Chestnut

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 KEVIN ROBERTO CARRANZA Case No. 2:26-cv-0570-DJC-JDP

GARCIA (A-Number: 241-102-107),

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Petitioner,

13 ORDER; FINDINGS AND

v. RECOMMENDATIONS

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CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT,

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Respondent.

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17 Petitioner Kevin Roberto Carranza Garcia entered the United States in 2022 and was

18 detained by ICE in 2026. Petitioner, proceeding through counsel, filed an amended petition for

19 writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the following reasons, I recommend that the

20 amended petition be granted and that petitioner be immediately released.

21 Background

22 Petitioner entered the United States on September 8, 2022. ECF No. 12-1 at 2. Petitioner

23 alleges that he “remember[s] being detained for a brief period at the border” but that he does not

24 “recall receiving a Notice of Appearance or being granted parole with a Form I-94.” ECF No. 11-

25 2 ¶ 2. While respondent also references petitioner’s “prior release in the discretion of the

26 government,” there is no evidence establishing that petitioner was previously detained by

27 immigration officers. See ECF No. 12 at 2. Petitioner’s Form I-213 shows that petitioner entered

28 at “an unknown location,” which suggests that immigration officers did not encounter petitioner

1 after his entry; otherwise, his Form I-213 would presumably state that he entered near where he

2 was encountered. See ECF No. 11-2 at 2. Notably, also in the form’s “Immigration History”

3 section, there is no mention of any encounter or detention after petitioner entered the United

4 States. See id. There is no other official documentation, such as a Notice to Appear, that

5 supports petitioner’s allegation that he has previously been detained by immigration officers.

6 Accordingly, I find that, prior to his current detention, petitioner has not been detained by

7 immigration officers.

8 According to the government, petitioner does not have “any previous or current criminal/

9 civil encounters with any law enforcement.” ECF No. 12-1 at 3. Petitioner also has not filed any

10 applications, such as to pursue asylum, with the United States Citizenship and Immigration

11 Services. Id. at 2.

12 On January 19, 2026, petitioner was detained by ICE on Long Island in New York. Id.

13 There is no allegation or evidence that petitioner has received a bond hearing; on the contrary, the

14 government asserts that “petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and thus ineligible for a

15 bond hearing.” See ECF No. 12 at 2.

16 Procedural History

17 On February 24, 2026, petitioner, initially proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of

18 habeas corpus.1 ECF No. 1. On March 18, 2026, I dismissed the petition with leave to amend

19 because the majority of the petition was in Spanish; I also determined that the interests of justice

20 required the appointment of counsel. ECF No. 8. On March 31, 2026, petitioner, now

21 proceeding through counsel, filed an amended petition. ECF No. 11. On April 7, 2026,

22 respondent filed an answer to the amended petition. ECF No. 12. The matter is deemed

23 submitted.2 See ECF No. 8 at 2.

24 Legal Standard

25 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates

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1 That same day, the court referred the matter to me for further proceedings. ECF No. 4.

27 2 Petitioner also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 10. Because

petitioner has made the requisite showing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the motion at ECF No. 10

28 will be granted.

1 federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75

2 (2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of

3 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”

4 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a

5 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.

6 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of

7 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have

8 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction

9 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

10 Analysis

11 Petitioner claims that his detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act because,

12 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), he is entitled to a bond hearing—which he has been denied. ECF No.

13 11 ¶¶ 48-52. Respondent counters that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8

14 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). ECF No. 12 at 2. I address this claim below.3

15 Under section 1225(b)(2)(A), applicants “seeking admission” to the United States are

16 subject to mandatory detention: “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the

17 examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and

18 beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained . . . .” 8 U.S.C.

19 § 1225(b)(2)(A). Critically, no bond hearing is provided for a noncitizen detained under this

20 section. Id. By contrast, “[u]nder § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, a detainee may

21 request a bond hearing before an [immigration judge] at any time before a removal order becomes

22 final.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022).

23 For decades, the government applied section 1226(a)—and not section 1225(b)(2)(A)—to

24 noncitizens apprehended in the interior of the United States. See id. at 1196 (“The provision at

25 3 Because the petition should be granted on the basis of petitioner’s statutory claim alone,

I do not address his other claims alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment and the

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Administrative Procedure Act. See ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 38-47, 53-59. It bears mention, however, that

27 his Fifth Amendment claim would be unsuccessful because the evidence does not establish that

petitioner was previously released from detention on his own recognizance such that he had a

28 protected liberty interest in his release when he was detained in January 2026.

