The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 IMAN SOLANTI BOZCHALOOI, et al., No. 2:25-cv-02983-DJC-SCR
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Plaintiffs,
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v. ORDER
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
15 STATE, et al.,
16 Defendants.
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18 Defendants move for dismissal or, in the alternative, summary judgment on
19 Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendants have unreasonably delayed adjudication of Plaintiffs’
20 immigrant visa application. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are unreviewable
21 because the application was already reviewed and refused by a consular officer under
22 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g), which was a final adjudication, and judicial review of final consular
23 decisions is precluded under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. Defendants
24 also argue that, even if the refusal was not a final decision, it has only been slightly
25 over a year since the visa application was refused, which does not constitute an
26 unreasonable delay.
27 The Court finds that there has been no unreasonable delay in adjudicating
28 Plaintiffs’ visa application. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion.
1 BACKGROUND
2 Plaintiff Iman Solanti Bozchalooi is a United States citizen. (Compl. (ECF No. 1)
3 ¶ 4.) Plaintiff Mahvash Oskoui is a national and resident of Iran. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff
4 Oskoui is Plaintiff Bozchalooi’s biological mother. (Id. ¶ 4.)
5 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), consular officers may issue
6 immigrant and nonimmigrant visas to foreign nationals who are eligible for those visas
7 and who are admissible to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1201. One of the
8 methods by which foreign nationals may immigrate to the U.S. is via their familial
9 relationship with a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. This includes issuance of
10 visas to applicants who are sponsored by U.S. citizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)–(4).
11 A family-based immigrant visa application is initiated when a U.S. citizen or
12 legal permanent resident files a Form I-130 with United States Citizenship and
13 Immigration Services (“USCIS”). See 8 U.S.C. § 1154. USCIS verifies that the petitioner
14 is a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident and that a qualifying relationship exists
15 between the petitioner and the beneficiary. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). Upon a Form I-
16 130 approval, if the beneficiary of the immigrant visa petition is residing outside of the
17 U.S., the petition is then sent to the National Visa Center (“NVC”) for pre-processing,
18 and the beneficiary is able to begin the process of formally applying for an immigrant
19 visa by submitting a Form DS-260.
20 After completing the Form DS-260, and submitting fees, forms, and supporting
21 documentation to the NVC for review, the application is then sent to the U.S. Embassy
22 having jurisdiction over the noncitizen’s place of residence for an interview. At the
23 end of a beneficiary’s immigrant visa interview at the U.S. Embassy or Consulate, the
24 consular officer informs the applicant whether their visa application is approved or
25 denied. The consular officer “must issue the visa, refuse the visa under INA 212(a) or
26 221(g) or other applicable law, . . . or discontinue granting the visa.” 22 C.F.R. §
27 42.81(a)).
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1 On September 15, 2022, Plaintiff Bozchalooi filed a petition on behalf of his
2 mother, Plaintiff Oskoui. (Compl. ¶ 28.) The petition was approved on August 7,
3 2023, and forwarded to the NVC for processing. (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff Oskoui submitted
4 her completed DS-260 on October 7, 2023. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff Oskoui attended her
5 interview on March 24, 2025. (Id. ¶ 32.) At the conclusion of the interview, Plaintiff
6 Oskoui’s application was refused by the consular officer under section 221(g) of the
7 INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). (Id. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff’s application was placed in administrative
8 processing “without further explanation” by the consular officer. (Id.) To the Court’s
9 knowledge, Plaintiff Oskoui’s application still remains in administrative processing at
10 the time of this Order.
11 Plaintiffs brought the present action based on the above. Plaintiffs don’t
12 specifically state the causes of action within the Complaint, but identify the
13 Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), mandamus, and due process within the
14 Complaint. (See Compl. ¶¶ 40, 50, 56–57.) Subsequent briefing makes clear that
15 both parties understand Plaintiffs’ Complaint as bringing claims under the APA,
16 Mandamus Act, and due process clause.1 (See Mot. (ECF No. 8) at 6; Opp’n (ECF No.
17 13) at 5.) Briefing on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary
18 Judgment is complete. (See Mot.; Opp’n; Reply (ECF No. 14).) This matter was
19 submitted without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g).
20 LEGAL STANDARD
21 I. Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
22 A party may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which
23 relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the
24 complaint lacks a “cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable
25 legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir.
