The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 GERMAN GEOVANNY PINTO-NUNEZ, No.: 2:26-cv-00969-KES-CDB
12 Plaintiff, ORDER STAYING ACTION PENDING
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL AND
13 v. DIRECTING RESPONDENTS TO FILE
STATUS REPORT (A-Number 221 489 588)
14 WARDEN, et al.,
(Doc. 8)
15 Defendants.
April 30, 2026, DEADLINE
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18 Petitioner German Geovanny Pinto-Nunez initiated this action with the filing of petition for
19 writ of habeas corpus on March 18, 2026, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 while in custody of
20 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the California City Correctional Center. (Doc.
21 1). That same day, Petitioner filed a motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (Doc. 2).
22 Respondents are the unnamed Warden of the California City Correctional Center; the unnamed
23 Field Office Director, San Diego ICE Field Office; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of ICE;
24 Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); and Todd
25 Blanche, Acting United States Attorney General.1 See id.
26 The Court directed Respondents to file a response to the TRO. (Doc. 5). On March 25,
27 2026, Respondents filed their combined opposition to the TRO and motion to dismiss the petition.
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1 (Doc. 6). On April 14, 2026, the assigned district judge denied Petitioner’s motion for TRO and
2 referred the action to the undersigned for further proceedings. (Doc. 8).
3 Legal Standard
4 The power to stay proceedings is “incidental to the power inherent in every court to control
5 the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel,
6 and litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936); accord CMAX v. Hall, 300 F.2d
7 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). “Courts have the power to consider stays sua sponte.” Ali v. Trump, 241
8 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1152 (W.D. Wash. 2017); see Ward v. Batra, No. 1:21-cv-00929-SKO (PC),
9 2025 WL 3120243, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2025) (same).
10 “On habeas review under § 2241, exhaustion is a prudential rather than jurisdictional
11 requirement.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011). A court may waive the
12 exhaustion requirement after evaluating whether: “(1) agency expertise makes agency
13 consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of
14 the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3)
15 administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the
16 need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007). “When a petitioner
17 does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the
18 petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies,
19 unless exhaustion is excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011).
20 Discussion
21 The undersigned incorporates herein the Court’s findings in its order denying Petitioner’s
22 motion for temporary restraining order. See (Doc. 8). In denying the motion, the assigned district
23 judge noted that Petitioner received a hearing where the immigration judge (“IJ”) denied bond after
24 finding that Petitioner was a flight risk and, thereafter, Petitioner appealed the immigration judge’s
25 order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). See id. (citing Docs. 6-1, 6-2, 6-3). The Court
26 explained that a “noncitizen dissatisfied with the IJ’s bond determination must ordinarily file an
27 administrative appeal so that the necessity of detention can be reviewed by… the BIA. If petitioner
28 remain[s] dissatisfied after the BIA rules on his appeal, then he may file a petition for habeas corpus
1 in the district court. When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative remedies, a district court
2 ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the
3 petitioner has exhausted remedies[.]” Id. (citing Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160, & Hernandez v.
4 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017)) (internal citations and quotations omitted; alterations
5 in original).
6 Here, the record shows that Petitioner’s appeal remains pending before the BIA. See (Doc.
7 6-3). A review of the Executive Office of Immigration Review’s (“EOIR”) Automated Case
8 Information database evidences a hearing set for April 23, 2026, before an immigration judge.2 The
9 undersigned finds that analysis of the Puga factors does not support waiver of the exhaustion
10 requirement, as relaxation of the requirement may encourage bypass of the administrative scheme
11 and administrative review may allow correction of mistakes and generation of a proper record, as
12 well as preclude the need for judicial review. See Nagiyev v. Warden, Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No.
13 25-cv-3744 JLS (MMP), 2026 WL 945965, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2026) (evaluating Puga factors
14 and determining that, though Petitioner presented “some compelling statistics, the Court is not
15 prepared to find that appeal to any BIA judge is necessarily futile”).
16 Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that a stay is appropriate to allow the BIA to rule
17 on the pending appeal. See Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160. The undersigned will direct the
18 Respondents to file a status report regarding the results of the appeal.
19 Conclusion and Order
20 For the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED:
21 1. This action is STAYED pending the completion of Petitioner’s appeal before the BIA
22 regarding denial of release on bond; and
23 ///
24 ///
25 ///
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2 See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited Apr. 15, 2026, using Petitioner’s
27 A-Number and nationality); Daniels-Hall v. National Edu. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“It is appropriate to take judicial notice of this information, as it was made publicly available by
28 government entities ... and neither party disputes the authenticity of the web sites or the accuracy of the
] 2. Respondents SHALL FILE a status report addressing the status of the appeal no later
2 than April 30, 2026.
3 | ITIS SOORDERED.
| Dated: _ April 16, 2026 | hrnnrD bo
5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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