The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 WANJING YU, No. 1:25-cv-2040 DJC AC
12 Petitioner,
13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
14 KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
15 Respondents.
16
17 Petitioner, an immigration detainee proceeding through counsel, has filed a petition for a
18 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
19 I. Factual Background
20 Petitioner was admitted to the United States as a non-immigrant visitor on October 5,
21 2019, with authorization to remain in the country until April 4, 2020. ECF No. 6-1 at 1; ECF No.
22 12 at 3; ECF No. 13 at 1. On August 23, 2025, petitioner was arrested for an alleged violation of
23 California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm. ECF No.
24 6-1 at 1-2; ECF No. 12 at 3. The county district attorney’s office declined to prosecute, and
25 petitioner was never charged. ECF No. 12 at 3; ECF No. 13 at 2. On November 15, 2025,
26 petitioner was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ECF No. 13 at 1.
27 Petitioner was scheduled to have a custody redetermination hearing on December 5, 2025,
28 but records indicate that the hearing did not occur because she had been transferred to a different
1 facility. Id. at 2. On January 7, 2026, petitioner had her first custody redetermination hearing and
2 the immigration judge denied bond, finding petitioner to be a danger to the community based on
3 her arrest for violating Penal Code § 245(a)(1). ECF No. 12 at 4; ECF No. 13 at 2. Petitioner did
4 not appeal the decision but appears to have attempted to file a motion for reconsideration, which
5 was rejected on February 18, 2026, because it was improperly filed. ECF No. 13 at 2; ECF No.
6 13-1 at 1. On February 24, 2026,1 petitioner received a second custody redetermination hearing.
7 ECF No. 13 at 2; ECF No. 13-1 at 2. Although petitioner appears to argue that the immigration
8 judge again denied bond based on a finding of dangerousness (ECF No. 12 at 3), the order
9 submitted by respondents indicates that bond was instead denied on the ground that petitioner was
10 “a flight risk such that no amount of bond or conditions would secure her future Court
11 appearances” (ECF No. 13-1 at 2). It is unclear whether petitioner filed an appeal. See ECF No.
12 13 at 2 (stating that petitioner had not yet filed an appeal but the time to do so had not yet
13 expired).
14 II. Procedural History
15 On December 24, 2025, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
16 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging her detention by the DHS. ECF No. 1. Respondents moved to dismiss
17 the petition (ECF No. 6), which petitioner opposed (ECF No. 9). Because petitioner raised claims
18 in her opposition to the motion to dismiss which had not been raised in the petition, she was
19 directed to file an amended petition if she wanted those claims considered. ECF No. 11. On
20 February 27, 2026, petitioner filed a first amended petition setting out completely different claims
21 from those set forth in the original petition. Compare ECF No. 1 with ECF No. 12.
22 The amended petition asserts that (1) petitioner’s detention is unlawful under § 2241
23 because her arrest does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness; (2) the
24
1 Petitioner states that the immigration judge denied her motion to reconsider bond on January
25
24, 2026, after she submitted evidence that criminal charges were not being filed. ECF No. 12 at
26 3. However, petitioner does not provide a copy of any order from January 24, 2026, and the date
appears to be a typographical error. It appears that petitioner is likely referring to the immigration
27 judge’s February 24, 2026 order, as the letter submitted as evidence is dated February 19, 2026
(id. at 8) and petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, submitted by respondents, is dated February
28 17, 2026 (ECF No. 13-1 at 5-11).
1 immigration judge’s reliance on the arrest violates procedural due process because petitioner was
2 never charged and there was no reliable evidence of dangerousness; (3) petitioner’s detention
3 violates substantive due process because her continued detention based on unsupported
4 allegations is punitive; and (4) petitioner’s continued detention based on an arrest that did not
5 result in criminal charges is arbitrary and capricious. ECF No. 12 at 5-6. Respondent has moved
6 to dismiss the petition on the grounds that petitioner has not named a proper respondent and she
7 has not exhausted her administrative remedies. ECF No. 13. In her opposition, petitioner accuses
8 respondents of “procedural nitpicking and inflammatory rhetoric” and argues that she has been
9 detained for over six months despite the fact that there is no evidence of wrongdoing. ECF No.
10 14. Petitioner further reiterates her arguments regarding the sufficiency of the first bond hearing
11 and argues that the denial of bond at her second hearing was arbitrary and capricious and any
12 claim she is a flight risk is wholly speculative. Id. at 3-4. Petitioner also argues that exhaustion
13 should be excused because it would be inadequate or futile because she has already been detained
14 over six months based on an arrest that did not result in charges, the denial of bond was based on
15 that arrest, and the second denial of bond based on “arbitrary reasoning regarding sponsorship.”