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1 Defendants correctly note that “[t]he complaint does not include any counts,” (Mot. at 6), but
27 otherwise correctly identify the nature of Plaintiffs’ claims. In their Opposition, Plaintiffs identify their
claims as arising from the APA and Mandamus Act, not the due process clause. (See Opp’n at 5.) To
28 the extent Plaintiffs raise a due process clause claim, that is addressed below.
1 2008). The court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the
2 light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Steinle v. City & County of San
3 Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019). However, if the complaint's
4 allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief” the motion must be
5 granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
6 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim
7 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed
8 factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However,
9 this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must
10 make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory
11 or formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. “A claim has facial
12 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
13 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
14 II. Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
15 Summary judgment may be granted when the evidence shows that there is no
16 genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
17 a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The “threshold inquiry” is whether there are any
18 factual issues that could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party, or conversely,
19 whether the facts are so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.
20 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). “Only disputes over facts
21 that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
22 preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248.
23 In a summary judgment motion, the moving party must inform the court of the
24 basis for the motion and identify the portion of the record that they believe
25 demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
26 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then
27 shifts to the opposing party, who must establish that there is a genuine issue of
28 material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585
1 (1986). Summary judgment is mandated where the nonmoving party fails to set forth
2 “specific facts showing that there remains a genuine factual issue for trial” and
3 evidence “significantly probative as to any [material] fact claimed to be disputed.”
4 Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks
5 omitted). If the evidence presented by the nonmoving party is “merely colorable, . . .
6 or is not sufficiently probative, . . . summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson,
7 477 U.S. at 249–50 (internal citations omitted).
8 DISCUSSION
9 I. Plaintiffs’ APA Claim
10 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have unreasonably delayed final adjudication
11 of Plaintiff Oskoui’s application in violation of APA § 555(b). (Compl. ¶ 40 (citing 5
12 U.S.C. § 555(b)).) Section 706(1) of the APA allows the Court to “compel agency
13 action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” while section 706(2) allows the
14 Court to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions.” 5
15 U.S.C. §§ 706(1)–(2). Because “[a] challenge to an agency’s alleged failure to act is
16 more appropriately channeled through Section 706(1),” the Court will evaluate
17 Plaintiffs’ claims under APA § 706(1). Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, 327 F. Supp. 3d
18 1284, 1309 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted). To succeed on an APA unreasonable
19 delay claim, Plaintiffs must show that: (1) the agency has a nondiscretionary duty to
20 act; and (2) the agency has unreasonably delayed acting on that duty. Norton v. S.
21 Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 62–64 (2004).
22 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not identified a non-discretionary duty to
23 adjudicate Plaintiff Oskoui’s visa application and that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred
24 under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability because the refusal of Plaintiff
25 Oskoui’s application was a final decision. Defendants also argue that even if Plaintiffs’
26 claims are not barred, Plaintiffs failed to state a claim based upon unreasonable delay.
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1 A. Defendants have a Non-Discretionary Duty to Adjudicate Plaintiff’s Visa
2 Application
3 Section 706(1) “grants judicial review only if a federal agency has a ‘ministerial
4 or non-discretionary’ duty amounting to a ‘specific, unequivocal command.’” Anglers
5 Conservation Network v. Pritzker, 809 F.3d 664, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Norton,
6 542 U.S. at 63–64). Plaintiffs argue Defendants have a non-discretionary duty to
7 adjudicate Plaintiff Oskoui’s visa application within a reasonable time under section
8 555(b). (See Opp’n at 8–9.)
9 Section 555(b) of the APA creates a non-discretionary duty to render a final
10 adjudication in a visa application. See Mobayen v. Blinken, 780 F. Supp. 3d 969, 981
11 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (collecting cases); see also Ali v. Ordeman, No. 2:23-cv-02822-CKD,
12 2024 WL 2274912, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2024); Khan v. Blinken, No. 2:23-cv-02814-
13 CKD, 2024 WL 3446432, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2024). Defendants argue that Plaintiff
14 has failed to identify a violation of section 555(b) because the consular officer’s refusal
15 under INA section 221(g) satisfies the final adjudication requirement of section 555(b).
16 (Mot. at 9–10.) Defendants acknowledge that “many district courts have found a
17 refusal under INA 221(g)/ 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) for administrative processing and security
18 screening is not a final refusal[.]” (Reply at 2 (citations omitted).) But Defendants
19 nevertheless argue that these cases were wrongly decided and that section 555(b)
20 does not create a non-discretionary duty.
