Antle, Inc. v. Packed Fresh Produce, Inc., 222 F.3d 132, 140 (3d Cir.

23 2000). In addition, PACA makes clear that it was enacted to safeguard the public interest and to

24 address the burden on commerce created by a buyer that does not pay for produce. 7 U.S.C.

25 § 499e(c)(1)(“This subsection is intended to remedy such burden on commerce in perishable

26 agricultural commodities and to protect the public interest.”).

27 IV. CONCLUSION

28 The Court finds that the requirements for issuing an ex parte temporary restraining order

1 are met as to Villa Produce. Bee Sweet’s ex parte application for temporary restraining order,

2 Doc. 5, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The application is denied without

3 prejudice to the extent it seeks injunctive relief to freeze assets or accounts held in a personal

4 capacity by Jesus Villarreal. The application is otherwise granted.

5 Villa Produce, Jesus Villarreal in his official capacity as an officer and/or shareholder of

6 Villa Produce, and Villa Produce’s officers, directors, shareholders, employees, agents, bankers,

7 subsidiaries, successors, assignees, principals, attorneys, and persons acting in concert with them

8 shall be and hereby are restrained and prevented from transferring, withdrawing or in any other

9 manner removing trust assets held pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 499e et seq., and all funds in banking

10 accounts held by or on behalf of Villa Produce.

11 The Court orders that, pending the hearing and determination of the motion for

12 preliminary injunction, Villa Produce, Jesus Villarreal in his official capacity as an officer and/or

13 shareholder of Villa Produce, and Villa Produce’s owners, officers, directors, shareholders,

14 employees, agents, bankers, subsidiaries, successors, assignees, principals, assignors, attorneys,

15 and persons acting in concert with them, shall be restrained and prevented from engaging in,

16 committing, or performing directly and indirectly all of the following acts:

17 1. Removing, withdrawing, transferring, or assigning to any other person or entity, the

18 proceeds from the sales of any or all prior, existing, or future inventories of food or other

19 business products, and otherwise disposing of assets, accounts, books, or funds belonging

20 to Villa Produce;

21 2. Taking any other action whatsoever which causes, has the effect of causing, or which

22 otherwise dissipates Bee Sweet’s beneficiary interest in funds or assets held by or on

23 behalf of Villa Produce.

24 Defendants are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE before this Court why a preliminary

25 injunction should not issue pending a final disposition of this matter. The hearing on the order to

26 show cause will be held on May 8, 2026, at 11:30 a.m. in Courtroom 6.7 Defendants shall file

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7 Counsel requesting to appear at the hearing by video appearance shall contact the courtroom

28 deputy at least 24 hours prior to the hearing.

1 | any opposition to the issuance of a preliminary injunction by April 30, 2026. Bee Sweet may file

2 | areply by May 5, 2026. The parties may stipulate to extend the briefing schedule and hearing

3 | date, provided that this temporary restraining order will remain in effect pending any such

4 | continuance. Bee Sweet’s counsel is ordered to serve a copy of this order promptly on defendants

5 | and to file a proof of service on the docket by April 27, 2026.

6 The PACA trust assets subject to Bee Sweet’s claims serve as sufficient security for this

7 | temporary restraining order pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c).

8 Defendants may apply to the Court for modification or dissolution of this Order on two (2)

9 | days’ notice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).

10 The hearing noticed for April 29, 2026 is vacated.

11 Dated and signed: April 24, 2026, at 4:15 p.m.

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13 | IT ISSO ORDERED. _

14 Dated: _ April 24, 2026 | |

15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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