16 Id. at 5. She also asserts that requiring her “to pursue additional administrative procedures while
17 she remains incarcerated would only prolong an already unjust detention.” Id. Petitioner has also
18 filed multiple requests for expedited review. ECF Nos. 9, 15, 16.
19 III. Legal Standard
20 A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to anyone who is held in custody in violation of
21 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Magana-Pizano
22 v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1999) (“28 U.S.C. § 2241 expressly permits the federal
23 courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens when those aliens are ‘in custody in violation of
24 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” (citations omitted)). In federal habeas
25 proceedings, the petitioner is required to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence.
26 Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004).
27 ////
28 ////
1 IV. Discussion
2 The parties are in agreement that petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and that
3 she has already had two bond hearings. If an individual is “dissatisfied with the IJ’s bond
4 determination, they may file an administrative appeal so that ‘the necessity of detention can be
5 reviewed by . . . the BIA.’” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)
6 (alteration in original) (quoting Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2008)).
7 The threshold issue, therefore, is whether petitioner should be required to exhaust her
8 administrative remedies by appealing the adverse bond determination to the Board of
9 Immigration Appeals (BIA) before seeking habeas review in this court.
10 “The exhaustion requirement is prudential, rather than jurisdictional, for habeas claims.”
11 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196,
12 1203 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011)).
13 Courts may require prudential exhaustion if “(1) agency expertise
makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record
14 and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the requirement would
encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and
15 (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its
own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.”
16
17 Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335
18 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). “When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a
19 district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the
20 proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is excused.”
21 Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160. Exhaustion can be excused where “pursuit of administrative
22 remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative
23 proceedings would be void.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting
24 SEC v. G.C. George Sec., Inc., 637 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1981)).
25 In considering the Puga factors, while the undersigned finds that agency expertise is not
26 necessarily required to reach a proper decision, relaxing the exhaustion requirement would
27 encourage bypassing administrative remedies, and there is no indication in the record that the
28 agency would be unlikely to correct its own mistakes in the present circumstances. See Resendiz
1 v. Holder, No. 12-cv-4850 WHA, 2012 WL 5451162, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2012) (“Allowing
2 those who argue procedural errors in their custody or bond determinations to bypass the
3 administrative process would disrupt the agency’s autonomy and result in unnecessary judicial
4 review of unexhausted claims.”); Aden v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv-1441 RSL, 2019 WL 5802013, at
5 *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7. 2019) (“[T]he BIA is capable of re-assessing the evidence and
6 determining whether the government has carried its burden of demonstrating by clear and
7 convincing evidence that Mr. Aden is a current danger and must be detained.” (citing Morgan v.
8 Gonzales, 495 F.3d 1084, 1090 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007))). The factors in this case weigh in favor of
9 requiring exhaustion. The undersigned finds that, like the noncitizen in Leonardo, petitioner is
10 seeking “habeas review of the IJ’s adverse bond determination before appealing to the BIA,” and
11 “[t]his shortcut [is] improper.” 646 F.3d at 1160.
12 To the extent petitioner argues that exhaustion should be excused because it would be
13 inadequate or futile (ECF No. 14 at 5), she fails to make a showing that any exception to the
14 exhaustion requirement is justified. Petitioner relies on her current detention and the IJ’s bond
15 denials but does not explain how they render an appeal to the BIA inadequate or futile. To the
16 extent she argues that she would suffer irreparable injury because having to appeal to the BIA
17 will prolong her detention, the same could be said for any individual appealing a bond denial, and
18 excusing exhaustion on that basis would cause the exception to swallow the rule.
19 The undersigned finds that exhaustion of administrative remedies is required in this case
20 and that petitioner has failed to establish any valid exception to the exhaustion requirement.
21 CONCLUSION
22 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner’s motions for expedited review
23 (ECF Nos. 9, 15, 16) are GRANTED to the extent findings and recommendations have now been
24 issued.
25 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that:
26 1. The amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 12) be DENIED without
27 prejudice; and
28 2. The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case.
] These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
2 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The undersigned finds
3 || that a shortened objection period is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as
4 || well as the fact that the parties have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written
5 || briefs. See United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that
6 || 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local
7 || Rule 304(b). Within seven days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any
8 | party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. The parties are
9 || advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the
10 || District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
11 | DATED: April 16, 2026 ~
12 Hhthtin— Clare
ALLISON CLAIRE
13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28