21 The Court joins with other district courts in finding that section 555(b) imposes
22 a non-discretionary duty on Defendants to adjudicate Plaintiff Oskoui’s visa
23 application within a reasonable time. The Court further joins other district courts in
24 finding this duty is not satisfied by the refusal of a visa application under INA section
25 221(g) for administrative processing. Defendants argue that the regulations provided
26 by 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a) establish that a refusal under section 221(g) is a final decision.
27 But this ignores that subsection (c) prescribes a required process for further action to
28 be taken by the consular officer to review the refusal and issue a final decision. See 22
1 C.F.R. § 42.81(c) (“If the grounds of ineligibility upon which the visa was refused
2 cannot be overcome by the presentation of additional evidence, the principal
3 consular officer at a post, or a specifically designated alternate, shall review the case
4 without delay, record the review decision, and sign and date the prescribed form.”);
5 see also Mobayen, 780 F. Supp. 3d at 982. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have identified a
6 non-discretionary duty that Defendants allegedly failed to satisfy with regard to the
7 timely adjudication of Plaintiff Oskoui’s visa application.
8 B. Plaintiffs’ Claim is Not Barred by Consular Nonreviewability
9 Plaintiffs alleged that Plaintiff Oskoui’s visa application has not yet received a
10 final adjudication because it has been placed in administrative processing, where it
11 remains. (Opp’n at 6–8; see Compl. ¶ 32.) As discussed above, Defendants argue that
12 the consular officer’s refusal of the visa application was a final decision and thus is
13 subject to the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. As the Court has previously held
14 in other similar cases, the doctrine of consular nonreviewability is not applicable here.
15 See Alam v. Blinken, No. 2:24-cv-01103-DJC-CKD, 2024 WL 4804557, at *4–6 (E.D.
16 Cal. Nov. 15, 2024). As noted above, the refusal was not a final decision, and Plaintiff
17 does not seek review of that decision.
18 The doctrine of consular nonreviewability enshrines a “longstanding
19 jurisprudential principle that, ordinarily, a consular official’s decision to deny a visa to a
20 foreigner is not subject to judicial review.” Munoz v. U.S. Dep't of State, 50 F.4th 906,
21 909 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). For the doctrine to apply, a denial of a visa
22 application must have occurred. See, e.g., Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931–32 (9th
23 Cir. 1997) (“Normally a consular official’s discretionary decision to grant or deny a visa
24 petition is not subject to judicial review.” (citations omitted)). But the doctrine does
25 not apply where a plaintiff seeks a final decision on their visa application rather than
26 judicial review of a consular decision. Id. (“However, when the suit challenges the
27 authority of the consul to take or fail to take an action as opposed to a decision taken
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1 within the consul’s discretion, jurisdiction exists.” (citation omitted)); see also Abbassi
2 v. Gaudiosi, No. 1:23-cv-01573-CDB, 2024 WL 1995246, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2024).
3 As discussed, the consular’s decision was not final. (See supra Discussion, I.A.)
4 Plaintiffs are also express in their statement in the Complaint that they “do[] not seek
5 to have the Court determine the merits of Plaintiff’s applications, but only to compel
6 the State Department to follow its statutory and regulatory mandate to process their
7 applications to completion, either to a denial with reasons of denial or an issuance of a
8 visa.” (Compl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiffs’ claims are thus not barred by the doctrine of consular
9 nonreviewability. See Abbassi, 2024 WL 1995246, at *4.
10 C. The Delay in Reviewing Plaintiff’s Visa Application is Reasonable
11 “When there is no set deadline by which an agency must act, a court evaluates
12 whether the agency’s delay is unreasonable by applying the six factors established by
13 the D.C. Circuit in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC [“TRAC”] and
14 adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt[.]” Alaska Indus.
15 Dev. & Exp. Auth. V. Biden, 685 F. Supp. 3d 813, 857 (D. Alaska 2023) (citing 750 F.2d
16 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 105 F.3d 502, 507 (9th Cir. 1997)). The TRAC factors are:
17 (1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be
governed by a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has
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provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with
19 which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling
statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this
20
rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the
21 sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when
human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should
22 consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency
activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court
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should also take into account the nature and extent of the
24 interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not
find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in
25 order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.
26
In re Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 956 F.3d 1134, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting
27
TRAC, 750 F.2d at 79–80).