1 issue in this case, 8 U.S.C. § 1226, provides the general process for arresting and detaining aliens

2 who are present in the United States and eligible for removal.”). In July 2025, however, the

3 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) revisited its legal position and now maintains that all

4 applicants for admission within the meaning of section 1226(a) are subject to mandatory

5 detention under section 1225(b)(2)(A). See ECF No. 12 at 2. Respondent urges the court to

6 follow suit and find that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention. Id.

7 This issue is one of statutory interpretation, and so I begin with the plain text of the

8 Immigration and Nationality Act. See United States v. Lillard, 935 F.3d 827, 833-34 (9th Cir.

9 2019). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for

10 admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not

11 clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained.” 8 U.S.C.

12 § 1225(b)(2)(A). There is only one exception to mandatory detention: a noncitizen may be

13 paroled into the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit”

14 under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018).

15 While the text of section 1225(b)(2)(A) limits its reach to applicants “seeking admission,”

16 section 1226(a) does not include the same qualifying language. Section 1226(a) provides that, for

17 a noncitizen who is arrested and detained “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General,” the

18 Attorney General (1) “may continue to detain” the arrested noncitizen, (2) “may release” the

19 noncitizen on “bond,” or (3) “may release” the noncitizen on “conditional parole.”4 8 U.S.C.

20 §§ 1226(a)(1)-(2).

21 The government urges the court to read section 1225(b)(2)(A) as using the terms

22 “applicant for admission” and “seeking admission” interchangeably. See ECF No. 12 at 2.

23 According to the government, all noncitizens who have not been admitted to the United States—

24 i.e., “applicants for admission”—are necessarily “seeking admission” for purposes of section

25 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. Thus, the government contends, section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens

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27 4 Section 1226(c) mandates detention of noncitizens falling into “one of several

enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and terrorist activities.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at

28 289. There is no argument or evidence suggesting that this section applies to petitioner.

1 who are “applicants for admission.” Id.

2 I find that the government’s interpretation violates the rule against surplusage in three

3 ways. First, for section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention to apply, “a noncitizen must (1) be

4 an applicant for admission, (2) be ‘seeking admission’, and (3) be ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt

5 entitled to be admitted.’” J.S.H.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01309-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 2938808,

6 *11 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025). If, as the government argues, all “applicants for admissions” were

7 also individuals “seeking admission,” the phrase “seeking admission” would be unnecessary. The

8 government’s reading, therefore, runs contrary to the rule against surplusage. See United States,

9 ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023) (“[E]very clause and word

10 of a statute should have meaning.”); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“[N]o clause,

11 sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”).

12 Second, the government’s reading cannot be squared with the text of section 1226. Were

13 it possible to interpret section 1225(b)(2)(A) in the manner favored by the government, section

14 1226(a)’s requirement that noncitizens be afforded bond hearings—arguably the section’s

15 centerpiece—would serve no purpose because the government would be allowed to detain all

16 “applicants for admission” under section 1225(b)(2)(A). Further, as noted, under section 1226(c),

17 Congress mandated the detention of certain categories of noncitizens. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). If, as

18 the government now contends, section 1225(b)(2)(A) can be applied to all noncitizens who are

19 inadmissible, section 1226(c) would also be superfluous.

20 Third, the Laken Riley Act (“LRA”)—passed in January 2025—would also be rendered

21 superfluous. The LRA amended section 1226(c) to add new categories of mandatory detention.

22 See Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3,

23 2025). Under the government’s theory of section 1225(b)(2)(A), the LRA would be unnecessary;

24 if mandatory detention for all unauthorized noncitizens were already permitted—and, in fact,

25 required—by section 1225(b)(2)(A), the amendment would be surplusage. “When Congress acts

26 to amend a statute, [courts] presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”

27 Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995).

28 Respondent’s theory, essentially, is that both sections 1226(a) and 1226(c) have been

1 taken out of commission, not by any new law or act of Congress, but by a shift in executive

2 branch policy. This interpretation collides squarely with the rule against surplusage. See Marx v.