28
1 Plaintiffs suggest that the Court should abstain from analyzing the TRAC factors
2 at this point in the litigation. (Opp’n at 10.) Plaintiffs have not, however, identified
3 with any specificity what additional facts require further development. See Fed. R. Civ.
4 Proc. 56(d) (court may deny a motion if the nonmovant shows that they require
5 discovery to justify their opposition). Plaintiff also has not “proffer[ed] sufficient facts
6 to show that [some] evidence sought exists, and that it would prevent summary
7 judgment.” Kapoor v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-01961-BLF, 2022 WL 181217, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
8 Jan. 20, 2022) (quoting Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.6 (9th
9 Cir. 2001)). District courts in this circuit routinely decide immigration actions on
10 summary judgment without discovery. See, e.g., Ahmed v. United States Dep't of
11 State, No. 23-CV-02474-SVK, 2024 WL 315705, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2024)
12 (denying discovery to develop factual record as to reasonableness of two-year agency
13 delay); Ali v. Ordeman, No. 2:23-cv-02822-CKD, 2024 WL 2274912, at *12–18 (E.D.
14 Cal. May 17, 2024) (ruling on reasonableness of 14 month agency delay at dismissal
15 stage). But see Iqbal, 2023 WL 7418353, at *8 (declining to apply TRAC factors at
16 dismissal stage). As Plaintiffs have not demonstrated discovery is necessary or
17 warranted in this case, the Court will rule on Defendants’ Motion.
18 1. First TRAC Factor: Rule of Reason
19 When considering the TRAC factors, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he most
20 important is the first factor, the ‘rule of reason,’ though it, like the others, is not itself
21 determinative.” In re A Cmty. Voice, 878 F.3d 779, 786 (9th Cir. 2017). The gist of the
22 rule of reason inquiry is “whether there is any rhyme or reason for the Government’s
23 delay – in other words, whether the agency’s response time . . . is governed by an
24 identifiable rationale.” Poursohi v. Blinken, No. 21-CV-01960-TSH, 2021 WL 5331446,
25 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When the
26 alleged delay involves the processing of an immigrant visa application, district courts
27 have examined both the length of the delay and the reasons for the delay. See id. at
28 *4–7 (collecting cases). In the context of alleged delay involving visa application
1 processing, “[t]he delay is measured from the time that Plaintiffs attended their
2 interview, not the time that they first petitioned USCIS.” Ferdowski v. Blinken, No.
3 8:23-cv-01123-JWH-KES, 2024 WL 685912, at *4 & n.26 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2024).
4 Plaintiff Oskoui was interviewed by a consular officer on March 24, 2025, and
5 her visa application was refused for further administrative processing that same day.
6 (Compl. ¶ 32.) Thus, at the time of this order, Plaintiff’s application has been pending
7 for between twelve and thirteen months.2
8 This delay, however, falls far short of what has previously been considered
9 unreasonable in the immigration context. “Generally, courts have found ‘immigration
10 delays in excess of five, six, [and] seven years are unreasonable, while those between
11 three to five years are often not unreasonable.’” Ortiz v. United States Dep’t of State,
12 No. 1:22-cv-00508-AKB, 2023 WL 4407569, at *8 (D. Idaho July 7, 2023) (quoting
13 Arab v. Blinken, 600 F. Supp. 3d 59, 70 (D.D.C. 2022)); see also Dastagir v. Blinken,
14 557 F. Supp. 3d 160, 165 (D.D.C. 2021) (concluding 29-month delay not
15 unreasonable); Skalka v. Kelly, 246 F. Supp. 3d 147, 154 (D.D.C. 2017) (concluding “a
16 delay of [two years] does not typically require judicial intervention”); Islam v. Heinauer,
17 32 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (collecting cases and noting courts in that
18 district “have generally found delays of four years or less not to be unreasonable”).
19 The Court notes that there is a dearth of circuit law addressing what constitutes
20 unreasonable delay in the immigration context, particularly in the family-based
21 immigrant visa context. In addition, many of the district court cases that have found
22 delays of less than four years reasonable involve visa petitions where plaintiffs were in
23 the United States and not facing family separation, which is clearly distinguishable
24 from the context here. For example, in Motaghedi v. Pompeo, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1345
25 (E.D. Cal. 2020), the court surveyed unreasonable delay cases and concluded it was
26
2 Plaintiff notes the time that accrued prior to the interview. (Opp’n at 10–11.) The slow progression of
27 the application process as a whole is of substantial discomfort for Plaintiffs. But the Court’s analysis is
focused on the delay at issue here, which is the post-interview delay while the visa application remains
28 in administrative processing.
1 “not entirely convinced that the four-year guidepost suggested by these cases
2 involving I-485 petitions or I-526 investor visas (where plaintiffs were likely in the
3 United States and not facing family separation) is a direct comparison to what is
4 happening in this case, in which Plaintiffs have been waiting an average of 563 days
5 for waiver adjudications, whose families are enduring separation, and whose relatives
6 are living under the escalating threat of war.” Id. 1359–61. Similarly, this Court is not
7 convinced that Plaintiffs here must wait as long as five years to bring an unreasonable
8 delay claim. However, this Court has not found, nor have Plaintiffs pointed to, any
9 case in the immigration context where a delay of only thirteen months has been
10 deemed unreasonable. Thus, the Court cannot find that the length of delay alone is
11 unreasonable at this point. See Alam, 2024 WL 4804557 (finding an eighteen-month
12 delay was not unreasonable).
13 Accordingly, the first TRAC factor weighs in Defendants’ favor.
14 2. Second TRAC Factor: Congressional Timetable
15 “[W]here Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed
16 with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory
17 scheme may supply content for [the] rule of reason” analysis. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80.
18 Plaintiffs do not identify the source of any specific timetable in the Complaint or
19 Opposition. Without citation to any statute, Plaintiffs do reference a “180-day
20 guideline” (Opp’n at 11; see Compl. ¶¶ 4, 7), which Defendants interpret to be a
21 reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b). This section provides that “[i]t is the sense of
22 Congress that the processing of an immigration benefit application should be
23 completed not later than 180 days after the initial filing of the application . . . .” 8
24 U.S.C. § 1571(b). As Defendants note, the Ninth Circuit has held that similar “sense of
25 Congress” language is “’non-binding, legislative dicta’ which creates no obligations.”
26 Ali, 2024 WL 2274912, at *6 (quoting Yang v. Cal. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 183 F.3d 953,
27 961-62 (9th Cir. 1999)). On this basis, district courts have consistently rejected that
28 section 1571(b) creates a congressionally-mandated deadline. See Ali, 2024 WL
1 2274912, at *6; see also Aminzadeh v. Blinken, No. 2:24-cv-02025-DSF-MRW, 2024
2 WL 3811153, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2024); Iqbal v. Blinken, No. 2:23-cv-01299-KJM-
3 CSK, 2024 WL 3904959, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2024).
4 Although there is no mandated timeline, the court notes “a non-binding
5 deadline may still be an indication of the speed with which Congress expects the
6 agency to proceed.” Ramirez v. Blinken, 594 F. Supp. 3d 76, 94 (D.D.C. 2022)
7 (emphasis in original) (internal marks and citations omitted). Thus, while the 180-day
8 timeline may be aspirational, a substantial delay in excess of this goal runs counter to
9 Congressional expectations. Cf., e.g., Keller Wurtz v. U. S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.,
10 No. 20-2163, 2020 WL 4673949, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2020) (“USCIS is correct that
11 this timeline is not mandatory, but it nevertheless weighs in favor of finding the delay
12 here—approximately four times Congress’s stated goal—to be unreasonable.”).
13 However, because Congress has not yet imposed a mandatory timeline and the
14 delay otherwise comports with the rule of reason, the second TRAC factor is neutral
15 based on this record.3 See Jain v. Renaud, No. 21-CV-03115-VKD, 2021 WL 2458356,
16 at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2021) (second TRAC factor was neutral where Congress did
17 not mandate a timeline); see also Poursohi, 2021 WL 5331446, at *9 (“[G]iven the
18 absence of a mandatory timetable for adjudication of Plaintiffs’ Application combined
19 with the fact that the delay comports with the rule of reason, the second TRAC factor
20 also weighs in Defendant’s favor or is at least neutral.”).
21 3. Third and Fifth TRAC Factors: Nature of Interests
22 “The third and fifth factors overlap, requiring the court to consider whether
23 human health and welfare are at stake, and the nature and extent of the interests
24 prejudiced by the delay.” Poursohi, 2021 WL 5331446, at *9. Plaintiffs allege that the
25 delay has caused them “substantial economic loss and emotional hardship . . . .”
26
27 3 Defendants also argued that section 1571(b) “applies to the Immigration and Naturalization Services,
not the State Department.” (Reply at 7.) Given the Court’s determination that section 1571(b) does not
28 create a mandatory timeline, this argument is ultimately irrelevant and need not be addressed.