3 Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013) (“[T]he canon against surplusage is strongest

4 when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.”).

5 I also find that the government’s interpretation runs contrary to the DHS’s longstanding

6 practice prior to July 2025. As noted, the government previously interpreted these provisions in

7 the manner argued by petitioner. Prior agency practice, though not dispositive, may inform this

8 court’s determination of law. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024)

9 (“[T]he longstanding practice of the government—like any other interpretive aid—can inform a

10 court’s determination of what the law is.”). Other courts have emphasized the persuasive value of

11 the DHS’s “longstanding agency practice.” See Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239,

12 1259 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“Congress enacted the LRA against the backdrop of longstanding

13 agency practice applying Section 1226(a) to inadmissible noncitizens already residing in the

14 country.”).

15 Finally, I note that arguments substantially similar to those made by the government here

16 have been rejected by a large majority of district courts nationwide. See, e.g., Lepe v. Andrews,

17 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (collecting cases). The government’s argument also

18 runs contrary to Jennings, which held that section 1225(b) “applies primarily to aliens seeking

19 entry into the United States,” whereas sections 1226(a) and (c) “authorize[] the Government to

20 detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings . . . .”

21 583 U.S. at 289, 297. While the government’s interpretation was endorsed by the Board of

22 Immigration Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the persuasive

23 power of an agency ruling is limited. See Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 400.

24 Accordingly, because petitioner was detained in the interior of the United States, I find

25 that his detention is governed by section 1226(a) and not, as respondent argues, by section

26 1225(b). Given this finding, I must determine whether the appropriate relief is release or a bond

27 hearing. Petitioner requests immediate release. ECF No. 11 at 15. Respondent does not address

28 this issue. See ECF No. 12.

1 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[h]abeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful

2 executive detention” and the “typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” Munaf v.

3 Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008); see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.

4 103, 107 (2020) (“Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful

5 detention.”). Moreover, where the government has erroneously applied section 1225(b) to a

6 petitioner, courts have ordered immediate release. See, e.g., Morillo v. Albarran, No. 1:25-cv-

7 1533-DJC-AC, 2025 WL 3190899, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2025). In Feng v. Lyons, the court

8 held that a delay “in providing the statutorily mandated bond hearing violates [a petitioner’s] due

9 process rights” and found that the “[p]rovision of a bond hearing after months of detention

10 without the opportunity to seek release on bond cannot be said to satisfy due process where that

11 bond hearing is a matter of statutory right.” No. 1:26-cv-0235-DJC-SCR, 2026 WL 472635, at *1

12 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2026) (citations omitted).

13 Here, I find that the “typical remedy” of release is appropriate because the government has

14 not provided a lawful justification for petitioner’s detention and has deprived him of his statutory

15 right to a bond hearing. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693. As such, petitioner’s due process rights

16 have been violated such that the provision of a bond hearing is a constitutionally insufficient

17 remedy. See Feng, 2026 WL 472635, at *1. Moreover, the evidence shows that petitioner has no

18 criminal history, and respondent does not argue that petitioner is a danger to the community or a

19 flight risk. See ECF No. 12-1 at 3; ECF No. 12.

20 Conclusion

21 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma

22 pauperis, ECF No. 10, is GRANTED.

23 Further, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

24 1. The first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 11, be GRANTED.

25 2. Respondent be ordered to immediately release petitioner (A-Number: 241-102-107)

26 from their custody. Respondent shall not impose any additional restrictions on petitioner, unless

27 that is determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing. If the government

28 seeks to re-detain petitioner, it must provide no less than seven days’ notice to petitioner and must

1 | hold a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter pursuant to section 1226(a) and its

2 | implementing regulations, at which petitioner’s eligibility for bond must be considered. This

3 | Order does not address the circumstances in which respondent may detain petitioner in the event

4 || petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal.

5 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to serve California City Detention Facility with a copy

6 || of this Order.

7 4. The Clerk of Court be further directed to enter judgment accordingly and close this

8 || case.

9 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

10 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days of

11 || service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the

12 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to

13 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed

14 | within seven days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

15 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See

16 || Turner vy. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

17 | 1991).

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19 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ April 20, 2026 Q_——_

21 JEREMY D. PETERSON

59 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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