1 (Compl. ¶ 10.) In their Opposition, Plaintiffs note that “given the current war between
2 the United States and Iran, Plaintiff[ Oskoui] lives in constant fear and danger.” (Opp’n
3 at 12.) Plaintiffs also note the difficulties in communication and Plaintiff Oskoui’s
4 advanced age. (Id. at 12–13.)
5 The Court acknowledges the severe effect on an individual’s health and welfare
6 that separation from family can cause. See, e.g., R. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.,
7 No. 2:23-cv-05460 DDP-ASx, 2023 WL 9197564, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2023)
8 (concluding the third and fifth TRAC factors favored the plaintiff in light of “the
9 significant harm and emotional distress that family separation causes”); Ghadami v.
10 United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. CV 19-00397-ABJ, 2020 WL 1308376, at *9
11 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2020) (weighing third and fifth TRAC factors in favor of visa applicant
12 who alleged that he was “irrevocably harmed” by separation from his children and
13 wife). This effect is undoubtedly multiplied by the geopolitical conditions where
14 Plaintiff Oskoui presently resides.
15 Thus, the Court concludes the third and fifth TRAC factors favor Plaintiffs.
16 4. Fourth TRAC Factor: Effect of Expediting Delayed Action
17 Under the fourth TRAC factor, the Court considers the effect of expediting the
18 adjudication of the plaintiff's applications on other agency action of a higher or
19 competing priority. Kapoor, No. 2022 WL 181217, at *8. “Most courts have found that
20 the fourth TRAC factor weighs heavily in the agency’s favor when a judicial order
21 putting plaintiffs at the head of the line would simply move all others back one space
22 and produce no net gain.” Jain, 2021 WL 2458356, at *6.
23 Plaintiffs ask the Court to order that Defendants process Plaintiff Oskoui’s visa
24 application. (See Compl. at 8.) However, “Plaintiffs make no showing that would
25 justify moving them to the head of the queue, or why their petitions should be
26 processed immediately while other similarly-situated petitioners wait their turn.” Jain,
27 2021 WL 2458356, at *6. The effect of expediting Plaintiffs’ application undoubtedly
28 favors the Defendants, as expediting Plaintiff S. Oskoui’s application would result in no
1 net gain in the backlog while disadvantaging visa applicants of higher priority or of
2 the same priority but whose applications have been pending longer. Poursohi, 2021
3 WL 5331446, at *11; see also Throw v. Mayorkas, No. 3:22-CV-05699-DGE, 2023 WL
4 2787222, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 2023) (noting many families face delays and
5 ordering the State Department to schedule the beneficiary plaintiff’s interview would
6 not ameliorate the situation).
7 Plaintiffs argue that they are not asking to be prioritized over others and instead
8 “are asking this Court to compel completion of a nondiscretionary duty to render a
9 final adjudication that Defendants have already undertaken.” (Opp’n at 11.) But this
10 appears to be a distinction without a difference. Granting relief and ordering
11 Defendants to adjudicate Plaintiff Oskoui’s application would necessarily push others
12 further back in the process. See Aghchay v. U.S. Dep't of State, No. 22-cv-5708-PA-
13 PVC, 2022 WL 19569516, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2022) (“Granting the relief Plaintiff
14 seeks would simply push others, some of whom may not have the resources to
15 commence litigation, further back in the process.” (cleaned up)); see also Ahmed v.
16 Bitter, No. 4:22-cv-02474, 2024 WL 1340255, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2024)
17 (“[E]xpediting any putative delayed action on Plaintiff’s application will affect other
18 agency priorities, while sending other applicants, whom the Government is entitled to
19 prioritize for foreign policy and other reasons, to the back of the line.”)
20 The fourth TRAC factor weighs in favor of Defendants.
21 5. Sixth TRAC Factor: Impropriety
22 The sixth TRAC factor is “not really a ‘factor,’ but merely a confirmation that
23 agency delay need not be intentional to be unreasonable.” Feng v. Beers, No. 2:13-
24 CV-02396-JAM, 2014 WL 1028371, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2014). If a plaintiff does
25 not allege bad faith, courts should either ignore this factor or hold that it slightly favors
26 the government without “excus[ing] unreasonable delay.” Id.
27 Plaintiffs assert that “the absence of any meaningful progress or communication
28 not prompted by Plaintiffs suggest at minimum a lack of diligence and inefficiency that
1 supports a claim for agency impropriety.” (Opp’n at 12.) However, this factor does
2 not concern the length or nature of the delay or whether Defendants have provided
3 adequate communication during the delay, but whether the delay is improper. The
4 Complaint does not plausibly allege that the delay is intentional or the result of
5 impropriety on the part of Defendants. See Sawahreh, 630 F. Supp. 3d at 164.
6 The Court finds no lurking impropriety, and therefore concludes that the sixth
7 TRAC factor favors neither party.
8 6. Weighing the TRAC Factors
9 The Court finds that the first and fourth TRAC factors weigh against granting
10 Plaintiffs’ requested relief, while the third and fifth factors weigh in favor of granting
11 Plaintiffs’ request. However, in evaluating the TRAC factors, “courts routinely afford
12 the most weight” to the first and fourth factors. Poursohi, 2021 WL 5331446, at *11.
13 The Court finds that the overall balance favors Defendants as factor one, which
14 is the most important factor, weighs heavily in their favor. In re A Cmty. Voice, 878
15 F.3d at 786. While the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiffs’ situation and unique
16 hardships that Plaintiffs face, the weight of caselaw dictates that the thirteen-month
17 delay in adjudicating Plaintiff Oskoui’s visa application is not unreasonable. Further,
18 Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the existence of any disputed material facts that
19 would preclude summary judgment.
20 Although the Court can foresee a point at which the delay in ruling on Plaintiffs’
21 visa application would be unreasonable, based on the existing record, that time has
22 not yet come. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to
23 summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ APA claim for unreasonable delay.
24 II. Plaintiffs’ Mandamus Act Claim
25 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that relief sought under the Mandamus Act
26 and the APA is “essentially the same.” Indep. Mining Co., 105 F.3d at 507. Thus,
27 “when a complaint seeks relief under the Mandamus Act and the APA and there is an
28 adequate remedy under the APA, [the Court] may elect to analyze the APA claim
1 only.” Vaz v. Neal, 33 F.4th 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2022). “If Plaintiffs’ APA claim fails,
2 their claim under the Mandamus Act fails as well.” Infracost Inc. v. Blinken, 732 F.
3 Supp. 3d 1240, 1251–52 (S.D. Cal. 2024).
4 As Plaintiffs seek relief under the APA as well as the Mandamus Act, the Court
5 need not separately analyze Plaintiffs’ Mandamus Act claim. See, e.g., Shahijani, 2023
6 WL 6889774, at *2 (“Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks identical relief under the APA
7 and the Mandamus Act, courts routinely elect to analyze both claims under the APA
8 only.”). Because the Court grants summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ APA claim, the
9 Court grants summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Mandamus Act claim.
10 III. Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Due Process Claim
11 In the Complaint, Plaintiffs mention in a single paragraph that they have “been
12 denied due process of law under the terms of the Fifth Amendment to the United
13 States Constitution . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 50.) Defendants interpret this to mean that
14 Plaintiffs are asserting a due process claim and seek dismissal of that claim. (See Mot.
15 at 2.) However, Plaintiffs’ Opposition does not assert that they are pursuing a due
16 process claim and does not mention due process at any point. (See Opp’n.) Thus, it
17 does not appear that Plaintiffs are actually pursuing a due process claim under the
18 Fifth Amendment.
19 Even if Plaintiffs were pursuing a Due Process claim, that claim would be
20 foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Department of State v. Munoz,
21 144 S. Ct. 1812 (2024), wherein the Supreme Court held that “a citizen does not have
22 a fundamental liberty interest in [their] noncitizen spouse being admitted to the
23 country.” Id. at 1821. Consistent with that decision and to the extent Plaintiffs did
24 intend to assert a due process claim, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have failed to
25 plausibly allege a deprivation of a fundamental liberty interest. Thus, even if Plaintiffs
26 did bring a due process claim, the Court would grant summary judgment in
27 Defendants’ favor.
28 ////
1 CONCLUSION
2 In accordance with the above, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion
3 | for Dismissal and Summary Judgment (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED. The Court finds that
4 | Defendants are entitled to judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims. The Clerk of Court is
5 | directed to enter judgment in Defendants’ favor.
6
j IT 1S SO ORDERED.
8 | Dated: _ April 16, 2026 “Daniel CoD tto—
Hon. Daniel □□ |. Cod
? UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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